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Abstract.	   With	   the	   radicalisation	   of	   the	   ‘War	   on	   Terror’	   and	   the	   chaos	  following	   the	  2003	   Iraq	  War,	   the	   concept	  of	   ‘risk’	   emerged	  as	   central	   to	   a	  wide-­‐ranging	  set	  of	  claims	  about	  the	  extent	  and	  significance	  of	  the	  changed	  post-­‐Cold	   War	   strategic	   environment	   and	   its	   impact	   on	   policy-­‐making.	  International	   Relations	   (IR)	   scholars	   argued	   that	   ‘risk’	   and	   ‘risk	  management’	   defined	   foreign	   policy-­‐making,	   with	   the	   US	   as	   the	   principal	  exemplar	   of	   such	   a	   change.	   The	   thesis	   explores	   the	   two,	   sociologically	  rooted,	   accounts	   of	   risk	   that	   underpin	   this	   literature	   –	   indebted	   to	   Ulrich	  Beck	  and	  Michel	  Foucault	   respectively	  –	   to	   identify	   the	  deeply	   contrasting	  and	   contradictory	   conceptualisations	   of	   risk	   they	   produce.	   Returning	   to	  some	   classic,	   and	   badly	   neglected,	   writing	   on	   risk	   and	   highlighting	   an	  alternative	   account	   originally	   developed	   by	   John	   Graham	   and	   Jonathan	  Wiener,	  the	  thesis	  establishes	  Presidential	  decision-­‐making	  in	  foreign	  policy	  as	   a	   series	   of	   ‘risk	   versus	   risk	   trade-­‐offs.’	   This	   framework	   focuses	   on	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   risk	   operates	   simultaneously	   in	   different	   environments	   via	  concepts	   of	   ‘political	   risks’	   focusing	   on	   the	   domestic	   environment	   and	  ‘strategic	   risks’	   focusing	   on	   the	   international	   dimension.	   The	   concept	   of	  trade-­‐off	  elucidates	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  actions	  aimed	  at	  countering	  a	  ‘target	  risk’	  frequently	  produce	  ‘countervailing	  risks’	  of	  their	  own.	  	  Using	   this	   approach,	   the	   thesis	   assesses	   the	  build-­‐up	   to	   three	   crises	   in	  US	  foreign	  policy;	  two	  from	  the	  Cold	  War	  (the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis,	  and	  the	  Iran	  hostage	   crisis)	   and	   one	   from	   the	   post-­‐Cold	   War	   period	   (the	   road	   to	  Srebrenica).	   The	   case	   studies,	   based	   on	   archival	   research	   and	   interviews,	  effectively	  challenge	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  represented	  the	  onset	   of	   an	   era	   of	   foreign	   policy-­‐making	   as	   risk	  management,	   by	   showing	  how	   the	   Kennedy	   and	   Carter	   administrations	   engaged	   in	   policy-­‐making	  practices	  and	  processes	  that	  are	  not	  markedly	  dissimilar	  from	  Clinton’s.	   In	  addition,	   the	  case	  studies	  enrich	   the	   ‘risk	   literature’	  and	  demonstrate	  how	  the	   analysis	   of	   crises	   can	   be	   advanced	   by	   understanding	   the	   moment	   of	  crisis	  as	  the	  culmination	  of	  a	  series	  of	  neglected	  ‘countervailing	  risks.’	  More	  generally,	  the	  thesis	  points	  to	  the	  initial	  validity	  of	  an	  approach	  that	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  diverse	  issues	  in	  foreign	  policy-­‐making.	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CHAPTER	  1:	  INTRODUCTION	  
1.1	  MAIN	  ARGUMENT	  OF	  THE	  THESIS	  	  
Students	  and	  practitioners	  of	  international	  politics	  are	  at	  present	  in	  a	  
strange	  predicament.	  Complex	  though	  their	  problems	  have	  been	  in	  the	  
past,	  there	  was	  then	  at	  least	  some	  certainty	  about	  the	  “givens,”	  the	  basic	  
structure	  and	  the	  basic	  phenomena	  of	  international	  relations.1	  John	  Herz,	  1957.	  	  With	   the	   radicalisation	  of	   the	   ‘War	  on	  Terror’	   and	   the	  chaos	   following	   the	  2003	  Iraq	  War,	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘risk’	  emerged	  as	  central	  to	  a	  wide-­‐ranging	  set	  of	   claims	   about	   the	   extent	   and	   significance	   of	   the	   changed	   strategic	  environment	   and	   its	   impact	   on	   policy-­‐making.	   Leading	   International	  Relations	   (IR)	   scholars	   argued	   that	   ‘risk’	   and	   ‘risk	   management’	   defined	  foreign	   policy-­‐making,	   with	   the	   US	   as	   the	   principal	   exemplar	   of	   such	   a	  change.	   More	   specifically,	   two	   rich	   and	   diverse	   bodies	   of	   literature	  developed:	  one	   inspired	  by	   the	  German	  sociologist	  Ulrich	  Beck’s	   theory	  of	  the	   ‘risk	   society,’	   the	   other	   inspired	   by	   the	   French	   philosopher	   Michel	  Foucault’s	  work	  on	  security.	  The	   thesis	  starts	  with	  an	  exploration	  of	   these	  sociologically	   rooted	   accounts.	   It	   argues	   that,	   although	   starting	   from	  different	   perspectives	   and	   drawing	   on	   different	   authors,	   both	   schools	  assume	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  radical	  break,	  a	  historical	  divide,	  between	  an	  era	  of	   certainty,	   generally	   identified	   with	   the	   Cold	   War,	   and	   an	   era	   of	  uncertainty	   and	   risk	   identified	  mainly	  with	   the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world.	  This	  thesis	  is,	  above	  all,	  an	  effort	  to	  evaluate	  the	  propositions	  that	  support	  these	  interpretations.	  	  	  The	   thesis,	   however,	   also	   acknowledges	   that	   the	   deeply	   contrasting	   and	  contradictory	  conceptualisations	  of	  risk	  these	  scholarships	  produce	  make	  a	  direct	   evaluation	   of	   these	   propositions	   impossible.	   Equally	   unclear	   is	   the	  interpretation	   of	   risk	   and	   of	   the	   role	   of	   risk	   in	   foreign	  policy	   provided	  by	  studies	  in	  ‘decision	  theory.’	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  thesis	  is	  also	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  risk	  literature,	  establishing	  a	  clear	  and	  viable	  connection	  between	  risk	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  John	  Herz,	  ‘Rise	  and	  Demise	  of	  the	  territorial	  state,’	  World	  Politics,	  Vol.	  9,	  No.	  4	  (July	  1957),	  p.	  473.	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and	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making.	   Returning	   to	   some	   classic,	   and	   badly	  neglected,	  writing	  on	  risk	  and	  highlighting	  an	  account	  originally	  developed	  by	   John	   Graham	   and	   Jonathan	  Wiener,	   the	   thesis	   establishes	   Presidential	  decision-­‐making	   in	  US	   foreign	  policy	  as	  a	  series	  of	   ‘risk	  vs.	  risk	   trade-­‐offs.’	  This	  alternative	  offers	  a	  number	  of	  crucial	  advantages	  to	  either	  the	  Beck	  or	  Foucault-­‐derived	  approaches.	  First,	   it	  suggests	   the	  relevance	  of	  risk	  and	  of	  practices	  of	  risk	  management	  in	  US	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making.	  Second,	  it	  establishes	  a	  framework	  of	  analysis	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  risk	  operates	  simultaneously	  in	  different	  environments	  via	  concepts	  of	  ‘political	  risks’	   -­‐	   focusing	   on	   the	   domestic	   environment	   -­‐	   and	   ‘strategic	   risks’	   -­‐	  focusing	  on	  the	  international	  dimension.	  Third,	  it	  better	  conceptualises	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  actions	  aimed	  at	  countering	  a	  ‘target	  risk’	  frequently	  produce	  ‘countervailing	   risks’	   of	   their	   own.	   More	   generally,	   providing	   a	   clear	  interpretation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  risk	  in	  foreign	  policy,	  the	  ‘risk	  vs.	  risk	  trade-­‐off’	  framework	   enables	   a	   critical	   assessment	   of	   the	   claim	   that	   the	   end	   of	   the	  Cold	  War	  marked	   a	  moment	   of	   fundamental	   transformation	   in	   the	   policy-­‐making	  environment.	  	  	  Using	   this	   approach,	   the	   thesis	   assesses	   the	  build-­‐up	   to	   three	   crises	   in	  US	  foreign	  policy:	  two	  from	  the	  Cold	  War	  (the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis	  and	  the	  Iran	  hostage	   crisis)	   and	   one	   from	   the	   post-­‐Cold	   War	   period	   (the	   road	   to	  Srebrenica).	  Through	  this	  analysis	   the	  thesis	  contextualises	   the	  emergence	  of	   crises	   as	   culminations	   of	   a	   series	   of	   neglected	   ‘countervailing’	   risks	  arising	   from	   efforts	   to	   tackle	   a	   ‘target’	   risk.	   The	   thesis	   shows	   how	   the	  Kennedy	   and	   Carter	   administrations	   engaged	   in	   policy-­‐making	   practices	  and	  processes	  that	  were	  not	  markedly	  dissimilar	  from	  those	  adopted	  by	  the	  Clinton	  Administration.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  reconceptualisation	  of	  risk	  and	  the	  study	   of	   crises	   help	   the	   thesis	   reach	   its	   original	   destination,	   suggesting	  continuity	   along	   the	   Cold	   War/Post-­‐Cold	   War	   divide,	   where	   previously	   a	  radical	  break	  seemed	  to	  predominate.	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1.2	  PLAN	  OF	  THE	  THESIS	  	  
Chapter	   2	   starts	   with	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   Beckian	   and	   Foucauldian	  literatures.	  This	  review	  deals	  with	  both	  the	  original	  works	  in	  sociology	  and	  with	   their	   ‘translations’	   in	   IR.	   	   The	   chapter	   identifies	   three	   main	  propositions	   supporting	   the	  existence	  of	  a	   radical	  break	   in	   the	  nature	  and	  practice	   of	   US	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making.	   First,	   the	   two	   scholarships	  position	  risk	  and	  uncertainty	  as	  radically	  new	  features	  of	  the	  international	  context.	   Second,	   both	   schools	   identify	   a	   change	   in	   the	   practice	   of	   foreign	  policy	   -­‐	   brought	   about	   by	   the	   rise	   of	   risk	   -­‐	   with	   a	   shift	   from	   long-­‐term	  strategies	   to	   short-­‐term	   practices	   of	   risk	   management.	   Third,	   the	   two	  schools	   provide	   extreme	   (albeit	   radically	   opposed)	   views	   of	   the	   role	   and	  possibilities	  of	  the	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐maker.	  At	  this	  stage,	  the	  chapter	  acknowledges	   that	   the	   effort	   to	   evaluate	   the	   strength	   and	   depth	   of	   these	  propositions	   is	   stymied	   by	   the	   weaknesses	   and	   contradictions	   in	   the	  conceptualisations	  of	  risk	  and	  uncertainty	  provided	  within	  these	  literatures.	  The	   thesis,	   then,	   starts	   the	   search	   for	   better	   understanding	   of	   these	  concepts.	   This	   search	   touches	   upon	   several	   interpretations	   provided	   in	  ‘decision	   theory.’	   In	   spite	   of	   the	   impressive	   richness	   of	   this	   literature,	   the	  chapter	   concludes	   with	   a	   ‘bleak’	   report	   card	   suggesting	   the	   need	   for	   a	  reconceptualisation	  of	  risk	  and	  uncertainty.	  	  	  
Chapter	   3	   provides	   this	   reconceptualisation.	   The	   chapter	   starts	   with	   a	  collection	  of	  hints	  regarding	  the	  role	  of	  risk	  and	  uncertainty,	  available	  in	  the	  foreign	  policy	  literature.	  As	  the	  analysis	  progresses,	  the	  focus	  shifts	  from	  the	  more	  general	  discussion	  of	  foreign	  policy,	  to	  a	  more	  specific	  interpretation	  of	  US	  Presidents	  and	  their	  role	  in	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making.	  This	  shift	  is	   made	   necessary	   by	   the	   focus	   on	   US	   foreign	   policy	   prevalent	   in	   both	  sociologically	  rooted	  analyses	  of	  risk	  and	  in	  the	  ‘decision	  theory’	  literature.	  Looking	  at	  the	  work	  of	  Thomas	  Schelling,	  Richard	  Neustadt,	  Alan	  Lamborn	  and	  Alexander	  George	  the	  chapter	  suggests	  that	  US	  Presidents	  are	  called	  to	  balance	  risks	  in	  the	  domestic	  context	  against	  risks	  in	  the	  international	  one.	  After	   this	   review,	   the	   second	   part	   of	   Chapter	   3	   provides	   operational	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definitions	  of	  risk,	  uncertainty,	  and	  risk	  management.	  Having	  specified	  what	  risk,	  uncertainty,	  and	  risk	  management	  mean,	  the	  definitional	  effort	  permits	  the	   re-­‐interpretation	   of	   Presidential	   decision-­‐making	   as	   a	   specific	   form	   of	  risk	  management.	  US	  Presidents,	   the	   chapter	   suggests	   confront	   a	   series	  of	  ‘risk	   vs.	   risk	   trade-­‐offs.’	   For	   each	   choice	   Presidents	   are	   called	   to	   balance	  domestic	  political	   risks	  against	   strategic	   international	   risks.	  The	  outcomes	  of	  this	  balancing	  act	  are	  affected	  by	  both	  the	  prevailing	  uncertainty	  and	  by	  the	   short-­‐termism	   of	   the	   choices	   made.	   Having	   provided	   this	  reinterpretation,	   the	   chapter	   identifies	   the	   emergence	   of	   foreign	   policy	  crises	  as	  representing	  an	  ideal	  context	  in	  which	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  balancing	  act	   can	   be	   explored.	   Section	   5	   of	   the	   chapter	   provides	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	  crisis	   literature	   and,	   building	   on	   recent	   scholarship,	   suggests	   a	   re-­‐interpretation	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  crisis	  in	  which	  risk	  and	  uncertainty	  play	  a	  key	  role.	  The	  chapter	  concludes	  with	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  three	  main	  research	  hypotheses	  that	  drive	  the	  thesis.	  	  	  The	  first	  hypothesis	  suggests	  that	  risk	  and	  uncertainty	  have	  always	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making.	  The	  second	  hypothesis	  suggests	  that	  the	  shift	  from	  a	  Cold	  War	  era	  of	  long-­‐term	  strategies	  to	  a	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  era	   of	   short-­‐termism	   and	   risk-­‐management	   might	   be	   overdrawn.	   The	  hypothesis	  assumes	  that	  Presidential	  decision-­‐making	  in	  foreign	  policy	  has	  always	   been	   a	  matter	   of	   risk	  management.	   The	   third	   hypothesis	   suggests	  that	   the	   outcome	   of	   this	   balancing	   act	   is	   a	   loss	   of	   control	   over	   both	   the	  international	  environment	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  one’s	  own	  action.	  	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  Chapter	  2	  identifies	  the	  main	  target	  of	  the	  research.	  Chapter	  
3	   identifies	   the	  nature	  of	   the	   inquiry	  and	   the	  context	   in	  which	   the	   inquiry	  will	  be	  conducted.	  Before	  proceeding	   towards	   the	  case	  studies,	  Chapter	   4	  provides	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   methodology	   and	   methods	   adopted	   by	   the	  thesis.	  The	  chapter	  discusses	  the	  interpretive	  character	  of	  the	  thesis	  and	  the	  connection	   between	   a	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making	   approach	   and	   the	  study	   of	   risk.	   The	   chapter	   also	   provides	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   case	   study	  approach	   and	   of	   the	   rationale	   behind	   the	   cases	   selected.	   The	   methods	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section	   discusses	   the	   type	   of	   research	   conducted,	   the	   documents	   and	  archives	  consulted,	  and	  the	  type	  of	  interviews	  carried	  out.	  	  Chapters	   5	   to	   8	   contain	   the	   case	   studies.	   The	   chapters	   have	   a	   similar	  structure.	  The	   inquiry	   focuses	  on	   the	   long	  pre-­‐crisis	   period	   as	   opposed	   to	  the	   crisis	  management	   phase	   on	  which	  most	   studies	   seem	   to	   concentrate.	  After	   a	   general	   introduction,	   each	   chapter	   discusses	   the	   historical	  background	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  and	  the	  level	  of	  knowledge	  available	  to	  the	  incoming	  Administration.	  The	  account,	  then,	  develops	  through	  an	  analysis	  of	  Presidential	  decision-­‐making.	  Each	  decision	  is	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘risk	  vs.	  risk	  trade-­‐offs.’	  The	  analysis	  identifies	  the	  level	  of	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  the	  issue,	  the	  risks	  Presidents	  managed	  with	  their	  decisions,	  and	  those	  they	  dismissed.	  The	  chapters	  conclude	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  crises.	  	  	  
Chapter	   5	   deals	   with	   the	   Kennedy	   Administration’s	   approach	   to	   Cuba.	   It	  discusses	  the	  uncertain	  position	  of	   the	  United	  States	   in	   the	   late	  1950s	  and	  the	   emergence	   of	   the	   issue	   of	   Cuba.	   It	   then	   follows	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	  ‘Cuban	   issue’	   from	   an	   electoral	   card	   played	   by	   John	   Kennedy	   as	   a	  Democratic	   Presidential	   candidate,	   to	   a	   thorn	   in	   the	   side	   of	   the	   Kennedy	  Administration.	  As	  the	  focus	  narrows	  onto	  the	  various	  trade-­‐offs	  confronted	  by	   President	   Kennedy,	   the	   chapter	   highlights	   the	   short-­‐termism	   and	  minimalism	   of	   the	   President’s	   decisions	   and	   the	   consequences	   of	   these	  measures	  for	  the	  Cold	  War	  confrontation.	  In	  this	  account,	  the	  missile	  crisis	  emerges	  as	  the	  by-­‐product	  of	  the	  accumulation	  of	  countervailing	  risks.	  	  	  
Chapter	  6	  deals	  with	  the	  Carter	  Administration’s	  approach	  to	  Iran.	  It	  opens	  with	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  position	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s,	  and	  of	   the	  Nixon	  and	  Ford	  Administrations’	  policies	   towards	   the	  Shah	  and	  Iran.	   The	   chapter,	   then,	   moves	   to	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   risk	   trade-­‐offs	  confronted	  by	  President	  Carter	  as	  he	  took	  office.	  The	  chapter	  discusses	  how	  the	   relations	   with	   the	   Shah	   threatened	   key	   commitments	   of	   the	   Carter	  Administration	  including	  the	  promotion	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  a	  reduction	  in	  arms	   sales.	   With	   Iran	   in	   turmoil,	   the	   chapter	   follows	   the	   Administration	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attempts	   to	   come	   to	   grips	   with	   the	   Revolution.	   In	   particular,	   the	   chapter	  identifies	  the	  short-­‐termism	  of	  the	  policies	  adopted	  by	  the	  White	  House,	  the	  stubbornness	   in	   ‘sticking	  with	   the	  Shah,’	   the	  unwillingness	   to	   chart	   a	  new	  course,	   the	   inability	   and	   unwillingness	   to	   open	   to	   the	   opposition,	   the	  President’s	   illusion	   of	   neutrality	   in	   the	   confrontation	   between	   opposition	  and	  the	  Shah,	  and	  the	  US	  restraint	  in	  opening	  to	  the	  new	  government.	  In	  this	  account,	   the	   admission	   of	   the	   Shah	   and	   the	   taking	   of	   the	   hostages	  represented	  only	  the	  proverbial	  last	  straw	  on	  the	  camel’s	  back.	  	  	  
Chapter	  7	  starts	  with	  the	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush	  Administration’s	  attempt	  to	  set	  a	  new	  course	  for	  the	  United	  States	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  with	  its	  efforts	   to	   set	   clear	   guidelines	   for	   the	   use	   of	   American	   power	   in	   the	   new	  international	   context.	   After	   this	   overview,	   the	   chapter	   moves	   towards	   a	  study	  of	   the	  Balkan	  wars,	   and	  of	  Bosnia.	  Bosnia,	   not	  unlike	  Cuba,	   features	  first	  as	  a	  ‘card’	  played	  by	  a	  Democratic	  Presidential	  candidate	  to	  tarnish	  the	  foreign	  policy	  reputation	  of	  the	  incumbent	  Republican	  Administration.	  The	  chapter	  then	  follows	  the	  incoming	  Clinton	  Administration’s	  inability	  to	  set	  a	  clear	  course	  on	  Bosnia.	  Focusing	  on	  what	  is	  generally	  considered	  the	  ‘Bosnia	  containment’	  phase	  the	  chapter	  exposes	  the	  uncertainty	  and	  risks	  inherent	  in	   the	   confrontation	   in	   the	   Balkans.	   The	   various	   trade-­‐offs	   identify	   the	  Administration’s	   inability	   to	   manage	   contrasting	   risks	   coming	   from	  domestic	   pressure,	   strategic	   concerns,	   and	   relations	   with	   other	   great	  powers.	   Clinton’s	   minimalism	   and	   his	   tendency	   to	   adopt	   short-­‐term	  measures	  to	  placate	  domestic	  criticism	  -­‐	  with	  little	  regard	  for	  international	  consequences	   -­‐	   finally	   come	   back	   to	   haunt	   him	   with	   the	   escalation	   of	  violence	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1995.	  	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  case	  studies,	  Chapter	  8	  provides	  a	  conclusion	  to	  the	  thesis.	  The	   Chapter	   reflects	   on	   the	   research	   journey.	   First,	   it	   evaluates	   the	  performance	  of	  the	  research	  hypotheses	  in	  the	  case	  studies.	  In	  doing	  this,	  it	  suggests	   continuities	   in	   the	  practices	  of	  US	   foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making	  along	   the	   Cold	  War/Post-­‐Cold	  War	   divide.	   Second,	   the	   chapter	   provides	   a	  discussion	  of	  the	  main	  contribution	  to	  the	  research.	  The	  chapter	  concludes	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with	   a	   section	   on	   the	   possible	   objections	   to	   the	   thesis	   and	   with	   a	   brief	  overview	  of	  possible	  new	  avenues	  of	  research.	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CHAPTER	  2:	  RISK	  IN	  INTERNATIONAL	  RELATIONS	  
2.1	  INTRODUCTION	  
	  
Don't	  you	  understand,	  what	  I'm	  trying	  to	  say?	  	  
Can't	  you	  see	  the	  fear	  that	  I'm	  feeling	  today?	  	  
If	  the	  button	  is	  pushed,	  there's	  no	  running	  away,	  	  
There'll	  be	  no	  one	  to	  save	  with	  the	  world	  in	  a	  grave,	  	  
take	  a	  look	  around	  you,	  boy,	  it's	  bound	  to	  scare	  you,	  boy.1	  Barry	  McGuire,	  Eve	  of	  Destruction	  
	  In	   1992,	   a	   report	   from	   the	   Royal	   Society	   stated	   that	   risk	   had	   become	  ‘ubiquitous.’2	  If,	   at	   the	   time,	   the	   statement	   appeared	   excessive,	   today	   it	   is	  almost	   an	   understatement.	   Although	   risk	   has	   a	   long	   story,3	  the	   explicit	  definition	   of	  more	   and	  more	   aspects	   of	   life	   in	   terms	   of	   risk	   is	   a	   relatively	  new	  phenomenon.	  A	  Nexis	  search	  for	  UK	  newspaper	  articles	  containing	  the	  word	   ‘risk’	   in	   the	   headline	   retrieved	   only	   two	   results	   between	   1970	   and	  1990;	  more	   than	  3000	  between	  1990	  and	  2012.4	  Today,	   ‘it	   seems	  as	   if	  we	  must	  take	  a	  risk-­‐based	  description	  of	  everything.’5	  	  	  Starting	   in	   the	   1980s,	   a	   boom	   in	   the	   risk	   literature	   has	   accompanied	   the	  increased	   attention	   to	   risk.	   Risk	   has	   progressively	   abandoned	   its	   ‘hard	  science’	  origins	  to	  enter	  the	  world	  of	  sociology.	  In	  the	  long	  aftermath	  of	  the	  terrorist	  attacks	  of	  September	  the	  11th	  2001,	  IR	  scholars	  developed	  a	  strong	  interest	  in	  risk	  and	  saw,	  in	  the	  new	  risks	  brought	  about	  by	  globalisation	  and	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  key	  determinant	  of	  Western	  policies.	  More	  specifically,	   two	   schools;	   one	   inspired	   by	   Ulrich	   Beck’s	   theory	   of	   the	   ‘risk	  society,’	   the	   other	   inspired	   by	   Michel	   Foucault’s	   study	   of	   security;	  positioned	  risk	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  a	  historical	  divide;	  of	  a	  radical	  rupture	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Barry	  McGuire,	  ‘Eve	  of	  destruction,’	  writer	  P.	  F.	  Sloan,	  1965.	  2	  Christopher	  Hood	  et	  al.,	  Risk:	  Analysis,	  Perception	  and	  Management	  (London:	  The	  Royal	  Society,	  1992),	  p.	  135.	  3	  Peter	  Bernstein,	  Against	  the	  Gods:	  the	  remarkable	  story	  of	  risk	  (London:	  Wiley,	  1998).	  4	  Search	  conducted	  through	  LexisNexis,	  limited	  to	  UK	  newspapers.	  [http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezphost.dur.ac.uk].	  5	  Michael	  Power,	  Organized	  Uncertainty	  Designing	  a	  World	  of	  Risk	  
Management	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  p.	  2.	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nature	  and	  practice	  of	  both	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  policies.	  As	  argued	  in	  the	  
Chapter	   1,	   the	  aim	  of	   the	   thesis	   is	   to	  assess	   the	  validity	  and	   the	  extent	  of	  this	  divide.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  provide	  the	  theoretical	  background	  to	  conduct	  this	  assessment.	  	  The	   chapter	   can	   be	   divided	   into	   three	   main	   parts.	   After	   this	   brief	  introduction,	  Part	   two	  will	  provide	  a	  discussion	  of	  sociological	  approaches	  to	  risk	  and	  of	  the	  post-­‐9/11	  risk	  literature	  in	  IR.	  The	  analysis	  will	  focus	  on	  the	   Beckian	   and	   Foucauldian	   acknowledging	   key	   differences,	   but	   also	  identifying	   common	   tenets.	   It	   will	   point	   out	   the	   contradictions	   in	   these	  conceptualisations,	   initiating	   the	   search	   for	   better	   definitions.	  Part	   three	  will	   discuss	   classic	   understandings	   of	   risk	   in	   the	   foreign	   policy	   literature,	  looking	   at	   studies	   interpreting	   risk	   from	   economic	   or	   psychological	  perspectives.	  It	  will	  conclude	  with	  the	  suggestion	  that	  both	  the	  ‘sociological’	  and	  the	   ‘decision	  theory’	  approach	  do	  not	  provide	  consistent	  definitions	  of	  risk	   and	   uncertainty,	   nor	   a	   realistic	   portrayal	   of	   the	   role	   of	   the	   decision-­‐maker.	  This	  conclusion	  will	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  a	  reconceptualisation	  of	  risk	  in	  foreign	  policy	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  	  
2.2	   RISK	   IN	   THE	   POST-­‐COLD	   WAR	   WORLD:	   FROM	   SOCIOLOGY	   TO	  
INTERNATIONAL	  RELATIONS	  	  A	   2008	   collection	   identified	   five	   theories	   of	   risk	   in	   sociology:	   ‘risk	   and	  reflexive	   modernization,’	   ‘governmentality	   and	   risk,’	   ‘systems	   theory	   and	  risk,’	   ‘edgework	   and	   risk,’	   ‘culture	   and	   risk.’6	  Deborah	   Lupton	   provided	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Reflexive	  modernisation	  and	  governmentality	  are	  discussed	  below.	  Niklas	  Luhmann	  discusses	  risk	  as	  a	  key	  feature	  of	  his	  ‘systems	  theory’	  in	  which	  social	  systems	  are	  discussed	  as	  systems	  of	  communication.	  Niklas	  Luhmann,	  
Risk:	  a	  sociological	  theory	  (London:	  Aldine	  Transactions,	  2008).	  Risk	  and	  culture	  refers	  to	  the	  work	  of	  (among	  others)	  Mary	  Douglas	  who	  interpreted	  risk	  as	  a	  cultural	  construction.	  See	  Mary	  Douglas,	  Risk	  and	  Blame	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1994),	  and	  Mary	  Douglas	  and	  Aaron	  Wildavsky,	  Risk	  and	  Culture	  (Los	  Angeles:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1983).	  Edgework	  refers	  to	  Stephen	  Lyng’s	  study	  of	  voluntary	  risk-­‐taking.	  See	  Stephen	  Lyng	  (Ed.),	  
Edgework:	  the	  sociology	  of	  risk-­‐taking	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2004).	  For	  a	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similar	   division	   in	   her	   seminal	   work	   on	   risk.7	  Ortwin	   Renn	   listed	   seven	  theories,	   divided	   according	   to	   their	   realist	   or	   constructivist	   ontology	   and	  their	  structural	  or	   individualist	  approach.8	  This	  analysis	  will	  not	  discuss	  all	  these	   theories	   but	   only	   those	   sociological	   approaches	   that	   have	   recently	  inspired	  IR	  scholars.	  Beyond	  studies	  trying	  to	  distinguish	  between	  risk	  and	  threat,9	  IR	  has	  witnessed	  a	   ‘boom’	  in	  works	  specifically	  discussing	  risk	  only	  since	  2005.	  In	  2006,	  eight	  articles	  cited	  other	  articles	  within	  IR	  journals	  with	  ‘risk’	   in	   their	   topic.	   The	   number	   has	   grown	   steadily,	   with	   539	   articles	   in	  2010,10	  when	  this	  research	  started.	  	  	  Several	   scholars	   have	   tried	   to	   bring	   order	   to	   this	   maze,	   and	   two	   main	  classifications	  of	  theories	  of	  risk	  have	  been	  presented.	  Karen	  Lund	  Petersen	  has	  suggested	  that	  studies	  of	  risk	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  three	  macro	  categories:	  critical	   risk	   studies,	   focusing	   on	   risk	   governance	   in	   the	   daily	   practices	   of	  government;	  global	  risk	  management	  studies,	  aimed	  at	   improving	  decision-­‐making	   and	   changing	   the	   international	   environment;	   and	   political	   risk	  studies,	   adopting	   economic	   and	   technical	   approaches. 11 	  Global	   risk	  management	   studies	   certainly	   played	   a	   key	   part	   within	   this	   literature,	  fostering	  interdisciplinary	  efforts	  aimed	  at	  preventing	  strategic	  surprise	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  general	  overview	  see	  Jens	  O.	  Zinn	  (Ed.),	  Social	  Theories	  of	  Risk	  and	  
Uncertainty	  (Oxford:	  Blackwell	  Publishing,	  2008).	  7	  Deborah	  Lupton,	  Risk:	  key	  ideas	  (Routledge,	  London	  1999).	  Lupton	  added	  ‘risk	  and	  the	  other,’	  and	  ‘risk	  and	  subjectivity’	  as	  separate	  categories.	  See	  also	  Ortwin	  Renn,	  Risk	  Governance:	  coping	  with	  uncertainty	  in	  a	  complex	  
world	  (London:	  Routledge/Earthscan,	  2008),	  pp.	  23-­‐24.	  8	  Ortwin	  Renn,	  Risk	  Governance:	  coping	  with	  uncertainty	  in	  a	  complex	  world	  (London:	  Earthscan,	  2008),	  pp.	  23-­‐24.	  Renn	  added	  ‘social	  amplification	  of	  risk,’	  ‘rational	  choice,’	  and	  ‘critical	  theory’	  to	  Zinn’s	  lists	  and	  ignored	  ‘edgework.’	  9	  Keohane	  and	  his	  colleagues	  distinguished	  between	  risk	  and	  threat	  in	  two	  main	  ways.	  First,	  actors	  who	  do	  not	  have	  the	  capabilities	  to	  threaten,	  merely	  pose	  risks.	  Second,	  risks	  represent	  problem	  within	  alliances,	  whereas	  threats	  endanger	  an	  alliance	  from	  the	  outside.	  Celeste	  A.	  Wallander	  and	  Robert	  O.	  Keohane,	  ‘Risk,	  threat,	  and	  security	  institutions,’	  in	  Robert	  O.	  Keohane,	  Power	  and	  Governance	  in	  a	  Partially	  Globalized	  world	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2002).	  10	  Karen	  Lund	  Petersen,	  ‘Risk	  analysis	  –	  a	  field	  within	  Security	  Studies,’	  
European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Relations,	  2013,	  p.	  694.	  11	  Petersen,	  ‘Risk	  analysis.’	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catastrophic	  risks.12	  Petersen’s	  division,	  however,	  extends	  beyond	  IR	  to	  look	  at	  economic	  concepts	  such	  as	  country-­‐specific	  political	  risk.	  William	  Clapton	  provided	   a	   classification	   more	   targeted	   to	   the	   world	   of	   IR	   and	   a	   succinct	  description	  of	  the	  debate:	  	   Critical	   realists	   suggest	   that	   risks	   are	   real	   and	   exist	   ‘out	   there’;	  constructivists	   maintain	   that	   risks	   are	   social	   constructions	   and	  that	  what	  matters	  is	  how	  social	  norms…shape	  actors’	  perceptions	  and	  responses	  to	  risk;	  and	  post-­‐structuralist	  argue	  that	  risks	  are	  not	  real,	  and	  that	  representations	  of	  risk	  are	  actually	  a	  method	  of	  applying	  particular	  governing	  techniques.13	  	  This	  thesis	  largely	  agrees	  with	  this	  division.	  However,	  three	  problems	  can	  be	  identified.	  First,	  many	  of	  what	  Clapton	  calls	   ‘constructivist	   scholars’	  do	  not	  deal	  with	  risk	  as	  a	  specific	  concept.	  Risk	  and	  threat,	  as	  one	  of	  them	  admits,	  are	   treated	   as	   synonyms.14	  An	   analysis	   of	   risk	   is	   not	   the	   point	   in	   these	  studies,	   which	   focus	   principally	   on	   processes	   of	   ‘framing,’	   and	   of	   ‘threat	  inflation.’15	  Second,	  as	  the	  analysis	  will	  make	  clear,	  a	  rigid	  division	  in	  terms	  of	  epistemology	  and	  ontology	  does	  not	  reflect	  many	  of	  the	  authors’	  positions	  within	   the	   risk	   literature.	   The	   authors’	   opinions	   have	   changed	   throughout	  their	  work,	  and	  they	  often	  sit	  uneasily	  at	  the	  crossroads	  between	  realism	  and	  constructivism.	  Third,	  only	  authors	  inspired	  by	  two	  sociological	  approaches	  the	   ‘reflexive	   modernization’	   or	   ‘risk	   society’	   school	   and	   the	  ‘governmentality’	   school	   have	   laid	   a	   precise	   claim	   regarding	   the	   radical	  newness	   of	   risk	   and	   the	   changes	   that	   risk	   has	   brought	   to	   international	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Paul	  Bracken,	  Ian	  Bremmer,	  and	  David	  Gordon	  (Eds.),	  Managing	  Strategic	  
Surprise	  Lessons	  from	  Risk	  Management	  and	  Risk	  Assessment	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008);	  Francis	  Fukuyama	  (Ed.),	  Blindside:	  How	  
to	  Anticipate	  Forcing	  Events	  and	  Wild	  Cards	  in	  Global	  Politics	  (Baltimore:	  Brookings	  Institution	  Press,	  2007),	  and	  Nick	  Bostrom	  and	  Milan	  M.	  Circovic,	  
Global	  catastrophic	  risks	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  press,	  2008).	  13	  William	  Clapton,	  ‘Risk	  in	  International	  Relations,’	  International	  relations,	  Vol.	  25,	  2011,	  p.	  281.	  14	  Lennart	  Sjoberg,	  ‘Risk	  Perceptions:	  taking	  on	  societal	  salience,’	  in	  Johan	  Eriksson	  (Ed.),	  Threat	  Politics:	  new	  perspectives	  on	  security,	  risks	  and	  crisis	  
management	  (Aldershot:	  Ashgate,	  2001),	  p.	  20.	  15	  Johan	  Eriksson	  (Ed.),	  Threat	  Politics:	  new	  perspectives	  on	  security,	  risks	  
and	  crisis	  management	  (Aldershot:	  Ashgate,	  2001),	  and	  Trevor	  Thrall	  and	  Jane	  K.	  Cramer,	  American	  Foreign	  Policy	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Fear	  (London:	  Routledge	  2009).	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politics	  and	   foreign	  policy.	  For	   these	  reasons,	   this	  analysis	  divides	  scholars	  discussing	   risk	   in	   IR	   into	   two	  main	   categories.	  The	   first	   group,	   inspired	  by	  Beck’s	   theory	   of	   ‘risk	   society’	   and,	   more	   generally,	   by	   works	   on	   reflexive	  modernisation,	  will	   be	  defined	   as	   the	   ‘risk	   society	   at	  war’	   scholarship.	  The	  second	   group,	   inspired	   by	   Foucault’s	   work	   on	   security,	   and	   by	   studies	   on	  ‘governmentality,’	   will	   be	   defined	   as	   the	   ‘governmentality	   at	   war’	  scholarship.16	  The	   analysis	   will	   start	   with	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   sociological	  theories,	  and	  will	  later	  focus	  on	  their	  IR	  re-­‐interpretations.	  	  
2.2.1	  The	  Power	  of	  Risk	  
2.2.1.1	  From	  Foucault’s	  ‘notion	  of	  risk’	  to	  governmentality	  studies	  	  
The	  anti-­‐scarcity	  system	  is	  basically	  focused	  
on	  a	  possible	  event	  that	  could	  take	  place,	  	  
and	  which	  one	  tries	  to	  prevent	  	  
before	  it	  becomes	  reality.17	  Michel	  Foucault.	  	  Foucault	   never	   dealt	   at	   length	  with	   risk.	   In	   his	   1977-­‐1978	   lectures	   at	   the	  Collège	  de	   France,	   the	   French	  philosopher	  delineated	   the	   emergence,	   from	  the	  Sixteenth	  century	  onwards,	  of	  new	  rationalities	  of	  government	  based	  on	  ‘security,’	   as	   distinct	   from	   law	   or	   discipline.	   Whereas	   law	   sets	   clear	  benchmarks	   of	   what	   is	   permitted	   and	   what	   is	   prohibited,	   representing	   a	  ‘negative	   power;’	   and	   discipline	   shapes	   behaviour,	   representing	   positive	  power;	   security	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   neutral.	   Security	   ‘stands	   back	  sufficiently,’	   to	   comprehend	   reality	   and	   to	   respond	   to	   it,	   possibly	   using	  instruments	   of	   prohibition	   (law),	   and	   prescription	   (discipline).	   This	  response	  ‘cancels	  out	  the	  reality	  to	  which	  it	  responds	  –	  nullifies	  it.’18	  Behind	  an	  appearance	  of	  letting	  things	  happen,	  ‘security’	  implies	  the	  management	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  The	  terms	  are	  used	  to	  distinguish	  these	  new	  scholarships	  in	  IR	  from	  previous	  works	  inspired	  by	  the	  same	  sociological	  approaches.	  In	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  thesis	  the	  terms	  ‘Beckian’	  and	  ‘Foucauldian’	  will	  also	  be	  used	  as	  shortcuts	  to	  clarify	  these	  scholarships’	  inspiration.	  	  17	  Michel	  Foucault,	  Security,	  Territory,	  Population:	  Lectures	  at	  the	  Collège	  de	  
France	  1977-­‐1978,	  trans.	  Graham	  Burchell	  (New	  York:	  Palgrave	  McMillan,	  2009),	  p.	  33.	  18	  Foucault,	  Security,	  pp.	  45-­‐46.	  
	   26	  
possible	   outcomes	   through	   prevention	   and	   through	   an	   effort	   to	   eliminate	  everything	  that	  could	  be	  aleatory.19	  	  	  The	  emergence	  of	   this	  new	  form	  of	  government	  and	  its	  diffusion	  depended	  largely	  on	  the	  rise	  of	  statistics.	  First,	  statistics	  permitted	  the	  identification	  of	  regularities	  and	  dynamics	  within	  the	  population	  that	  went	  beyond	  the	  family	  or	   the	   single	   individual. 20 	  Second,	   statistics	   helped	   in	   establishing	   the	  ‘absolutely	  crucial	  notion	  of	  risk.’21	  With	  statistics	  a	  case	  is	  no	  longer	  treated	  individually,	   but	   as	   part	   of	   a	   category.	   Establishing	   what	   is	   ‘at	   risk’	   also	  defines	  what	  is	  ‘normal.’22	  The	  rise	  of	  security	  and	  of	  statistics	  represented	  a	  crucial	   stage	   in	   the	   evolution	   of	   government.	   Governmental	   aims	   evolved	  from	  the	  wealth	  of	  the	  sovereign,	  to	  the	  security	  of	  the	  territory,	  and	  finally	  to	   the	   control	   of	   the	   population.	   In	   this	   shift,	   the	   population	   evolved	   from	  being	   an	   object	   of	   repression,	   to	   a	   raw	   source	   of	   power,	   in	   mercantilist	  economies,	  and	  finally	  an	  object	  of	  control.	  A	  whole	  new	  series	  of	  elements	  became	  objects	  of	  knowledge	  and	  control,	  to	  form	  part	  of	  the	  ‘rationality	  of	  government,’	   or	   ‘governmentality.’	   Foucault	   defined	   governmentality	   as	   an	  ‘ensemble	   formed	   by	   institutions,	   procedures,	   analyses	   and	   reflections,	  calculations	  and	  tactics.’23	  	  In	   particular,	   the	   governmentality	   of	   liberalism	   aimed	   at	   ‘standing	   back	  sufficiently,’	   and	   ensuring	   free	   circulation,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	  maintaining	   control	   and	   isolating	   the	   ‘at	   risk’	   categories. 24 	  	   Foucault	  elaborated	  on	  the	  inherent	  contradiction	  between	  maintaining	  freedom	  and	  maintaining	   security.	   In	   a	   second	   series	   of	   lectures,	   he	   argued	   that	   in	  liberalism	   the	   government	   is	   no	   longer	   interested	   in	   the	   individual	   in	  him/herself,	   or	   in	   the	   population	   in	   itself;	   but	   in	   the	   ‘interests’	   they	   carry.	  For	   liberalism:	   ‘the	   problem	   of	   security	   is	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   collective	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Nick	  Butler,	  ‘The	  management	  of	  population,’	  Ephemera,	  Vol.	  7,	  No.	  3	  (2007),	  p.	  475.	  20	  Foucault,	  Security,	  pp.	  100-­‐101.	  21	  Foucault,	  Security,	  p.	  61.	  22	  Foucault,	  Security,	  p.	  62.	  23	  Foucault,	  Security,	  p.	  108.	  24	  Foucault,	  Security,	  p.	  65.	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interest	  against	  individual	  interest.’25	  Liberalism	  cannot	  deal	  with	  interests	  if	  it	  does	  not	  manage	  the	  interplay	  of	  security	  and	  freedom,	  limiting	  exposure	  to	  danger.	  Freedom	  in	  liberalism	  is	  not	  real	  freedom,	  but	  a	  produced	  ‘good,’	  constantly	   manufactured.	   To	   guarantee	   the	   co-­‐existence	   of	   freedom	   and	  security,	   governments	   spread	   their	   instruments	   of	   control,	   justified	   by	   the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  ‘education	  and	  culture’	  of	  danger.26	  	  These	   ideas	   have	   formed	   part	   of	   a	   rich	   scholarship.	   In	   spite	   of	   Foucault’s	  warning	   against	   an	   understanding	   of	   ‘governmentality’	   as	   a	   series	   of	  successive	  and	  mutually	  exclusive	  phases,27	  many	  scholars	  have	  discussed	  the	  rise	  of	  risk	  through	  historical	  phases.	  Francois	  Ewald	  suggested	  that	  the	  birth	  of	  risk	  could	  not	  be	  understood	  without	  referring	  to	  insurance	  as	  the	  first	  explicit	  attempt	  to	  shape	  future	  events.28	  Ewald	  identifies	  an	  evolution	  in	  the	  rationality	  of	  government	  from	  a	  phase	  of	   individual	   ‘responsibility’	  and	  prudence	  (in	  early	  liberalism),	  to	  a	  phase	  of	  ‘solidarity’	  and	  prevention	  in	  which	  the	  welfare	  state	  acts	  as	  insurer	  of	  last	  resort;	  and	  finally	  a	  phase	  of	  safety	  and	  precaution	  in	  which	  risks	  have	  become	  too	  great	  to	  be	  insured	  against.29	  Risks	  have	  moved	  towards	  a	  double	  infinity:	  ‘toward	  the	  infinitely	  small-­‐scale’	   of	   biological,	   natural	   or	   food-­‐related	   risks,	   and	   toward	   the	  ‘infinitely	   large-­‐scale’	   of	   the	   catastrophes	   they	   can	   endanger. 30	  Governments,	   unable	   to	   insure	   against	   these	   risks,	   and	   unwilling	   to	   face	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Michel	  Foucault,	  The	  Birth	  of	  Bio-­‐politics:	  Lectures	  at	  the	  Collège	  de	  France	  
1978-­‐1979,	  trans.	  Graham	  Burchell	  (New	  York:	  Palgrave	  MacMillan,	  2009),	  p.	  65.	  26	  Foucault,	  The	  Birth,	  p.	  66.	  27	  Foucault,	  Security,	  p.	  8.	  28	  Francois	  Ewald,	  ‘Insurance	  and	  Risk’	  in	  Graham	  Burchell,	  Colin	  Gordon,	  and	  Peter	  Miller	  (Eds.),	  The	  Foucault	  Effect:	  Studies	  in	  Governmentality	  (Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1991),	  p.	  200.	  29	  Francois	  Ewald,	  ‘The	  return	  of	  Descartes’s	  Malicious	  demon:	  an	  outline	  of	  a	  philosophy	  of	  precaution,’	  in	  Tom	  Baker	  and	  Jonathan	  Simon	  (Eds.),	  
Embracing	  Risk:	  the	  changing	  culture	  of	  insurance	  and	  responsibility	  (Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2002).	  30	  Francois	  Ewald,	  ‘Two	  Infinities	  of	  Risk,’	  in	  Brian	  Massumi	  (Ed.),	  The	  
Politics	  of	  Everyday	  Fear	  (London:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1993),	  p.	  222.	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their	  catastrophic	  potential,	  extend	  precautionary	  regulatory	  measures.31	  In	  Ewald,	  risks	  appear	  sometimes	  ‘real;’	  sometimes	  constructed.	   ‘Nothing	  is	  a	  risk	  in	  itself,’	  he	  wrote	  in	  a	  much	  quoted	  sentence,	  ‘there	  is	  no	  risk	  in	  reality.	  But	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  anything	  can	  be	  a	  risk.’32	  The	  predominant	  account	  within	  this	  scholarship,	  however,	  is	  that	  of	  risk	  as	  a	  technology	  to	  deal	  with	  problems.33	  This	  analysis	  has	  developed	  at	  several	  levels.	  	  Starting	  at	  the	  individual	  level,	  a	  large	  body	  of	  literature	  has	  focused	  on	  risk	  as	  a	  strategy	  to	  regulate	  the	  body.	  Risk,	   in	  these	  accounts,	  establishes	  new	  forms	  of	  ‘bio-­‐politics’	  through	  which	  ‘basic	  biological	  features	  of	  the	  human	  species	   are	   turned	   into	   objects	   of	   political	   control.’34	  As	   security	   becomes	  redefined	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   individual	   ‘new	   prudentialism,’ 35 	  individual	  characteristics	  become	  governmental	  concerns.	   ‘Active	  citizens	   (capable	  of	  managing	   their	   own	   risks)’	   are	   now	   kept	   separate	   from	   the	   ‘at	   risk’	  categories	   that	   require	   external	   intervention. 36 	  To	   remain	   in	   the	   first	  category,	   individuals	   need	   to	   ‘police	   themselves;’	   they	   are	   obliged	   to	   be	  responsibly	   free.37	  This	   analysis	   of	   individual	  behaviour	  has	  permitted	   the	  study	  of	  more	  general	   trends	   in	  society,	   relating	   to	  crime,38	  madness39	  and	  medicine.40	  A	  common	  theme	  is	  the	  shift	  from	  a	  paradigm	  of	  danger	  to	  one	  of	  risk.	  With	  risk,	  the	  collection	  of	  otherwise	  unrelated	  factors	   leads	  to	  the	  deduction	   of	   a	   definition	   of	   danger,	   thus	   lowering	   the	   threshold	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Ewald,	  ‘The	  return.’	  32	  Ewald,	  ‘Insurance,’	  p.	  199.	  33	  Nikolas	  Rose,	  Pat	  O’Malley	  and	  Mariana	  Valverde,	  ‘Governmentality,’	  
Annual	  review	  of	  law	  and	  social	  sciences,	  Vol.	  2	  (2006),	  p.	  95.	  	  34	  Foucault,	  The	  Birth,	  p.	  1.	  35	  Pat	  O’Malley,	  ‘Risk,	  Power	  and	  crime	  prevention,’	  Economy	  and	  Society,	  Vol.	  21,	  No.	  2	  (1992),	  pp.	  252-­‐275.	  36	  Mitchell	  Dean,	  Governmentality:	  Power	  and	  Rule	  in	  Modern	  Society	  (London:	  SAGE,	  1999),	  p.	  167.	  37	  Rose	  et	  al.	  ‘Governmentality,’	  p.	  91.	  38	  Richard	  V.	  Ericson	  and	  Kevin	  D.	  Haggerty,	  Policing	  the	  Risk	  society	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1997)	  39	  Nikolas	  Rose,	  ‘At	  risk	  of	  madness,’	  in	  Baker	  and	  Simon,	  Embracing.	  40	  Robert	  Castel,	  ‘From	  dangerousness	  to	  risk,’	  in	  Burchell	  et	  al.,	  The	  
Foucault.	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governmental	   intervention.41	  ‘To	  be	  suspected,	   it	   is	  no	   longer	  necessary	   to	  manifest	   symptoms	   of	   dangerousness,’	   it	   is	   sufficient	   to	   ‘display	  whatever	  characteristics’	  are	  defined	  as	  risky.	  This	  power	  of	  definition	  has	  no	  limits.	  ‘For	  what	  situation	  is	  there	  of	  which	  one	  can	  be	  certain	  that	  it	  harbours	  no	  risk…?’42	  The	   spread	   of	   risk	   as	   a	   technique,	   the	   diffusion	   of	   neo-­‐liberal	  practices	   of	   government,	   and	   the	   lowering	   of	   threshold	   for	   governmental	  action	  represent	  key	  themes	  in	  post-­‐9/11	  governmentality	  studies.	  	  
2.2.1.2	  A	  ‘dispositif’	  of	  precaution:	  risk	  and	  the	  War	  on	  Terror	  	   Our	   government	   has	   kept	   us	   in	   a	   perpetual	   state	   of	   fear…with	  the	   cry	   of	   grave	   national	   emergency.	   Always	   there	   has	   been	  some	   terrible	   evil	   at	   home	   or	   some	   monstrous	   foreign	   power	  that	   was	   going	   to	   gobble	   us	   up…Yet,	   in	   retrospect,	   these	  disasters…seem	  never	  to	  have	  been	  quite	  real.43	  	  The	  quote	   from	  General	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  dates	  back	   to	  1956,	   and	  yet	   it	  encapsulates	   the	   spirit	   of	   the	   ‘politics	  of	   everyday	   fear’44	  that,	   according	   to	  the	   ‘governmentality	   at	   war’	   scholarship,	   rules	   contemporary	   Western	  societies.	   Like	   governmentality	   studies,	   this	   scholarship	   has	   discussed	   the	  policies	   of	   the	  War	  on	  Terror	  both	   at	   the	   ‘bio-­‐political’	   and	   at	   the	  national	  level,	   often	   extending	   the	   argument	   to	   foreign	   policy.	   According	   to	   Louise	  Amoore	  and	  Mareike	  de	  Goede,	  the	  terrorist	  attacks	  on	  9/11	  represented	  the	  entry	  into	  a	  new	  historical	  and	  political	  phase;	  a	  paradigm	  shift.	  Whereas	  in	  previous	   eras	   risk	   had	   acted	   as	   the	   key	   instrument	   to	   ensure	   safety	   and	  security, 45 	  after	   9/11	   governments	   had	   to	   confront	   the	   radical	  unpredictability	   and	   uncertainty	   of	   terrorism.	   This	   ‘recognition	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Castel,	  ‘From	  dangerousness,’	  p.	  288.	  42	  Castel,	  ‘From	  dangerousness,’	  p.	  289.	  43	  Gen.	  Douglas	  MacArthur,	  ‘Remarks	  to	  stockholders	  at	  the	  Annual	  Meeting	  of	  Sperry	  Rand	  Corporation,’	  31	  July	  1956	  [http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/the-­‐risk-­‐within#axzz2ZE2yr5ex]	  (accessed	  16	  July	  2013).	  44	  Brian	  Massumi,	  The	  Politics	  of	  everyday	  fear	  (London:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1992).	  45	  Louise	  Amoore	  and	  Mareike	  de	  Goede,	  ‘Governing	  by	  risk	  in	  the	  War	  on	  Terror,’	  in	  Louise	  Amoore	  and	  Mareike	  de	  Goede	  (Eds.),	  Risk	  and	  the	  War	  on	  
Terror	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2008),	  p.	  9.	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incalculability’	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  an	  acknowledgment	  of	  the	  fragility	  of	  life,	  but	  to	   aggressive	   efforts	   to	   pre-­‐empt	   any	   possible	   contingency.46	  The	   initial	  failure	  of	  imagination	  -­‐	  later	  recognised	  by	  the	  9/11	  Commission	  as	  ‘a	  mind-­‐set	   that	   dismissed	  possibilities’47	  -­‐	   spurred	   an	   overreaction.	   The	   illusion	   of	  ‘connecting’	   previously	   unconnected	   dots,	   and	   of	   learning	   the	   ‘lessons’	   of	  9/11	   became	   the	   impetus	   for	   action.48	  The	   very	   pervasiveness	   of	   threats	  within	  media	  and	  political	  debates	  constituted	  a	  governmental	  strategy,	  built	  on	  ‘premediation.’	  The	  term	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  way	  of	  forecasting.49	  The	  ‘premediation’	  of	  possible	  or	  even	  imaginary	  scary	  future	  scenarios	  enables	  repressive	  and	  preventive	  actions	  in	  the	  present.50	  The	  reproduction	  and	  re-­‐enactment	  of	  ‘worst	  case	  scenarios’	  scares	  the	  population	  into	  obedience.51	  	  In	   this	   account	   risk	   is	   generally	   defined	   as	   a	   ‘dispositif:’	   ‘a	   heterogeneous	  assemblage	   of	   discursive	   and	   material	   elements	   for	   governing	   social	  problems.’52	  This	  ‘dispositif’	  drives	  new	  practices	  of	  risk	  management	  and	  of	  control.	  Drawing	  on	  Ewald,	  Claudia	  Aradau	  and	  Rens	  Van	  Munster	  suggest	  that	   the	   post-­‐9/11	   dispositif	   is	   one	   of	   ‘risk	   precaution.’	   On	   one	   side,	  maintaining	   the	   rhetoric	   of	   ‘risk,’	   the	   dispositif	   provides	   a	   useful	  smokescreen	   (an	   appearance	   of	   manageability).	   On	   the	   other	   side,	   the	  ‘precautionary’	  element,	   takes	  advantage	  of	   the	  uncertainty	  created	  by	   the	  alleged	   ‘double	   infinity	   of	   risks’	   to	   extend	   governments’	   possibilities	   of	  intervention	  far	  beyond	  the	  presence	  of	  real	  threats.53	  These	  developments	  alter	   the	   traditional	   ‘calculus’	   of	   security.	   Security	  policies	   are	  now	  driven	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Amoore	  and	  de	  Goede,	  ‘Governing,’	  p.	  10.	  47	  National	  Commission	  on	  Terrorist	  Attacks	  Upon	  the	  United	  States,	  Final	  
Report,	  [www.911commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf]	  (accessed	  17	  July	  2013),	  p.	  336.	  48	  Amoore	  and	  de	  Goede,	  ‘Governing,’	  p.	  6.	  49	  Richard	  Grusin,	  ‘Premediation,’	  Criticism,	  Vol.	  46,	  No.	  1	  (2004),	  p.	  28.	  50	  Mareike	  de	  Goede,	  ‘Beyond	  Risk:	  Premediation	  and	  the	  Post-­‐9/11	  Security	  Imagination,’	  Security	  Dialogue,	  Vol.	  39,	  No.	  2-­‐3	  (2008),	  p.	  159.	  51	  Stuart	  Price,	  Worst	  Case	  Scenario?	  Governance,	  Mediation	  and	  the	  Security	  
Regime	  (London:	  Zed	  Books,	  2011).	  52	  Claudia	  Aradau	  and	  Rens	  Van	  Munster,	  ‘Taming	  the	  future:	  the	  dispositif	  of	  risk	  in	  the	  War	  on	  Terror,’	  in	  Amoore	  and	  De	  Goede,	  Risk,	  p.	  24.	  53	  Aradau	  and	  Van	  Munster,	  ‘Taming,’	  p.	  29.	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by	   hypothesis	   and	   suspicion,	   by	   ‘What	   if?’	   questions.54	  If	   the	   threat	   is	  depicted	   as	   ‘incalculable,	   unpredictable	   but	   always	   imminent,’	   and	   the	  outcomes	   of	   an	   attack	   are	   depicted	   as	   catastrophic,	   preventive	   and	  aggressive	  measures	  are	  the	  only	  available	  solution.55	  	  	  At	   the	   ‘bio-­‐political’	   level,	   individuals	   are	   divided	   along	   categories	   of	   risk.	  Computer-­‐based	  screening	  systems	  collect	  heterogeneous	  characteristics	  of	  the	   whole	   population	   to	   identify	   ‘connections	   between	   otherwise	  insignificant	  pieces	  of	  data’	  that,	  in	  combination,	  are	  ‘cause	  for	  suspicion.’56	  ‘Everyone	   is	   presumed	   guilty	   until	   the	   risk	   profile	   proves	   otherwise.’57	  An	  individual’s	   features	   become	   objects	   of	   screening.58	  Border	   controls	   are	  devised	  to	  keep	  out	  the	  ‘at	  risk,’	  and	  to	  permit	  the	  free	  and	  fast	  circulation	  of	  those	  who	  promote	  neo-­‐liberal	  practices	  and	  models.59	  Biometrics	  are	  used	  to	   distinguish	   between	   ‘authenticated’	   citizens	   and	   the	   ‘others.’ 60	  Governments	   rely	   on	   private	   companies	   and	   on	   technologically	  unprecedented	  systems	  to	  spy	  on	  every	  type	  of	  communication,	  as	  Edward	  Snowden’s	  revelations	  have	  recently	  confirmed.61	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Gabe	  Mythen	  and	  Sandra	  Walklate,	  ‘Terrorism,	  Risk	  and	  International	  Security:	  the	  Perils	  of	  asking	  “What	  if?”’	  Security	  Dialogue,	  Vol.	  39,	  no.	  2-­‐3	  (2008),	  p.	  234.	  55	  Rosalyn	  Diprose,	  et	  al.,	  ‘Governing	  the	  future:	  the	  Paradigm	  of	  Prudence	  in	  Political	  Technologies	  of	  Risk	  Management,’	  Security	  Dialogue,	  Vol.	  39,	  no.	  2-­‐3	  (2008),	  p.	  269.	  56	  Amoore	  and	  de	  Goede,	  ‘Governing,’	  p.	  7.	  57	  Ericson	  and	  Haggerty,	  Policing,	  p.	  42.	  58	  Louise	  Amoore,	  ‘Vigilant	  Visualities:	  the	  watchful	  politics	  of	  the	  War	  on	  Terror,’	  Security	  Dialogue,	  Vol.	  38,	  No.	  2	  (June	  2007),	  pp.	  139-­‐156.	  	  59	  Wendy	  Larner,	  ‘Spatial	  imaginaries:	  economic	  globalization	  and	  the	  War	  on	  Terror,’	  in	  Amoore	  and	  De	  Goede,	  Risk.	  60	  Charlotte	  Epstein,	  ‘Embodying	  risk:	  using	  biometrics	  to	  protect	  the	  border,’	  in	  Amoore	  and	  de	  Goede,	  Risk.	  61	  Ewen	  MacAskill,	  ‘Edward	  Snowden:	  how	  the	  spy	  story	  of	  the	  age	  leaked	  out,’	  The	  Guardian,	  12	  June	  2013	  [http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/11/edward-­‐snowden-­‐nsa-­‐whistleblower-­‐profile]	  (accessed	  28	  August	  2013),	  and	  Glenn	  Greenwald,	  ‘NSA	  whistleblower:	  “I	  don't	  want	  to	  live	  in	  a	  society	  that	  does	  these	  sort	  of	  things,”’	  The	  Guardian,	  9	  June	  2013	  [http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2013/jun/09/nsa-­‐whistleblower-­‐edward-­‐snowden-­‐interview-­‐video]	  (accessed	  23	  September	  2013).	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For	  Foucauldian	  scholars,	  the	  justification	  of	  these	  powers	  becomes	  clear	  if	  one	  looks	  at	  the	  changes	  risk	  brought	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  Risk	  changed	  the	  features	  of	  sovereignty,	  security	  and	  ‘emergency.’	  The	  government	  extends	  control	   over	   previously	   unregulated	   sectors	   through	   a	   ‘plurality	   of	   forces	  circulating	   through	   and	   under	   the	   positional	   sovereignty	   of	   the	   official	  arbitrating	  body.’62	  Sovereignty	  becomes	  plural	  and	  develops	  through	  layers	  of	   bureaucratic	   administrators.	   As	   Judith	   Butler	   puts	   it,	   ‘petty	   sovereigns’	  proliferate.	   They	   are	   ‘institutions	  mobilized	   by	   aims	   and	   tactics	   of	   power	  they	  do	  not	  inaugurate	  or	  fully	  control.’	  And	  yet,	  like	  the	  sovereign,	  they	  act	  both	  within	  and	  above	  the	   law.	  They	  partake	   in	   the	   ‘prerogative	  power’	  of	  the	   executive. 63 	  Mark	   Neocleous	   argued	   that	   the	   predominance	   of	  emergency	   represented	   a	   traditional	   feature	   of	   liberalism.	   Liberalism,	  promoting	   the	  myth	  of	  a	  balance	  between	  security	  and	   liberty,	  has	  always	  opened	   ‘the	   (back)	   door	   to	   an	   acceptance	   of	   all	   sorts	   of	   authoritarian	  security	   measures.’64	  In	   the	   Foucauldian	   scholarship,	   however,	   the	   rise	   of	  emergency	   has	   been	   interpreted	   as	   a	   recent	   phenomenon	   and	   has	   been	  linked	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  contemporary	  risks	  and	  to	  their	  unmanageability.	  Due	  to	  the	  shadowy	  and	  ‘infinite’	  nature	  of	  risks,	  governments	  are	  always	  on	  the	  attack,	   trying	   to	   prevent	   them.	   In	   doing	   this,	   authorities	   deprive	   the	  ‘securitization’	  of	  an	  issue	  of	  its	   ‘exceptional’	  character.	  Exception	  becomes	  the	  rule.65	  Insecurity	  rather	  than	  security	  becomes	  the	  ‘normality.’	  	  	  This	  conception	  of	  security	  is	  radically	  different	  from	  others	  available	  in	  IR.	  First,	   whereas	   for	   critical	   theorists,	   security	   had	   ‘emancipatory	   effects,’66	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  William	  E.	  Connolly,	  Pluralism	  (Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  p.	  145.	  63	  Judith	  Butler,	  Precarious	  Life:	  The	  Power	  of	  Mourning	  and	  Violence	  (London:	  Verso,	  2004),	  p.	  56.	  64	  Mark	  Neocleous,	  Critique	  of	  Security	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  p.	  5	  and	  13.	  65	  Rens	  Van	  Munster,	  ‘Logics	  of	  Security:	  The	  Copenhagen	  School,	  Risk	  Management	  and	  the	  War	  on	  Terror,’	  Political	  Science	  Publications,	  No.	  10	  (2005),	  University	  of	  Southern	  Denmark	  [http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Om_SDU/Institutter/Statskundskab/Skriftserie/05RVM10.pdf]	  (accessed	  23	  September	  2013).	  66	  Ken	  Booth,	  ‘Security	  and	  Emancipation,’	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies,	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security	   becomes,	   here,	   an	   instrument	   of	   repression.	   Second,	   whereas	  security	   studies	   and,	   in	   particular,	   the	   Copenhagen	   School,	   identified	   the	  presence	  of	  an	  ‘existential	  threat’	  as	  a	  requirement	  to	  ‘securitize’	  an	  issue,67	  precautionary	   practices	   of	   risk	   management	   address	   the	   potentialities	   of	  risk,	   rather	   than	   real	   threats.68	  Security	   creates	   a	   never-­‐ending	   ‘state	   of	  exception’	   where	   threats	   are	   no	   longer	   defined,	   but	   nonetheless	   always	  imminent.69	  As	  Slavoj	  Zizek	  writes,	  we	  have	  entered	  ‘a	  time	  in	  which	  a	  state	  of	  peace	  can	  at	  the	  same	  time	  be	  a	  state	  of	  emergency.’70	  Risk	  management,	  like	   Gilles	  Deleuze’s	   control,	   ‘is	   short-­‐term	   and	   rapidly	   shifting,	   but	   at	   the	  same	   time	   continuous	   and	   unbounded.’	   It	   is	   a	   form	   of	   short-­‐term,	  continuous	  domination	  extending	  even	  to	  speech	  and	  imagination.71	  	  This	  governmental	  control	  and	  this	  constant	  state	  of	  emergency	  have	  been	  duplicated	   at	   the	   international	   level.	   The	   ‘welfare	   state’	   has	   turned	   into	   a	  ‘warfare	  state:	  a	  permanent	  state	  of	  emergency	  against	  a	  multifarious	  threat	  as	   much	   in	   us	   as	   outside.’72	  The	   wars	   in	   Afghanistan	   and	   Iraq,	   and	   the	  foreign	   policies	   of	   the	   ‘War	   on	   Terror’	   represent	   the	   flipside	   of	   domestic	  developments.	  Amoore	  and	  de	  Goede	  write:	  	  	   The	  preemptive	  decisions	  of	  the	  battlefield	  have	  their	  echoes	  in	  really	  quite	  prosaic	  and	  everyday	  domains	  where	  action	  is	  taken	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  anticipation.73	  	  A	  common	  rhetoric	  of	  emergency	  and	  war:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Vol.	  17,	  No.	  4	  (1991),	  pp.	  313–26.	  	  67	  Barry	  Buzan,	  Ole	  Waever,	  and	  Jaap	  de	  Wilde,	  Security:	  a	  new	  framework	  
for	  Analysis,	  (London:	  Lynne	  Rienner,	  1998).	  68	  Rens	  Van	  Munster,	  ‘The	  War	  on	  Terrorism:	  when	  the	  exception	  becomes	  the	  rule,’	  International	  Journal	  of	  the	  Semiotics	  of	  Law,	  Vol.	  17	  (2004),	  p.	  147.	  69	  Giorgio	  Agamben,	  State	  of	  Exception	  (London:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2005).	  70	  Slavoj	  Zizek,	  Welcome	  to	  the	  desert	  of	  the	  real	  (London:	  Verso,	  2002),	  p.	  108.	  71	  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  Negotiations	  1972-­‐1990,	  trans.	  Martin	  Joughin	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  p.	  181.	  72	  Massumi	  (Ed.),	  The	  Politics,	  pp.	  10-­‐11.	  73	  Amoore	  and	  de	  Goede,	  ‘Governing,’	  p.	  14.	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Simultaneously	   terrorize	   the	   American	   population	   into	   the	  preemptive	   policies	   of	   homeland	   security,	   and	   populations	   in	  Iraq	   and	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   Middle	   East	   through	   preemptive	  attacks.74	  	  The	  logic	  of	  pre-­‐emption,	  intended	  here	  as	  precautionary	  action	  in	  the	  face	  of	   uncertain	   or	   even	   imaginary	   threats,	   has	   a	   ‘self-­‐propelling’	   effect	   on	  government.75	  The	  2002	  National	  Security	  Strategy’s	  call	  for	  aggressive	  pre-­‐emption,76 	  and	   George	   W.	   Bush’s	   division	   of	   the	   world	   in	   ‘us	   vs.	   the	  terrorists’77	  created	  a	  situation	  of	  perpetual	  conflict	  (real	  or	  imagined)	  that	  justified	  the	  presence	  of	  forces	  abroad,	  and	  militarism	  at	  home.	  Beyond	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  risk	  and	  precaution	  that	  surrounded	  the	  Bush	  Doctrine	  and	  the	  build-­‐up	  to	  the	  2003	  Iraq	  War,	  Foucauldian	  scholars	  can	  also	  rely	  on	  more	  recent	   developments,	   such	   as	   the	   Obama	   Administration’s	   ‘signature	  strikes.’	   Part	   of	   the	   drone	   campaign,	   these	   strikes	   target	   not	   necessarily	  terrorist	   militants,	   but	   individuals	   who	   appear	   to	   behave	   like	   one	   in	   an	  insurgent-­‐controlled	  area.78	  The	  sovereign	  (the	  US	  government)	  emerges	  in	  foreign	  policy	  as	  strong	  and	  in	  control	  as	  it	  is	  in	  the	  domestic	  context.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Larner,	  ‘Spatial,’	  p.	  60.	  75	  Brian	  Massumi,	  ‘Potential	  Politics	  and	  the	  Primacy	  of	  Preemption,’	  Theory	  
and	  Event,	  2007,	  [http://muse.jhu.edu.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2massumi.html]	  (accessed	  10	  July	  2013).	  76	  US	  Government,	  National	  Security	  Strategy	  2002	  (September)	  [http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf]	  (accessed	  5	  August	  2013).	  77	  George	  W.	  Bush,	  ‘Address	  to	  a	  Joint	  Session	  of	  Congress	  and	  the	  Nation,’	  
The	  Washington	  Post,	  20	  September	  2001	  [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­‐srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html]	  (accessed	  20	  September	  2013).	  78	  Audrey	  Kurth	  Cronin,	  'Why	  Drones	  fail:	  when	  tactics	  drive	  strategy,'	  
Foreign	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  92,	  No.	  4	  (July/August	  2013),	  p.	  47.	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2.2.2	   Welcome	   to	   the	   risk	   society:	   reflexive	   modernity	   and	  
uncontrollable	  risks	  
2.2.2.1	  Beck’s	  Risk	  Society:	  the	  ageing	  of	  modernity	  
	  
Progress	  has	  turned	  into	  a	  sort	  of	  endless	  	  
and	  uninterrupted	  game	  of	  musical	  chairs	  
in	  which	  a	  moment	  of	  inattention	  	  
results	  in	  irreversible	  defeat.	  79	  	  Zygmunt	  Bauman.	  	  ‘Modernity	   is	   ageing:’	   this	   is	   the	   central	   tenet	   of	  Ulrich	  Beck’s	   risk	   society	  theory.	   Going	   beyond	   the	   ‘modern/post-­‐modern	   debate,’	   Beck	   argues	   that	  modernity	   is	  not	  dead;	   it	   is	  simply	  confronting	  the	  consequence	  of	   its	  own	  evolution.80	  The	   age	   we	   are	   living	   in	   represents	   the	   ultimate	   stage	   of	  industrialisation.	  Progress	  is	  taking	  its	  toll	  on	  humanity.81	  Beck	  argues	  that	  the	  risk	  society	  developed	  through	  several	  historical	  stages.	  In	  the	  timeline,	  pre-­‐industrial	   societies	   attributed	   accidents	   to	   Gods	   or	   to	   the	   role	   of	   fate.	  Industrial	  society,	  that	  he	  also	  calls	  the	  ‘reflex	  stage’	  of	  modernity,82	  started	  to	   perceive	   risks,	   but	   still	   considered	   them	   manageable.	   Risk	   society	  describes:	  	  	   A	  phase	  of	  development	  of	  modern	   society	   in	  which	   the	   social,	  political,	   ecological	   and	   individual	   risks	   created	   by	   the	  momentum	   of	   innovation	   increasingly	   elude	   the	   control	   and	  protective	  institutions	  of	  industrial	  society.83	  	  Risks	  derive	  from	  three	  types	  of	  threats:	  wealth-­‐driven	  threats	  coming	  from	  technology	   and	   science,	   poverty-­‐driven	   threats	   at	   the	   crossroads	   between	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Zygmunt	  Bauman,	  Liquid	  Times	  (Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press,	  2010),	  p.	  11.	  80	  Ulrich	  Beck,	  Scott	  Lash,	  and	  Anthony	  Giddens,	  Reflexive	  Modernization:	  
politics,	  tradition	  and	  aesthetics	  in	  the	  modern	  social	  order	  (Oxford:	  Polity	  Press,	  1995).	  81	  Ulrich	  Beck,	  ‘World	  at	  Risk:	  the	  new	  task	  of	  critical	  theory,’	  Development	  
and	  Society,	  Vol.	  37,	  No.	  1	  (June	  2008),	  p.	  2.	  82	  Ulrich	  Beck,	  ‘Risk	  Society	  and	  the	  Provident	  State,’	  in	  Scott	  Lash,	  Bronislaw	  Szerszynski,	  and	  Brian	  Wynne	  (Eds.),	  Risk,	  Environment	  and	  
Modernity:	  towards	  a	  new	  ecology	  (London:	  SAGE,	  1996).	  83	  Ulrich	  Beck,	  World	  Risk	  Society	  (Oxford:	  Polity	  Press,	  1999),	  p.	  72.	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environmental	   destruction	   and	   misery;	   and	   the	   proliferation	   of	   WMDs84	  (and	  terrorism,	  in	  Beck’s	  latest	  works).85	  The	  unprecedented	  nature	  of	  such	  risks	   is	   guaranteed	   by	   their	   ‘de-­‐bounded’	   nature.	   They	   are	   ‘socially	   de-­‐bounded:’	   the	   result	   of	   complex	  processes	   involving	   long	   term	  effects	   and	  catastrophic	   consequences 86 	  that	   deprive	   social	   institutions,	   such	   as	  insurance	   and	   accountability,	   of	   any	   meaning.87	  They	   are	   ‘spatially	   de-­‐bounded:’	   they	   ‘do	   not	   take	   nation-­‐state	   boundaries	   or	   any	   other	  boundaries...into	   account.’88	  They	   are	   ‘temporally	   de-­‐bounded.’	   The	   effects	  of	  risks	  are	  latent,	  and	  develop	  within	  extremely	  long	  time	  frames.89	  	  The	   emergence	   of	   these	   risks	   is	   the	   key	   development	   in	   the	   ‘risk	   society,’	  and	  yet,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  find,	  in	  Beck,	  a	  clear	  definition	  of	  risk.	  Throughout	  his	  work,	   Beck	   oscillated	   between	   realist	   and	   constructivist	   definitions.	   The	  book	  Risk	  Society	  originated	  from	  the	  concern	  over	  real	  environmental	  and	  health	   risks,	   such	   as	   those	   posed	   by	   the	   Chernobyl	   disaster.	   Beck	   argued	  that	   risks	  were	   real	   and	  produced	  by	  modernisation,	   but	  when	   it	   came	   to	  give	   a	   definition,	   he	   wrote	   that	   risk	   was	   not	   the	   problem	   in	   itself,	   but	   ‘a	  systematic	   way	   of	   dealing	   with	   hazards	   and	   insecurities	   induced	   and	  introduced	   by	   modernization.’90	  This	   was	   reflected	   in	   the	   confusion	   as	   to	  whether	   ‘risk	   society’	  meant	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   amount	   and	  magnitude	   of	  risks,	   or	   simply	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   tendency	   to	   interpret	   problems	   and	  dangers	  in	  terms	  of	  risk.	  Beck	  also	  seemed	  confused	  as	  to	  the	  social	  effects	  of	   risks,	   suggesting	   first	   that	   risks	   entail	   new	   conflicts	   over	   definition,	  creating	   ‘winners	  and	   losers’	   in	  risks;91	  but	   later	  exposing	   their	  egalitarian	  character	   -­‐	   smog	   could	   strike	   the	   rich	   and	   the	   poor	   with	   the	   same	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Beck,	  World	  Risk,	  p.	  35.	  85	  Ulrich	  Beck,	  ‘The	  Terrorist	  Threat.	  World	  Risk	  Society	  Revisited,’	  Theory,	  
Culture	  and	  Society,	  Vol.	  19,	  No.	  4	  (2002),	  pp.	  39-­‐55,	  and	  Ulrich	  Beck,	  World	  
at	  Risk	  (Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press,	  2009).	  86	  Ulrich	  Beck,	  ‘World	  at	  Risk,’	  p.	  10.	  87	  Beck,	  World	  Risk,	  p.	  55.	  88	  Mythen	  and	  Walklate,	  ‘Terrorism,’	  p.	  224.	  89	  Beck,	  ‘World	  at	  Risk.’	  	  90	  Ulrich	  Beck,	  Risk	  Society:	  towards	  a	  new	  modernity	  (London:	  SAGE,	  1992),	  p.	  21.	  91	  Beck,	  Risk,	  p.	  22.	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intensity.92	  The	  situation	  did	  not	   improve	  with	  World	  Risk	  Society,	  where	  it	  became	  unclear	  if	  ‘dangers’	  or	  ‘risks’	  were	  the	  problem.93	  Furthermore,	  Beck	  took	   a	   very	   constructivist	   position.	   ‘Ultimately,’	   he	   wrote,	   ‘it	   is	   cultural	  perception	   and	   definition	   that	   constitute	   risk.	   “Risk”	   and	   the	   “(public)	  definition	  of	  risk”	  are	  one	  and	  the	  same.’94	  Beck	  repeated	  this	  definition	   in	  his	   latest	   works,	   but	   here	   he	   seemed	   to	   achieve	   an	   uneasy	   compromise	  between	   constructivist	   and	   realist	   positions,	   blending	   constructivist	  ontology,	   with	   realist	   epistemology.	   ‘Risks,’	   he	   wrote,	   ‘do	   not	   have	   any	  abstract	   existence	   in	   themselves.	  They	  acquire	   reality	   in	   the	   contradictory	  judgments	  of	  groups	  and	  populations.’95	  	  In	   this	   labyrinth,	   one	   element	   seems	   to	   remain	   constant:	   risks	   depend	   on	  decisions.	   Like	   Anthony	   Giddens,	   Beck	   argues	   that	   risks	   depend	   on	   the	  centrality	   of	   ‘decision’	   typical	   of	   modernity	   and	   on	   processes	   of	  ‘disembedding’	   in	  which	   ‘distant	  events	  and	  actions	  have	  a	   constant	  effect	  on	  our	  lives,	  and	  a	  constantly	  increasing	  one	  too.’96	  Risks	  revolutionise	  time	  frames,	   representing	   an	   effort	   to	   colonise	   the	   future,	   to	   influence	   future	  events	  with	  today’s	  decisions:	  	   Risk	  reverses	  the	  relationship	  of	  past,	  present	  and	  future.	  The	  past	   loses	   its	  power	   to	  determine	   the	  present.	   Its	  place	  as	  a	  cause	  of	  present-­‐day	  experience	  is	  taken	  by	  the	  future.97	  	  Through	  actions	  taken	  in	  the	  present	  to	  tame	  uncertainty,	  decision-­‐makers	  create	   future	   risks.	   Risks	   ‘depend	   on	   decisions	   –	   that	   is	   they	   presuppose	  decisions.’	  They	   ‘arise	   from	  the	   transformation	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  hazards	  into	  decisions	  (and	  compel	  the	  making	  of	  decisions,	  which	  in	  turn	  produce	  risks).’98	  In	   this	  paradox	   lies	   the	   irony	  of	   the	   risk	   society.	   In	   our	   ‘runaway	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Beck,	  Risk,	  p.	  39.	  93	  Beck,	  World	  Risk,	  p.	  36.	  94	  Beck,	  World	  Risk,	  p.	  135.	  95	  Beck,	  World	  at	  Risk,	  p.	  13.	  96	  Anthony	  Giddens	  and	  Christopher	  Pearson,	  A	  Conversation	  with	  Anthony	  
Giddens	  (Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press,	  1998),	  p.	  98.	  97	  Beck,	  World	  Risk,	  p.	  137.	  98	  Beck,	  World	  Risk,	  p.	  75.	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world,’	  99	  we	  are	  surrounded	  by	  uncertainty	  and	  by	  unpredictable	  risks,	  but	  we	  still	  have	  to	  decide.	  We	  have	  to	  control	  something	  even	  though	  we	  do	  not	  know	  whether	  it	  exists.100	  The	  consequences	  of	  this	  paradox	  are	  enormous.	  The	  attempt	  to	  ‘colonize	  the	  future,’	  to	  decide	  even	  when	  facing	  uncertainty	  unleashes	  uncontrollable	  ‘boomerang	  effects.’	  The	  production	  of	  risks,	  Beck	  argues,	   ‘follows	  a	  boomerang	  curve:’	  risks	  that	  were	  previously	  considered	  secondary	  come	  back	  to	  haunt	  the	  centres	  of	  decision.101	  In	  this	  sense,	  Beck	  disagrees	   with	   Giddens.	   Reflexive,	   for	   Beck,	   does	   not	   mean	   subject	   to	  ‘endless’	   revision, 102 	  but	   self-­‐confrontation.	   The	   ‘heightening	   of	   the	  intention	  of	  control’	  produces	  the	  opposite	  effect.103	  This	  condition	  compels	  a	  shift	   in	  the	  purpose	  of	  society:	  whereas	  industrial	  society	  was	  concerned	  with	  the	  distribution	  of	  ‘goods,’	  risk	  society	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  avoidance	  of	  ‘bads.’104	  In	  Beck’s	  analysis,	  the	  recognition	  of	  these	  developments	  should	  lead	   to	  a	  new	   ‘cosmopolitan	  era’	  with	   forms	  of	   transnational	  politics	   from	  above,	  and	  of	  ‘sub-­‐politics’	  from	  the	  civil	  society.105	  In	  his	  post-­‐9/11	  works,	  however,	  he	  had	  to	  recognise:	   ‘the	  state	  is	  back,	  and	  for	  the	  old	  Hobbesian	  reason	  –	  the	  provision	  of	  security.’106	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Anthony	  Giddens,	  Runaway	  world	  (London:	  Profile	  Books,	  2002).	  100	  Beck,	  ‘World	  at	  Risk,’	  p.	  6.	  101	  Beck,	  Risk,	  p.	  37.	  102	  Anthony	  Giddens,	  The	  consequences	  of	  modernity	  (Stanford:	  Polity	  Press,	  1990),	  p.	  39.	  103	  Ulrich	  Beck,	  ‘The	  Reinvention	  of	  Politics:	  towards	  a	  theory	  of	  reflexive	  modernization,’	  in	  Ulrich	  Beck,	  Anthony	  Giddens,	  and	  Scott	  Lash	  (Eds.),	  
Reflexive	  Modernization:	  politics,	  tradition	  and	  aesthetics	  in	  the	  modern	  social	  
order	  (Oxford:	  Polity	  Press,	  1995),	  p.	  9.	  104	  Beck,	  World	  Risk,	  p.	  62.	  105	  Jens	  O.	  Zinn,	  ‘Risk	  Society	  and	  reflexive	  modernization,’	  in	  Zinn,	  Social	  
Theories	  of	  Risk.	  106	  Beck,	  ‘Terrorist,’	  p.	  47.	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2.2.2.2	  The	  Risk	  Society	  goes	  to	  War	  	  
Two	  Nokia	  mobiles,	  $150	  each,	  two	  HP	  printers,	  
	  $300	  each,	  plus	  shipping,	  
	  transportation	  and	  other	  miscellaneous	  expenses	  
	  add	  up	  to	  a	  total	  bill	  of	  $4,200.	  	  
That	  is	  all	  what	  [sic]	  Operation	  Haemorrhage	  cost	  us.107	  	  Since	   the	   ‘double	   surprise’	   of	   the	   2003	   Iraq	   (that	   Saddam	  was	   hiding	   no	  WMDs	   and	   that	   the	   ‘Mission	   Accomplished’	   celebrations	   were	   far	   too	  premature)	   that	   allegedly	   exposed	   the	   ‘irony’	   of	   the	   risk	   society,	   several	  scholars	  started	  to	  interpret	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  War	  on	  Terror	  as	  an	  effort	  to	  manage	   ‘de-­‐bounded’	   risks.	   In	   suggesting	   the	   new	   predominance	   of	   risk,	  scholars	  could	  rely	  on	  a	  series	  of	  official	  documents	  portraying	  risk	  as	   the	  new	   key	   concept	   in	   Western	   security.	   Since	   the	   early	   1990s,	   NATO	   had	  started	  to	  warn	  member	  states	  that	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  Soviet	  threat	  did	  not	  guarantee	   security.	   The	   1991	   Strategic	   Concept	   stated:	   ‘the	   threat	   of	   a	  simultaneous,	   full-­‐scale	   attack	   on	   all	   of	   NATO's	   European	   fronts	   has	  effectively	   been	   removed.’	   However,	   the	   alliance	   faced	   new	   risks	   ‘multi-­‐faceted	   in	   nature	   and	   multi-­‐directional,’	   and,	   for	   this	   reason,	   difficult	   to	  predict.108	  Similarly,	  the	  1999	  Concept	  stated:	   ‘the	  dangers	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  have	  given	  way…to	  new	  opportunities	  and	  risks.’	  Due	  to	  the	  appearance	  of	  ‘complex	   new	   risks,’	   the	   West’s	   policies	   should	   be	   geared	   towards	   early	  prevention.109	  Authors	  within	   this	   line	  of	   scholarship	   took	  NATO’s	  and	   the	  West’s	  position	  as	  their	  starting	  point.	  Two	  main	  elements	  predominate	   in	  these	   works:	   the	   portrayal	   of	   today’s	   world	   as	   one	   of	   unprecedented	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  in	  the	  Arabian	  Peninsula,	  Yahia	  Ibrahim,	  ‘$4200,’	  Inspire,	  Special	  Issue,	  ‘The	  Objectives	  of	  Operation	  Haemorrhage,’	  Vol.	  1431	  (2010),	  p.	  15	  [http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/375.pdf]	  (accessed	  23	  September	  2013).	  	  108	  NATO,	  ‘The	  Alliance	  New	  Strategic	  Concept,’	  7-­‐8	  November	  1991,	  [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm]	  (accessed	  18	  July	  2013),	  pp.	  7-­‐8.	  109	  NATO,	  ‘The	  Alliance	  Strategic	  Concept,’	  24	  April	  1999	  [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm]	  (accessed	  18	  July	  2013),	  p.	  3.	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uncertainty	  and	  danger,	  coupled	  with	  a	  nostalgia	  for	  the	  Cold	  War;	  and	  the	  study	  of	  Western	  policies	  as	  practices	  of	  risk	  management.	  	  Today’s	   uncertainty	   is	   framed	   in	   terms	   of	   entrance	   into	   a	   new	   age.	   In	   his	  
War	   in	   an	   Age	   of	   Risk,	   Christopher	   Coker	   portrays	   a	   world	   in	   which	  uncertainty	   ‘is	   not	   the	   outcome	   of	   defects	   in	   intelligence-­‐gathering,’	   but	  depends	   on	   the	   very	   limits	   of	   knowledge.	   Uncertainty	   is	   ‘the	   organising	  principle	  of	   today’s	  disorder.’110	  The	  point	  was	  made	  famous	  by	  former	  US	  Secretary	   of	   Defense	   Donald	   Rumsfeld’s	   distinction	   between	   ‘known	  unknowns’	  –	  things	  we	  don’t	  know	  but	  that	  we	  could	  know	  –	  and	  ‘unknown	  unknowns’	   –	   things	   we	   don’t	   know	   that	   we	   don’t	   know.111	  On	   this	   score,	  Coker	  compares	  our	  uncertain	  world	  with	  the	  clearer	  and	  simpler	  world	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  During	   the	  Cold	  War,	  Coker	   suggests,	   the	   capabilities	  of	   the	  enemy	   could	   be	   assessed	   through	   intelligence	   gathering.	   ‘Intentions	   too	  could	  be	  assessed	  with	  some	  accuracy	  by	  diplomats	  or	  academic	  who	  visited	  Moscow.’112 	  This	   is	   no	   longer	   possible;	   there	   is	   no	   enemy	   to	   spy	   on.	  Unpredictable	  risks	  have	  filled	  the	  gap	  left	  by	  a	  clearly	  defined	  threat.	  As	  in	  Beck,	  though,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  risks	  are.	  They	  often	  appear	  real.	  When	  a	  definition	  is	  provided,	  however,	  risk	  is	  defined	  as	  ‘a	  belief,	  or	  attitude,	  a	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	  world.’113	  	  	  Security,	   then,	   is	   not	   so	   much	   about	   assessing	   something	   that	   exists,	   but	  about	   anticipating	   something	   we	   do	   not	   know.	   Once	   again,	   the	   Cold	  War	  emerges	   as	   a	   clearer	   age.	  The	   risk	   calculus	  of	   the	  Cold	  War,	   Coker	  writes,	  ‘was	  part	  of	  an	  instrumental	  world,	  a	  realm	  that	  provided	  clear	  distinctions	  between	   safety	   and	   danger.’	   Today’s	   risks	   are	   both	   unpredictable	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  Christopher	  Coker,	  War	  in	  an	  Age	  of	  Risk	  (Cambridge:	  Polity,	  2009),	  p.	  148.	  111	  Donald	  Rumsfeld,	  ‘DoD	  News	  Briefing,	  Secretary	  Rumsfeld	  and	  Gen.	  Myers,’	  12	  February	  2002	  [http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636]	  (accessed	  23	  July	  2013),	  and	  Donald	  Rumsfeld,	  Known	  and	  Unknown	  (New	  York:	  Sentinel,	  2011).	  112	  Coker,	  War,	  p.	  95.	  113	  Coker,	  War,	  p.	  66.	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present,	   and	   ‘associated	   with	   the	   unintended	   consequences	   of	   our	   own	  actions.’114	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   ‘we	   are	   forced	   to	   reflect	   even	   more	   on	   our	  circumstances	   because	   the	   cost	   of	   getting	   it	   wrong	   has	   risen	   so	  greatly.’115Decision-­‐making	   becomes	   almost	   impossible.	   No	   wonder	   that	  many	   policies	   fail.	   Policies	   are	   doomed	   to	   failure	  when	   consequences	   can	  snowball	  and	  risks	  can	  cascade.	  	   We	  can	  take	  responsibility	   for	   the	  consequences	  of	  our	  actions	  but	  we	  will	  never	  know	  what	   those	  consequences	  are	  going	   to	  be,	   we	   can	   never	   anticipate	   all	   of	   them,	   and	   we	   can	   never	  calculate	  with	  any	  precision,	  the	  cost	  of	  those	  that	  we	  can.116	  	  	  Hence,	  Coker	  concludes,	  policy	  makers	  should	  abandon	  grandiose	  projects	  of	   New	   World	   Orders,	   and	   should	   settle	   for	   a	   practical,	   day-­‐to-­‐day	  management	  of	  disorder.117	  	  	  In	  similar	  fashion,	  Mikkel	  Rasmussen	  affirmed	  that	  following	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	   War,	   Western	   societies	   started	   to	   recognise	   the	   existence	   of	   an	  ‘unpredictable	   and	   uncontrollable	   environment.’ 118 	  This	   recognition,	   he	  suggested,	   compelled	  a	   change	   in	   strategy.	   In	  a	   risk	  environment,	   strategy	  means	  choosing	  the	  risks	  you	  take	  before	  they	  choose	  you.119	  Policymakers	  need	  to	  mothball	  long-­‐term	  strategies,	  such	  as	  containment	  and	  deterrence	  that	   guided	   foreign	   policy	   during	   the	   Cold	   War,	   in	   favour	   of	   short-­‐term	  management.	  Whereas	  strategy	  used	  to	  represent	  the	  outcome	  of	  linear	  and	  rational	   thinking,	   security	   today	   needs	   to	   settle	   for	   much	   less:	   a	  ‘meteorologist	   approach.’	   Meteorology	   is	   a	   ‘method	   for	   making	   the	  unpredictable	  predictable	  by	  creating	  a	  scenario	   for	  what	  will	  happen	  and	  giving	   people	   the	   opportunity	   to	   act	   accordingly.’120	  Once	   again,	   it	   is	   not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  Coker,	  War,	  p.	  69.	  115	  Coker,	  War,	  p.	  5.	  116	  Coker,	  War,	  p.	  130.	  117	  Coker,	  War,	  p.	  151.	  118	  Mikkel	  Vedby	  Rasmussen,	  The	  Risk	  Society	  at	  War	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  p.	  95.	  119	  Rasmussen,	  The	  Risk,	  p.	  35.	  120	  Rasmussen,	  The	  Risk,	  p.	  98.	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clear	  what	  risks	  are.	  They	  are	  defined	   first	  as	   ‘a	  systematic	  way	  of	  dealing	  with	  hazards	  and	  insecurities,’	  and	  later	  as	  ‘flows,’	  and	  a	  matter	  of	  ‘political	  judgment.’121	  What	   is	   clear	   is	   that	   they	   predominate,	   making	   our	   world	  much	  more	  uncertain	   than	   the	  Cold	  War	  world,	  and	   imposing	  a	  shift	   from	  long-­‐term	  strategy	  to	  short-­‐term	  risk	  management.	  And	  it	  is	  more;	  through	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  ‘risk	  framework,’	  the	  criteria	  through	  which	  policy	  choices	  should	  be	  assessed	  change.	  Successes	  are	  impossible	  to	  identify	  since	  a	  risk	  prevented	  will	  never	  materialise.	  More	   importantly,	   the	   fact	   that	  past	   ‘risk	  justifications’	  proved	  empty	  should	  not	  be	  a	  primary	  concern.122	  The	  more	  so,	  since	  the	  outcomes	  of	  any	  decision	  depend	  on	   ‘boomerang	  effects’	  over	  which	  decision-­‐makers	  lack	  control.123	  	  	  In	   Coker	   and	   Rasmussen,	   risk	  management	   emerges	   as	   the	  most	   suitable	  path	  to	  security.	  Other	  scholars	  have	  dealt	  with	  questions	  of	  who	  manages	  risks	   and	   with	   how	   risk	   management	   affects	   Western	   policies.	   Michael	  Williams	  wrote	  that	  with	  the	  predominance	  of	  risks	  and	  of	  practices	  of	  risk	  management,	  124 	  common	   definitions	   of	   risk	   become	   the	   new	   basis	   for	  collective	   action.	   NATO	   turns	   from	   an	   Alliance,	   into	   a	   risk	   community.125	  Yee-­‐Kuang	   Heng	   argues	   that	   with	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	   War,	   new	   risks,	  radicalised	   by	   globalisation,	   have	   changed	   not	   only	   security,	   but	   also	   the	  nature	  and	  practice	  of	  war.	  To	  build	  his	  framework,	  Heng	  borrows	  elements	  from	   literatures	   outside	   the	   foreign	   policy	   context,	   and	   defines	   risk	  management	   as	   a	   cyclical	   process	   of	   perception,	   assessment,	   action,	   and	  communication.126	  In	   this	   analysis,	   risk	   -­‐	   defined	   in	   terms	   of	   probabilities	  and	  magnitude	  of	  the	  probable	  outcome	  -­‐	  is	  clearly	  interpreted	  as	  different	  from	   threat,	   which	   is	   defined	   in	   term	   of	   capabilities	   and	   intentions.	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Rasmussen,	  The	  Risk,	  pp.	  33	  and	  114.	  122	  Rasmussen,	  The	  Risk,	  p.	  127.	  123	  Rasmussen,	  The	  Risk,	  p.	  129.	  124	  Michael	  J.	  Williams,	  ‘(In)security	  Studies:	  Reflexive	  Modernization	  and	  the	  Risk	  Society,’	  Cooperation	  and	  Conflict,	  Vol.	  43	  No.	  1	  (2008),	  p.	  58.	  We	  will	  return	  to	  this	  definition.	  125	  Michael	  J.	  Williams,	  NATO,	  Security	  and	  Risk	  Management	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2009).	  126	  Yee-­‐Kuang	  Heng,	  War	  as	  Risk	  Management:	  Strategy	  and	  Conflict	  in	  an	  
Age	  of	  Globalised	  Risks	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2006),	  p.	  54.	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substitution	   of	   threats	   with	   risks,	   Heng	   affirms,	   affected	   recent	   western	  military	   operations	   (from	   Kosovo	   to	   Iraq)	   driving	   every	   moment	   of	   the	  campaign.	   The	   impetus,	   aims,	   and	   conduct	   of	   war	   changed.127	  In	   Heng’s	  opinion,	  today’s	  risks	  revolutionise	  war	  and	  foreign	  policy.	  For	  this	  reason,	  a	  ‘new	  minimalism’	  should	  inspire	  their	  conduct.128	  	  	  
2.2.3	  The	  two	  scholarships	  reconsidered	  	  As	   should	   be	   clear	   from	   the	   account	   above,	   the	   Beckian	   and	   Foucauldian	  literatures	   within	   IR	   start	   from	   different	   perspectives,	   look	   at	   different	  levels	   of	   analysis,	   and	   have	   different	   normative	   outlooks.	   Beyond	   these	  differences,	  however,	  a	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  permits	  the	  identification	  of	  common	  tenets.	  Both	  schools	  seem	  to	  share	  three	  main	  propositions:	  	  1)	   They	   identify	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   historical	   divide,	   and	   they	   justify	   the	  existence	  of	  such	  divide	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  new	  uncertainty,	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  rise	  of	  risk.	  	  	   -­‐ Foucauldian	  scholars	  generally	  position	  the	  divide	  with	  the	  terrorist	  attacks	   of	   9/11	   when	   the	   unpredictability	   of	   terrorism	   pierced	  through	  governments’	  illusion	  of	  control,	  -­‐ For	  Beckian	  scholars,	  9/11	  represented	  only	   the	   latest	  episode	  of	  a	  longer	  process	  started	  with	  the	  dissolution	  of	   the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  spread	  of	  risks	  substituted	  the	  certainty	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  threat.	  	  	  2)	   Both	   schools	   identify	   a	   shift	   from	   longer-­‐term	   practices	   of	   security,	   to	  short-­‐term,	  and	  constantly	  running	  practices	  of	  risk	  management.	  	  	   -­‐ For	  Foucauldian	  scholars,	  the	  new	  ‘double	  infinity’	  of	  risk	  means	  that	  governments	   are	   constantly	  on	   the	  move,	   constantly	  managing	   real	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  Heng,	  War,	  p.	  58.	  See	  also	  Edward	  Luttwak,	  ‘Towards	  post-­‐heroic	  warfare,’	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  74,	  No.	  3	  (May/June	  1995),	  pp.	  109-­‐120,	  and	  Martin	  Shaw,	  The	  New	  Western	  Way	  of	  War	  (Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press,	  2005).	  128	  Heng,	  War,	  p.	  59.	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or	   imaginary	   risks.	   The	   mask	   of	   risk	   management	   permits	   the	  continuous	   promotion	   of	   governmental	   control	   and	   of	   practices	  aimed	  at	  socio-­‐political/neoliberal	  gains,	  -­‐ For	  Beckian	  scholars,	  risk	  reshapes	  strategy,	  war,	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  foreign	   policy.	   During	   the	   Cold	   War,	   policy-­‐makers	   could	   rely	   on	  long-­‐term	   strategies,	   whereas	   today	   they	   need	   to	   adopt	   a	   ‘fire-­‐fighter’	  behaviour	  extinguishing	  risks	  before	  they	  escalate.	  Risks	  are	  not	   liable	   to	   be	   eradicated,	   but,	   at	   best,	   managed.	   As	   such,	   they	  revolutionise	  the	  goals	  of	  foreign	  policy,	  towards	  a	  ‘new	  minimalism.’	  	  3)	   As	   should	   be	   clear	   from	   the	   two	   points	   above,	   both	   schools	   share	   a	  radical	   view	   of	   the	   decision-­‐maker,	   and	   of	   his/her	   possibilities	   of	   control	  over	   the	  external	   environment	  and	  over	   the	   consequences	  of	  his/her	  own	  actions.	  	   -­‐ In	   the	   Foucauldian	   scholarship,	   the	   government	   is	   almost	  omnipotent,	   extending	   governmental	   control	   to	   more	   and	   more	  aspects	   of	   society.	   In	   this	   effort,	  multiple	   layers	   of	   sovereignty	   and	  ‘petty	   sovereigns’	   support	   the	   government,	   sharing	   its	   lawless	  power.	  This	  state	  of	  exception	  is	  as	  powerful	  in	  the	  domestic	  context,	  as	   it	   is	   in	   the	   international	   one,	  where	   pre-­‐emptive	   action	   imposes	  control	  on	  the	  external	  ‘other.’	  -­‐ In	   the	   Beckian	   scholarship,	   the	   decision-­‐maker	   appears	   almost	  hopeless.	  He/She	   confronts	  de-­‐bounded	   risks	   that	  he/she	   is	  unable	  to	   control	   due	   to:	   the	   radical	   uncertainty	   of	   the	   environment,	   the	  impossibility	  of	  controlling	  the	  consequences	  of	  his/her	  own	  actions,	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  unpredictable	  boomerang	  effects.	  	  To	   summarise,	   the	   two	   schools	   identify	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   clear	   historical	  divide,	  originating	   in	   the	   rise	  of	   risk	  and	  uncertainty,	  which	  brings	   radical	  changes	   in	   the	  way	  decision-­‐making,	   and	   foreign	  policy	   are	   conducted.	  As	  previously	  stated,	  the	  overarching	  aim	  of	  the	  thesis	  is	  to	  evaluate	  the	  extent	  and	   nature	   of	   this	   historical	   divide;	   to	   assess	   whether	   the	   nature	   and	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practice	   of	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making	   has	   changed	   quite	   so	   radically	  between	   the	   Cold	  War	   and	   the	   post-­‐Cold	  War	   or	   post-­‐9/11	  world.	   In	   the	  account	   above,	   the	   emergence	   of	   risk	   and	   uncertainty	   is	   presented	   as	   the	  main	   determinant	   of	   the	   historical	   and	   political	   divide.	   To	   assess	   the	  existence	   of	   such	   a	   divide,	   one	   has	   to	   evaluate	   the	   claim	   that	   risk	   and	  uncertainty	   represent	   radically	   new	   features	   of	   the	   international	   context.	  Before	  addressing	  this	  theme,	  however,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  come	  to	  grips	  with	  what	   risk	   and	   uncertainty	   are,	   and	   with	   how	   decision-­‐makers	   deal	   with	  them.	  	  	  From	   a	   review	   of	   this	   literature,	   two	  main	   problems	   emerge.	   First,	   as	  we	  have	   seen,	   although	   relying	  on	   risk	   and	  uncertainty	   as	  main	   justifications,	  these	  schools	  offer	  vague	  and	  often	  contradictory	  conceptualisations.	  In	  the	  Beckian	   scholarship,	   risks	  are	   sometimes	   real	   and	   sometimes	   constructed.	  They	  are	  defined	  as	  the	  danger	  itself,	  as	  the	  probability	  of	  danger,	  and	  as	  a	  way	  to	  deal	  with	  uncertainty	  and	  danger.130	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  unclear	  if	  the	  changes	   in	   international	   politics	   occur	   because	   the	   amount	   of	   risk	   has	  increased,	   or	   because	   ‘strategists’	   have	   become	   more	   risk-­‐conscious.	  Uncertainty	  is	  described	  as	  a	  brand	  new	  phenomenon.	  Beckian	  scholars	  rely	  on	  a	  rough	  simplification	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  which	  appears	  as	  a	  simple	  ‘bean	  counting’	   exercise	   between	   the	   superpowers,	   and	   as	   an	   era	   of	   complete	  certainty	   and	   foresight.	   As	   Heng	   puts	   it,	   only	   the	   ‘structural	   novelty’	   of	  today’s	   world,	   brought	   about	   by	   risks,	   made	   knowing	   the	   future	  impossible. 131 	  Uncertainty	   seems	   to	   depend	   alternatively	   on	   lack	   of	  knowledge,	   on	   the	   impossibility	   of	   knowing,	   and	   on	   the	   impossibility	   of	  controlling	   the	   consequences	   of	   one’s	   own	   actions.	   Foucauldian	   scholars	  oscillate	  between	  constructivist	  and	  post-­‐structuralist	  definitions.	  Risks	  are	  sometimes	  ‘mediated’	  and	  sometimes	  defined	  as	  ‘dispositifs’.	  In	  this	  twist,	  as	  a	   critic	   has	   put	   it,	   risks	   lose	   essence,	   they	   become	   ‘unreal,’	   and	   turn	   into	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  Scott	  Campbell	  and	  Greg	  Currie,	  ‘Against	  Beck:	  in	  defence	  of	  risk	  analysis,’	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  Social	  Sciences,	  Volume	  36,	  No.	  2	  (June	  2006),	  p.	  151.	  131	  Hen,	  War,	  p.	  50.	  It	  is	  unclear	  in	  which	  past	  historical	  era	  we	  ‘knew’	  the	  future.	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‘empty	   signifiers.’ 132 	  Uncertainty	   derives	   from	   the	   ‘double	   infinity’	   of	  contemporary	   risks,	   and	   it	   is	   carelessly	  understood	  as	   a	  pretext	   to	   extend	  practices	  of	  risk-­‐precaution.133	  	  The	   second	   problem	   concerns	   the	   understanding	   of	   agency.	   Although	   the	  various	  developments	   in	  domestic	   and	   international	  politics	   are	  discussed	  mainly	  at	  the	  structural	  level,	  both	  schools	  often	  refer	  to	  ‘decision-­‐makers,’	  ‘government’	   and	   ‘strategists.’	   Neither	   account	   goes	   into	   much	   detail	   in	  discussing	  who	  ‘decision-­‐makers’	  are	  and	  what	  they	  do.	  Furthermore,	  both	  accounts	   provide	   unrealistic	   portrayals	   of	   the	   ‘risk	   decision-­‐maker,’ 134	  especially	   in	   foreign	   policy.	   Before	   assessing	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   historical	  divide,	   this	   analysis	   will	   search	   for	   a	   more	   consistent	   and	   precise	  understanding	   of	   risk,	   uncertainty	   and	   of	   the	   role	   and	   possibilities	   of	   the	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐maker.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132	  Clapton,	  ‘Risk,’	  p.	  284.	  133	  Tanja	  Aalberts	  and	  Wouter	  Werner,	  ‘Mobilising	  uncertainty	  and	  the	  making	  of	  responsible	  sovereign,’	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies,	  Vol.	  37	  (2011),	  pp.	  2183-­‐2200.	  134	  The	  definition	  ’risk	  decision-­‐maker’	  was	  inspired	  by	  a	  study	  of	  the	  ‘risk	  citizen’	  emerging	  from	  sociological	  interpretations	  of	  risk.	  Sandra	  Walklate	  and	  Gabriel	  Mythen,	  ‘Agency,	  reflexivity	  and	  risk:	  cosmopolitan,	  neurotic	  of	  prudential	  citizen?’	  The	  British	  Journal	  of	  Sociology,	  Vol.	  61,	  No.	  1	  (2010),	  pp.	  46-­‐62.	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2.3	  DECISION	  THEORY:	  RISK	  AND	  RISK-­‐TAKING	  IN	  FOREIGN	  POLICY	  	  
Decision	  theory	  is	  the	  theory	  
of	  deciding	  what	  to	  do	  	  
when	  it	  is	  uncertain	  what	  will	  happen.135	  Ian	  Hacking.	  	  Although	  the	  study	  of	  risk	   in	   international	  politics	   is	  sometimes	  presented	  as	  a	  new	  endeavour,136	  several	  authors	  have	  discussed	  risk	  and	  risk-­‐taking	  to	  explain	  how	   foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐makers	  deal	  with	  uncertainty.	  Most	  of	   these	   scholars	   relied	   on	   understanding	   risk	   as	   probability.137	  However,	  they	  also	  recognised	  that	  events	  in	  international	  politics	  were	  ‘unique’	  and	  thus	   beyond	   statistical	   analysis.	   As	   John	   Herz	   wrote,	   the	   study	   of	  international	   politics	   suffered	   from	   the	   exceptionality	   of	   its	   events.138	  The	  predominance	  of	  exceptionality	  critically	  affected	  the	  efforts	   to	  export	  risk	  as	   a	   purely	   probabilistic	   concept	   in	   the	   field	   of	   foreign	   policy.	   More	  specifically,	   the	   fact	   that	   events	   in	   international	   politics	   are	   unique	   and	  often,	   necessarily,	   rare,	   made	   these	   scholars	   uneasy	   in	   the	   discussion	   of	  ‘risk,’	   especially	   since	   they	   considered	   the	   concept	  of	   risk	   relevant	  only	   in	  cases	   where	   a	   precise	   calculus	   of	   probability	   is	   possible	   and	   available.139	  Throughout	  its	  evolution,	  this	  ‘decision	  theory’	  literature	  has	  demonstrated	  an	   inherent,	   often	   ill-­‐concealed	   conflict.	   Between	   the	  messiness	   of	   politics	  and	  the	  clarity	  of	  a	  scientific	  account,	  the	  second	  has	  too	  often	  prevailed.	  If	  the	  sociological	  literature	  discussed	  the	  US	  as	  primary	  example	  of	  a	  shift	  in	  the	   practices	   of	   foreign	   policy,	   several	   authors	  within	   this	   literature	   have	  focused	  on	  US	  foreign	  policy	  and	  on	  Presidential	  decision-­‐making.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  Ian	  Hacking,	  The	  Emergence	  of	  Probability	  (London:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1975),	  p.	  62.	  136	  Bracken	  et	  al.	  (Eds.),	  Managing,	  p.	  1.	  137	  Frank	  Knight	  defined	  risk	  as	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  we	  know	  the	  odds.	  Frank	  Knight,	  Risk,	  Uncertainty	  and	  Profit	  (Cambridge:	  Mifflin	  and	  Company,	  1921).	  We	  will	  return	  to	  this	  definition.	  138	  John	  Herz,	  International	  Politics	  in	  the	  Atomic	  Age	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1959),	  p.	  4.	  139	  We	  will	  see	  how	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  case.	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2.3.1	  From	  Bernoulli	  to	  Vertzberger	  
2.3.1.1	  Bernoulli	  meets	  Allison’s	  Rational	  Actor	  Model	  	  In	   the	   1970s,	   Eugene	   Alpert	   suggested	   that	   risk	   could	   play	   a	   part	   in	  understanding	   international	   behaviour.	   Like	   Herz,	   he	   recognised	   that	  international	  politics	  could	  not	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘frequentist’	  (that	  is	  objective)	  probability.	  As	  he	  wrote,	  ‘the	  statement	  "France	  will	  probably	  go	  to	   war	   tomorrow"	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   probability	   statement	   but	   it	   is	   very	  difficult	   to	  see	  how	  it	  could	  describe…frequencies	  of	  outcomes	  of	  repeated	  experiment.’140	  He	  suggested,	  as	  alternative,	  the	  use	  of	  Bayesian	  probability	  -­‐	   that	   is	   probability	   based	   on	   a	   degree	   of	   belief.141	  This	   study,	   however,	  focused	   mainly	   on	   uncertainty	   and	   the	   model	   was	   applied	   to	   a	   state’s	  perception	   of	   other	   powers’	   capabilities.	   Only	   with	   Hannes	   Adomeit	   risk	  clearly	  took	  the	  centre	  stage	  in	  international	  politics.	  	  	  Acknowledging	   the	   difficulty	   in	   transferring	   Knight’s	   risk	   to	   international	  politics,	   Adomeit	   wrote:	   ‘When	   political	   scientists	   talk	   of	   risk,	   they	   have	  something	   in	  mind	  which	   is	   puzzling	   to	   an	   economic	   theorist:	   a	   degree	  of	  belief	  about	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  catastrophe	  in	  the	  relations	  among	  states.’142	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  concession,	  Adomeit	  explained	  Soviet	  risk-­‐taking	  behaviour	  through	  Daniel	  Bernoulli’s	   ‘expected	  utility	  theory.’	  According	  to	  Bernoulli,	  the	   utility	   of	   an	   outcome	   for	   each	   individual,	   and	   not	   its	   inherent	   value,	  determined	   the	   choice.	   Decisions	   could	   not	   be	   understood	  without	   taking	  into	  account	   the	   ‘characteristics	  of	   the	  persons	   themselves.’143	  Since	  utility	  decreases	  with	  an	   increase	   in	   the	  amount	  of	  a	  good	  possessed,	   individuals	  are	   naturally	   risk-­‐averse:	   the	  more	   they	   have	   the	   less	   they	   are	  willing	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  140	  Eugene	  J.	  Alpert,	  ‘Capabilities,	  Perceptions,	  and	  risks:	  a	  Bayesian	  model	  of	  international	  behavior,’	  International	  Studies	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  20,	  No.	  3	  (September	  1976),	  p.	  422.	  141	  Alpert,	  ‘Capabilities,’	  p.	  422.	  142	  Hannes	  Adomeit,	  Soviet	  Risk-­‐taking	  and	  Crisis	  Behavior	   (London:	  George	  Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  1982),	  p.	  17.	  143	  Daniel	  Bernoulli,	  ‘Exposition	  of	  a	  new	  theory	  on	  the	  measurement	  of	  risk,’	  Econometrica,	  Vol.	  22,	  No.	  1	  (Jan.	  1954),	  p.	  24.	  Translated	  by	  Louise	  Sommer;	  original	  first	  published	  in	  1738.	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risk.	  In	  his	  study,	  Adomeit	  defined	  ‘calculated	  risk-­‐taking,’	  as	  the	  conscious	  choice	   among	   alternatives,	   and	   contended	   that	   it	   could	   be	   successfully	  explained	  by	  referring	  to	  a	  state’s	  utility	  function.	  	  	  In	  the	  analysis,	  two	  elements	  stand	  out.	  First,	  whereas,	  in	  deterrence	  theory,	  the	  stronger	  actor	  might	  be	  tempted	  to	  attack,	  here,	  following	  Bernoulli,	  ‘the	  player	  with	  the	  stronger	  position’	  will	  be	  risk-­‐averse,	  while	  the	  weaker	  will	  take	  higher	  risks	  in	  a	  desperate	  effort	  to	  turn	  the	  tide.144	  Second,	  Adomeit’s	  most	  controversial	  hypothesis	  stated	  that	  a	  player’s	  risk-­‐taking	  propensity	  influenced	   its	   risk-­‐taking.145	  Adomeit	   openly	   acknowledged	   that	   such	   a	  hypothesis	   approached	   a	   truism,	   but	   dismissed	   any	   need	   for	   further	  explanation.	   If	   a	   state’s	   risk-­‐taking	   propensities	   are	   understood	   as	   the	  product	  of	  a	  single	  utility	  function,	  that	  state	  needs	  to	  speak	  with	  one	  voice.	  The	   state	   must	   be	   interpreted	   as	   a	   unitary	   actor.	   ‘The	   most	   appropriate	  research	   procedure	   for	   the	   analysis	   of	   risk-­‐taking	   behaviour,’	   Adomeit	  accordingly	  wrote,	   ‘appears	  to	  be	  the	  consideration	  of	  a	  nation’s	  behaviour	  in	   terms	   of	   a	   rational	   actor	   model.’146	  In	   doing	   so,	   he	   did	   not	   ignore	   the	  effects	   of	   other	   variables	   such	   as	   human	   weaknesses,	   organisational	  constraints	   or	   domestic	   politics,	   but	   simply	   discounted	   their	   role.	   For	  organisations	   to	   work,	   he	   wrote,	   ‘someone	   had	   to	   give	   the	   orders.’147	  Similarly,	   although	   ‘bureaucratic	   politics’	   and	   human	   weaknesses	   could	  influence	   decision-­‐making	   processes,	   countermeasures	   taken	   during	  international	  crises	  compensated	  for	  ‘irrational	  elements.’148	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  Adomeit,	  Soviet,	  p.	  18.	  145	  Adomeit,	  Soviet,	  p.	  23.	  146	  Adomeit,	  Soviet,	  p.	  38.	  147	  Adomeit,	  Soviet,	  p.	  35.	  	  148	  Adomeit,	  Soviet,	  p.	  48.	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2.3.2.2	  Prospect	  Theory’s	  reality	  check	  
The	  failure	  of	  the	  rational	  model	  is	  not	  in	  its	  logic	  	  
but	  in	  the	  human	  brain	  it	  requires.149	  Daniel	  Kahnmenan	  	  Adomeit’s	  model	  was	  based	  on	   the	   assumptions	   that	  Bernoulli’s	   ‘expected	  utility	   theory’	   closely	   approached	   human	   and,	   as	   an	   extension,	   state	  behaviour.	   Prospect	   Theory	   (PT)	   questioned	   Bernoulli’s	   assumptions.	  Scholars	  such	  as	  Daniel	  Kahneman,	  Amos	  Tversky,	  and	  Paul	  Slovic	  redefined	  the	  understanding	  of	  decision-­‐making	  under	  uncertainty.	  According	  to	  these	  scholars,	   the	   decision	   process	   developed	   in	   two	  main	   phases.	   In	   the	   first	  part,	  which	  they	  labelled	  ‘judgment	  under	  uncertainty’,	   ‘heuristics’	  or	  rules	  of	   thumb,	   such	   as	   ‘illusion	   of	   validity,’	   ‘availability,’	   and	   ‘anchoring’150	  are	  used	   to	   model	   uncertainty.	   The	   establishment	   of	   ‘frames’	   also	   helps	   in	  simplifying	   the	  decision	   task,	  categorising	   ‘outcomes	   in	   terms	  of	  gains	  and	  losses.’151	  Heuristics	   and	   framing	   strategies	   are	   successful	   in	   modelling	  uncertainty,	   in	  reducing	  the	  complexity	  of	   ‘probability	  assessments’	  and	   in	  partially	  easing	  decisional	  stress;152	  still,	  they	  are	  far	  from	  inconsequential.	  In	   this	   process,	   ‘certain	   prospects	   become	   labelled	   as	   potential	   options	  while	  others	  are	  disregarded	  from	  consideration.’153	  	  	  In	   the	   second	   part,	   once	   uncertainty	   has	   been	   reduced	   and	   the	   problem	  framed,	   decision-­‐makers	   start	   to	   evaluate	   the	   remaining	   alternatives.154	  In	  contrast	  with	  previous	  theories,	  the	  selection	  of	  an	  option	  does	  not	  depend	  on	   value	   or	   utility,	   but	   on	   a	   decision-­‐maker’s	   ‘domain.’155	  The	   ‘domain’	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  149	  Bernstein,	  Against,	  p.	  284.	  150	  Daniel	  Kahneman,	  Paul	  Slovic,	  and	  Amos	  Tversky,	  Judgment	  under	  
Uncertainty:	  heuristics	  and	  biases	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1982);	  and	  Daniel	  Kahneman,	  Thinking	  Fast	  and	  Slow	  (London:	  Penguin	  Books,	  2011).	  151	  Rose	  McDermott,	  Risk-­‐Taking	  in	  International	  Politics:	  Prospect	  Theory	  in	  
American	  Foreign	  Policy	  (Ann	  Arbor:	  Michigan	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  p.	  22-­‐24.	  152	  Kahneman	  et	  al.,	  Judgment,	  p.	  2.	  153	  McDermott,	  Risk-­‐Taking,	  p.	  25.	  154	  McDermott,	  Risk-­‐Taking,	  p.	  5.	  155	  McDermott,	  Risk-­‐Taking,	  pp.	  28-­‐29.	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established	  by	  comparing	  the	  situation	  at	  hand	  with	  a	   ‘reference	  point’	  -­‐	   ‘a	  state	   to	   which	   one	   has	   adapted’	   -­‐	   influenced	   by	   variables	   such	   as	   social	  norms,	   expectations	   and	   aspiration.156	  Decision-­‐makers	   will	   adopt	   a	   risk-­‐averse	  behaviour	  if	  they	  perceive	  it	  to	  be	  in	  a	  domain	  of	  gains	  -­‐	  that	  is	  when	  things	   are	   going	   well	   -­‐	   and	   a	   risk-­‐seeking	   one	   in	   a	   domain	   of	   losses.	  Furthermore,	   individuals	   demonstrate	   a	   relative	   ‘loss	   aversion’,	   that	   is	  ‘losing	  hurts	  more	  than	  comparable	  gains.’157	  	  	  Many	  scholars	  have	  built	  on	  PT	  to	  interpret	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making.	  Most	   of	   these	   studies	   have	   focused	   on	   US	   Presidents	   and	   on	   Presidential	  decision-­‐making	   in	   foreign	   policy.	   In	   Rose	   McDermott’s	   study,	   a	   decision	  maker’s	   status	   quo	   represents	   his	   reference	   point.	   Using	   the	   ‘domain’	   as	  explanatory	  variable,	  McDermott	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  ignore	  other	  dimensions	   such	   as	   individual	   characteristics.	   McDermott	   defines	   risk	   as	  ‘relative	  variance	   in	  outcome.’	  158	  The	  evaluation	  of	  outcome	  variance,	   that	  is	  the	  ‘riskiness’	  of	  a	  choice,	  depends	  on	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  domain.	  In	  particular,	  ‘U-­‐turns’	  such	  as	  that	  of	  President	  Carter	  on	  the	  admission	  of	  the	  Shah	  in	  New	  York,	  and	  high	  risk-­‐taking	  such	  as	  Carter’s	  decision	  to	  go	  ahead	  with	  the	  hostage	  rescue	  mission,	  are	  explained	  as	  a	  change	  of	  domain	  from	  one	  of	  perceived	  gains	  to	  one	  of	  perceived	  losses.159	  In	  PT’s	  favour,	  decision-­‐makers’	   perceptions	   are	   certainly	   crucial,	   ‘loss-­‐aversion’	   is	   a	   common	   and	  intuitive	  phenomenon,	  and	   the	   focus	  on	   the	  domain	  permits	  simplification	  of	   the	   explanation	   of	   foreign	   policy.	   Furthermore,	   PT	   seems	   to	   offer	  acceptable	   explanations	   for	   dynamics	   of	   commitment	   and	   entrapment.	   In	  domains	  of	  losses,	  policymakers	  might	  be	  willing	  to	  take	  increased	  risks	  in	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  156	  Amos	  Tversky	  and	  Daniel	  Kahneman,	  ‘The	  framing	  of	  decision	  and	  the	  psychology	  of	  choice,’	  Science,	  Vol.	  211,	  No.	  4481	  (1981),	  p.	  456.	  157	  McDermott,	  Risk-­‐Taking,	  p.	  29.	  158	  McDermott,	  Risk-­‐Taking,	  p.	  39.	  159	  McDermott,	  Risk-­‐Taking,	  and	  Rose	  McDermott,	  ‘Prospect	  Theory	  and	  International	  Relations:	  The	  Iranian	  Hostage	  rescue	  Mission,’	  Political	  
Psychology,	  Vol.	  13,	  No.	  2	  (June	  1992),	  pp.	  237-­‐263.	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desperate	   effort	   to	   decisively	   turn	   the	   tide,	   but	   ending	   up	   knee-­‐deep	   in	  quagmires.160	  	  	  Although	  convincing	  at	  a	  first	  look,	  three	  main	  charges	  can	  be	  levied	  against	  PT.	   First,	   as	   Jack	   Levy	   suggests,	   in	   the	   account,	   decision-­‐makers’	   risk-­‐propensity	  seems	  to	  depend	  on	  a	   ‘regret’	   for	  a	   lost	  status	  quo.	  There	   is,	   in	  other	   words,	   a	   ‘premium’	   on	   the	   status	   quo.161	  Second,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	  discern	  what	   ‘status	  quo’	  means:	   ‘In	  some	  cases,	   the	  reference	  point	   is	  not	  the	  status	  quo,	  but	  something	  better.	  The	  gap	  between	  this	  desired	  state	  of	  affairs	  and	  the	  current	  one	  can	  lead	  to	  high	  risk-­‐taking.’162	  Third,	  there	  are	  problems	   in	   the	   translation	  of	  PT’s	  original	   laboratory	   setting	   into	   foreign	  policy	   decision-­‐making.	   PT	   findings	   are	   based	   on	   individual	   subjects	   and	  explicit,	   structured	   decisions,	  with	   no	   stress	   or	   tension	   involved.	   In	   these	  examples,	  ‘the	  original	  formulation…leaves	  no	  room	  for	  further	  editing,’	  and	  ‘the	   edited	   prospects	   can	   be	   specified	   without	   ambiguity.’ 163 	  This	   is	  abysmally	  different	  from	  what	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐makers	  face.	  	  For	   this	   reason,	   several	   scholars	  have	  maintained	   the	  core	  assumptions	  of	  PT	  but	  have	  added	  other	  theoretical	  insights.	  Jeffrey	  Taliaferro	  has	  coupled	  defensive	  realism	  and	  loss	  aversion	  to	  explain	  great	  powers’	  intervention	  in	  the	   periphery. 164 	  Williams	   Boettcher	   III	   has	   included	   PT	   in	   his	   ‘risk	  explanation	   framework.’	   The	   framework	   aimed	   at	   explaining	   Presidential	  risk-­‐taking	   in	   US	   foreign	   policy	   building	   on	   individual	   variables.	   Starting	  from	  Knight,	   like	  many	   others,	   Boettcher	   argued	   that	   the	   concepts	   of	   risk	  and	  uncertainty	  have	  too	  often	  been	  modelled	  according	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  the	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  Barry	  M.	  Staw,	  ‘Knee-­‐deep	  in	  the	  Big	  Muddy,’	  Organizational	  Behavior	  
and	  Human	  Performance,	  Vol.	  16	  (1979),	  pp.	  27-­‐44.	  	  161	  Jack	  S.	  Levy,	  ‘Loss	  aversion,	  Framing,	  and	  Bargaining,’	  International	  
Political	  Science	  Review,	  Vol.	  17,	  No.	  2	  (Apr.	  1992),	  pp.	  179-­‐195.	  162	  Robert	  Jervis,	  ‘Political	  Implications	  of	  loss	  aversion,’	  Political	  Psychology,	  Vol.	  13,	  No.	  2	  (June	  1992),	  p.	  196.	  163	  Daniel	  Kahneman	  and	  Amos	  Tversky,	  ‘Prospect	  Theory:	  an	  analysis	  of	  decision-­‐making	  under	  risk,’	  Econometrica,	  Vol.	  47,	  1979,	  p.	  275.	  164	  Jeffrey	  W.	  Taliaferro,	  Balancing	  Risks:	  Great	  Power	  Intervention	  in	  the	  
Periphery	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2004).	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field	   to	   which	   they	   have	   been	   applied.165	  Foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making	  occurs,	   in	  his	  opinion,	   in	  a	  condition	  of	   ‘subjective	  risk	  under	  uncertainty.’	  Policymakers	   face	   a	   situation	   in	   which	   ‘the	   complete	   set	   of	   potential	  outcomes…and	  outcome	  probabilities	  are	  not	   fully	  known,’	   and	   this	   forces	  them	   to	   ‘develop	   subjective	   estimates	   of	   potential	   outcomes,	   the	   value	   of	  those	   outcomes,	   and	   the	   probabilities	   associated	   with	   the	   occurrence	   of	  those	  outcomes.’166	  As	   in	  McDermott,	   ‘riskier	  choice’	  means	  one	  with	  more	  numerous	   and	   more	   divergent	   possible	   outcomes. 167 	  Furthermore,	  Boettcher	  acknowledges	  that	  status	  quo	  means	  different	  things	  to	  different	  people.	   In	   his	   framework,	   a	   US	   President’s	   personality	   becomes	   the	  main	  driver	   of	   foreign	   policy	   choice.	   Using	   Margaret	   Hermann’s	   study	   of	  personality-­‐at-­‐a-­‐distance168	  and	  building	  on	  Lola	  Lopes’	  ‘aspiration	  level,’169	  he	   hypothesises	   that	   if	   a	   President’s	  main	  motivation	   is	   ‘security,’	   he	  will	  base	   estimates	   on	  worst-­‐case	   scenarios	   and	   losses.	   This	   will	   lead	   to	   risk-­‐aversion.	  If,	  conversely,	  a	  President	  is	  driven	  by	  ‘potential,’	  he	  will	  see	  gains	  and	  best-­‐case	  scenarios,	  leading	  to	  risk-­‐seeking	  behaviour.	  	  	  This	  model	   successfully	   deflects	   some	   of	   the	   attacks	   on	   PT,	   and	   correctly	  positions	  the	  President	  at	  the	  helm	  of	  foreign	  policy.	  However,	  the	  abysmal	  difference	   between	   the	   messiness	   of	   political	   decisions	   and	   the	   aseptic	  nature	   of	   prospect	   theory	   remains.170	  Similarly,	   too	   narrow	   a	   focus	   on	  psychology	   leads	   to	   a	   dismissal	   of	   the	   role	   of	   politics	   and	   political	  variables.171	  Ignoring	  such	  criticisms,	  Boettcher	  identifies	  the	  presence	  of	  a	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  William	   Boettcher	   III,	   Presidential	   Risk	   Behavior	   in	   Foreign	   Policy:	  
Prudence	  or	  Peril	  (New	  York:	  Palgrave	  MacMillan,	  2005),	  p.	  17.	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  Boettcher	  III,	  Presidential,	  p.	  19.	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  Boettcher	  III,	  Presidential,	  p.	  20.	  168	  Margaret	  G.	  Hermann,	  ‘Explaining	  Foreign	  Policy	  Behavior	  using	  the	  personal	  characteristics	  of	  political	  leaders,’	  International	  Studies	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  27	  (1980),	  pp.	  7-­‐46.	  169	  Lola	  Lopes	  and	  Gregg	  C.	  Oden,	  ‘The	  role	  of	  aspiration	  level	  in	  risky	  choice,’	  Journal	  of	  Mathematical	  Psychology,	  Vol.	  43	  (1999),	  pp.	  286-­‐313.	  170	  Jack	  S.	  Levy,	  ‘Prospect	  Theory	  and	  International	  Relations:	  Theoretical	  applications	  and	  analytical	  problems,’	  Political	  Psychology,	  Vol.	  13,	  No.	  2	  (June	  1992),	  pp.	  283-­‐310.	  171	  Jervis,	  ‘Political.’	  
	   54	  
realm	   of	   relative	   freedom	   in	  which	   a	   President	   can	   decide	   unimpeded	   by	  domestic	  or	  international	  pressures.172	  	  	  
2.3.2.3	  Vertzberger’s	  ‘convergent	  synergism’	  	  In	   an	   effort	   to	   duplicate	   the	   complexity	   of	   international	   politics,	   some	  authors	  have	  tried	  to	  bring	  together	  insights	  from	  several	  theories.	  Yaacov	  Vertzberger	   expanded	   his	   work	   on	   decision-­‐making173	  to	   look	   at	   how	   US	  Presidents	  and	  policymakers	  perceive	  risks.	  Risk,	  Vertzberger	  wrote,	  is	  a	  far	  more	   complex	   concept	   than	   most	   of	   the	   studies	   acknowledge.	   In	   his	  definition	  risk	  is:	  	  	   The	   likelihood	   that	   validly	   predictable,	   direct	   and	   indirect	  consequences,	  with	   potentially	   adverse	   values,	  will	  materialize	  arising	   from	   particular	   events,	   self-­‐behavior,	   environmental	  constraints,	  or	  the	  reaction	  of	  an	  opponent	  or	  third	  party.174	  	  Although	   probability	   still	   seems	   to	   play	   a	   major	   role	   in	   the	   definition,	  Vertzberger	   also	   added	   that	   different	   types	   of	   risk	   exist.	   A	   ‘real	   risk’	   out	  there,	  a	  ‘perceived	  risk,’	  depending	  on	  decision-­‐makers’	  perceptions,	  and	  an	  ‘acceptable	  risk,’	  a	  level	  set	  by	  the	  decision-­‐makers	  according	  to	  the	  context	  in	   which	   they	   act.175	  To	   understand	   which	   risks	   are	   accepted	   in	   foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making,	  Vertzberger	  suggested	  the	  use	  of	  a	   ‘socio-­‐cognitive	  approach.’	   This	   framework	   includes:	   individual	   level	   variables	   such	   as	  cognitive	   and	   emotional	   biases; 176 	  social-­‐level	   variables	   such	   as	   group	  dynamics, 177 	  and	   cultural-­‐level	   variables 178 	  affecting	   the	   perception	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  172	  Boettcher	  III,	  Presidential,	  p.	  2.	  	  173	  Yaacov	  Vertzberger,	  The	  World	  in	  their	  Minds,	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1990).	  174	  Yaakov	  Vertzberger,	  Risk	  Taking	  and	  Decisionmaking:	  Foreign	  Military	  
Intervention	  decisions	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  p.	  22.	  175	  Vertzberger,	  Risk	  Taking,	  p.	  17.	  176	  Ellen	  Langer,	  ‘The	  Illusion	  of	  control,’	  Journal	  of	  Personality	  and	  Social	  
Psychology,	  Vol.	  32,	  No.	  2	  (1975),	  pp.	  311-­‐328;	  and	  Irving	  L.	  Janis	  and	  Leon	  Mann,	  Decision-­‐making	  (New	  York:	  Free	  press,	  1977).	  177	  Dorwin	  Cartwright,	  ‘Risk	  taking	  by	  individuals	  and	  groups,’	  Journal	  of	  
Personality	  and	  Social	  Psychology,	  Vol.	  20,	  No.	  3,	  pp.	  361-­‐378;	  and	  Paul	  ‘t	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risk.179 	  Vertzberger	   suggests	   that	   several,	   often	   contradictory,	   elements	  influence	   risk-­‐taking.	   Pushed	   and	   pulled,	   decision-­‐makers	   rarely	   make	   a	  decision	  with	  the	  clarity	  suggested	  by	  the	  rational	  actor	  model.180	  Decisions	  are	   taken	   in	   a	   piecemeal	   fashion.	   ‘Decision-­‐makers	   contemplate,	   hesitate,	  anticipate,	  rethink	  and	  change	  their	  minds.’	  The	  final	  decision	  is	  the	  product	  of	   ‘convergence’	   and	   ‘synergism;’	   the	   accumulated	   effect	   of	   several	  variables.181	  	  	  In	   spite	   of	   an	   admirable	   depth,	   however,	   Vertzberger’s	   account	   is	   not	  faultless.	   First,	   in	   his	   analysis,	   the	   ‘convergent	   synergism’	   seems	   to	   fade	  away,	   substituted	   by	   an	   interpretation	   of	   decisions	   as	   a	   ‘once-­‐and-­‐for-­‐all’	  event.	   No	   concern	   is	   shown	   for	   the	   choices	   and	   actions	   that	   brought	  decision-­‐makers	   to	   the	   point	   where	   they	   had	   to	   accept	   or	   avoid	   risks.	  Second,	   these	   decisions	   are,	   somewhat	   unconvincingly,	   divided	   into	   ‘high	  risk’	  or	  ‘low	  to	  moderate	  risk’,	  as	  though	  their	  outcomes	  were	  known	  at	  the	  very	   beginning	   and	   decision-­‐makers	   could	   measure	   their	   actions	  accordingly.	   Whereas	   this	   is	   tenable	   for	   decisions	   such	   as	   the	   US	  intervention	   in	   Grenada	   or	   Panama,	   an	   account	   in	   the	   same	   terms	   of	   US	  involvement	  in	  Vietnam	  seems	  more	  problematic.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Hart,	  Groupthink	  in	  Government	  (London:	  The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1990).	  178 	  Douglas	   and	   Wildavsky,	   Risk;	   and	   Aaron	   Wildavsky	   and	   Karl	   Dake,	  ‘Theories	  of	  Risk	  Perception,’	  Daedalus,	  Vol.	  119,	  No.	  4	  (Fall),	  pp.	  41-­‐60.	  179	  Vertzberger,	  Risk	  Taking,	  p.	  8.	  180	  Vertzberger,	  Risk	  Taking,	  p.	  109.	  181	  Vertzberger,	  Risk	  Taking,	  p.	  394.	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2.4	  AN	  INTERIM	  REPORT	  CARD	  	  
If	  war	  were	  arithmetic,	  
the	  mathematicians	  would	  rule	  the	  world.182	  	  	  
Part	   two	   concluded	   by	   identifying	   key	   tenets	   and	   weaknesses	   of	   the	  sociological	  approaches	  to	  risk.	  The	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  above	  aimed	  at	  assessing	   whether	   ‘decision	   theory’	   provided	   a	   more	   consistent	   and,	  ultimately,	  more	  convincing,	   interpretation	  of	  risk	   in	   foreign	  policy,	  and	  of	  the	   role	   of	   decision-­‐makers.	   The	   report	   card,	   however,	   is	   quite	   bleak.	  Not	  only	   does	   this	   literature	   share	   some	  of	   the	  weaknesses	   of	   the	   sociological	  approach,	   but	   it	   also	   presents	   problems	   of	   its	   own.	   First,	   as	   in	   the	  sociological	  literature,	  it	  is	  almost	  impossible	  to	  find	  a	  univocal	  definition	  of	  risk.	  Some	  scholars	  define	  risk	   in	  terms	  of	  probabilities,	  others	   in	  terms	  of	  variance	  in	  outcomes.	  Second,	  striving	  for	  a	  scientific	  outlook,	  these	  scholars	  have	  reified	  risk.	  Risk	  is	  too	  often	  used	  as	  an	  ‘external	  substance,	  an	  entity	  with	   a	   location	   and	   quantity,’	   that	   decision	   makers	   are	   free	   to	   take	   or	  avoid.183	  The	   presence	   of	   a	   real	   and	   constant	   risk	   out	   there,	   feasible	   as	   it	  might	   be	   in	   a	   laboratory	   setting,	   seems	   less	   plausible	   in	   the	   world	   of	  international	  politics.184	  A	  third	  problem	  is	  the	  dismissal	  of	  domestic	  politics	  and	  of	  domestic	  political	  variables;	  key	  factors	   in	  how	  states	  and	  decision-­‐makers	  manage	  risks.	  	  	  Adomeit	   dismissed	   the	   role	   of	   politics	   since	   the	   introduction	   of	   petty	  politicking	   would	   not	   have	   improved	   the	   strength	   of	   the	   analysis. 185	  McDermott	  similarly	  remarked	  that	  preferences	  and	  values	  are	  constructed	  within	  the	  domain,	  and	  not	  elicited	  by	  political	  developments.186	  Boettcher	  dismissed	  ‘domestic	  politics’	  arguing	  that	  Presidential	  decisions	  were	  often	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  182	  Lord	  Baelish,	  Game	  of	  Thrones,	  Season	  2,	  Episode	  4.	  183	  Barry	  O’Neill,	  ‘Risk	  Aversion	  in	  International	  Relations	  Theory,’	  
International	  Studies	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  45,	  No.	  4	  (2001),	  p.	  636.	  184	  Eldar	  Shafir,	  ‘Prospect	  Theory	  and	  political	  analysis:	  a	  psychological	  perspective,’	  Political	  Psychology,	  Vol.	  13,	  No.	  2	  (1992),	  pp.	  311-­‐322.	  185	  Adomeit,	  Soviet.	  186	  McDermott,	  Risk-­‐Taking,	  p.	  185.	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‘made	  with	   little	  public	  or	  congressional	   involvement,’	  and	  that	  Presidents	  often	   perceived	   and	   enjoyed	   ‘a	   relatively	   open	   decision	   space.’187	  Even	  Vertzberger,	  in	  his	  ‘convergent	  synergism,’	  identified	  the	  role	  of	  politics	  and	  domestic	   factors	  as	  variables	  affecting	  the	  perception	  and	   ‘acceptability’	  of	  an	  external	  risk,	  rather	  than	  as	  powerful	  forces	  of	  their	  own.188	  In	  this	  sense,	  if	   the	   decision-­‐maker	   of	   the	   sociological	   literature	   appeared	   either	   too	  powerful	   or	   too	   weak,	   the	   decision-­‐maker	   emerging	   from	   this	   literature	  appears	  too	  aseptic.	  As	  Mary	  Douglas	  wrote,	  in	  this	  literature:	  	  	   Humans	  are	  presented…as	  hedonic	   calculators…We	  are	   said	   to	  be	  risk-­‐aversive,	  but,	  alas,	  so	  inefficient	  in	  handling	  information	  that	  we	  are	  unintentional	  risk-­‐takers;	  basically	  we	  are	  fools.189	  	  In	  particular,	  studies	  of	  US	  foreign	  policy	  often	  identify	  the	  President	  as	  the	  ‘ultimate’	   decision-­‐maker,	   but	   he	   emerges	   as	   largely	   unconcerned	   by	  developments	  around	  him,	  unimpaired	  in	  his	  ability	  to	  make	  decisions,	  free	  to	   follow	   his	   personal	   risk	   propensity	   in	   taking	   or	   avoiding	   clear	   and	  predetermined	  risks,	  and	  sometimes	  able	  to	  perfectly	  assess	  those	  risks	   in	  advance.	  The	  review	  of	  the	  ‘decision	  theory’	  literature	  has	  not	  improved	  our	  understanding	  of	  risk	  and	  uncertainty,	  of	  the	  role	  they	  play	  in	  foreign	  policy,	  and	  of	  the	  predicament	  of	  the	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐maker.	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  analysis	  will	  now	  move	  towards	  a	  reconceptualisation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  187	  Boettcher	  III,	  Presidential,	  p.	  2.	  188	  Vertzberger,	  Risk	  Taking.	  189	  Douglas,	  Risk,	  p.	  13.	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CHAPTER	  3:	  RE-­‐CONCEPTUALISING	  RISK	  IN	  FOREIGN	  POLICY	  
3.1	  INTRODUCTION	  
	  The	   previous	   chapter	   started	   with	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   sociological	   risk	  literature	  and	  discussed	  the	  main	  claims	  authors	  within	  these	  schools	  make.	  In	  particular,	   it	   focused	  on	   their	  account	  of	   the	   rise	  of	   risk,	  of	   the	  ensuing	  unprecedented	  level	  of	  uncertainty,	  and	  of	  the	  changes	  these	  developments	  brought	   to	   the	   nature	   and	   practice	   of	   foreign	   policy.	   Sceptical	   of	   this	  portrayal	   of	   decision-­‐making	   and	   of	   the	   conceptualisations	   of	   risk	   and	  uncertainty	   provided	   in	   the	   literature,	   the	   chapter	   started	   a	   search	   for	  better	   interpretations.	   This	   search	   ended	   inconclusively,	   largely	   bogged	  down	   in	   the	   too	   aseptic	   accounts	   of	   various	   decision	   theory	   authors.	   The	  aim	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   continue	   this	   search,	   and	   to	   provide	   a	  reconceptualisation	  of	   risk	  and	  uncertainty,	  and	  of	   the	  role	   these	  concepts	  play	   in	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making.	   In	   achieving	   this	   aim,	   the	   analysis	  will	  also	  provide	  a	  better	  portrayal	  of	  who	  the	  ‘decision-­‐makers’	  are;	  of	  their	  role;	  and	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  control	  the	  environment	  in	  which	  they	  act	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  their	  own	  actions.	  	  	  
Part	   two	   of	   the	   chapter	  will	   discuss	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making	   texts	  and	   will	   identify	   hints	   as	   to	   the	   role	   of	   risk,	   uncertainty	   and	   risk	  management	  in	  foreign	  policy.	  Following	  in	  the	  path	  of	  the	  sociological	  and	  decision	   theory	   literatures,	   the	   analysis	  will	   concentrate	   on	   the	   activity	   of	  US	   Presidents	   and	   their	   inner	   circle.	  Part	   three	  will	   provide	   operational	  definitions	   of	   risk,	   uncertainty	   and	   risk	   management	   relying	   on	   seminal	  works	   on	   risk	   and	   uncertainty,	   and	   on	   more	   recent	   risk	   management	  literature.	  With	  a	  clear	  set	  of	  definitions,	  Part	  four	  will	  proceed	  to	  establish	  a	   connection	   between	   the	   two	  worlds,	   suggesting	   an	   interpretation	   of	   US	  Presidential	  decision-­‐making	  as	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  risk	  management.	  Part	  
five	  will	  suggest	  that	  the	  study	  of	  foreign	  policy	  crises	  represents	  a	  suitable	  area	   to	   explore	   these	   issues.	   It	   will	   discuss	   the	   literature	   on	   crises,	   and	  provide	   an	   alternative	   interpretation	   of	   crises	   as	   long-­‐term	   processes	  emerging	   from	   the	   mismanagement	   of	   risks.	   Part	   six	   will	   conclude	   the	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chapter	   specifying	   the	   research	   hypotheses	   that	  will	   drive	   the	   analysis	   in	  the	  case	  studies.	  	  
3.2	  RISK,	  UNCERTAINTY	  AND	  RISK	  MANAGEMENT:	  A	  FOREIGN	  POLICY	  
PERSPECTIVE	  
	  
3.2.1	  Schelling’s	  uncertain	  competition	  in	  risk-­‐taking	  
	  Uncertainty	   has	   been	   interpreted	   as	   the	   main	   determinant	   of	   the	   Cold	  War/Post-­‐Cold	  War	  divide.	  Despite	  suggesting	  entrance	  into	  an	  ‘age	  of	  risk,’	  many	   ‘sociological	   risk’	   scholars	   point	   to	   uncertainty	   as	   the	   overarching	  feature	  of	  the	  contemporary	  international	  context.	  The	  recent	  discussion	  of	  uncertainty	   unveils	   several	   flaws.	   At	   the	   theoretical	   level,	   the	   claim	   to	  novelty	  seems	  quite	  weak.	  As	  Brian	  Rathbun	  put	  it,	  the	  ‘force	  of	  uncertainty	  is	   central	   to	   every	   major	   research	   tradition	   in	   the	   study	   of	   IR.’1	  More	  specifically,	   on	   ‘uncertainty	   as	   lack	   of	   information,’	   the	   argument	   is	  fascinatingly	   simple.	   The	   presence	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   guaranteed	   the	  possibility	   of	   assessing	   capabilities	   and	   intentions,	   filling	   informational	  gaps.	   Its	   absence	   today	   impedes	   such	   an	   assessment;	   hence	   the	  predominance	  of	  uncertainty.	  The	  point	  is	  surprising	  since,	  discussing	  Iraq,	  Coker	  states	   that	   ‘there	   is	  only	  so	  much	  the	  world	  can	  know	  about	  what	  a	  secretive	  regime	  chooses	  to	  spend	  its	  money	  on.’2	  If	  this	  assessment	  applies	  to	   Iraq,	   it	   is	   unclear	   why	   it	   should	   not	   have	   applied	   to	   the	   Soviet	   Union.	  Moreover,	   even	   if	   this	   argument	   could	   be	   right	   in	   suggesting	   that	   Soviet	  capabilities	  could	  be	  (and	  sometimes	  were)	  known,3	  the	  analysis	  goes	  awry	  when	   intentions	   are	   brought	   into	   the	   picture.	   This	   is	   both	   intuitive	   -­‐	   if	  intentions	  could	  be	  known,	  one	  is	  left	  to	  wonder	  why	  there	  was	  a	  Cold	  War	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Brian	  Rathbun,	  ‘Uncertain	  about	  Uncertainty:	  Understanding	  the	  multiple	  meanings	  of	  a	  crucial	  concept	  in	  International	  Relations	  Theory,’	  
International	  Studies	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  51,	  No.	  3	  (2007),	  p.	  533.	  2	  Coker,	  War,	  p.	  97.	  3	  Even	  this	  concession	  is	  quite	  generous,	  as	  recent	  revelations	  on	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis	  and	  on	  Soviet	  chemical	  and	  biological	  arsenals	  have	  made	  clear.	  See	  Michael	  Dobbs,	  One	  minute	  to	  midnight	  (Vintage:	  London,	  2009),	  and	  David	  Hoffman,	  The	  Dead	  Hand	  (New	  York:	  Anchor	  Books,	  2009).	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in	  the	  first	  place	  -­‐	  and	  demonstrated	  by	  several	  strands	  of	  literature,	  such	  as	  the	  study	  of	  the	  ‘security	  dilemma.’	  Although	  disagreeing	  on	  its	  origins,	  John	  Herz	  and	  Herbert	  Butterfield	  –	  the	  fathers	  of	  the	  ‘security	  dilemma’	  -­‐	  agreed	  that	   the	   ‘dilemma’	  represented	  a	   ‘fundamental	  human	  predicament.’4	  More	  recently,	  Ken	  Booth	  and	  Nicholas	  Wheeler	  have	  confirmed	  uncertainty	  and	  the	   impossibility	   of	   knowing	   as	   key	   features	   of	   international	   politics.5	  The	  Cold	  War	  security	  dilemma,	  recently	  portrayed	  as	  an	  idyllic	  condition,	  was	  more	  realistically	  a	  kingdom	  of	  fear	  and	  uncertainty:	  	   Everything	  was	  uncertain.	  Who	  was	  responsible	  for	  ‘pushing	  the	  button’?	  Could	  people	  ‘trust’	  machines	  and	  supercomputers	  not	  to	   malfunction?	   How	   real	   was	   the	   Soviet	   threat?	   Were	   entire	  populations	  being	  manipulated?	  Would	  a	  nuclear	  war	  be	  as	  bad	  as	  ‘they’	  say	  –	  and	  who	  exactly	  were	  ‘they’?6	  	  As	  Sherman	  Kent	  -­‐	   the	  first	  to	  distinguish	  between	   ‘known	  unknowns’	  and	  ‘unknown	  unknowns’	   -­‐	  put	   it	   in	   the	  1960s,	   in	   ‘a	  world	  of	  closed	  covenants	  secretly	   arrived	   at,	   of	   national	   business	   conducted	   behind	   the	  walls	   of	   all	  but	   impenetrable	   security,	  of	   skilfully	  planned	  deceptions,’	   evidence	   is	  not	  always	  available.	  All	  decision-­‐makers	  can	  rely	  on	   is	   the	  knowledge	   that	  an	  event	  is	  ‘neither	  certain	  to	  happen	  nor	  is	  its	  happening	  an	  impossibility.’	  7	  	  On	   uncertainty	   as	   ‘impossibility	   of	   knowing,’	   and	   uncertainty	   as	   lack	   of	  control,	  the	  sociological	  arguments	  seem	  equally	  wanting.	  Decision-­‐makers	  have	  always	  confronted	  situations	  in	  which	  issues	  are	  knowable,	  and	  others	  in	   which	   estimates	   must	   be	   based	   on	   ‘something	   that	   no	   man	   alive	   can	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  See	  John	  Herz,	  ‘Idealist	  Internationalism	  and	  the	  Security	  Dilemma,’	  World	  
Politics,	  Vol.	  2,	  No.	  2	  (January	  1950),	  pp.	  157-­‐180;	  and	  Herbert	  Butterfield,	  
History	  and	  Human	  Relations	  (London:	  Collins,	  1951),	  p.	  14.	  5	  Ken	  Booth	  and	  Nicholas	  Wheeler,	  The	  Security	  Dilemma	  (New	  York:	  Palgrave	  MacMillan,	  2008).	  6	  Joanna	  Bourke,	  Fear:	  a	  cultural	  History	  (London:	  Virago	  Press,	  2006),	  p.	  285.	  	  	  7	  Sherman	  Kent,	  ‘Words	  of	  Estimative	  probability,’	  Studies	  in	  Intelligence,	  Fall	  1964	  [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-­‐for-­‐the-­‐study-­‐of-­‐intelligence/csi-­‐publications/books-­‐and-­‐monographs/sherman-­‐kent-­‐and-­‐the-­‐board-­‐of-­‐national-­‐estimates-­‐collected-­‐essays/6words.html]	  (accessed	  30	  July	  2013).	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know.’8	  To	  be	   sure,	  during	   the	  Cold	  War,	   the	  presence	  of	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  meant	   that	   there	  was	  an	  enemy	   to	   spy	  on.	  The	  problems	  of	   foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐makers,	  however,	  were	  not	  limited	  to	  assessing	  Soviet	  capabilities	  and	  intentions,	  surprises	  and	  unknowns	  could	  come	  from	  several	  quarters.	  Furthermore,	   as	   Gary	   Sick	   wrote	   in	   his	   study	   of	   the	   Iranian	   Revolution,	  although	   foreign	   policy	   events	   develop	   largely	   as	   a	   chess	   game,	   the	  possibility	  of	  hurricanes	  swiping	  away	  the	  game	  and	  its	  rules	  always	  looms	  large.9	  For	   this	   reason,	   the	   study	  of	   foreign	  policy	  has	  always	   included	   the	  possibility	  of	  loss	  of	  control.	  	  	  Thomas	   Schelling	   was	   the	   first	   to	   identify	   the	   interplay	   between	   risk,	  uncertainty	   and	   loss	   of	   control.	   His	   Arms	   and	   Influence	   is	   generally	  remembered	   for	   the	   description	   of	   the	   superpower	   confrontation	   as	   a	  competition	   in	   risk-­‐taking.10	  Schelling,	   however,	   recognised	   the	   bounded	  nature	  of	  such	  competition.	  He	  understood	  war	  and	  international	  politics	  as	  a	   realm	   of	   confusion,	   uncertainty	   and	   high	   unpredictability,	   originating	   in	  the	   fallibility	   of	   human	   beings	   and	   in	   the	   imperfection	   of	   their	  governments.11	  	  	   Not	  everybody	  is	  always	   in	  his	  right	  mind.	  Not	  all	   the	  frontiers	  and	   thresholds	   are	   precisely	   defined…and	   known	   to	   be	   so	  beyond	  the	  least	  temptation	  to	  test	  them	  out.12	  	  Uncertainty	   normally	   envelops	   decision-­‐making,	   and	   enveloped	   the	  superpower	   confrontation.	   ‘The	   fact	   of	   uncertainty	   –	   the	   sheer	  unpredictability	   of	   dangerous	   events,’	   Schelling	   wrote,	   ‘not	   only	   blurs	  things,	   it	   changes	   their	   character.’ 13 	  Similarly,	   in	   his	   discussion	   of	  brinkmanship,	   Schelling	   warned	   that	   the	   ‘brink’	   was	   not	   an	   easily	  controllable	  area.	   ‘Neither	   the	  person	  standing	   there	  nor	  onlookers	  can	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Kent,	  ‘Words.’	  9	  Gary	  Sick,	  All	  Fall	  Down	  (New	  York:	  Penguin	  Books,	  1986),	  pp.	  45-­‐46.	  10	  Thomas	  Schelling,	  Arms	  and	  Influence	  (London:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2008	  [1966]),	  p.	  95.	  	  11	  Schelling,	  Arms,	  p.	  93.	  12	  Schelling,	  Arms,	  p.	  93.	  13	  Schelling,	  Arms,	  p.	  94.	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quite	   sure	   just	   how	   great	   the	   risk	   is…Brinkmanship	   involves	   getting	   onto	  the	  slope	  where	  one	  may	  fall	  in	  spite	  of	  his	  own	  best	  efforts.’14	  In	  this	  sense,	  uncertainty	   is	   both	   present,	   as	   impossibility	   of	   knowing;	   and	   future	   as	  impossibility	  of	  controlling	  the	  consequences	  of	  one’s	  own	  action.	  	  	  Uncertainty	  changes	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  in	  unpredictable	  ways.	  Such	  is	  the	  context	   in	   which	   decision-­‐makers	   are	   called	   to	   perform.	   Knowledge,	   as	  Roger	   Hilsman	   wrote	   at	   the	   end	   of	   his	   experience	   in	   the	   Kennedy	  Administration,	  is	  always	  ‘inadequate.’	  Inadequacy	  comes	  not	  only	  from	  the	  difficulty	   in	  comprehending	   ‘how	  and	  why	  things	  work	  in	  the	  social	  affairs	  of	  men,’	  but	  also	  from	  limited	  capacity	   ‘to	  foresee	  developments	  that	  bring	  problems,’	   and	   to	   ‘predict	   the	   consequences	   of	   whatever	   action	   we	   take.’	  Furthermore,	   Hilsman	   added,	   the	   problem	   is	   not	   simply	   one	   of	   lack	   of	  information,	   ‘more	   and	   better	   understanding	   will	   not	   always	   necessarily	  lead	   to	   sure	   solutions	   to	   knotty	   problems.’	   The	   inadequacy	   of	   knowledge	  also	   increased	  with	   the	   complexity	   of	   foreign	   affairs	   where	   problems	   are	  always	   ‘new.’15	  In	   spite	   of	   their	   lack	   of	   understanding,	   in	   spite	   of	   their	  inability	  to	  predict	  the	  consequences	  of	  their	  own	  actions,	  decision-­‐makers	  are	  still	  compelled	  to	  act.	  	  	  
3.2.2	   Neustadt’s	   ‘fire-­‐fighter’	   behaviour:	   risk	   management	   and	  
Presidential	  decision-­‐making	  	  Beyond	  uncertainty,	  the	  second	  tenet	  of	  the	  sociological	  scholarship	  was	  the	  shift	   from	   long-­‐term	   strategies	   such	   as	   ‘containment,’	   to	   short-­‐term	  practices	   of	   risk	   management.	   Once	   again,	   however,	   a	   quick	   look	   at	   the	  literature	   suggests	   that	   several	   scholars	   had	   already	   identified	   the	  difficulties	   and	   often	   the	   impossibility	   of	   long-­‐term	   strategies.	   Some	   had	  proved	  sceptical	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  setting	  policies.	  As	  Charles	  Burton	  Marshall	   caustically	   put	   it,	   ‘ultimate	   purposes’	   and	   good	  wishes	   ‘relate	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Thomas	  Schelling,	  The	  Strategy	  of	  Conflict	  (London:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1980	  [1960]),	  pp.	  200-­‐201.	  15	  Roger	  Hilsman,	  To	  move	  a	  nation	  (New	  York:	  Doubleday	  and	  Company,	  1967),	  pp.	  11-­‐12.	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foreign	   policy	   as	   cheer-­‐leading	   to	   quarter-­‐backing	   or	   as	   the	   sum	  of	  man’s	  New	   Year’s	   resolutions	   to	   his	   biography.’16	  Although	   we	   like	   to	   assume,	  Hilsman	   wrote,	   ‘that	   what	   we	   call	   “decisions”	   of	   government	   are	   in	   fact	  decisions	  –	  discrete	  acts,	  with	  recognizable	  beginnings	  and	  sharp,	  decisive	  endings;’	   it	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   it	   is	   true.17	  The	   flow	   of	   foreign	   policy	  decisions	   and	   events,	   Frederick	   Northedge	   suggested,	   is	   more	   like	  gardening	   ‘in	  which	   luck	  and	  the	  chances	  of	   favourable	  weather	  play	   their	  part,’	   than	   like	   a	   ‘process	   of	   manufacturing…which	   extends	   in	   direct	   line	  from	   drawing	   board	   to	   retail	   shop.’18	  In	   foreign	   policy,	   ‘we	   must	   never	  overlook	  the	  force	  of	  the	  unpredictable…the	  play	  of	  the	  contingent	  and	  the	  unforeseen.’	   A	   ‘perverse	   logic’	   drives	   foreign	   policy,	   he	   cautioned;	   ‘the	  tendency	   for	   situations	   to	   arise	   that	   were	   not	   only	   not	   anticipated,	   but	  which	   states	   devote	   their	   best	   efforts	   to	   avert.’ 19 	  Such	   an	   account	   is	  remarkably	   similar	   to	   both	   Beck’s	   description	   of	   ‘boomerang	   effects,’	   and	  Rasmussen’s	  discussion	  of	   strategy	  as	   ‘meteorology.’	  However,	   if	  we	  move	  to	  the	  analysis	  to	  US	  foreign	  policy	  and	  to	  US	  Presidents	  as	  most	  of	  the	  risk	  literature	   does,	   Richard	   Neustadt’s	   study	   of	   Presidential	   power	   is	   key	   in	  understanding	  a	  President’s	  predicament.	  	  Neustadt	  established	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  President’s	  ‘power	  to	  persuade,’	  but	  his	  analysis	   went	   further.	   Neustadt	   suggested	   that	   for	   a	   President	   to	   be	  effective,	  he	  needed	  to	   ‘guard	  his	  power	  prospects	  in	  the	  course	  of	  making	  choices.’20	  What	  ‘prospects’	  meant	  was	  later	  explained.	  For	  ‘each	  choice	  that	  comes	   his	   way’	   a	   President	   needed	   the	   ‘ability	   to	   recognize	   the	  preconditions	   and	   the	   chance	   advantages.’ 21 	  A	   President’s	   ‘prospects’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Charles	  B.	  Marshall,	  The	  Limits	  of	  Foreign	  Policy	  (New	  York:	  Henry	  Holt	  and	  Company,	  1954),	  p.	  54.	  17	  Hilsman,	  To	  move,	  p.	  5.	  18	  Frederick	  S.	  Northedge,	  ‘The	  Nature	  of	  Foreign	  Policy,’	  in	  Frederick	  S.	  Northedge	  (Ed.),	  The	  Foreign	  Policies	  of	  the	  Powers	  (London:	  Faber	  and	  Faber,	  1974),	  p.	  11.	  19	  Northedge,	  ‘The	  Nature,’	  p.	  12.	  20	  Richard	  E.	  Neustadt,	  Presidential	  power	  and	  the	  Modern	  Presidents:	  the	  
Politics	  of	  Leadership	  from	  Roosevelt	  to	  Reagan	  (New	  York:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  1990	  [1960]),	  p.	  47.	  	  21	  Neustadt,	  Presidential,	  p.	  49.	  
	   64	  
depended	  on	  his	  ability	  to	  balance	  different	  domestic	  constituencies	  against	  international	  concerns.	  These	  posed	  competing	  challenges	  through	  which	  a	  President	   needed	   to	   develop	   ‘leeway.’	   This	   space	   of	  manoeuvre	   had	   to	   be	  built	   in	   the	   domestic	   context,	  with	   the	   accumulation	   of	   political	   capital,	   if	  foreign	   policy	   choices	  were	   to	   be	   accepted.	   Foreign	   policy	   choices,	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	   could	   impinge	  on	   a	  President’s	   domestic	  priorities.22	  Neustadt	  recognised	  that	  Presidents	  were	  not	  free	  to	  set	  their	  own	  agenda;	  deadlines	  and	   events	   did	   that.	   All	   a	   President	   could	   do	   was	   to	   ‘try	   to	   stop	   fires.’23	  Describing	  Johnson’s	  Vietnam	  decisions,	  Neustadt	  suggested	  that	  the	  former	  President	   was	   caught	   in	   a	   balancing	   act	   between	   short-­‐term	   and	   longer-­‐term	   risks.	   In	   such	   a	   balancing	   act,	   the	   ‘short-­‐run	   tangibles’	   tended	   to	  overshadow	   long-­‐run	   risks,	   but	   such	   a	   narrow	   focus	   was	   not	  inconsequential.	   First,	   a	   short-­‐term	   approach	   obscured	   longer-­‐term	   risks.	  The	   latter,	  as	  Neustadt	  adds	  begrudgingly,	  were	  scarcely	  seen	  at	  all	  due	  to	  ‘arrogance	   or	   ignorance,	   suspiciousness	   or	   fear,	   or	   all	   of	   these	   until	   too	  late.’ 24 	  Second,	   even	   a	   focus	   on	   more	   tangible	   targets	   was	   far	   from	  guaranteeing	   control;	   it	   represented	   a	   ‘gamble.’	   The	   choices	   made	   in	   the	  present	  and	  their	  future	  consequences	  unpredictably	  affect	  not	  only	  present	  chances,	   but	   also	   future	   prospects.	   ‘What	   Presidents	   do	   every	   single	   day,’	  then,	  is:	  	  	   Make	  decisions	  that	  are	  mostly	  thrust	  upon	  them,	  the	  deadlines	  all	  too	  often	  outside	  their	  control,	  on	  options	  mostly	  framed	  by	  others,	   about	   issues	   crammed	  with	   technical	   complexities	   and	  uncertain	  outcomes.25	  	  But	  still,	  they	  have	  to	  decide.	  Beyond	  Neustadt,	  the	  President	  has	  often	  been	  portrayed	   as	   being	  pulled	   by	   several	   forces	   on	  both	   the	   domestic	   and	   the	  international	  side.	  The	  ‘bureaucratic	  politics’	  approach	  to	  foreign	  policy	  has	  also	   shed	   light	   on	   this	   issue.	   Morton	   Halperin,	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  See	  also	  James	  A.	  Nathan	  and	  James	  K.	  Oliver,	  ‘Bureaucratic	  Politics:	  academic	  windfalls	  and	  Intellectual	  pitfalls,’	  Journal	  of	  Political	  and	  Military	  
Sociology,	  Vol.	  6	  (Spring	  1978),	  p.	  83.	  23	  Neustadt,	  Presidential,	  p.	  131.	  	  24	  Neustadt,	  Presidential,	  p.	  212.	  25	  Neustadt,	  Presidential,	  p.	  209.	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scholarship,	   wrote	   that	   ‘many	   issues’	   come	   to	   the	   President	   ‘at	   once	   and	  from	  different	  directions	  and…many	  pressures	  are	  involved.’	  In	  his	  analysis,	  this	  led	  the	  President	  to	  short-­‐term,	  ‘uncommitted	  thinking’	  that	  could	  leave	  options	   open.26	  Similarly,	   Fen	   Hampson	   has	   suggested	   that	   each	   decision	  represents	   more	   the	   ‘vector	   sum’	   of	   these	   forces,	   than	   the	   outcome	   of	   a	  President’s	  will.27	  Bruce	  Russett	  has	  portrayed	  the	  President	  as	  imprisoned	  in	  a	   ‘triangle	  of	   forces’	  composed	  by	   the	  public,	  Washington’s	  bureaucracy	  and	  the	  world.	  For	  this	  reason,	  he	  has	  suggested,	  an	  effective	  foreign	  policy	  depends	  on	  a	  President’s	  understanding	  of	  such	  a	   triangle	  and	   its	  needs.28	  Even	  George	  Edwards	  III,	  a	  leading	  scholar	  of	  the	  Presidency,	  who	  disagrees	  with	  Neustadt’s	  ‘power	  to	  persuade’	  thesis,	  describes	  Presidential	  decision-­‐making	   as	   a	   short-­‐term	   endeavour;	   more	   a	   matter	   of	   exploiting	   existing	  options,	   than	   of	   setting	   a	   long-­‐term	   agenda.29 	  Foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making,	   it	   seems,	   has	   always	   been	   an	   uncertain,	   complex,	   and	   short-­‐term	  process.	   The	   key	   point	   is	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘chance	   advantage;’	   the	   fact	   that	  Presidents	  act	  to	  manage	  potential	  future	  consequences.30	  	  
3.2.3	  Lamborn	  and	  George:	  risks	  and	  trade-­‐offs	  	  From	   this	   account,	   foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making	   emerges	   as	   a	   ‘bounded’	  balancing	   act	   between	   domestic	   and	   international	   dimensions.	   In	   a	  somewhat	   neglected	  work,	   Alan	   Lamborn	   provided	   a	   description	   of	   what	  this	  balancing	  act	  entailed.	  He	  suggested	  that	  to	  make	  foreign	  policy	  choices,	  decision-­‐makers	   have	   to	   pay	   a	   price:	   they	   need	   to	   build	   and	   maintain	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Morton	  Halperin	  (with	  Priscilla	  A.	  Clapp	  and	  Arnold	  Kanter),	  Bureaucratic	  
Politics	  and	  Foreign	  Policy	  (Washington:	  Brookings	  Institution	  Press,	  2006),	  p.	  83.	  27	  Fen	  O.	  Hampson,	  ‘The	  Divided	  Decision-­‐maker:	  American	  Domestic	  Politics	  and	  the	  Cuban	  Crises,’	  International	  Security,	  Vol.	  9,	  No.	  3	  (Winter	  1984),	  pp.	  130-­‐165.	  28	  Bruce	  Russett,	  Controlling	  the	  Sword:	  The	  Democratic	  governance	  of	  
National	  Security	  (London,	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1990),	  p.	  9.	  29	  George	  C.	  Edwards	  III,	  The	  Strategic	  President	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  p.	  22.	  30	  Thomas	  Knecht,	  ‘Public	  Opinion	  and	  Foreign	  Policy:	  the	  Stages	  of	  Presidential	  decision	  making,’	  International	  Studies	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  50,	  No.	  3	  (2006),	  pp.	  705-­‐727.	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domestic	   coalition	   that	   supports	   their	   choice.31	  To	   express	   the	   whimsical	  and	   unstable	   nature	   of	   this	   power,	   Lamborn	   suggested	   that	   it	   could	   be	  understood	   in	   terms	   of	   ‘risk.’	   More	   specifically,	   Lamborn	   wrote	   that	   risk	  represented	   the	   link	   between	   the	   domestic	   and	   international	   context	   of	  foreign	   policy.32	  For	   every	   decision	   policymakers	   face	   two	   types	   of	   risk:	   a	  ‘policy	   risk’	   -­‐	   the	  probability	   that	  policy	  goals	  will	  not	  be	  achieved	   -­‐	  and	  a	  ‘political	   risk’	   -­‐	   the	   probability	   that	   policy	   choices	   will	   have	   adverse	  consequences	  on	  the	  political	  position	  of	  the	  decision-­‐maker.	  He	  added	  that	  policy	  risks	  could	  be	  sub-­‐divided	  into	  two	  components.	   ‘Intrinsic	  risks’	  are	  the	  risks	   inherent	   in	   the	  policy	  chosen,	   that	   is,	   the	  risk	   that	   the	  policy	  will	  fail	   even	   if	   carried	  out	  effectively.	   ‘Extrinsic	   risks’	   encompass	   the	   risk	   that	  the	  policy	  won’t	  be	  politically	  sustained	  long	  enough.33	  	  	  Starting	  from	  these	  assumptions,	  Lamborn	  tested	  a	  series	  of	  hypotheses	  and	  concluded	   that	   foreign	   policy	   decisions	   could	   not	   be	   understood	   without	  taking	   into	   account	   both	   political	   risks	   and	   policy	   risks.	   In	   particular,	   he	  affirmed	   that	   the	  higher	   the	  political	   risks,	   the	  higher	   the	   ‘probability	   that	  policymakers	  will	  –	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  reduce	  those	  political	  risks	  –	  be	  willing	  to	  adopt	   policy	   alternatives	   that	   have	   higher	   policy	   risks.’ 34 	  That	   is,	  policymakers	   are	  willing	   to	   accept	   ‘suboptimal	   policies’	   that	   are	   riskier	   at	  the	  international	  level,	  if	  they	  believe	  those	  policies	  might	  help	  in	  lowering	  expected	  adverse	  political	  consequences.	  In	  a	  sort	  of	  vicious	  cycle,	  increased	  political	   risks	   lead	   to	   an	   increase	   in	   suboptimal	   policies	   and,	   hence,	   in	   an	  increase	   in	   intrinsic	   risk.	   Furthermore,	   he	   suggested,	   considerations	   of	  short-­‐term	  political	  risks,	  influence	  foreign	  policy	  choice,	  since,	  in	  the	  trade-­‐off,	  policymakers	  balance	  known	  political	  risks	  with	  possible	  policy	  effects.	  They	  put,	  so	  to	  say,	  a	  dangerous	  premium	  on	  certainty.35	  Lamborn	  analysed	  the	  foreign	  policies	  of	  European	  powers,	  but	  his	  portrayal	  of	  the	  European	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Alan	  Lamborn,	  The	  Price	  of	  Power	  (London:	  Unwin	  Lyman,	  1991).	  32	  Lamborn,	  The	  Price,	  p.	  8.	  33	  Alan	  Lamborn,	  ‘Risk	  and	  Foreign	  Policy	  Choice,’	  International	  Studies	  
Quarterly,	  Vol.	  29,	  No.	  4	  (December	  1985),	  p.	  387.	  34	  Lamborn,	  ‘Risk,’	  p.	  387.	  35	  Lamborn,	  ‘Risk,’	  p.	  392.	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decision-­‐maker	   is	   not	   too	   dissimilar	   from	   Neustadt’s	   discussion	   of	   US	  Presidents.	   In	   line	   with	   Neustadt,	   Lamborn’s	   decision-­‐makers	   need	   to	  gather	  a	  constituency	  behind	  their	  decision.	  In	  this	  effort,	  the	  probability	  of	  something	   going	   wrong	   in	   terms	   of	   political	   ‘short-­‐run	   tangibles,’	   makes	  policymakers	  more	  willing	  to	  gamble	  on	  riskier	  policies.	  	  	  Vertzberger	   acknowledged	   Lamborn’s	   work,	   but	   dismissed	   it	   as	   another	  example	   of	   ‘the	   primacy	   of	   domestic	   politics.’36	  What	   Lamborn	   suggests	   is	  subtler.	  None	  of	  the	  two	  dimensions	  enjoys	  a	  primacy	  over	  the	  other.	  There	  is	   a	   ‘contingent	   relationship	   between	   political	   and	   strategic	   variables.’37	  Being	  contingent	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  expect	  one	  of	  the	  two	  ‘to	  provide,	  in	  isolation,	   an	   adequate	   explanation	   of	   foreign	   policy	   choice.’38	  As	   in	  Robert	  Putnam’s	   ‘two-­‐level’	   game,39	  political	   and	  policy	   risks	  are	   intertwined,	   and	  both	  play	  a	  part	  in	  the	  outcomes	  of	  decision.	  Each	  move	  affects	  both	  sectors	  simultaneously;	   it	   is	   a	   trade-­‐off.	   Presidents	   can	   choose	   to	   manage	   policy	  risks	  or	  political	  risks,	  but	  not	  both,	  not	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  	  	  Alexander	   George’s	   study	   of	   Presidential	   decision-­‐making	   confirmed	   the	  point.	   Beyond	   his	   discussion	   of	   cognitive	   factors,	   George	   described	  Presidential	  decision-­‐making	  as	  a	  ‘trade-­‐off’	  bounded	  by	  uncertainty.	  In	  his	  discussion,	   he	   provided	   a	   three-­‐dimensional	   trade-­‐off,	   between	   ‘need	   for	  acceptability,	   consensus	   and	   support,’	   ‘search	   for	   high	   quality	   decisions,’	  and	   ‘prudent	  management	  of	   time	  and	  other	  policymaking	  resources.’40	  As	  Neustadt	   would	   caution,	   however,	   under	   the	   pressure	   of	   strategic	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Vertzberger,	  Risk	  Taking,	  p.	  2.	  37	  Robert	  G.	  Kaufman,	  ‘Book	  review:	  Alan	  Lamborn	  and	  Stephen	  Mumme,	  
Statecraft,	  Domestic	  Politics,	  and	  Foreign	  Policy	  Making:	  The	  El	  Chamizal	  
Dispute,’	  The	  Journal	  of	  Politics,	  Vol.	  51,	  No.	  3	  (1989),	  p.	  792.	  38	  Alan	  Lamborn	  and	  Stephen	  Mumme,	  Statecraft,	  Domestic	  Politics	  and	  
Foreign	  Policy	  making:	  the	  El	  Chamizal	  Dispute	  (London,	  Westview	  Press,	  1989),	  p.	  6.	  39	  Robert	  Putnam,	  ‘Diplomacy	  and	  Domestic	  Politics:	  The	  Logic	  of	  Two-­‐Level	  Games,’	  International	  Organization,	  Vol.	  42	  (Summer	  1988),	  pp.	  427-­‐460.	  40	  Alexander	  George,	  Presidential	  Decisionmaking	  in	  foreign	  policy	  (Boulder:	  Westview	  Press,	  1980),	  p.	  2.	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political	   concerns,	   high	   quality	   often	   becomes	   a	   luxury	   that	   Presidents	  cannot	  afford.	  	  	  At	   the	   end	   of	   this	   detour,	   Presidential	   decision-­‐making	   in	   foreign	   policy	  emerges	   as	   a	   series	   of	   uncertain	   trade-­‐offs	   between	   risks	   in	   the	   policy	  dimension,	   and	   risks	   in	   the	  domestic	   political	   dimension.	   These	   trade-­‐offs	  leave	  open	  the	  possibility	  of	  improving	  the	  quality	  of	  decisions,	  but	  also	  the	  chance	   of	   loss	   of	   control.	   Most	   of	   the	   key	   concepts	   of	   the	   sociological	  literature	   -­‐	  uncertainty,	   risk,	  and	  risk	  management	   -­‐	  are	  clearly	  embedded	  in	  this	  discussion.	  	  	  
3.3	   UNCERTAINTY,	   RISK,	   AND	   RISK	   MANAGEMENT:	   A	   NEW	  
PERSPECTIVE	  	  	  
3.3.1	  Towards	  operational	  definitions	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  provide	  definitions	  of	  these	  concepts.	  The	  author	  is	  aware	  that	  these	  definitions	  will	  not	  be	  ‘the	  last	  word’	  on	  the	  topic.	  The	  ‘definitional’	  effort	  is	  not	  undertaken	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  these	  definitions	  will	   gather	   universal	   consensus.	   It	   is	   guided	   by	   different	   aims.	   These	  definitions	   will	   try	   to	   bring	   a	   certain	   level	   of	   ‘simplicity’	   to	   the	   debate,	  eschewing	   both	   the	   complexity	   of	   many	   ‘decision	   theory’	   definitions,	   and	  ‘postmodern’	  tendencies	  to	  make	  sweeping	  and	  hardly	  defensible	  claims,	  or	  to	  give	  a	  word	  whatever	  meaning	  we	  want	  it	  to	  have.41	  The	  definitions	  will	  work	   as	   ‘foundation	   stones,’42	  setting	   markers	   for	   what	   is	   meant	   by	   the	  various	  terms,	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  this	  research	  project.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Nicholas	  Shackel	  defines	  these	  two	  ‘postmodern	  tactics’	  as	  the	  ‘motte	  and	  bailey,‘	  and	  the	  ‘Humpty	  Dumpty’	  tactic.	  See	  Nicholas	  Shackel,	  ‘The	  vacuity	  of	  postmodernist	  methodology,’	  Metaphilosophy,	  Vol.	  36,	  No.	  3	  (April	  2005),	  pp.	  295-­‐320.	  42	  Yee-­‐Kuang	  Heng,	  War	  as	  Risk	  Management:	  Strategy	  and	  Conflict	  in	  an	  Age	  
of	  Globalised	  Risks	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2006),	  p.	  44.	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3.3.1.1	  Knight	  and	  Keynes:	  risk,	  uncertainty,	  and	  that	  ‘awkward	  fact’	  	  Several	   scholars	   within	   the	   risk	   literature	   started	   their	   discussion	   of	   risk	  from	   the	   economist	   Frank	   Knight’s	   seminal	   distinction	   between	   risk	   and	  uncertainty.	   In	   his	   Risk,	   Uncertainty,	   and	   Profit,	   Knight	   defined	   risk	   as	   a	  situation	  of	   objective	  probability,	   in	  which	   the	  distribution	  of	   outcomes	   is	  known;	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  we	  know	  the	  odds.	  Uncertainty,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  represented	   a	   situation	   in	   which	   we	   do	   not	   even	   know	   the	   odds.43	  Many	  have	   concluded,	   that	   since	   most	   real-­‐life	   decisions	   are	   a	   matter	   of	  uncertainty,	   risk	   has	   no	   role	   to	   play.	   Similarly,	   scholars	   within	   ‘decision	  theory’	  had	  troubles	  translating	  risk	   into	  a	  relevant	   foreign	  policy	  variable	  since	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making,	  at	  face	  value,	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  a	  series	  of	   statistical	   probabilities.	   To	   the	   previous	   point,	   however,	   Knight	   added	  that:	  ‘when	  an	  individual	  instance	  only	  is	  at	  issue,	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  for	  conduct	   between	   a	   measurable	   risk	   and	   an	   unmeasurable	   uncertainty.’	  Confronted	  with	  this	  type	  of	  problem	  the	  individual	  ‘throws	  his	  estimate	  of	  the	  value	  of	   an	  opinion	   into	   the	  probability	   form…and	   “feels”	   toward	   it	   as	  toward	   any	   probability	   situation.’44	  And	   he	   concluded:	   ‘all	   decisions	   as	   to	  conduct	   in	   real	   life	   rest	   upon	   opinions	   which	   on	   scrutiny	   easily	   resolve	  themselves	   into	  an	  opinion	  of	   a	  probability.45	  On	   this	  point,	   John	  Maynard	  Keynes	  concurred	  with	  Knight.	  According	  to	  Keynes,	  uncertainty,	  a	  situation	  in	   which	   ‘there	   is	   no	   scientific	   basis	   on	   which	   to	   form	   any	   calculable	  probability	  whatever’	  -­‐	  in	  which	  ‘we	  simply	  do	  not	  know’	  –	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  everyday	  experience.	  Nevertheless,	  he	  added	  that	  the	  ‘necessity	  for	  action	  and	  for	  decision’	  compelled	  decision-­‐makers	  to:	  	   Overlook	  this	  awkward	  fact	  and	  to	  behave	  exactly	  as	  we	  should	  if	  we	  had	  behind	  us	  a	  good	  Benthamite	  calculation	  of	  a	  series	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Frank	  Knight,	  Risk,	  Uncertainty	  and	  Profit	  (Cambridge:	  Mifflin	  and	  Company,	  1921),	  p.	  233.	  44	  Knight,	  Risk,	  p.	  234.	  45	  Knight,	  Risk,	  p.	  237.	  
	   70	  
prospective	   advantages	   and	   disadvantages,	   each	   multiplied	   by	  its	  appropriate	  probability,	  waiting	  to	  be	  summed.46	  	  That	   is,	  as	   if	   they	  could	  act	   in	   terms	  of	  risk.	   In	  other	  words,	  uncertainty	   is	  the	   predominant	   condition	   of	   mankind,	   but	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   making	  choices,	   individuals	   treat	  uncertainty	  as	   if	   it	  was	  risk.	  This,	  however,	   is	   far	  from	  guaranteeing	  control.	  As	  David	  Jarvis	  has	  recently	  argued,	  for	  Knight:	  	  	   What	   we	   know	   with	   some	   degree	   of	   certainty	   is	   mostly	  unimportant…This	   quota	   of	   knowledge	   is…necessary,	   but	  marginal.	   The	   larger	   and	   thus	   more	   significant	   quota	   of	  knowledge	  rests	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  uncertainty.47	  	  Beyond	   individuals’	   possibilities	   of	  managing	   uncertainty	   through	   risk,	   an	  irreducible	   kernel	   of	   uncertainty	   remains,	   suggesting	   scepticism	   towards	  any	   effort	   of	   prediction	   and	   control.48 	  ‘Agential	   interpretations	   of,	   and	  reactions	  to,	  uncertainty,’	  in	  Knight’s	  account,	  	  	   Combined	   with	   the	   myriad	   ways	   individuals	   seek	   to	   interface	  with	   future	   situations	  before	   they	  materialize	   in	   order	   to	   alter	  the	  circumstances	  that	  obtain,	  were	  altogether	  too	  complex	  a	  set	  of	   phenomena	   and	   too	   contingent…to	   be	   reduced	   to	   accurate	  calculation.49	  	  In	   this	   sense,	   uncertainty	   represents	   the	   overarching	   condition.	   It	   comes	  from	  lack	  of	  knowledge,	  from	  the	  impossibility	  of	  knowing,	  and	  from	  lack	  of	  control	   over	   the	   consequences	   of	   one’s	   own	   actions.	   Risks	   are	   defined	   by	  probability,	   and	   come	   into	   play	   when	   individuals	   are	   confronted	   with	  decisions	   (an	   argument	   not	   too	   dissimilar	   from	   that	   found	   in	   the	  sociological	  literature).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  John	  Maynard	  Keynes,	  ‘The	  General	  Theory	  of	  Employment,’	  The	  
Quarterly	  Journal	  of	  Economics,	  Vol.	  51,	  No.	  2	  (February	  1937),	  pp.	  213-­‐214.	  47	  David	  S.	  L.	  Jarvis,	  ‘Theorising	  Risk	  and	  uncertainty	  in	  International	  Relations:	  the	  contribution	  of	  Frank	  Knight,’	  International	  Relations,	  Vol.	  25,	  No.	  4	  (2011),	  p.	  306.	  48	  Sanjay	  G.	  Reddy,	  ‘Claims	  to	  expert	  knowledge	  and	  the	  subversion	  of	  democracy:	  the	  triumph	  of	  risk	  over	  uncertainty,’	  Economy	  and	  Society,	  Vol.	  25,	  No.	  2	  (May	  1996),	  p.	  227.	  49	  Jarvis,	  ‘Theorising,’	  p.	  305.	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3.3.1.2	   Uncertainty,	   risk,	   and	   risk	   management:	   the	   risk	   management	  
perspective	  	  More	   recent	   studies	   of	   uncertainty,	   risk	   and	   risk	   management	   have	  maintained	   some	   of	   these	   insights.	   There	   is	   widespread	   agreement	   that	  uncertainty	   represents	   a	   fundamental	   human	   condition; 50 	  the	   ‘basic	  condition	  of	  human	  knowledge.’51	  The	  understanding	  of	   risk,	  however,	  has	  evolved	   from	  Knight’s	   definition.	   Risk	   remains	   a	   highly	   contested	   concept	  even	   in	   the	   risk	   management	   literature. 52 	  In	   spite	   of	   the	   literature’s	  richness,	  three	  main	  features	  seem	  to	  enjoy	  a	  relative	  consensus.	  First,	  risks	  depend	  on	  decisions:	   they	   take	   shape	   in	   the	   ‘distinction	  between	  possible	  and	   chosen	   action,’	   in	   the	   contingency	   of	   choice.53	  They	   lie	   between	   the	  extremes	  of	   ‘perfect	   ignorance’	  -­‐	   in	  which	  every	  choice	  would	  be	  random	  -­‐	  and	   perfect	   knowledge	   -­‐	   in	   which	   decisions	   would	   be	   perfectly	  predictable.54	  As	  Michael	  Power	  recently	  put	  it,	   ‘uncertainties	  become	  risks	  when	   they	  enter	   into	  management	   systems,’	  when	   they	  become	  objects	  of	  decision.55	  Second,	   as	   discussed	   above,	   risks	   are	   a	  matter	   of	   probability.56	  Third,	   risks	   are	   a	   specific	   type	   of	   probability:	   a	   probability	   of	   something	  negative.	   Knight	   acknowledged	   that,	   in	   everyday	   language,	   risk	  meant	   the	  probability	  of	  something	  negative,	  but	  ignored	  this	  point.57	  Today,	  however,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  See	  Douglas	  Hubbard,	  The	  failure	  of	  risk	  management:	  why	  it’s	  broken	  and	  
how	  to	  fix	  it	  (Hoboken:	  John	  Wiley	  and	  Sons,	  2009).	  51	  Richard	  V.	  Ericson,	  ‘Ten	  uncertainties	  of	  risk	  management	  approaches	  to	  security,’	  Canadian	  Journal	  of	  Criminology	  and	  Criminal	  Justice,	  Volume	  48,	  No.	  3	  (June	  2006),	  p.	  346.	  52	  Power,	  Organized.	  53	  Ortwin	  Renn,	  Risk	  Governance	  Coping	  with	  Uncertainty	  in	  a	  Complex	  World	  (London:	  Routledge/Earthscan	  2008),	  p.1.	  54	  Alfred	  A.	  Marcus,	  ‘Risk,	  Uncertainty	  and	  Scientific	  Judgment,’	  Minerva,	  Vol.	  26,	  No.	  2	  (1988),	  p.	  141.	  55	  Michael	  Power,	  Organized	  Uncertainty	  Designing	  a	  World	  of	  Risk	  
Management	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  p.	  5.	  56	  Christopher	  Hood	  and	  David	  K.	  C.	  Jones	  (Eds.),	  Accidents	  and	  design:	  
contemporary	  debates	  in	  risk	  management	  (London:	  Routledge	  2003),	  pp.	  2-­‐3.	  57	  Knight,	  Risk,	  p.	  233.	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there	  has	  been	  a	  shift	  from	  risk	  as	  ‘chance’	  to	  risk	  as	  ‘danger.’58	  As	  Douglas	  Hubbard	  wrote,	  risk	  today	  refers	  to	  ‘the	  probability	  and	  magnitude	  of	  a	  loss,	  disaster,	   or	   other	   undesirable	   event;’	   or,	   more	   succinctly,	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  ‘something	   bad	   could	   happen.’59	  Most	   scholars	  within	   the	   sociological	   and	  the	   ‘decision	  theory’	   literatures	  share	  this	   ‘negative’	  understanding	  of	  risk.	  Crucially,	   risk	   is	   not	   the	   ‘negative	   thing’	   in	   itself,	   nor	   a	   technology	   to	   deal	  with	  the	  negative	  thing,	  but	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  negative	  thing,	  coupled	  with	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  negative	  outcome’s	  impact.	  To	  sum	  up,	  we	  finally	  have	  two	  operational	  definitions:	  	  
i)	  Uncertainty	  is	  an	  overarching	  condition.	  It	  comes	  from	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  or	   information,	   from	   the	   impossibility	   of	   knowing,	   and	   from	   the	   lack	   of	  control	  over	  the	  consequences	  of	  one’s	  own	  action;	  	  
ii)	   Risk	   is	   the	   probability	   of	   something	   going	   wrong	   coupled	   with	   the	  magnitude	   of	   the	   negative	   outcome.	   Risks	   depend	   on	   the	   contingency	   of	  decision.	  	  	  To	   be	   sure,	   this	   categorisation	   could	   appear	   as	   a	   simplification.	   In	   both	  natural	   and	   social	   sciences,	   several	   scholars	   have	   provided	  more	   complex	  distinctions,	   describing	   several	   types	   of	   knowledge	   and,	   hence,	   going	  beyond	  risk	  and	  uncertainty.	  Some	  authors	  have	  subdivided	  risks	  according	  to	   the	   amount	   of	   uncertainty	   they	   entail	   and	   to	   their	   potential	   impact.60	  Andreas	   Klinke	   and	   Owtwin	   Renn	   relied	   on	   Greek	   mythology	   to	   classify	  risks	   according	   to	   probability	   and	   catastrophic	   potential.	   As	   an	   example	  ‘Sword	   of	   Damocles’	   risks	   have	   low	   probability	   with	   high	   potential	  damage.61	  Other	  scholars	  have	  identified	  additional	  categories	  depending	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Mary	  Douglas,	  ‘Risk	  as	  a	  forensic	  resource,’	  Daedalus,	  Vol.	  119,	  No.	  4	  (Fall,	  1990),	  pp.	  1-­‐16.	  59	  Hubbard,	  The	  failure,	  p.	  9.	  60	  Jerome	  R.	  Ravetz,	  ‘Post-­‐normal	  science	  and	  the	  complexity	  of	  transitions	  towards	  sustainability,’	  Ecological	  Complexity,	  Vol.	  3	  (2006),	  pp.	  275–284.	  61	  Andreas	  Klinke	  and	  Ortwin	  Renn,	  ‘A	  new	  approach	  to	  risk	  evaluation	  and	  management:	  risk-­‐based,	  precaution-­‐based,	  and	  discourse-­‐bases	  strategies,’	  
Risk	  Analysis,	  Vol.	  22,	  No.	  6	  (2002),	  p.	  1080.	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what	   we	   know	   and	   on	   whether	   we	   can	   know.	   In	   1992,	   Brian	   Wynne	  provided	   one	   of	   the	   most	   influential	   classifications	   identifying	   risk	   as	   a	  situation	  in	  which	  we	  know	  the	  odds;	  uncertainty	  as	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  we	  don’t	   know	   the	   odds,	   but	   we	   know	   the	   main	   parameters;	   ignorance	   as	   a	  situation	   in	   which	   we	   don’t	   even	   know	   what	   we	   don’t	   know;	   and	  indeterminacy	   as	   a	   situation	   in	   which	   causal	   chains	   or	   networks	   are	  completely	  open.62	  	  	  In	   IR,	   similar	   divisions	   received	   particular	   attention	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	  Secretary	   of	   Defense	   Donald	   Rumsfeld’s	   ‘unknown	   unknowns’	   remarks.63	  Christopher	   Daase	   and	   Oliver	   Kessler	   suggested	   the	   addition	   of	   a	   fourth	  category.	   Beyond	   ‘known	   knowns,’	   ‘known	   unknowns,’	   and	   ‘unknown	  unknowns,’	  the	  authors	  brought	  forward	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘unknown	  knowns’	  that	   is	   things	   we	   know	   but	   we	   don’t	   want	   to	   know.64	  In	   particular,	   they	  classified	   knowledge	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   ontology	   (what	   we	   know)	   and	  ‘methodology’	  (how	  can	  we	  know).	  They	  used	  this	  classification	  to	  describe	  different	   forms	   of	   danger	   in	   international	   politics.	   In	   their	   matrix,	   K-­‐Ks	  represented	  a	  situation	   in	  which	  we	  know	  and	  we	  have	  means	   to	  know;	  a	  situation	   of	   threat.	   K-­‐Us	   represented	   conditions	   in	   which	   we	   don’t	   know	  what	   is	   out	   there	   but	  we	   have	  means	   to	   know.	   They	   called	   this	   condition	  ‘risk.’	  U-­‐Ks	  represented	  conditions	  of	  ignorance	  in	  which	  we	  refuse	  to	  know	  what	  we	  know.	  Finally,	  U-­‐Us,	  in	  which	  we	  don’t	  know	  what	  we	  don’t	  know,	  represented	  a	  situation	  of	  looming	  disaster.65	  The	  authors,	  then,	  went	  on	  to	  identify	   international	   politics	   example	   for	   their	   categories:	   deterrence	  exemplified	  a	  case	  of	  threat,	  terrorism	  of	  risk,	  nuclear	  terrorism	  of	  disaster.	  The	   argument	  was	   also	   repeated	   in	   a	   second	   article	   in	  which	   the	   authors	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Brian	  Wynne,	  ‘Uncertainty	  and	  environmental	  learning,’	  Global	  
Environmental	  Change,	  Vol.	  2,	  No.	  2	  (1992),	  p.	  114.	  63	  Donald	  Rumsfeld,	  ‘DoD	  News	  Briefing,	  Secretary	  Rumsfeld	  and	  Gen.	  Myers,’	  12	  February	  2002	  [http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636]	  (accessed	  23	  July	  2013).	  64	  Christopher	  Daase	  and	  Oliver	  Kessler,	  ‘Knowns	  and	  unknowns	  in	  the	  “War	  on	  terror:”	  uncertainty	  and	  the	  political	  construction	  of	  danger,’	  
Security	  Dialogue,	  Vol.	  38	  (2007),	  p.	  412.	  65	  Daase	  and	  Kessler,	  ‘Knowns	  and	  unknowns,’	  p.	  415.	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suggested	  that	  the	  Cold	  War	  represented	  a	  security	  dilemma	  and	  a	  realm	  of	  threats,	   whereas	   the	   post-­‐9/11	   world	   represents	   a	   ‘security	   paradox,’	   in	  which	   unknown	   unknowns	   predominate	   and	   measure	   to	   increase	  knowledge	  do	  not	  necessarily	  increase	  security	  (an	  argument	  similar	  to	  that	  made	  by	  Coker	  and	  Rasmussen).66	  	  As	  a	  recent	  scholarship	  on	  risk	  suggests,	  however,	  there	  are	  problems	  with	  these	   classifications.	   Hauke	   Riesch	   writes	   that,	   according	   to	   Wynne,	  indeterminacy	  includes	  ‘the	  various	  social	  contingencies	  that	  are	  not	  usually	  captured	   in	  conventional	  risk	  assessments,’	  but	   there	   is	  no	  specification	  of	  what	  these	  contingencies	  are.	  More	  generally,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  discern	  where	  the	   boundaries	   between	   the	   various	   categories	   lie.67	  The	   problem	   is	   only	  exacerbated	   if	   the	   focus	   shifts	   to	   international	   politics.	   In	   particular,	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	   see	   how	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐makers	   could	   precisely	   draw	  boundaries	  between	  the	  various	  types	  of	  unknowns.	  First,	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  decision,	   whether	   uncertainty	   comes	   from	   lack	   of	   knowledge	   or	  impossibility	  of	  knowing	  is,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  largely	  inconsequential.	  Rarely	  Presidents	   enjoy	   the	   luxury	   of	   time	   to	   acquire	   additional	   information.	  Second,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  problems	  in	  international	  politics	  only	  present	  one	  type	  of	  ‘lack	  of	  knowledge.’	  Deterrence,	  categorised	  by	  Kessler	  and	  Daase,	  as	  a	   situation	   of	   ‘known	   known,’	   included	   both	   ‘known	   unknowns,’	   and	  ‘unknown	   unknowns.’	   Finally,	   as	   Schelling	   suggested,	   uncertainty	  represents	   not	   only	   a	   lack	   of	   knowledge,	   but	   also	   a	   lack	   of	   control	   on	   the	  external	  environment	  and	  an	  impossibility	  of	  knowing	  the	  consequences	  of	  one’s	  own	  actions.	  Uncertainty	  is	  not	  only	  a	  passive	  element,	  external	  to	  the	  decision-­‐context,	  but	  an	  active	  concern	  within	  it.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  discussing	  Knight,	  beyond	  our	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  a	  ‘kernel’	  of	  uncertainty	  remains.	  ‘We	  have	   to	   accept	   the	   fact	   of	   uncertainty	   and	   learn	   to	   live	   with	   it,’	   Roberta	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Christopher	  Daase	  and	  Oliver	  Kessler,	  ‘From	  Insecurity	  to	  Uncertainty:	  Risk	  and	  the	  Paradox	  of	  Security	  Politics,’	  Alternatives,	  Vol.	  33	  (2008),	  pp.	  211-­‐232.	  67	  Hauke	  Riesch,	  ‘Levels	  of	  Uncertainty,’	  in	  Sabine	  Roeser,	  Rafaela	  Hillerbrand,	  Per	  Sandin	  and	  Martin	  Peterson	  (Eds.)	  Essentials	  of	  Risk	  Theory	  (New	  York:	  Springer,	  2013),	  p.	  33.	  Quite	  ironically,	  Riesch	  proceeded	  to	  provide	  his	  own	  classification	  of	  levels	  of	  uncertainty.	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Wohlstetter	  wrote	  at	  the	  high	  noon	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	   ‘No	  magic…provide[s]	  certainty.	   Our	   plans	   must	   work	   without	   it.’ 68 	  For	   these	   reasons,	   the	  classification	   provided	   here	   only	   distinguishes	   between	   two	   dimensions:	  risk	   (taking	   into	   account	   probability,	   outcome,	   and	   decision),	   and	  uncertainty	  (including	  both	  the	  various	  types	  of	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  and	  lack	  of	  control).	  	  Moving	   forward,	   definitions	   of	   risk	   management	   abound	   within	   the	  literature.	   As	  with	   risk	   and	  uncertainty,	   however,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   identify	  some	  common	  tenets.	  First,	  risk	  management	  is	  a	  cyclical	  process.	  Scholars	  disagree	  on	  the	  name	  and	  number	  of	  phases,	  but	  they	  agree	  that	  a	  tendency	  continuously	   to	   go	   back	   to	   reassess	   the	   same	   problem	   is	   inherent	   in	   risk	  management.	  Heng,	  for	  example,	   identifies	  four	  main	  phases:	   identification	  of	  risks,	  assessment	  of	  risks,	  tackling	  of	  risks,	  review	  and	  report.69	  Hubbard	  settles	   on	   five:	   identify	   risks,	   assess	   risks,	   identify	   risk	   mitigation	  approaches,	   assess	   expected	   risk	   reduction,	   and	   select	   and	   implement	  mitigation	   methods.70	  Christopher	   Hood	   and	   David	   Jones	   identify	   five	   as	  well:	   hazard	   identification,	   risk	   assessment,	   policy	   decision,	   policy	  implementation	   and	   policy	   evaluation.71	  This	   cyclical	   nature	   means	   that	  instead	  of	  an	  official	  closure	  of	  the	  process,	  there	  are	  continuous	  practices	  of	  re-­‐evaluation	  and	  surveillance.72	  Second,	  and	  connected	  to	  the	  first	  element,	  risk	  management	   is	   guided	  by	   a	   ‘minimalist	   ethos.’	   The	  ultimate	   aim	   is	   to	  contain	  risks.	  There	   is	  a	   recognition	  of	   the	   limits	  of	  action;73	  a	   ‘continuous	  striving	   to	   reduce	   the	   level	   of	   risk	   to	   a	   point	   where	   it	   is	   held	   to	   be	  “tolerable.”’74	  The	  aim	  is	  not	  to	  eradicate	  the	  risk	  at	  its	  source,	  but	  to	  make	  risks	  acceptable.	  Fourth,	  risk	  management	  is	  necessarily	  proactive.	  It	  deals	  with	  the	  future	  probability	  of	  negative	  events.	  However,	  proactive	  does	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Roberta	  Wohlstetter,	  Pearl	  Harbor:	  warning	  and	  decision	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1962),	  p.	  401.	  69	  Heng,	  War,	  p.	  54.	  	  70	  Hubbard,	  The	  Failure,	  p.	  30.	  71	  Hood	  and	  Jones,	  Accidents,	  p.	  6.	  72	  Heng,	  War,	  p.	  55.	  73	  Heng,	  War,	  p.	  59.	  74	  Hood	  and	  Jones,	  Accidents,	  p.	  7.	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necessarily	   mean	   precautionary	   (as	   Heng	   would	   have	   it).75	  Finally,	   risk	  management	  entails	  the	  recognition	  that	  resources	  are	  scarce,	  and	  need	  to	  be	  measured	  with	  attention.	  Decision-­‐makers	  are	  called	  to	  ‘minimize	  risk	  in	  some	   area…relative	   to	   the	   opportunities	   being	   sought,	   given	   resource	  constraints.’76	  More	   succinctly,	   risk	   management	   entails:	   ‘using	   what	   you	  have	   to	  get	  what	  you	  need.’77	  Having	   identified	   these	   four	  main	   tenets,	  we	  can	  now	  provide	  a	  definition	  of	  risk	  management.	  	  
Risk	  management:	  the	  cyclical	  identification,	  assessment	  and	  prioritisation	  of	   risks	   followed	   by	   application	   of	   resources	   to	  minimise	   and	   control	   the	  probability	  and	  impact	  of	  a	  negative	  outcome.78	  	  	  Risk	  management	  represents	  a	  way	  to	  prevent	  future	  negative	  outcomes,	  a	  way	  of	  being	   smart	  when	   taking	  chances.	   In	   this	   sense,	   it	   could	  be	  argued	  that	  risk	  management,	  even	  ‘formalised	  risk	  management,’	  has	  been	  around	  forever,	   even	   if	   the	   term	   risk	   management	   has	   not. 79 	  This	   definition,	  however,	   seems	   to	   entail	   that	   risk	  management	   is	   a	   fairly	   straightforward	  process	  and	  that,	  above	  all,	  decision-­‐makers	  can	  take	  into	  account	  one	  risk	  at	  a	  time	  and	  devise	  strategies	  to	  manage	  it.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  For	  a	  succinct	  discussion	  see	  Jonathan	  B.	  Wiener,	  ‘Precaution	  in	  a	  Multi-­‐Risk	  World,’	  in	  Dennis	  Paustenbach	  (Ed.),	  Human	  and	  Ecological	  Risk	  
Assessment:	  Theory	  and	  Practice	  (New	  York:	  John	  Wiley	  &	  Sons,	  2002).	  For	  a	  distinction	  between	  proactive	  and	  precautionary	  action	  see	  Craig	  McLean,	  Alan	  Patterson	  and	  John	  Williams,	  ‘Risk	  Assessment,	  Policy-­‐Making	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  Knowledge:	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  and	  International	  Relations,'	  International	  Relations,	  Vol.	  23	  No.	  4	  (2009),	  pp.	  548-­‐566.	  76	  Hubbard,	  The	  failure,	  p.	  10.	  77	  Hubbard,	  The	  failure,	  p.	  9.	  78	  This	  definition	  is	  an	  elaboration	  of	  the	  one	  provided	  by	  Hubbard.	  Hubbard,	  The	  failure,	  p.	  10.	  79	  Hubbard,	  The	  Failure,	  p.	  22,	  and	  Theodore	  J.	  Lowi,	  ‘Risks	  and	  Rights	  in	  the	  History	  of	  American	  Governments,’	  Daedalus,	  Vol.	  119,	  No.	  4	  (Fall,	  1990),	  pp.	  17-­‐40.	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3.4	  ESTABLISHING	  THE	  CONNECTION	  
3.4.1	  Presidential	  decision-­‐making	  and	  ‘risk	  vs.	  risk	  trade-­‐offs’	  
	  
An	  act…gives	  birth	  not	  only	  to	  an	  effect,	  
	  but	  to	  a	  series	  of	  effects.	  
	  Of	  these	  effects,	  the	  first	  only	  is	  immediate…it	  is	  seen.	  	  
The	  others	  unfold	  in	  succession.	  	  
They	  are	  not	  seen.80	  	  Frederic	  Bastiat.	  	  In	  the	  field	  of	  risk	  and	  risk	  management,	  several	  scholars	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  risks	  come	  from	  different	  directions,	  and	  that	  the	  management	  of	  risks	  in	  one	  sector	  can	  ‘blindside’	  decision-­‐makers	  in	  another.	  Risk	  management	  is	  a	  game	  much	  more	  complex	  than	  a	  single	  ‘cycle.’	  John	  Adams	  discussed	  at	  length	  cognitive	  factors	  and	  the	  tendency	  of	  individuals	  to	  react	  to	  increased	  safety	   with	   increased	   risk-­‐taking.81	  In	   his	   definition,	   risk	   is	   more	   like	   a	  ‘thermostat’	   in	   which	   risk	   reduction,	   often	   leads	   to	   ‘risk	   compensation.’82	  Other	  scholars	  have	  suggested	  that	  an	   increase	   in	  risks	  can	  come	  from	  the	  very	   efforts	   of	   control.	   John	   Graham	   and	   Jonathan	  Wiener	   suggested	   that	  every	   effort	   to	   manage	   a	   risk	   could	   entail	   the	   creation	   of	   additional	  unexpected	   risks.83	  In	   their	  definition	   the	   risk	  managed	   is	   the	   ‘target	   risk,’	  the	   risks	   involuntarily	   created	   are	   the	   ‘countervailing	   risks.’	   Crucially,	  ‘countervailing	   risks’	   are	   not	   ‘opportunity	   costs	   (what	   Bastiat	   referred	   to	  with	   ‘that	  which	   is	   not	   seen’)	   but	   additional	   unpredictable	   or	   unexpected	  risks.	   And	   it	   is	   more,	   the	   greater	   the	   effort	   to	   control,	   the	   likelier	   the	  emergence	  of	  countervailing	  risks.	  ‘As	  we	  try	  to	  squeeze	  out	  more	  and	  more	  risk,	  the	  pressure	  leading	  to	  side	  effects	  may	  grow.’	  Inevitably,	  the	  tendency	  to	   manage	   ever-­‐smaller	   target	   risks	   increases	   the	   importance	   of	  countervailing	   risks,	   relative	   to	   the	   benefit	   from	   the	   management	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Frederic	  Bastiat,	  That	  Which	  is	  Seen,	  and	  That	  Which	  is	  Not	  Seen,	  1850	  [http://bastiat.org/en/twisatwins.html]	  (accessed	  25	  July	  2013).	  81	  The	  use	  of	  seatbelts	  and	  the	  increase	  in	  reckless	  diving	  was	  one	  of	  Adams’	  main	  examples.	  	  82	  John	  Adams,	  Risk	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1995),	  p.	  19.	  83	  John	  Graham	  and	  Jonathan	  Wiener,	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk	  (London:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  p.	  vi.	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target	   risk84	  (something	   that	   could	   go	   a	   long	  way	   in	   explaining	   the	   rise	   in	  ‘boomerang	   effects’	   in	   increasingly	   risk-­‐averse	   Western	   societies).	   Risk	  management	  is	  not	  a	  single	  cycle,	  but	  a	  continuous	  trade-­‐off.	  Risk	  decisions	  are	   taken	   along	   a	   ‘Risk	   Protection	   Frontier’	   (similar	   to	   the	   production	  possibilities	   frontier	   in	   economics)	   in	   which	   more	   and	   more	   efforts	   to	  reduce	  a	  target	  risk	  means	  that	  larger	  increases	  in	  countervailing	  risks	  must	  be	  tolerated.85	  	  The	   selection	   of	   the	   ‘point’	   in	   the	   curve	   at	   which	   the	   trade-­‐off	   occurs	  depends	  on	  the	  decision-­‐maker’s	  predicament.86	  But	  two	  main	  factors	  make	  this	  selection	  complex.	  First,	  several	  risks	  and	  several	  trade-­‐offs	  impinge	  on	  the	   same	   decision.	   Second,	   the	   increase	   in	   countervailing	   risks	   is	   not	  straightforward;	   it	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   probability	   and	   uncertainty.	   In	   the	  framework,	   uncertainty	   plays	   a	   role,	   but	   the	   trade-­‐offs	   selected	   and	   the	  decisions	  made	  represent	  the	  ‘crucial	  issue.’87	  	  	   The	   decisionmaker	   being	   urged	   to	   think	   about…risk	  consequences	   is	  not	  being	  asked	  to	  do	  the	   impossible,	   to	  know	  what	  cannot	  be	  known	  or	  to	  foresee	  the	  unforeseeable.	  There	  is	  certainly	   a	   difference	   between	   unintended	   consequences	   and	  unforeseeable	  consequences.	  The	  former	  category	  encompasses	  many	  countervailing	  risks	  which	  might	  have	  been	  considered	  in	  the	   effort	   to	   reduce	   the	   target	   risk,	   but	   which	   were	   either	  ignored	  or	  considered	  and	  dismissed.88	  	  As	  in	  George’s	  trade-­‐off,	  decision-­‐makers	  have	  the	  possibility	  of	  improving	  the	  quality	  of	  their	  decisions	  through	  additional	  information	  and	  additional	  resources.	   Graham	   and	   Wiener	   call	   this	   option	   a	   ‘risk	   superior	   move.’89	  However,	   like	  George	  and	  Neustadt,	   they	  conclude	  that	  these	  moves	  occur	  far	  too	  rarely.	  They	  write	  that	  risk	  trade-­‐offs	   ‘are	  prevalent	  not	  because	  of	  an	   inescapable	   law	  of	   risk	  homeostasis,’	   as	  Adams	  or	  Beck	  would	  have	   it,	  ‘but	  because	  of	  systematic	  shortcomings	  in	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  decisions	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Graham	  and	  Wiener,	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk,	  p.	  12.	  85	  Graham	  and	  Wiener,	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk,	  p.	  28.	  86	  Graham	  and	  Wiener,	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk,	  p.	  29.	  87	  Wiener,	  ‘Precaution	  in	  a	  multirisk,’	  p.	  1519.	  88	  Graham	  and	  Wiener,	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk,	  p.	  21.	  89	  Graham	  and	  Wiener,	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk,	  p.	  37.	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considered	  and	  structured.’90	  The	  challenge	  is	  to	  consider	  the	  full	  set	  of	  risk	  consequences.	  Otherwise,	  a	  policy	  might	  actually	  accomplish	  its	  target	  goal,	  but	  ‘inadvertently	  or	  predictably’	  cause	  another	  failure.91	  From	  Graham	  and	  Wiener’s	  account,	  decision-­‐makers	  emerge	  as	  pulled	  by	  several	  forces,	  and	  constrained	   by	   several	   types	   of	   pressure.	   They	   appear	   as	   limited	   in	   their	  possibilities	   of	   control	   and	   too	   often	   ready	   to	   dismiss	   countervailing	   and	  long-­‐term	   risks.	   They	   appear	   as	   the	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making	  literature	  had	  portrayed	  them.	  This	  analysis	  will	  use	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  Graham	  and	  Wiener’s	  framework	  as	  a	  lens	  to	  look	  at	  Presidential	  decision-­‐making.	  	  The	  argument	  suggested	  here	  is	  simple:	   if	  we	  abandon	  the	  generalisations	  of	  the	  sociological	  literature,	  and	  we	  start	  looking	  at	  the	  day	  to	  day	  practice	  of	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making,	  not	  only	  will	  risk	  and	  uncertainty	  emerge	  as	   key	   variables,	   but	   decision-­‐makers	   will	   confront	   them	   through	   short-­‐term	   practices	   of	   risk	   management.	   More	   specifically,	   as	   in	   Graham	   and	  Wiener,	   the	  analysis	  will	  keep	  uncertainty	  as	   the	  overarching	  condition	  of	  decision-­‐making,	   but	   will	   focus	   on	   the	   risk	   trade-­‐offs.	   US	   Presidents	   and	  their	   inner	   circle	  will	   be	   the	  main	  actors	  under	   the	   spotlight.	  Recognising	  the	   role	   of	   Presidents	   as	   ultimate	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐makers,	   the	  project	   will	   look	   at	   the	   risks	   they	   have	   faced.	   For	   each	   decision,	   it	   will	  identify	  the	  ‘target’	  risks	  managed,	  and	  the	  ‘countervailing’	  risks	  ignored	  or	  dismissed.	  Building	  on	  Lamborn,	  the	  analysis	  will	  divide	  the	  risks	  faced	  by	  Presidents	   into	   two	  main	  categories:	  domestic	  political	   risks	  and	  strategic	  international	  risks.	  Domestic	  political	  risks	  include	  Lamborn’s	  political	  risk	  and	   ‘extrinsic’	   policy	   risks.	   They	   represent	   both	   the	   probability	   that	   the	  policy	  chosen	  will	  have	  adverse	  consequences	  for	  the	  domestic	  position	  of	  the	  President	  and	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  policy	  chosen	  might	  be	  opposed	  domestically.	   Strategic	   risks	   represent	   the	   risks	   inherent	   in	   the	   policy	  chosen,	   and	   the	  probability	  of	   its	   failure	   at	   the	   international	   level,	   even	   if	  carried	  out	  appropriately.	  Finally,	   the	  analysis	  will	   try	   to	  discuss	  how	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Graham	  and	  Wiener,	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk,	  p.	  226.	  91	  Graham	  and	  Wiener,	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk,	  p.	  229.	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with	   what	   results	   Presidents	   managed	   these	   two	   dimensions.	   Before	  proceeding	  to	  explicitly	  spell	  out	  the	  research	  hypotheses	  driving	  the	  thesis,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  discuss	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  thesis	  will	  develop.	  
	  
3.5	   COUNTERVAILING	   RISKS,	   UNCERTAINTY	   AND	   FOREIGN	   POLICY	  
CRISES	  	  
There	  is	  no	  longer	  any	  such	  thing	  as	  strategy,	  only	  crisis	  management.92	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Robert	  McNamara,	  1963.	  	  
In	  the	  end	  we	  lucked	  out.	  It	  was	  luck	  that	  prevented	  nuclear	  war.93	  Former	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Robert	  McNamara,	  2004.	  	  The	  study	  of	  foreign	  policy	  crises	  is	  the	  object	  of	  a	  rich	  and	  ever-­‐expanding	  literature.	   The	   fascination	   with	   crises,	   as	   many	   scholars	   point	   out,	   is	  justified	   by	   their	   being	   something	   ‘exceptional,’	   distinct	   from	   ‘business	   as	  usual.’94	  Furthermore,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   international	   politics,	   crises	   have	  been	   generally	   understood	   as	   the	   ‘finest’	   moments	   of	   decision-­‐makers’	  political	   life.	  Crises	   ‘distil’	   elements	   that	  make	  up	   the	  essence	  of	  politics.95	  They	   represent	   an	   ‘international	   politics	   microcosm’	   in	   which	   crucial	  features	  of	  politics	  such	  as	  power,	  resolve,	  bargaining,	  and	  risk	  are	  forced	  to	  surface. 96 	  Crises	   represent	   important	   events	   and	   for	   this	   very	   reason	  deserve	   inclusion	   in	   research	   projects.97	  Paradoxically,	   this	   popularity	   has	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Michael	  Dobbs,	  ‘Myths	  of	  the	  Missile	  Crisis,’	  Today,	  BBC	  Radio	  4,	  Transcript	  [http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_7492000/7492678.stm]	  (accessed	  22	  September	  2013).	  93	  Robert	  McNamara,	  in	  Errol	  Morris,	  The	  Fog	  of	  War,	  Movie	  Transcript	  [http://www.errolmorris.com/film/fow_transcript.html]	  (accessed	  22	  September	  2013).	  94	  Eric	  K.	  Stern,	  Crisis	  Decisionmaking:	  a	  cognitive	  institutional	  approach	  (Stockholm,	  Swedish	  National	  Defence	  College,	  2003),	  p.	  7.	  95	  Glenn	  H.	  Snyder	  and	  Paul	  Diesing,	  Conflict	  Among	  Nations	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1977),	  p.	  4.	  96	  Glenn	  H.	  Snyder,	  ‘Crisis	  bargaining,’	  in	  Charles	  F.	  Hermann	  (Ed.),	  
International	  Crises:	  Insights	  from	  behavioural	  research	  (New	  York:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  1972),	  p.	  217.	  97	  Gary	  King,	  Robert	  Keohane,	  and	  Sidney	  Verba,	  Designing	  Social	  Enquiry	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1994),	  p.	  4.	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limited	   the	   breadth	   of	   the	   study	   of	   crises	   in	   two	   main	   ways.	   First,	   the	  proliferation	   of	   studies	   has	   prevented	   a	   comprehensive	   account	   of	   what	  crises	  are.	  Studies	  have	  often	  become	  bogged	  down	   in	  endless	  definitional	  debates.	  Second,	  since	  the	  very	  moment	  of	  crisis	  is	  considered	  as	  ‘the	  finest,’	  most	   studies	   focus	   on	   the	   process	   of	   crisis	  management	   and	   resolution,98	  with	  relatively	  less	  attention	  devoted	  to	  how	  crises	  originate.	  Only	  recently	  has	  an	  academic	   re-­‐discovery	  of	   crises	   suggested	   that,	  beyond	  definitional	  debates	  and	  beyond	  crisis	  management,	  it	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  crises	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  rethought.	  	  
3.5.1	  The	  crisis	  literature	  
3.5.1.1	  The	  heated	  debate:	  lost	  in	  definitions	  	  David	  Singer	  famously	  wrote	  that,	  whether	  a	  scholar	  selects	  for	  his	  analysis	  a	  macro	  or	  micro	  level	  is	  largely	  a	  matter	  of	  methodological	  and	  conceptual	  convenience.	   ‘Yet	   the	   choice	   often	   turns	   out	   to	   be	   quite	   difficult,	   and	  may	  well	  become	  a	  central	  issue	  within	  the	  discipline	  concerned.’99	  Certainly,	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  level	  of	  analysis	  has	  been	  crucial	  for	  the	  ‘crisis	  literature.’	  Most	  studies,	   in	   fact,	   present	   a	   common	   structure.	   They	   elaborate	   a	   definition	  depending	  on	  the	  selected	  level	  of	  analysis;	  the	  definition	  is	  later	  compared	  with	   other,	   obviously	   weaker,	   definitions,	   and	   is	   finally	   tested,	   either	  through	  quantitative	  or	  qualitative	  methods.	  	  	  Charles	   Hermann,	   a	   leading	   scholar	   in	   the	   field,	   followed	   Singer	   in	  suggesting	   three	   main	   approaches	   to	   crises:	   a	   systemic	   approach,	   a	  bargaining	  approach,	  and	  a	  decision-­‐making	  approach.100	  Some	  have	  added	  a	  fourth	  approach:	  the	  ‘political	  symbolic	  approach,’	  in	  which	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  the	   manipulations	   of	   symbols	   and	   on	   the	   distortion	   of	   crisis	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  James	  Richardson,	  Crisis	  diplomacy	  :	  the	  great	  powers	  since	  the	  mid-­‐
nineteenth	  century	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  studies	  in	  International	  Relations,	  1994),	  p.	  3.	  99	  David	   Singer,	   ‘The	   level	   of	   Analysis	   problem	   in	   International	   Relations,’	  
World	  Politics,	  Vol.	  14,	  No.	  1	  (October	  1961),	  p.	  77.	  100	  Hermann,	  International	  Crises.	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communication. 101 	  It	   is,	   however,	   at	   the	   three	   main	   levels	   Hermann	  identified	   that	   most	   of	   the	   literature	   has	   developed.	   At	   a	   systemic	   level,	  crises	   are	   generally	   considered	   as	   conditions	   disrupting	   the	   international	  system.	   They	   do	   not	   necessarily	   lead	   to	   its	   transformation	   but	   have	   the	  ‘potential’	   to	   do	   so.102	  ‘The	   concept,’	   as	   Coral	   Bell	   famously	   put	   it,	   ‘is	   of	  normal	   strain	   rising	   to	   the	   level	   of	   breaking	   strain.’ 103 	  Starting	   from	  systemic	   assumptions,	   Charles	   McClelland	   explained	   that	   a	   crisis	  ‘temporarily	   narrows	   the	   focus	   of	   international	   politics,	   stressing	   the	  interaction	   between	   actors,’	   and	   making	   the	   identification	   of	   ‘exchanges’	  easier.104	  In	   his	   analysis,	   the	   use	   of	   a	   ‘system	   interaction	   framework,’	   and	  the	   ‘coding’	   of	   these	   exchanges	   permitted	   the	   identification	   of	   events	   that	  preceded	  crises,	  and	  hence,	  their	  prevention.105	  	  	  At	  a	  lower	  level	  of	  analysis	  -­‐	  although	  the	  stated	  purpose	  of	  Conflict	  among	  
Nations	   is	   to	   bridge	   the	   gap	   between	   the	   levels	   –	   Glenn	   Snyder	   and	   Paul	  Diesing’s	  work	  can	  be	  catalogued	  as	  a	  ‘crisis	  bargaining’	  study.	  Through	  an	  analysis	  of	  sixteen	  historical	  crises,	  they	  conclude	  that	  ‘deliberateness’	  is	  the	  main	  characteristic	  of	  crisis.106	  There	  is	  no	  crisis	  until	  the	  challenged	  party	  responds.	  Crises	  are	  a	   ‘bargaining	  phenomenon’	  and	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  sequences	  of	  interactions,	  or	  ‘games.’	  For	  example,	  with	  ‘games’	  as	  simple	  as	  ‘two	   x	   two’	   matrices,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   go	   directly	   ‘at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	  crisis...the	  choice	  between	  accommodation	  and	  coercion.’107	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  Paul	  ‘t	  Hart,	  ‘Symbols,	  Rituals	  and	  Power:	  the	  lost	  dimension	  of	  crisis	  management,’	  The	  journal	  of	  contingencies	  and	  crisis	  management,	  Vol.	  1,	  No.	  1	  (1993),	  pp.	  36-­‐50;	  and	  Murray	  J.	  Edelmann,	  Constructing	  the	  political	  
spectacle	  (Chicago:	  Chicago	  University	  Press,	  1988).	  102	  Hermann,	  International	  Crises,	  p.	  10.	  103	  Coral	  Bell,	  The	  Convention	  of	  Crisis:	  a	  Study	  in	  Diplomatic	  Management	  (London:	  Oxford	  Paperbacks,	  1971),	  p.	  9.	  104	  Charles	  McClelland,	  ‘The	  Acute	  International	  Crisis,’	  World	  Politics,	  Vol.	  14,	  No.	  1	  (October	  1961),	  p.	  191.	  105	  Charles	  McClelland,	  ‘The	  anticipation	  of	  International	  Crises:	  Prospects	  for	  theory	  and	  research,’	  International	  Studies	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  21,	  No.	  1	  (March	  1977),	  pp.	  15-­‐38.	  106	  Snyder	  and	  Diesing,	  Conflict,	  p.	  18.	  107	  Snyder	  and	  Diesing,	  Conflict,	  p.	  181.	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Studies	   of	   crisis	   at	   the	   decision-­‐making	   level	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	   a	  response	   to	   the	   ‘aseptic’	   character	   of	   these	   games.	   They	   can	   rely	   on	   the	  etymology	  of	  the	  word	  crisis,	  literally,	  ‘to	  decide.’	  In	  particular,	  the	  term	  was	  originally	  used	  in	  medicine	  as	  the	  moment	  in	  which	  the	  intensification	  of	  the	  illness	  required	  a	  ‘decision.’108	  James	  Robinson	  accordingly	  defined	  crises	  as	  ‘occasion	   for	   decisions’	   that	   could	   be	   catalogued	   according	   to	   three	  characteristics:	   the	   origin	   (internal	   or	   external),	   the	   amount	   of	   time	  available	  to	  respond,	  and	  the	  type	  of	  values	  threatened.109	  Largely	  inspired	  by	  Robinson,	  Hermann	  developed	  a	  ‘cube’	  in	  which	  events	  could	  be	  inserted	  according	   to:	   the	   levels	   of	   threat	   perceived	   (high-­‐low),	   the	   level	   of	  awareness	  by	  decision-­‐makers	   (unexpected-­‐anticipated)	   and	   the	   time	   that	  decision	   makers	   perceive	   to	   have	   to	   respond	   (extended-­‐short).110	  From	  these	  dimensions,	  Hermann	  derived	  a	  definition	  of	  crisis	  as	  ‘a	  situation	  that	  1)	  threatens	  high	  priority	  goals	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  unit,	  2)	  restricts	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  available…3)	  surprises	  the	  members	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  unit.’111	  This	   definition	   opened	   up	   several	   areas	   of	   disagreement.	   Many	  scholars	  have	  contested	   the	   requirement	  of	   surprise,	  pointing	  out	   that	   the	  interpretation	   of	   the	   event	   as	   a	   future	   trend,	  more	   than	   the	  perception	   of	  surprise,	   defines	   the	   outbreak	   of	   a	   crisis.112	  Similarly,	   other	   scholars	   have	  suggested,	  that	  there	  exist	  crisis	  situations	  that	  ‘do	  not	  occasion	  surprise;’113	  and	  that	  the	  broader	  contours	  of	  a	  crisis	  can	  often	  be	  anticipated.114	  	  	  More	   crucially,	   the	   first	   of	   Hermann’s	   condition	   has	   been	   the	   object	   of	   a	  heated	   debate.	   Around	   this	   dimension,	   revolve	   three	   main	   issues:	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  Colin	  Hay,	  Re-­‐stating	  social	  and	  political	  change	  (Philadelphia:	  Open	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  p.	  86.	  109	  James	  Robinson,	  ‘Crisis,’	  in	  David	  Sills	  (Ed.),	  International	  Encyclopaedia	  
of	  the	  Social	  Sciences,	  Vol.	  3	  (London:	  MacMillan,	  1968),	  pp.	  510-­‐514.	  110	  Hermann,	  International,	  p.	  14.	  111	  Hermann,	  International,	  p.	  13.	  	  112	  Phil	  Williams,	  Crisis	  Management	  (New	  York:	  Wiley	  and	  Sons,	  1976),	  p.	  23.	  113	  Michael	  Brecher,	  Crises	  in	  World	  Politics	  (Oxford:	  Pergamon	  Press,	  1993),	  p.	  17.	  114	  Howard	  Lentner,	  ‘The	  Concept	  of	  crisis	  as	  viewed	  by	  the	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  State,’	  in	  Hermann,	  International.	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‘depth’	   of	   crises,	   their	   ontology,	   and	   decision-­‐makers’	   role	   in	   them.	   The	  different	   interpretations	  can	  be	  positioned	  along	  a	  continuum:	  at	  one	  pole	  crises	  are	  interpreted	  as	  a	  response	  to	  external	  tension.	  ‘There	  would	  be	  no	  crisis	   for	   the	   decision-­‐making	   unit,’	   Lentner	   argued,	   ‘if	   there	   weren’t	  something	  out	  there.’115	  Similarly,	  Brecher	  argued	  that,	  for	  a	  crisis	  to	  occur,	  two	  types	  of	  values	  needed	  to	  be	  threatened:	  ‘context-­‐specific	  high-­‐priority	  values,’	  representing	  the	   ideological	  and	  material	   interests	  of	   the	  decision-­‐making	  unit,	  and	   ‘core	  values,’	  shared	  by	  the	  decision-­‐making	  unit	  and	  the	  mass	   public.116	  At	   the	   opposite	   extreme,	   crises	   are	   largely	   what	   decision-­‐makers	   make	   of	   them.	   Thomas	   Halper	   contended	   that	   a	   threat	   to	   the	  decision-­‐makers’	   image	   was	   sufficient	   to	   spur	   a	   crisis.	   US	   Presidents,	   he	  contended,	  define	  a	  foreign	  policy	  situation	  as	  a	  crisis	  when	  it	   is	  perceived	  as	   ‘constituting	   serious	   and	   immediate	   threats	   to	   national	   or	   Presidential	  appearances	  of	  strength,	  competence	  or	  resolve,	  even	  if	  these	  situations	  do	  not	  pose	  substantial	  dangers	  to	  national	  security.’117	  Similarly,	  Jutta	  Weldes	  famously	   argued	   that	   in	   the	   Cuban	   Missile	   Crisis,	   the	   missiles	   were	  irrelevant;	   what	   mattered	   was	   US	   credibility.	   Appearances	   made	   the	  crisis.118	  Considering	  this	  vast	  disagreement	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  crises,	  it	  is	  surprising	   that	   two	  elements	  within	   the	   literature	   seem	   to	  enjoy	  a	   certain	  consensus:	   the	   temporal	   finiteness	   of	   crises	   and	   their	   inherent	  ‘manageability.’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  Lentner,	  ‘The	  Concept,’	  p.	  7.	  116	  Brecher,	  Crises,	  p.	  18.	  117	  Thomas	  Halper,	  Foreign	  Policy	  Crises:	  appearance	  and	  reality	  in	  decision-­‐
making	  (Columbus:	  Merrill	  Publishing	  Company,	  1971),	  p.	  iii.	  118	  Jutta	  Weldes,	  Constructing	  national	  interests:	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  
Cuban	  
Missile	  Crisis	  (London:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1999),	  p.	  86.	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3.5.1.2	  The	  ‘explosion	  thesis’	  and	  the	  origins	  of	  crisis	  	  In	   the	   shadow	   of	   Coral	   Bell’s	   pioneering	   study,	   crises	   are	   generally	  considered	   as	   finite	   events.	   A	   crisis	   is	   a	   defined,	   isolable	   phenomenon.119	  More	  specifically,	  in	  spite	  of	  using	  different	  names,	  many	  scholars	  agree	  that	  a	   crisis	   evolves	   in	   specific	   phases.	   Whether	   it	   is	   divided	   in	   ‘onset,’	  ‘escalation,’	   and	   ‘de-­‐escalation;’ 120 	  or	   ‘precipitant,’	   ‘challenge-­‐resistance,’	  ‘confrontation,’	   and	   ‘resolution;’121	  or	   again	   ‘pre-­‐crisis,’	   ‘early	   crisis,’	   ‘acute	  crisis,’	   and	   ‘bargaining-­‐resolution;’122	  a	   crisis	   is	   often	   linked	   to	   a	  pre-­‐crisis	  period	   in	   which	   it	   seems	   to	   explode.	   The	   ‘onset’,	   Brecher	   argued,	   ‘is	  indicated	   by	   the	   outbreak	   of	   a	   crisis,	   that	   is	   the	   eruption	   of	   higher-­‐than-­‐normal	   disruptive	   interaction.’123	  A	   protracted,	   underlying	   conflict,	   can	   be	  distinguished	   from	   the	   explosion	   of	   a	   crisis	   situation.124	  This	   ‘explosion	  thesis’	   has	   focused	   the	   attention	   of	   the	   literature	   on	   a	   specific	   set	   of	  phenomena.	  	  The	   origins	   of	   crises	   have	   been	   explained	   in	   terms	   of	   limits	   of	   decision-­‐making,	  both	  internal	  to	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  and	  affecting	  it	  from	  outside.	   At	   the	   individual	   level,	   stress,125 	  cognitive,126 	  and	   motivational	  biases 127 	  have	   played	   the	   part	   of	   the	   usual	   suspects.	   Groups	   and	  organisations	   have	   been	   equally	   singled	   out.	   If	   the	   agreement	   on	   groups’	  responsibility	   has	   been	   feeble,	   due	   to	   the	  mixed	   evidence	   from	   studies	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	  Bell,	  The	  convention,	  p.	  9.	  120	  Brecher,	  Crises.	  121	  Snyder	  and	  Diesing,	  Conflict.	  122	  Halper,	  Foreign.	  123	  Brecher,	  Crises,	  p.	  26.	  124	  Brecher,	  Crises,	  p.	  58.	  125	  Ole	  R.	  Holsti,	  ‘Time,	  Alternatives	  and	  Communications:	  the	  1914	  and	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crises,’	  in	  Hermann	  International;	  and	  Ole	  R.	  Holsti,	  ‘Crisis	  Decision-­‐making,’	  in	  Philip	  E.	  Tetlock,	  et	  al.	  (Eds),	  Behavior,	  Society	  and	  
Nuclear	  War,	  Vol.	  1	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1989).	  126	  Robert	  Jervis,	  Perceptions	  and	  Misperceptions	  in	  International	  Politics	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1977),	  and	  Richard	  Ned	  Lebow,	  
Between	  Peace	  and	  War:	  the	  nature	  of	  International	  crisis	  (London:	  The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1981).	  127	  Irving	  L.	  Janis	  and	  Leon	  Mann,	  Decision-­‐making	  (New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  1977).	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group	   dynamics,128 	  ‘organizational	   responsibilities’	   have	   received	   much	  attention	   since	   Graham	   Allison’s	   Model	   II	   warned	   against	   reliance	   on	  ‘standard	   operating	   procedures.’129	  More	   recent	   scholarship	   also	   suggests	  that	   organisations	   are	   geared	   towards	   the	   achievement	   of	   goals	   and	   the	  collection	  of	  ‘normal	  data;’	  and	  not	  towards	  the	  prevention	  of	  events	  and	  the	  collection	   of	   ‘aberrant’	   data.	   Moreover,	   both	   organisations	   and	   personnel	  within	  them	  often	  prefer	  to	  use	  information	  as	  a	  source	  of	  power	  to	  enhance	  their	   status,	   instead	  of	   sharing	   it.130	  If	   the	   focus	  moves	   to	   external	   factors,	  electoral	   pressures	   and	   the	   power	   of	   ‘domestic	   audiences’	   to	   judge	   a	  President’s	   action	   have	   played	   a	   major	   part.131	  The	   presence	   of	   domestic	  political	  factors	  has	  been	  interpreted	  as	  a	  ‘source	  of	  misperception,’132	  more	  than	  a	  dimension	  of	  its	  own.	  	  	  The	  unfortunate	  focus	  on	  these	  dimensions	  has	  derailed	  the	  crisis	  literature	  towards	   an	   overflow	   of	   recommendations,	   to	   amend	   the	   decision-­‐making	  process	   or	   reform	   the	   actors	   involved	   in	   it.	   These	   recommendations	   are	  based	  on	  a	  general	  faith	  in	  the	  possibility	  of	  managing	  crises	  correctly.	  The	  hope	   is	   that	   crises,	   if	   properly	  managed,	  might	   turn	   into	   a	   ‘staged	   drama’	  through	   which	   states	   can	   achieve	   their	   aims	   without	   fighting.133	  From	   a	  cognitive	  and	  political	  psychology	  perspective,	  some	  scholars	  criticised	  the	  excessive	   reliance	   on	   recommendations.	   Lebow	   affirmed	   that	   reform	  projects	  are	  based	  on	   the	  assumption	   that	   ‘leaders	  will	  be	  willing	   to	  make	  purposeful	  efforts	   to	  structure	  an	  environment	   that	  elicits	  and	  encourages	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  Paul	  ‘t	  Hart,	  Eric	  K.	  Stern	  and	  Bengt	  Sundelius	  (Eds.),	  Beyond	  Groupthink	  (Ann	  Arbor:	  The	  University	  of	  Michigan	  Press,	  1997),	  and	  Dorwin	  Cartwright	  and	  Alvin	  Zander	  (Eds.),	  Group	  Dynamics:	  Research	  and	  Theory	  (London:	  Tavistock,	  1968).	  129	  Graham	  Allison	  and	  Philip	  Zelikow,	  The	  Essence	  of	  Decision:	  Explaining	  
the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis	  (New	  York:	  Longman,	  1999),	  p.	  174.	  130	  Arjen	  Boin,	  Paul	  ‘t	  Hart,	  Eric	  Stern	  and	  Bengt	  Sundelius,	  The	  Politics	  of	  
Crisis	  Management	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  pp.	  20-­‐23.	  131	  Lebow,	  Between;	  and	  James	  Fearon,	  ‘Domestic	  Political	  Audiences	  and	  the	  escalation	  of	  international	  disputes,’	  The	  American	  Political	  Science	  
Review,	  Vol.	  88,	  No.	  3	  (September	  1994),	  pp.	  577-­‐592.	  132	  Lebow,	  Between.	  133	  Bell,	  The	  Convention,	  p.	  116.	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critical	   thinking	   and	   dissent.’	   Such	   an	   assumption,	   generally	   unrealistic,	  becomes	  extremely	  problematic	  in	  a	  situation	  as	  stressful	  and	  demanding	  as	  a	  crisis.134	  Ole	  Holsti	  added	  that	  the	  first	  casualties	  of	  a	  stress-­‐inducing	  crisis	  situation	   are	   those	   ‘very	   abilities	   that	   are	  most	   vital	   for	   coping	   effectively	  with	   such	   situations.’135	  Going	   beyond	   this	   type	   of	   critique	   and	   through	   a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  ‘crisis	  literature,’	  however,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  collect	  a	  series	  of	   hints	   that	   seem	   to	  weaken	   both	   the	   ‘manageability’	   and	   the	   ‘finiteness’	  assumptions.	  	  	  
3.5.2	  The	  nature	  of	  crisis:	  enter	  risk	  and	  uncertainty	  	  In	   his	   definition,	   Brecher	   recognised	   the	   presence	   of	   an	   element	   of	  ‘probability.’	   The	   ‘perceived	   heightened	   probability	   of	   involvement	   in	  military	   hostilities’	   represented	   the	   ‘pivotal	   condition’	   for	   crisis.136	  Snyder	  and	   Diesing	   reached	   the	   same	   conclusion.	   The	   requirement	   of	   a	   ‘high	  probability	  of	  war’	  was	  used,	  in	  their	  account,	  to	  introduce	  the	  presence	  of	  an	   element	   of	   uncertainty.	   Uncertainty	   derived	   from	   both	   the	   imperfect	  nature	  of	  information	  on	  the	  others’	  actions	  and	  intentions,	  and	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  total	  control	  over	  events.137	  In	  making	  their	  point,	  these	  authors	  explicitly	  took	  inspiration	  from	  Schelling’s	  understanding	  of	  crises.	  The	  ‘crisis’	  that	  is	  confidently	   believed	   to	   involve	   no	   danger	   of	   ‘things	   getting	   out	   of	   hand,’	  Schelling	  warned,	  ‘is	  no	  crisis	  no	  matter	  how	  energetic	  the	  activity.’138	  Crises	  take	   place	   in	   a	   realm	   of	   risk	   and	   uncertainty.	   Decision-­‐makers,	   Schelling	  warned,	   are	  not	   authors	   of	   clear-­‐cut,	   yes	   or	  no	  decisions.	   Each	  decision	   is	  rather	  the	  result	  of	  a	  ‘dynamic	  process’	  in	  which	  decision-­‐makers	  ‘get	  more	  and	   more	   deeply	   involved,	   more	   and	   more	   expectant,	   more	   and	   more	  concerned.’139	  This	   process	   lies	   in	   great	   part	   beyond	   their	   control	   and	  awareness.	   Crises	   do	   not	   derive	   from	   a	   key	   accident,	   from	   a	   momentous	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  Lebow,	  Between,	  p.	  296.	  	  135	  Holsti,	  ‘Crisis,’	  p.	  36.	  136	  Brecher,	  Crises,	  p.	  20.	  137	  Snyder	  and	  Diesing,	  Conflict,	  p.	  8.	  138	  Thomas	  Schelling,	  Arms	  and	  Influence	  (London:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2008	  [1966]),	  p.	  97.	  139	  Schelling,	  Arms,	  p.	  98.	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decision,	  or	  from	  an	  organisational	  flaw;	  but	  from	  a	  ‘process	  of	  commitment	  that	   is	   itself	   unpredictable.’ 140 	  This	   idea	   of	   an	   unpredictable	   dynamic	  process	   leading	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   crisis	   stands	   in	   contrast	   with	   the	  orthodoxy	   of	   the	   ‘crisis	   literature’	   in	   which	   crises	   usually	   ‘explode’	   in	   a	  demarcated	  ‘on-­‐set	  phase.’	  Schelling’s	  account	  points	  to	  the	  second	  series	  of	  hints	  suggesting	  the	  need	  to	  reinterpret	  crises.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  their	  focus	  on	  bargaining,	  Snyder	  and	  Diesing	  admitted	  that	  ‘the	  real	  causes	  of	  a	  crisis	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  general	  precipitant’	  at	   the	   national	   level.	   However,	   they	   added,	   this	   precipitant	   should	   not	   be	  interpreted	   as	   a	   single	   ‘cause’	   but	   rather	   as	   a	   series	   of	   developments	   that	  made	  the	  conflict	  boil	  over	  into	  a	  crisis.141	  Lebow	  similarly	  explained	  crises	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  other’s	  commitment.	  Two	  elements	  were	  responsible	  for	  this	  challenge:	  a	  ‘need,’	  coming	  from	  strategic	  and	  domestic	  requirements,	   and	   the	  perceptions	   that	   the	   challenge	  would	  be	   swallowed	  by	   the	   adversary.	   Whereas	   psychological	   biases	   were	   responsible	   for	   the	  perceptions,	   the	   ‘need’	   had	   deeper	   domestic	   political	   roots.142	  Concluding	  his	   study,	   Lebow	   seemed	   to	   go	   beyond	   this	   ‘primacy	   of	   domestic	   politics’	  argument.	   The	   emergence	   of	   crises,	   he	   wrote,	   depended	   on	   the	   more	  general	   ‘environment,’	  both	  domestic	  and	  strategic.	  Crises	  evolved	  through	  ‘amplified	   feedback	  networks’	   in	  which	   the	   effects	  of	  previous	   choices	   are	  amplified	   and	   reverberated	   in	   following	   stages.	   The	   emergence	   depended	  on	  patterns	   ‘established	  long	  before	  the	  onset	  of	  a	  crisis.’143	  This	  argument	  has	  recently	  received	  confirmation.	  	  Crises,	   Arjen	   Boin	   and	   his	   colleagues	   argue,	   do	   not	   ‘explode’,	   they	   evolve	  slowly.	  They	  ‘travel	  the	  continuum	  from	  the	  'no	  problem'	  pole	  to	  the	  'deep	  crisis'	   end.’144 	  This	   travel	   occurs,	   in	   great	   part,	   beyond	   the	   control	   of	  policymakers.	  Abandoning	  the	  ‘crises	  as	  events’	  orthodoxy,	  this	  scholarship	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  140	  Schelling,	  Arms,	  p.	  93.	  141	  Snyder	  and	  Diesing,	  Conflict,	  p.	  12.	  142	  Lebow,	  Between,	  p.	  60.	  143	  Lebow,	  Between,	  p.	  335.	  	  144	  Boin	  et	  al.,	  The	  politics,	  p.	  4.	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has	  suggested	  that	  crises	  are	  more	   like	  diseases,145	  in	  which	  the	  causes,	  or	  pathogens,	   live	   in	   the	   system	   long	   before	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   first	  symptoms	   or	   the	   recognition	   of	   their	   presence.	   This	   new	   scholarship	   has	  correctly	   pointed	   to	   the	   need	   to	   substitute	   the	   traditional	   linear	   thinking	  (big	  events	  need	  to	  have	  big	  causes),	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  complexity	  and	  unintended	  consequences.	  ‘Multiple	  causes…interact	  over	  time	  to	  produce	  a	  threat	  with	  devastating	  potential.’146	  Crises	  do	  not	  have	  a	  pre-­‐crisis	  period	  but	   develop,	   through	   reiterative	   and	   self-­‐reinforcing	   patterns,	   ultimately	  leading	  to	  a	  narrowing	  down	  of	  the	  options	  available	  and	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  ‘symptoms.’147	  	  	  Such	   interpretation	   finds	   support	   in	   the	   ‘disaster	   literature.’	   Crises	   and	  disasters	   represent	   stern	   ‘wake	   up	   calls,’	   reminding	   decision-­‐makers	   that	  the	  assumptions	  that	  had	  guided	  their	  policies	  were	  wrong.148	  This	  process	  accumulates	   slowly.149	  Hence,	   scholars	   need	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   ‘normality	  period’	   as	   the	   stage	   in	   which	   errors	   and	   mistakes	   started	   to	   accumulate,	  going	  unnoticed.150	  The	   ‘normality	  period’	   is	   the	  breeding	  ground	  of	  crisis.	  The	  study	  of	  crisis	  has	  started	  to	  move	  in	  the	  same	  direction	  with	  the	  ‘crisis	  as	  disease’	  thesis	  and	  with	  the	  inclusion	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  ‘sense-­‐making	  period,’	   the	   period	   in	   which	   decision-­‐makers	   start	   to	   perceive	   that	  something	   is	   wrong. 151 	  However,	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   even	   these	  scholars,	   beyond	   the	   significant	   recognition	   of	   the	   ‘different’	   nature	   of	  crises,	   have	   fallen	   back	   on	   ‘traditional’	   issues.	   They	   have	   identified	  organisational	   and	   decision-­‐making	   shortcomings	   as	   main	   culprits,	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	  This	  definition	  also	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  original	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  ‘crisis.’	  146	  Boin	  et	  al.,	  The	  politics,	  p.	  5	  147	  Boin	  et	  al.,	  The	  politics,	  pp.	  5-­‐6.	  148	  Nick	  Pidgeon,	  ‘The	  limits	  of	  Safety?	  Culture,	  Politics,	  Learning	  and	  Man-­‐made	  disasters,’	  Journal	  of	  Contingencies	  and	  crisis	  management,	  Vol.	  5,	  No.	  1	  (1997),	  pp.	  1-­‐14.	  149	  Barry	  Turner,	  ‘The	  Organizational	  and	  Interorganizational	  Development	  of	  Disaster,’	  Administrative	  Science	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  21,	  No.	  3	  (September	  1976),	  p.	  380.	  See	  also	  Barry	  Turner	  and	  Nick	  Pidgeon,	  Man-­‐made	  disasters	  (London	  Butterworth	  Heinneman,	  1997).	  150	  Turner,	  ‘The	  Organizational,’	  p.	  381.	  151	  Boin	  et	  al.,	  The	  Politics.	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have	   added	   recommendations	   to	   improve	   the	   decisional	   context.152	  The	  argument	  made	  here	   is	  different.	  Crises	  do	  not	  depend	  on	  certain	   types	  of	  organisational	  arrangements,	  or	  on	  certain	  decision-­‐making	  practices.	  They	  represent	   instances	   of	   decision-­‐makers’	   loss	   of	   control,	   deriving	   from	   the	  inherent	   ‘limitedness’	   of	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making.	   As	  we	   have	   seen,	  limitedness	  depends	  on	  uncertainty	  -­‐	  as	  lack	  of	  information,	  impossibility	  of	  knowing,	   and	   lack	   of	   control	   –	   and	   on	   the	   short-­‐term,	   minimalist,	   and	  constrained	   nature	   of	   risk	   management.	   The	   account	   will	   focus	   on	   the	  ‘normality’	   period	   to	   see	   how	   crises	   emerge.	   In	   particular,	   it	   will	   suggest	  that	  crises	  represent	  instances	  of	  decision-­‐makers’	  lack	  of	  control	  due	  to	  the	  mis-­‐management	  of	  the	  risks	  posed	  by	  foreign	  policy	  issues.	  
	  
3.6	  RESEARCH	  HYPOTHESES	  ALONG	  THE	  COLD	  WAR/POST-­‐COLD	  WAR	  
DIVIDE	  
	  As	  repeatedly	  stated,	  this	  thesis	  aims	  critically	  to	  assess	  the	  claims	  made	  in	  the	   Beckian	   and	   Foucauldian	   literature	   about	   a	   basic,	   even	   fundamental,	  transformation	  in	  the	  nature	  and	  practice	  of	  foreign	  policy	  making	  towards	  a	  ‘risk’	  approach	  in	  the	  period	  between	  the	  start	  of	  the	  1990s	  and	  the	  early	  2000s.	   After	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   risk	   literature,	   the	   reconceptualisation	   of	  risk,	  uncertainty	  and	  risk	  management,	  and	  the	  identification	  of	  the	  field	  in	  which	   the	   thesis	   will	   develop,	   it	   is,	   now,	   time	   to	   explicitly	   spell	   out	   the	  research	   hypotheses	   driving	   the	   project.	   Chapter	   2	   identified	   the	   key	  propositions	   of	   the	   sociology-­‐inspired	   IR	   approaches	   to	   risk.	   These	  propositions	  concern	  three	  main	  dimensions.	  The	  first	  dimension	  deals	  with	  the	   elements	   of	   decision-­‐making.	   Both	   Foucauldian	   and	   Beckian	   scholars	  identify	   risk	   and	   uncertainty	   as	   brand	   new	   elements	   of	   the	   foreign	   policy	  decision-­‐making	   context.	   The	   second	   dimension	   concerns	   the	   practice	   of	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making.	  In	  particular,	   it	   is	  suggested	  that	  long-­‐term	  policies	  have	  been	  abandoned	   in	   favour	  of	   cyclical,	   continuous,	   and	   short-­‐term	   practices	   of	   risk	   management.	   The	   third	   dimension	   concerns	   the	  decision-­‐maker	   and	   the	   extent	   of	   his/her	   control	   over	   the	   external	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  152	  Boin	  et	  al.,	  The	  Politics,	  pp.	  140-­‐150.	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environment.	   In	   line	   with	   the	   main	   aim	   of	   the	   thesis,	   the	   research	  hypotheses	  develop	  along	  the	  same	  dimensions.	  	  	  The	   first	   research	   hypothesis	   assumes	   the	   presence	   and	   relevance	   of	   risk	  and	   uncertainty	   in	   international	   contexts	   along	   the	   historical	   divide.	  Uncertainty	   is	   assumed	   as	   natural	   condition	   of	   the	   foreign	   policy	   context.	  Uncertainty	  is	  identified	  as	  ‘lack	  of	  knowledge,’	  as	  ‘impossibility	  of	  knowing,’	  and	  as	  ‘impossibility	  of	  knowing	  the	  consequences	  of	  one’s	  own	  decision’.	  In	  the	   analysis	   of	   the	   decision-­‐making	   contexts,	   uncertainty	   will	   be	  operationalised	  in	  three	  main	  ways.	  First,	  in	  terms	  of	  uncertainty	  as	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  decision	  makers	  will	  tend	  to	  acknowledge	  difficulties,	  problems	  and	  gaps	  in	  their	  understanding	  of	  the	  situation.	  Second,	  it	  will	  be	  suggested	  that	   a	   by-­‐product	   of	   uncertainty	   as	   impossibility	   of	   knowing	   is	   the	  production	   of	   several	   options.	   The	   contemporary	   consideration	   of	   several	  policy	   choices	   represents	   a	   symptom	   of	   insecurity	   and	   of	   the	  unpredictability	   of	   the	   situation.	   It	   permits	   decision-­‐makers	   to	   ‘hedge’	  against	   uncertainty.153	  Third,	   in	   terms	   of	   uncertainty	   as	   impossibility	   of	  control,	   decision-­‐makers	   will	   demonstrate	   doubts	   (sometimes	   fear)	   as	   to	  the	  consequences	  of	  their	  actions	  both	  on	  the	  target	  of	  the	  action	  and	  on	  the	  wider	  international	  context.	  	  	  On	   risk,	   the	   analysis	   suggests	   that	   decision-­‐makers	   and	   Presidents	   treat	  uncertainty	   as	   generative	  of	   risk.	  They	   reason	   and	   take	   action	   in	   terms	  of	  explicit	   or	   implicit	   probabilities,	   and	   they	   guard	   against	   the	   probability	   of	  something	   going	   wrong.	   Risk	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   the	   unavoidable	  necessity	   of	   making	   decisions.	   Risk	   provides	   an	   illusory	   sense	   of	   control,	  undermined	  by	  the	  prevailing	  condition	  of	  uncertainty.154	  The	  analysis	  will	  identify	  situations	  in	  which	  decision-­‐makers	  acted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  explicit	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  See	  William	  Kaufman,	  The	  McNamara	  Strategy	  (New	  York:	  Harper	  and	  Row,	  1965),	  Chapter	  2.	  154	  For	  a	  similar	  point	  see	  Jeffrey	  W.	  Taliaferro,	  ‘Power	  Politics	  and	  the	  Balance	  of	  Risk:	  hypotheses	  on	  great	  power	  intervention	  in	  the	  periphery,’	  
Political	  Psychology,	  Vol.	  25,	  No.	  2	  (April	  2004),	  p.	  182.	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implicit	  probabilities	  and	  in	  which	  the	  decisions	  were	  driven	  by	  the	  need	  to	  avoid	  potential	  negative	  outcomes	  either	  internationally,	  or	  domestically.	  	  This	   element	   is	   strongly	   connected	   with	   the	   second	   research	   hypothesis,	  dealing	   with	   the	   practice	   of	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making.	   The	   second	  research	   hypothesis	   assumes	   that	   Presidential	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	   an	   exercise	   in	   risk	   management	   and,	   more	  specifically,	   as	  a	   series	  of	   risk	  vs.	   risk	   trade-­‐offs.	  The	  operationalisation	  of	  this	   hypothesis	   will	   consist	   in	   the	   identification	   of	   key	   features	   of	   risk	  management	   in	   the	   practice	   of	   foreign	   policy.	   	   These	   features	   include:	  minimalism,	   the	   acceptance	   of	   the	   containment	   of	   risk	   as	   a	   ‘victory,’	   a	  tendency	   to	   go	   back	   cyclically	   to	   readdress	   the	   same	   problem,	   and	   a	  recognition	  of	   the	   limited	  possibilities	   of	   action	  both	   in	   terms	  of	   available	  resources	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  risks	  inherent	  in	  the	  choice	  made.	  The	  hypothesis	  also	   assumes	   that,	  when	   confronted	  with	   foreign	   policy	   issues,	   Presidents	  balance	   strategic	   risks	   at	   the	   international	   level,	   inherent	   in	   the	   policy	  chosen,	  and	  domestic	  political	  risks	  coming	  from	  both	  the	  negative	  political	  consequences	   of	   the	   policy	   chosen	   and	   the	   chance	   that	   the	   policy	   chosen	  will	  not	  be	  supported.	  In	  line	  with	  Lamborn,	  the	  analysis	  will	  suggest	  that	  in	  this	  balancing	  act,	  domestic	  political	  short-­‐term	  risks	  often	  take	  precedence	  over	  longer-­‐term	  ones.	  	  	  The	   third	   hypothesis	   deals	   with	   the	   outcomes	   of	   this	   balancing	   act.	   In	  particular,	  it	  suggests	  that	  the	  minimalism	  inherent	  in	  risk	  management	  and	  the	   predominance	   of	   short-­‐term	   political	   risks	   engender	   the	   creation	   of	  countervailing	   risks	   and,	   hence,	   contribute	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   foreign	  policy	  crises.	  Foreign	  policy	  crises	  represent	  instances	  of	  ‘lack	  of	  control.’	  US	  Presidents,	   in	   other	   words,	   are	   positioned	   in	   a	   middle	   area	   between	   the	  Beckian	  and	  the	  Foucauldian	  account.	  They	  lack	  control	  but	  they	  are	  not	  as	  powerless	  and	  guilt-­‐free	  as	  the	  Beckian	  account	  would	  suggest.	  	  Should	   these	  hypotheses	  be	  verified,	   the	   claim	   to	   the	  existence	  of	   a	   ‘Great	  Divide’	   would	   be	   weakened.	   It	   would	   be	   suggested	   that	   post-­‐Cold	   War	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accounts	  and	  the	  conceptualisations	  of	  risk	  and	  uncertainty	  on	  which	  they	  are	  based	  need	  a	  serious	  reconsideration.	  What	   is	  proposed	  here,	   in	  other	  words,	  is	  a	  search	  for	  continuities	  where	  change	  seems	  to	  predominate.	  	  
	  
3.6.1	  Towards	  the	  case	  studies	  	  In	   line	   with	   the	   aims	   of	   the	   thesis	   and	   with	   the	   research	   hypotheses	  stipulated	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   previous	   section,	   the	   case	   studies	   have	   been	  selected	  along	  the	  Cold	  War/Post-­‐Cold	  War	  divide.	  They	  represent	  different	  international	  contexts	  and	  different	  decision-­‐making	  environments.	  The	  aim	  is	   to	   strongly	   suggest	   the	   existence	   of	   continuities	   and	   similarities	   among	  them.	  Furthermore,	  the	  case	  studies	  will	   focus	  on	  US	  foreign	  policy	  and	  on	  Presidential	  management	  of	  risks.	  This	  choice	  is,	  in	  a	  sense,	  inevitable.	  The	  sociological	   literature	   takes	   the	   United	   States	   government	   as	   its	   main	  example	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  practice	  of	  decision-­‐making.	  The	  ‘decision-­‐theory’	   literature	   focuses	   largely	   on	   US	   Presidents	   and	   their	  approaches	   to	   risk.	   This	   project	  must	   confront	   these	   approaches	   on	   their	  own	  turf.	  	  	  The	   analysis	  will	   look	   at	   the	   Kennedy	   Administration	   and	   at	   how	   it	   dealt	  with	  the	  question	  of	  Cuba,	  until	   the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis.	  The	   Carter	   Administration’s	   management	   of	   the	   Iranian	   Revolution	   up	   to	  the	  start	  of	  the	  hostage	  crisis	  will	  represent	  the	  second	  case	  study.	  Finally,	  the	  Clinton	  Administration’s	  management	  of	  the	  conflict	  in	  Bosnia	  has	  been	  selected	  for	  its	  unequivocally	  ‘post-­‐Cold	  War’	  character.	  155	  Each	  case	  study	  will	  be	  preceded	  by	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  US	  foreign	  policy	  situation	  at	  the	  time,	  by	  a	  description	  of	  the	  President’s	  predicament,	  and	  by	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  uncertainty	  surrounding	   the	   issues	  at	  hand.	  The	  analysis	  will	   continue	  identifying	   various	   ‘risk	   vs.	   risk’	   trade-­‐offs,	   discussing	   how	   Presidents	  managed	   those	   risks	   and	   how	   the	  management	   contributed	   to	   the	   loss	   of	  control	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  crisis.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  briefly	  delay	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  155	  A	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  these	  issues	  and	  a	  more	  thorough	  justification	  of	  the	  selection	  process	  will	  be	  provided	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  
	   94	  
start	   of	   the	   case	   studies	   to	   consider	   the	   methodology	   and	   methods	   that	  drove	  the	  research	  project.	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Evaluating	  foreign	  policy	  is	  hard.1	  Stephen	  Walt.	  	  
God	  gave	  physics	  the	  easy	  problems.2	  Steven	  Bernstein	  et	  al.	  	  
Chapter	   3	  ended	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	   the	  research	  hypotheses	  and	  with	  a	  description	   of	   how	   the	   case	   studies	   would	   develop.	   Before	   proceeding,	  however,	   it	   seems	   necessary	   to	   explain	   how	   those	   research	   hypotheses	  came	  about,	  how	  the	  project	  aims	  to	  verify	  them,	  and	  why	  it	  aims	  to	  verify	  them	  in	  the	  way	  selected.	  This	  chapter	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  three	  main	  parts.	  
Part	   two	  will	   tackle	  a	   ‘why’	  question,	   looking	  at	   the	  origins	  of	   the	  project.	  
Part	  three	  will	  answer	  a	  ‘what’	  question,	  focusing	  on	  its	  methodology.	  Part	  
four	   looks	  more	  specifically	  at	  how	  the	  research	  was	  conducted	  and	  at	  the	  methods	  used.	  	  	  
4.2	  THE	  ‘WHY’	  QUESTION	  	  It	   is	   generally	   suggested	   that	   a	   research	   project	   should	   start	   from	   the	  identification	  of	  gaps	   in	   the	  relevant	   literature.	  As	  Barbara	  Geddes	  argued,	  however,	   a	   desperate	   search	   for	   gaps	   in	   the	   literature	   could	   turn	   into	   a	  search	   for	   mythical	   creatures.	   The	   research	   could	   as	   well	   originate	   in	   an	  ‘intense	  but	  unfocused	   curiosity.’3	  In	  particular,	   a	   sense	  of	   ‘annoyance	  and	  irritation’	  with	   the	  available	   literature	   can	  provide	   the	   researcher	  with	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Stephen	  M.	  Walt,	  ‘Evaluating	  foreign	  policy	  is	  hard,’	  Stephen	  Walt’s	  Blog,	  A	  
Realist	  in	  an	  Ideological	  Age,	  21	  June	  2011,	  [http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/20/evaluating_foreign_policy_is_hard]	  (accessed	  31	  July	  2013).	  2	  Steven	  Bernstein,	  et	  al.,	  ‘God	  gave	  physics	  the	  easy	  problems,’	  European	  
Journal	  of	  International	  Relations,	  Vol.	  6,	  No.	  1	  (2000),	  pp.	  43-­‐76.	  3	  Barbara	  Geddes,	  Paradigms	  and	  Sand	  Castles:	  Theory	  building	  and	  research	  
design	  in	  comparative	  politics	  (Ann	  Arbor:	  The	  University	  of	  Michigan	  Press,	  2003),	  p.	  29.	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initial	   boost.4	  Started	   as	   an	   unfocused	   interest	   in	   the	   post-­‐9/11	   foreign	  policy	  literature,	  this	  project	  soon	  identified	  risk	  as	  dominant	  theme	  within	  this	  scholarship.	  The	  blurred	  conceptualisation	  of	  risk	  and	  its	  alleged	  role	  in	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making	  provided	  the	  boost	  needed.	  	  	  As	  we	  have	   seen,	   the	   recent	   risk	   literature	   in	   IR	   reveals	   two	  predominant	  approaches.	   At	   a	   closer	   look,	   both	   understandings	   start	   from	   the	   same	  assumption:	   the	   recent	   rise	   to	  predominance	  of	   risk	   –	   coinciding	  with	   the	  end	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   or	   with	   9/11	   –	   and	   the	   ensuing	   uncertainty	   have	  radically	   changed	   the	   way	   in	   which	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   policies	   are	  conducted.	   Unsatisfied	   with	   this	   account,	   and	   specifically,	   with	   the	  conceptualisations	  of	  risk	  and	  uncertainty,	  and	  with	  the	  radical	  portrayal	  of	  decision-­‐makers,	   the	   project	   started	   a	   search	   for	   better	   understandings.	  Failing	   to	   find	  answers	   in	   ‘decision	   theory,’	   the	  project	  has	   redefined	   risk,	  relying	   on	   foreign	   policy	   and	   risk	   management	   texts.	   Going	   beyond	   this	  literature,	  it	  has	  argued	  that	  each	  foreign	  policy	  choice	  implies	  different	  risk	  trade-­‐offs	   between	   a	   strategic	   and	   a	   political	   dimension.	   The	   project	  identified	   foreign	   policy	   crises	   as	   the	   main	   testing	   ground.	   Building	   on	  recent	   literature,	   the	   project	   substituted	   an	   understanding	   of	   crises	   as	  ‘explosions’	   with	   one	   of	   crises	   as	   slowly	   evolving	   ‘diseases.’	   The	   focus	  shifted	   from	   momentous	   mistakes,	   to	   the	   slow	   accumulation	   of	  ‘countervailing’	  risks.	  The	  risks,	  uncertainty	  and	  lack	  of	  control	  inherent	  in	  the	   emergence	   of	   crises	   act	   as	   ‘exhibits’	   in	   the	   case	   against	   the	   Cold	  War/Post-­‐Cold	  War	  divide.	  	  Although	   starting	   from	   ‘annoyance’	   and	   ‘irritation,’	   then,	   the	   project	  identified	  a	  ‘gap	  in	  the	  literature:’	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  conceptualisation	  of	  risk	  that	  could	   be	   relevant	   for	   an	   analysis	   of	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making.	   In	   an	  effort	   to	   fill	   this	   gap,	   the	   project	   also	   satisfies	   (with	   an	   added	   twist)	   two	  main	   criteria	   generally	   considered	   necessary	   for	   a	   good	   research	   project.	  First,	   the	   object	   of	   a	   research	   project	   should	   be	   ‘important’	   for	   the	   real	  world	   outside	   academia.	   Second,	   the	   project	   should	   offer	   a	   precise	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Geddes,	  Paradigms,	  p.	  29.	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contribution	   to	   knowledge. 5 	  The	   importance	   is	   given	   by	   the	   need	   to	  moderate	   the	   dystopian	   claims	   of	   both	   Foucauldian	   and	   Beckian	  interpretations.	   Secondary	   aims	   include	   improving	   the	   understanding	   of	  risk	   as	   a	   foreign	   policy	   variable,	   contributing	   to	   the	   crisis	   and	   decision	  theory	   literatures,	  and	  strengthening	  interdisciplinary	  dialogue.	  The	  added	  twist	  comes	  from	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  project.	  The	  object	  of	  research,	  Richard	  Lebow	   argued,	   should	   certainly	   be	   important;	   but	   this	   should	   not	   lead	   to	  study	  everything	  that	  is	  ‘hot’	  in	  one’s	  own	  field.	  It	  is	  even	  better	  if	  the	  spirit	  and	  the	  topic	  of	  the	  project	  are	  counter-­‐intuitively	  ‘cold,’	  that	  is	  against	  the	  predominant	  positions.6	  Nothing	  at	  this	  stage,	  in	  which	  the	  identification	  of	  a	   radical	   change	  seems	   to	  define	  much	  of	   the	  current	   literature,	   is	   ‘colder’	  than	  a	  project	  suggesting,	  at	  least	  partial,	  continuity.	  	  	  
4.3	  THE	  ‘WHAT’	  QUESTION	  
	  
4.3.1	  Interpretation:	  a	  game	  of	  Scrabble	  
	  The	  previous	  section	  contained	  terms,	  such	  as	  ‘understand,’	  ‘interpretation,’	  and	   ‘exhibit’	   that	   represent	  more	   than	   simple	   cues	   as	   to	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  project.	  At	  the	  epistemological	  level,	  the	  primacy	  of	  ‘understanding’	  defines	  both	  its	  qualitative	  and	  interpretive	  nature.7	  Gary	  King,	  Robert	  Keohane	  and	  Sidney	  Verba	  identified	  key	  features	  of	  qualitative	  research:	  it	  covers	  a	  wide	  range	   of	   approaches,	   none	   of	   which	   relies	   on	   numerical	   measurement;	   it	  focuses	  on	  a	  small	  number	  of	  cases,	  using	   intensive	   interviews	  or	   in	  depth	  analysis	   of	   the	   historical	   material;	   it	   is	   discursive	   and	   concerned	   with	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Stephen	  Van	  Evera,	  Guide	  to	  methods	  for	  students	  of	  Political	  Science	  (London:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1997);	  and	  Gary	  King,	  Robert	  O.	  Keohane	  and	  Sideny	  Verba,	  Designing	  Social	  Enquiry	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1994).	  6	  Richard	  N.	  Lebow,	  ‘Social	  Science	  and	  History:	  ranchers	  versus	  farmers?’	  in	  Colin	  Elman	  and	  Miriam	  F.	  Elman	  (Eds.),	  Bridges	  and	  Boundaries:	  Historians,	  
Political	  Scientists,	  and	  the	  Study	  of	  International	  relations	  (London:	  The	  MIT	  Press,	  2001),	  p.	  113.	  7	  Martin	  Hollis	  and	  Steve	  Smith,	  Explaining	  and	  Understanding	  International	  
Relations	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1990).	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‘rounded	  or	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  some	  event.’8	  They	  went	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  despite	  the	  turf	  wars	  between	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  methods,	  the	  same	   underlying	   logic,	   the	   logic	   of	   inference,	   supported	   both	   types	   of	  method.9	  This	   project	   rejects	   such	   an	   assumption	   and,	   with	   it,	   the	   ill-­‐concealed	   suggestion	   that	   since	   the	   purpose	   of	   all	   research	   is	   statistical	  inference,	  being	  qualitative	  research	  pre-­‐statistical	  it	  is	  somewhat	  inferior.10	  More	  properly:	  	   Even	   though	   it	   is	   more	   than	   possible	   to	   describe	   empirically	  patterns	   of	   social	   action	   by	   using	   all	   the	   elegant	   correlational	  apparatus	  of	  positivist	  social	  science,	  this	  would	  fail	  to	  get	  at	  the	  proper	  subject-­‐matter	  of	  social	  science.	  It	  would	  fail...to	  give	  an	  adequate	   account	   or	   interpretation…in	   terms	   faithful	   to	   its	  status	  as	  a	  human	  product.11	  	  The	   ‘interpretivist’	   approach	  might	   seem	   in	   contrast	   with	   claims	   brought	  forward	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  The	  chapter	  suggested	  the	  identification	  of	  hypotheses	   and	   their	   test	   through	   case	   studies.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   project	  seemed	   to	   conform	   to	   a	   ‘hypothetic-­‐deductive’	   model.	   This	   model	   is	  generally	  appropriated	  by	  ‘positivist	  approaches’	  and	  consists	  of	  four	  main	  steps:	  the	  generation	  of	  hypotheses,	  the	  derivation	  of	  predictions,	  the	  test	  of	  hypotheses,	   and	   their	   confirmation	   or	   disconfirmation.	   These	   four	   steps,	  however,	  are	  as	  central	  to	  interpretivist	  approaches	  as	  they	  are	  to	  positivist	  ones.	  In	  both	  camps	  scholars	  will:	  	   Observe	  and	   form	  hunches…They	   then	  assess	  whether	   the	  bits	  of	   information	   they	   have	   gathered	   fit	   the	   interpretation	   they	  have	   posited,	   or	   they	   consider	   the	   fit	   of	   competing	  interpretations	   with	   the	   same	   basic	   set	   of	   ‘facts’	   they	   have	  gathered	  on	  their	  subject.12	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  King	  et	  al.,	  Designing,	  p.	  3	  9	  King	  et	  al.,	  Designing.	  10	  Timothy	  J.	  McKeown,	  ‘Case	  Studies	  and	  the	  Statistical	  Worldview,’	  
International	  Organization,	  Vol.	  53,	  No.	  1	  (Winter	  1999),	  pp.	  161-­‐190.	  11	  John	  A.	  Hughes,	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  Social	  Research	  (London:	  Longman,	  1990),	  p.	  94.	  12	  Brian	  Pollins,	  ‘Beyond	  Logical	  Positivism:	  reframing	  King,	  Keohane	  and	  Verba,’	  in	  Richard	  N.	  Lebow	  and	  Mark	  Lichbach	  (Eds.),	  Theory	  and	  Evidence	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The	  purpose	  of	  finding	  a	  fit	  between	  interpretations	  and	  ‘facts,’	  in	  inverted	  commas,	  implies	  scepticism	  towards	  any	  understanding	  of	  social	  sciences	  as	  an	  irresistible	  march	  towards	  the	  Truth.13	  As	  in	  a	  game	  of	  Scrabble:	  	  	   We	   begin	   with	   concepts	   and	   rules	   that	   make	   many	   outcomes	  possible.	   We	   can	   crisscross	   or	   add	   letters	   to	   existing	  combinations,	  but	  all	  these	  entries	  must	  be	  supportive	  and	  must	  at	   least	  partially	  build	  on	  existing	  words	  and	  the	  concepts	   that	  underlie	  them.14	  	  	  The	  Scrabble	  metaphor	  is	  not	  dissimilar	  from	  the	  metaphor	  of	  social	  science	  as	  a	  court	  in	  which	  ‘the	  issue	  of	  the	  warrants	  for	  the	  assertions	  made	  turns	  on	  appraisal,	  that	  is,	  on	  weighing	  the	  evidence.’	  This	  image	  proves	  especially	  true	  since,	  as	   in	  a	  court,	   ‘undecidable	  questions	  have	  to	  be	  decided,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  offering	  and	  rebutting	  “evidence,”	  not	  conclusive	  proof.’15	  In	  both	  a	  game	   of	   Scrabble	   and	   a	   court,	   standards	   are	   crucial.	   Not	   everything	   is	  permitted	   and	   standards	   differentiate	   between	   plausible	   and	   implausible	  claims.	  A	  qualitative,	  interpretive	  account	  is	  not	  a	  march	  towards	  the	  Truth,	  but	  neither	  is	  it	  a	  totally	  constructivist	  narrative.	  As	  Ian	  Lustick	  suggested,	  a	  balance	   needs	   to	   be	   struck	   between	   being	   ‘”constructivist”	   enough	   to	  recognize	  the	  unavoidable	  intrusion	  of	  point	  of	  view…	  but	  “realist”	  enough	  to	   ascribe	   actual	   truth	   value’,	  with	   a	   small	   t,	   to	   some	   accounts.16	  The	   only	  way	   to	   ascribe	   truth-­‐value	   is	   to	   submit	  one’s	  own	  claim	   to	   the	   scrutiny	  of	  others.	  Social	   science	   is	  communicative.	  Brian	  Pollins’	   suggestion	  of	  a	  new	  ‘minimal	  methodology,’	  based	  on	  falsifiability	  and	  replicability	  seems	  more	  than	  pertinent.	  Falsifiability	  implies	  that	  others	  ‘must	  have	  a	  fair	  chance	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  our	  claim	  about	  the	  world	   is	  subject	   to	  their	  opposition.’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in	  Comparative	  Politics	  and	  International	  Relations	  (New	  York:	  Palgrave	  MacMillan,	  2007),	  p.	  100.	  13	  Richard	  N.	  Lebow,	  ‘What	  can	  we	  do?	  How	  can	  we	  know?’	  in	  Lebow	  and	  Lichbach,	  Theory	  and	  Evidence,	  p.	  8.	  14	  Lebow,	  ‘What,’	  p.	  10.	  	  15	  Friedrich	  Kratochwil,	  ‘Evidence,	  Inference	  and	  Truth	  as	  Problems	  of	  Theory	  Building	  in	  the	  Social	  Sciences,’	  in	  Lebow	  and	  Lichbach,	  Theory	  and	  
Evidence,	  p.	  29.	  16	  Ian	  S.	  Lustick,	  ‘History,	  Historiography	  and	  Political	  Science:	  multiple	  historical	  records	  and	  the	  problem	  of	  selection	  bias,’	  The	  American	  Political	  
Science	  Review,	  Vol.	  90,	  No.	  3	  (September	  1996),	  p.	  613.	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Reproducibility	  means	  guaranteeing	  to	  other	  the	  possibility	  of	  retracing	  the	  steps	  made	  by	  the	  researchers.17	  	  	  At	   the	   ontological	   level,	   the	   project	   rejects	   the	   radical	   positivist	   notion	   of	  evidence	   as	   ‘unproblematic.’	   The	   analysis	   of	   a	   social	   fact	   is	   different	   from	  the	   analysis	   of	   ‘brute’	   facts	   such	   as	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   mountain.	   At	   least	  partially,	   scholars	   need	   to	   ‘import’	   meanings	   if	   they	   want	   to	   identify	   the	  relevant	  evidence.18	  These	  meanings	  are	  not	  imported	  casually,	  but	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  research	  project	  defines	  which	  ones	  will	  be	  imported.	  Previous	  thinking,	   or	   foreknowledge,	   informs	   every	   research	   project. 19 	  ‘The	  ‘”framework”	   through	   which	   evidence	   is	   collected	   is	   given	   by	   the	  researcher,	   not	   by	   the	   “facts”	   themselves.’20	  This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   the	  researcher	   can	   distort	   the	   evidence,	   otherwise	   it	   would	   be	   considered	  unacceptable	   in	   ‘court,’	   as	   much	   as	   cheating	   in	   Scrabble.	   The	   core	   of	  interpretivism	   is	   represented	   by	   an	   effort	   to	   ‘translate’	   what	   can	   be	  observed,	   in	   the	   language	   of	   scholarly	   research,	   ‘without	   changing	   the	  meaning	  of	  what	   is’	  or	  was	   ‘experienced	  by	  the	  subjects	  themselves.’21	  The	  main	   concern	   is	   a	  high-­‐fidelity	   representation	  of	  how	   the	   subjects	   studied	  understood	  the	  situation	  they	  were	  confronting,	  regardless	  of	  how	  complex	  this	   understanding	   might	   be.	   Interpretation	   rejects	   positivist	   faith	   in	   the	  possibility	   of	   identifying	   clearly	   delimited	   independent	   variables.	   It	  abandons	   a	   premium	   on	   parsimony	   for	   its	   own	   sake;	   instead	   it	   tries	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Pollins,	  ‘Beyond,’	  p.	  94.	  18	  John	  R.	  Searle,	  The	  construction	  of	  social	  reality	  (London:	  Penguin	  Books,	  1995),	  p.	  2.	  19	  McKeown,	  ‘Case	  studies,’	  p.	  181.	  	  20	  Alexander	  L.	  George	  and	  Timothy	  J.	  McKeown,	  ‘Case	  studies	  and	  theories	  of	  organizational	  decision	  making,’	  in	  Lee	  S.	  Sproull	  and	  Patrick	  D.	  Larkey	  (Eds.),	  Advances	  in	  Information	  Processing	  in	  Organizations,	  Vol.	  2	  (Greenwich:	  JAI	  Press,	  1985),	  p.	  34.	  21	  Ted	  Hopf,	  ‘The	  limits	  of	  interpreting	  evidence,’	  in	  Lebow	  and	  Lichbach,	  
Theory	  and	  Evidence,	  p.	  59.	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uncover	   ‘details,	  complexity	  and	  situated	  meanings’	  of	   those	  who	  lived	  the	  experiences.22	  	  	  
4.3.2	  From	  interpretation	  to	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making	  	  The	   same	   process	   of	   ‘uncovering’	   is	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   the	   foreign	   policy	  decision-­‐making	   approach.	   The	   approach	   developed	   from	   the	   behavioural	  revolution	   of	   the	   1950s	   as	   a	   critique	   of	   the	   realist	   study	   of	   international	  politics	  in	  terms	  of	  states’	  actions.23	  The	  establishment	  of	  a	  decision-­‐making	  approach	  aimed	  at	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  ‘normal	  science’	  of	  foreign	  policy.	  Many	  of	  the	  scholars	  within	  the	  ‘first	  generation’	  adopted	  ‘quantitative,	  positivist	  (scientific)	   models.’ 24 	  This	   project,	   epitomised	   by	   Comparative	   Foreign	  Policy,	   failed,	   but	   a	   broader	   approach	   survived,	   inspired	   by	   the	   founding	  text,	  Foreign	  Policy	  Decision-­‐Making	   (itself	  an	  effort	   to	  achieve	  a	   ‘positivist’	  study	   of	   foreign	   policy).	   Originally	   published	   in	   1954,	   the	   study	   aimed	   at	  positioning	   the	   individual	   at	   the	   centre	  of	  decision.	  The	  approach	  entailed	  two	  methodological	  choices:	  a	  state	  is	  its	  decision-­‐makers,	  and	  the	  study	  of	  foreign	   policy	   needs	   to	   be	   conducted	   from	   a	   ‘decision-­‐maker’s	   point	   of	  view.’25	  Since	  then,	  this	  scholarship	  has	  evolved,	  adopting	  multiple	  methods	  and	   methodologies,	   but	   often	   maintaining	   key	   assumptions,	   such	   as	   the	  primacy	  of	  agency	  over	  structure.26	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Thomas	  A.	  Schwandt,	  ‘Constructivist,	  Interpretivist	  approaches	  to	  Human	  inquiry,’	  in	  Norman	  K.	  Denzin	  and	  Yvonna	  S.	  Lincoln	  (Eds.),	  The	  Landscapes	  
of	  Qualitative	  Research:	  Theories	  and	  Issues	  (London:	  SAGE,	  1998),	  p.	  222.	  23	  Walter	  Carlsnaes,	  ‘Foreign	  Policy,’	  in	  Walter	  Carlsnaes,	  Thomas	  Risse	  and	  Beth	  A.	  Simmons	  (Eds.),	  Handbook	  of	  International	  Relations	  (London:	  SAGE,	  2002).	  24	  Laura	  Neack,	  Jeanne	  A.	  K.	  Hey,	  and	  Patrick	  J.	  Haney,	  ‘Generational	  Change	  in	  Foreign	  Policy	  Analysis,’	  in	  Laura	  Neack,	  Jeanne	  A.	  K.	  Hey,	  and	  Patrick	  J.	  Haney	  (Eds.),	  Foreign	  Policy	  Analysis:	  continuity	  and	  change	  in	  its	  second	  
generation	  (Englewood	  Cliff:	  Prentice	  Hall,	  1995),	  p.	  3.	  25	  Richard	  Snyder,	  H.	  W.	  Bruck,	  and	  Burton	  Sapin	  /	  Valerie	  Hudson,	  Derek	  H.	  Chollet,	  and	  James	  Goldgeiger,	  Foreign	  Policiy	  Decision-­‐making	  Re-­‐visited	  (New	  York,	  Palgrave	  and	  MacMillan,	  2002),	  p.	  4.	  26	  David	  Patrick	  Houghton,	  ‘Reinvigorating	  the	  Study	  of	  Foreign	  Policy	  Decision-­‐Making:	  toward	  a	  constructivist	  approach,’	  Foreign	  Policy	  Analysis,	  Vol.	  3	  (2007),	  pp.	  24-­‐45.	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In	   this	   regard,	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   approach	   has	   been	   accused	   of	  never	  coming	  to	  grips	  with	  the	  ‘agency-­‐structure’	  problem.27	  This	  is	  not	  the	  place	   to	  solve	   the	   ‘Gordian	  knot’28	  of	   the	  agency-­‐structure	  debate	   in	  either	  IR,	  or	  foreign	  policy	  analysis.	  However,	  it	  should	  be	  acknowledge	  that	  within	  the	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making	   literature,	   the	   attempt	   to	   identify	   how	  the	  two	  dimensions	  interact	  represented	  a	  key	  concern.	  	  	  Margaret	  and	  Harold	  Sprout	  famously	  argued	  that	  to	  explain	  foreign	  policy	  choice	  one	  had	  to	  look	  at	  the	  ‘psycho	  milieu’	  of	  decision-­‐makers’	  psychology,	  and	   cognition	   and	   at	   the	   ‘operational	   environment. 29 	  From	   a	   realist	  perspective,	   Arnold	   Wolfers	   similarly	   wrote	   that	   foreign	   policy	   was	  determined	  by	  how	  an	  actor’s	  ‘prism’	  filtered	  the	  external	  environment.30	  In	  similar	  terms,	  Michael	  Brecher	  suggested	  that	  a	  decision	  could	  be	  explained	  only	   through	   an	   understanding	   of	   how	   the	   ‘operational	   environment’	   is	  filtered	  through	  the	  ‘images’	  of	  decision-­‐makers.31	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  focus	  on	  decision-­‐makers	  did	  not	  exclude	  a	  consideration	  of	   the	   ‘environment.’	  The	  main	   aim	   was	   the	   simultaneous	   consideration	   of	   the	   domestic	   and	  international	   environment.32	  Richard	   Snyder	   and	   his	   co-­‐authors	   suggested	  the	   adoption	   of	   an	   ‘action-­‐situational’	   analysis	   that	   made	   it	   possible	   to	  ‘emphasize	   that	   state	   behaviour	   is	   determined	   but	   to	   avoid	   deterministic	  explanations.’ 33 	  ‘The	   concept	   of	   situation,’	   they	   wrote,	   ‘requires	  investigation	  of	  how	  relations	  among	  past	  action,	  existing	  rules,	  strategies	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Walter	  Carlsnaes,	  ‘The	  Agency-­‐Structure	  Problem	  in	  Foreign	  Policy	  Analysis,’	  International	  Studies	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  36,	  No.	  3	  (September	  1992),	  pp.	  245-­‐270.	  28	  Andreas	  Bieler	  and	  Adam	  David	  Morton,	  ‘The	  Gordian	  Knot	  of	  Agency—Structure	  in	  International	  Relations,’	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  
Relations,	  Vol.	  7,	  No.	  1	  (March	  2001),	  pp.	  5-­‐35.	  29	  Harold	  and	  Margaret	  Sprout,	  The	  Ecological	  Perspective	  on	  Human	  
relations	  with	  Specific	  reference	  to	  International	  Politics	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1965).	  30	  Arnold	  Wolfers,	  Discord	  and	  Collaboration	  (London:	  The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1962),	  p.	  42.	  31	  Michael	  Brecher,	  The	  Foreign	  Policy	  System	  of	  Israel:	  An	  analysis	  of	  
decision-­‐making	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1963),	  p.	  4.	  32	  James	  Barber	  and	  Michael	  Smith	  (Eds.),	  The	  Nature	  of	  Foreign	  Policy:	  a	  
reader	  (Milton	  Keynes:	  Open	  University	  Press,	  1974).	  33	  Snyder	  et	  al.,	  Foreign	  Policy,	  p.	  75.	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action,	   and	   particular	   aspects	   of	   the	   setting	   are	   established	   by	   decision-­‐makers.’34	  	  	  At	  the	  subnational	  level,	  a	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making	  approach	  permits	  us	  to	   include	  both	  domestic	  and	  international	   factors	   in	  the	  understanding	  of	  decisions.	  Decision-­‐makers	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	   ‘operating	   in	  a	  dual-­‐aspect	  setting	   so	   that	   apparently	   unrelated	   internal	   and	   external	   factors	   become	  related	   in	   the	   actions	   of	   decision-­‐makers.’ 35 	  The	   external	   setting	   -­‐	   of	  conditions	   beyond	   national	   boundaries	   -­‐	   and	   the	   internal	   setting	   -­‐	   of	  domestic	   politics,	   public	   opinion	   and	   other	   pressures	   –	  met	   in	   a	   decision-­‐maker’s	   ‘definition	   of	   the	   situation.’36	  The	   inclusion	   of	   both	   dimensions	  represents	   a	   third	  way	   between	   interpretations	   based	   on	   the	   ‘primacy	   of	  domestic	  politics,’	  and	  those	  –	  adopted	  by	  most	  decision	  theory	  literature	  -­‐	  excluding	  domestic	  politics	  altogether.37	  As	  Lawrence	  Freedman	  argued	  the	  exclusion	   of	   politics	   came	   from	   a	   ‘false	   dichotomy’	   that	   led	   scholars	   to	  consider	   logic	   and	   politics	   as	   ‘alternative	   and	  mutually	   exclusive	   ways	   to	  policy-­‐making.’	   Decisions,	   in	   his	   opinion,	   developed	   along	   a	   continuum	  between	  the	  two	  poles.38	  	  	  More	  recently,	  several	  scholars	  have	  started	  to	  reconsider	  the	  exclusion	  of	  domestic	  factors.	  James	  N.	  Rosenau	  argued	  that	  foreign	  policy	  reflects	  both	  an	   ‘opportunity…elsewhere	   in	   the	   world,’	   and	   domestic	   factors.39	  Some	  argued	   that	   the	   relevance	   of	   domestic	   politics	   in	   foreign	   policy	   increased	  with	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  that	  unipolarity	  made	  the	  international	  system	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Snyder	  et	  al.,	  Foreign	  Policy,	  p.	  75.	  35	  Snyder	  et	  al.,	  Foreign	  Policy,	  p.	  85.	  36	  Snyder	  et	  al.,	  Foreign	  Policy,	  p.	  60.	  	  37	  See	  Wolfers’	  ‘house	  on	  fire	  metaphor,’	  in	  Wolfers,	  Discord,	  p.	  13,	  and	  Helen	  Milner’s	  ‘poliarchy	  theory,’	  in	  Helen	  Milner,	  Interests,	  institutions	  and	  
information	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1997),	  p.	  4.	  38	  Lawrence	  Freedman,	  ‘Logic,	  Politics	  and	  Foreign	  Policy	  Processes:	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  Bureaucratic	  Politics	  Model,’	  International	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  52,	  No.	  3	  (June	  1976),	  p.	  436.	  39	  James	  Rosenau,	  ‘Introduction:	  new	  directions	  and	  recurrent	  questions	  in	  the	  comparative	  study	  of	  foreign	  policy,’	  in	  Charles	  Hermann,	  Charles	  Kegley,	  and	  James	  Rosenau	  (Eds.),	  New	  Directions	  in	  the	  Study	  of	  Foreign	  
Policy	  (London:	  Allen	  and	  Unwin,	  1987),	  p.	  2.	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closer	   to	   the	   domestic	   one,40	  or	   that	   globalisation	  made	   ‘foreign	   relations	  less	   foreign.’41	  This,	   however,	   might	   be	   another	   case	   of	   an	   unnecessary	  historical	  divide.	  Foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐makers,	  and	  especially	  Presidents,	  have	  never	  been	  completely	  isolated	  from	  domestic	  political	  dynamics.42	  As	  Campbell	  Craig	  and	  Fredrik	  Logevall	  have	  recently	   suggested,	   the	  study	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy	  should	  be	  conducted	  at	  the	  ‘intermestic	  level,’	  that	  is	   where	   the	   international	   and	   the	   domestic	   meet.43	  The	   foreign	   policy	  decision-­‐making	  approach	  permits	  not	  only	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  actors	  making	  the	  decisions,	  going	  beyond	  the	  ‘black	  box’	  of	  state	  actors,	  but	  it	  recognises	  the	  existence	   of	   ‘pink,	   purple,	   brown,	   and	   blue	   boxes’	   and	   works	   towards	  opening	  them.44	  As	  much	  as	  ‘interpretivism,’	  it	  values	  complexity	  and	  depth,	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  parsimony.45	  	  
4.3.3	  Interpretation,	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making	  and	  risk	  
	  From	  this	  account,	  it	  should	  be	  clear	  how	  an	  interpretive	  methodology	  and	  the	   decision-­‐making	   approach	   are	   strongly	   interconnected	   with	   the	   aims	  and	  the	  key	  tenets	  of	  the	  project.	  The	  previous	  chapter	  positioned	  risk	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  this	  project.	  It	  defined	  risk	  as	   ‘the	  probability	  of	  something	  going	  wrong,’	   and	   it	   made	   clear	   that	   risks	   depend	   on	   decision-­‐makers’	  engagement	  with	   an	   issue.	   In	   this	   sense	   ‘probability’	   is	   not	   something	  out	  there.	  Probabilities	  cannot	  be	  neutrally	  assessed.	  They	  refer	  to	  probabilities	  for	  someone,	  for	  the	  decision-­‐makers;	  specifically	  for	  the	  President.	  In	  other	  words,	  when	  the	  project	  identifies	  the	  risks	  Presidents	  managed,	  it	  does	  so	  interpreting	  their	  ‘definition	  of	  the	  situation,’	  uncovering	  the	  main	  features	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Robert	  Jervis,	  ‘Unipolarity	  a	  structural	  perspective,’	  World	  Politics,	  Vol.	  61,	  No.	  1	  (2009),	  pp.	  188-­‐213.	  41	  Thomas	  G.	  Paterson	  et	  al.,	  American	  Foreign	  Relations:	  A	  History,	  Vol.	  2,	  
Since	  1895	  (New	  York:	  Houghton	  Mifflin,	  2010),	  p.	  469	  42	  Campbell	  Craig	  and	  Fredrick	  Logevall,	  America’s	  Cold	  War	  (London:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  p.	  9.	  43	  Craig	  and	  Logevall,	  America’s,	  p.	  5.	  	  44	  Roger	  Hilsman,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Policymaking	  in	  defense	  and	  foreign	  affairs	  (Eastbourne:	  Antony	  Rowe,	  1992),	  p.	  53.	  45	  Valerie	  M.	  Hudson,	  ‘Foreign	  Policy	  Analysis:	  actor-­‐specific	  theory	  and	  the	  Ground	  of	  International	  Relations,’	  Foreign	  Policy	  Analysis,	  Vol.	  1,	  No.	  1	  (2005),	  pp.	  1-­‐30.	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of	   their	   predicament.	   In	   line	   with	   the	   methodology	   of	   the	   project,	   the	  conceptualisation	   of	   risk	   provided	   in	   this	   study,	   is	   a	   ‘constructivist	   light’	  one.	  The	  probability	  of	  something	  going	  wrong	  depends	  on	   ‘something	  out	  there,’	  but	  also	  on	  how	  that	  something	  is	  perceived,	  and	  on	  how	  it	  becomes	  the	  object	  of	  decision.	  46	  	  	  The	   project	   also	   interprets	   Presidents	   as	   the	   ultimate	   foreign	   policy	  decision-­‐makers.	  The	  President	  is	  not	  just	  another	  politician.47	  Even	  Morton	  Halperin,	   leading	   figure	   of	   the	   ‘bureaucratic	   politics’	   scholarship,	  acknowledged	   the	   particular	   role	   of	   the	   President.	   He	   suggested	   that,	  whereas	  the	   ‘actions	  of	   the	  American	  government	  related	  to	   foreign	  policy	  result	   from	   the	   interests	   and	   behavior	   of	   many	   different	   groups	   and	  individuals,’	  the	  President	  ‘stands	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  foreign	  policy	  process’	  and	  his	  contribution	  is	  ‘qualitatively	  different’	  from	  that	  of	  other	  actors.	  48	  	  A	  President’s	   choices,	   his	   style,	   and	   his	   management	   of	   risks	   make	   a	  difference.49	  The	   project	   suggests	   that	   a	   President’s	   task	   is	   to	   balance	  strategic	  and	  political	  risks	  in	  difficult	  and	  uncertain	  trade-­‐offs,	  but	  also	  that	  the	  President	  is	  neither	  helpless	  nor	  free	  from	  responsibilities.	  The	  project,	  to	   be	   sure,	   will	   discuss	   other	   actors	   and	   organisations	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	  process,	  but	   it	  will	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  President’s	  choices	  shape	  foreign	   policy.	   Within	   the	   limits	   of	   ‘bounded’	   risk	   management,	   the	  President	  is	  still	  ‘king,’50	  perhaps	  not	  an	  absolute	  one.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  See	  on	  the	  same	  point	  Michael	  Power,	  Organized	  Uncertainty	  Designing	  a	  
World	  of	  Risk	  Management	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007).	  47	  Steve	  Smith,	  ‘Perspectives	  on	  the	  Foreign	  Policy	  System:	  Bureaucratic	  Politics	  Approaches,’	  in	  Michael	  Clarke	  and	  Brian	  White	  (Eds),	  
Understanding	  foreign	  policy:	  the	  foreign	  policy	  system	  approach	  (Aldershot:	  Edward	  Elgar,	  1989).	  48	  Morton	  Halperin	  (with	  Priscilla	  A.	  Clapp	  and	  Arnold	  Kanter),	  Bureaucratic	  
Politics	  and	  Foreign	  Policy	  (Washington:	  Brookings	  Institution	  Press,	  2006),	  pp.	  4	  and	  16.	  	  49	  For	  a	  recent	  argument	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  relevance	  of	  Presidential	  leadership	  and	  choices,	  see	  Joseph	  S.	  Nye	  Jr.,	  Presidential	  Leadership	  and	  the	  
creation	  of	  the	  American	  Era	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2013).	  50	  Stephen	  Krasner,	  ‘Are	  Bureaucracies	  Important?	  (Or	  Allison	  Wonderland),’	  Foreign	  Policy,	  No.	  7	  (Summer	  1972),	  p.	  167.	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Furthermore,	   agreeing	  with	   Lamborn,	   the	   previous	   chapter	   has	   identified	  ‘contingency’	   as	   the	   key	   concept	   in	   any	   discussion	   of	   foreign	   policy.	  ‘Contingency’	   means	   the	   impossibility	   of	   understanding	   foreign	   policy	  decision-­‐making	   without	   taking	   both	   the	   domestic	   and	   international	  dimension	   into	   account.	   The	   project	   will	   suggest	   that,	   for	   every	   decision,	  Presidents	   consider	   both	   the	   strategic	   and	   political	   consequences	   of	   their	  actions.	  To	  be	  precise,	  they	  do	  not	  consider	  only	  the	  immediate,	  direct	  and	  visible	   consequences,	   but	   also	   potential	   consequences:	   potential	   public	  reactions,	   potential	   Congressional	   and	   media	   criticisms,	   potential	  ‘punishment’	   at	   the	  ballot	  box,	  potential	   attacks	   to	   their	  domestic	  political	  agenda.	  51	  They	  consider	  the	  possibility	  of	  things	  going	  wrong,	  that	  is,	  risks.	  This	  project	  focuses	  precisely	  on	  how	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  political	  and	  strategic	  settings	  are	  balanced,	  permitting	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	   the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  practice	  of	  foreign	  policy.52	  Instead	  of	  a	  set	  of	  clear	  decisions,	  foreign	  policy	  emerges	   from	   a	   ‘continuing	   and	   confusing	   flow	   of	   action.’ 53 	  More	  specifically,	  although	  the	  presence	  of	  risk	  and	  risk	  management	  is	  one	  of	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  verified,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  at	  this	  stage	  that	  Snyder	   and	   his	   co-­‐authors	   suggested	   that	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making	  relied	   on	   a	   continuous	   circle	   of	   implementation,	   re-­‐appraisal,	   and	  adjustments	  to	  achieve	  a	  desired	  outcome.54	  In	  this	  flow,	  crises	  are	  not	  the	  outcome	   of	   a	   clear	   mistake,	   but	   emerge	   from	   a	   slow	   process	   of	  mismanagement	  of	  risks.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Thomas	  Knecht,	  ‘Public	  Opinion	  and	  Foreign	  Policy:	  the	  Stages	  of	  Presidential	  decision	  making,’	  International	  Studies	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  50,	  No.	  3	  (2006),	  pp.	  705-­‐727.	  52	  Snyder	  et	  al.,	  Foreign	  Policy,	  p.	  78.	  53	  Michael	  Clarke,	  ‘The	  Foreign	  Policy	  System:	  a	  framework	  for	  analysis,’	  in	  Clarke	  and	  White	  (Eds),	  Understanding,	  p.	  27.	  54	  Miriam	  Steiner,	  ‘Review	  article:	  The	  Elusive	  Essence	  of	  Decision,’	  
International	  Studies	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  21,	  No.	  2	  (June	  1977),	  p.	  393.	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4.3.4	  Case	  studies:	  case	  studies	  as	  cases	  of	  something	  	  The	   premium	   on	   complexity	   and	   richness	   couples	   interpretation	   and	  decision-­‐making	   with	   a	   particular	   method	   of	   testing	   hypotheses:	   case	  studies.	   Case	   studies	   have	   been	   heavily	   criticised	   as	   unscientific	   and	   non-­‐replicable.55	  More	   problematically,	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   little	   consensus	   on	  what	   the	   use	   of	   case	   studies	   entails. 56 	  Starting	   from	   a	   very	   basic	  requirement,	  a	  case	  study	  has	  been	  defined	  as	  a	  ‘case	  of	  something.’57	  More	  to	  the	  point,	  a	  case	  study	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  ‘intensive	  study	  of	  a	  single	  unit	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  understanding	  a	  larger	  class	  of	  (similar)	  units.’58	  It	  is	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  class	  of	  events;	  not	  an	  historical	  event	  in	  itself,	  but	  ‘a	  well-­‐defined	   aspect	   of	   a	   historical	   episode	   that	   the	   investigator	   selects	   for	  analysis.’59	  	  	  Alexander	  George	  and	  Andrew	  Bennett	  discussed	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	   this	   method.	   Strengths	   include:	   high	   conceptual	   validity,	   that	   is	   the	  possibility	   of	   accounting	   for	   complexity;	   the	   possibility	   of	   discovery,	  through	   immersion	   in	   the	   case	   studies;	   the	   explanation	   of	   more	   complex	  causal	   mechanisms;	   and	   the	   understanding	   of	   difficult	   causal	  relationships.60 	  The	   weaknesses	   concern	   the	   problem	   of	   selection,	   the	  excess	   of	   explanatory	   richness,	   and	   the	   problem	   of	   replicability.	   The	  freedom	  of	  selection	  has	  been	  accused	  of	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  ‘selection	  bias.’	  In	   qualitative	   research,	   selection	   bias	   occurs	   when	   the	   researcher	   selects	  cases	  in	  which	   ‘independent	  and	  dependent	  variables	  vary	  as	  the	  favoured	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Jack	  S.	  Levy,	  ‘Qualitative	  Methods	  in	  International	  Relations,’	  in	  Michael	  Brecher	  and	  Frank	  P.	  Harvey	  (Eds.),	  Millennial	  reflections	  on	  International	  
studies	  (Ann	  Arbor:	  University	  of	  Michigan	  Press,	  2002),	  p.	  432.	  56	  John	  Gerring,	  ‘What	  is	  a	  case	  study	  and	  what	  is	  it	  good	  for?’	  The	  American	  
Political	  Science	  Review,	  Vol.	  98,	  No.	  2	  (May	  2004),	  pp.	  341-­‐354.	  57	  Audie	  Klotz,	  ‘Case	  Selection,’	  in	  Audie	  Klotz	  and	  Deepa	  Prakash	  (Eds.),	  
Qualitative	  Methods	  in	  International	  Relations	  (New	  York:	  Palgrave	  MacMillan,	  2008),	  p.	  43.	  58	  Gerring,	  ‘What	  is,’	  p.	  342	  59	  Alexander	  L.	  George	  and	  Andrew	  Bennett,	  Case	  Study	  and	  Theory	  
Development	  in	  the	  Social	  Sciences	  (London:	  MIT	  Press,	  2005),	  p.	  18.	  60	  George	  and	  Bennett,	  Case	  Studies,	  pp.	  19-­‐20.	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hypothesis	  suggests,	  ignoring	  cases	  that	  appear	  to	  contradict	  the	  theory	  and	  overgeneralizing	  from	  these	  cases	  to	  wider	  populations.’61	  Still,	  case	  studies	  have	   a	   tendency	   not	   to	   over-­‐generalise.62	  The	   specific	   characteristic	   and	  outcome	   of	   a	   case	   are	   the	   main	   focus,	   moderating	   the	   other	   weaknesses	  attributed	  to	  case	  studies	  project.	  Case	  studies	  lack	  representativeness,	  but	  representativeness	   is	   not	   the	   main	   concern.	   Similarly,	   case	   studies	  explanations	   are	   often	   over-­‐determined,	   but	   the	   premium	   in	   this	   type	   of	  research	  is	  on	  complexity	  and	  detail,	  not	  on	  parsimony.63	  	  Moreover,	   ‘structured	   focused	   comparison’	   provides	   a	  method	   to	   improve	  replicability.	   The	   comparison	   of	   different	   cases	   is	   focused	   ‘insofar	   as	   the	  researcher	   deals	   selectively	  with	   only	   those	   aspects	   of	   each	   case	   that	   are	  believed	  to	  be	  relevant	  to	  the	  research	  objectives.’	  In	  this	  case,	  these	  aspects	  include:	  the	  context	  of	  uncertainty,	  the	  President’s	  predicament,	  and	  the	  risk	  trade-­‐offs.	   It	   is	   structured	   ‘when	   the	   researcher...defines	   and	   standardizes	  the	   data	   requirements...by	   formulating	   theoretically	   relevant	   general	  questions	   to	   guide	   the	   examination.’ 64 	  The	   discussion	   of	   the	   research	  hypotheses	   at	   the	   end	  of	   the	  previous	   chapter	   seems	   to	  provide	   sufficient	  specificity	   to	   permit	   the	   adoption	   of	   this	   method.	   Certainly	   there	   is	   a	  drawback.	   ‘Some	  unique	  qualities	  of	   the	  explanation	   inevitably	  will	  be	   lost	  in	  the	  process.’65	  However,	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  simplification	  and	  a	  certain	  loss	   of	   information	   are	   inevitable	   in	   any	   scientific	   endeavour.	   Each	   case	  becomes	  an	  ‘interpretive	  history,’	   ‘not	  intended	  to	  cover	  all	  aspects…of	  the	  events	   or	   to	   analyse	   all	   decisions,	   only	   those	   pertaining	   to	   the	   research	  questions	  under	  consideration.’66	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  George	  and	  Bennett,	  Case	  Studies,	  p.	  22.	  62	  George	  and	  Bennett,	  Case	  Studies,	  p.	  25.	  63	  Clive	  Seale,	  ‘Validity,	  Reliability	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  social	  research,’	  in	  Clive	  Seale	  (Ed.),	  Researching	  Society	  and	  Culture	  (London:	  SAGE,	  2004),	  p.	  76.	  64	  George	  and	  McKeown,	  ‘Case	  studies,’	  p.	  41.	  65	  George	  and	  McKeown,	  ‘Case	  studies,’	  p.	  49.	  66	  Yaakov	  Vertzberger,	  Risk-­‐taking	  and	  decisionmaking:	  foreign	  military	  
intervention	  decisions	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  p.	  10.	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4.3.5	  Which	  case	  studies?	  And	  why?	  	  The	  previous	  chapter	  has	  already	  anticipated	  which	  case	  studies	  have	  been	  selected.	   Research	   needs	   are	   the	   main	   reason	   for	   the	   selection.67 	  The	  research	  project	  is	  interested	  in	  assessing	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  Cold	  War/Post-­‐Cold	  War	   divide	   in	   the	   practice	   of	   US	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making.	   For	  this	   reason,	   the	   cases	   studies	   need	   to	   lie	   across	   this	   historical	   divide.	  Furthermore,	  the	  case	  studies	  need	  to	  discuss	  relevant	  foreign	  policy	  issues	  with	   high	   Presidential	   involvement.	   The	   Cuban	   Missile	   crisis	   is	   generally	  considered	  the	  most	  dangerous	  Cold	  War	  crisis.	  The	  Iran-­‐hostage	  crisis	  was	  arguably	  one	  of	   the	  deepest	  crises	  of	   the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  defined	  the	  Carter	  presidency.	   The	   crisis	   in	   Bosnia	   and	   the	  massacre	   at	   Srebrenica,	   clearly	   a	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  crisis,	   included	  some	  of	   the	  most	  brutal	  events	  of	   the	  post-­‐World	  War	  Two	  era.	  As	  repeatedly	  stated,	  the	  analysis	  will	  not	  discuss	  the	  crisis	   management	   phase,	   but	   the	   slow	   emergence	   of	   crisis,	   and	   how	  Presidential	   risk	   management	   contributed	   to	   escalation.	   Beyond	   the	  research	   needs,	   the	   selection	   also	   seems	   to	   conform	   to	   more	   general	  strategies	  devised	  to	  reduce	  the	  drawbacks	  of	  the	  case	  study	  method.	  	  	  	  The	  cases	  selected	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  light	  version	  of	  John	  Stuart	  Mill’s	  method	   of	   agreement,	   and	   a	   light	   version	   of	   Jack	   Levy’s	   least-­‐likely	   case	  studies.	   The	   method	   of	   agreement	   is	   used	   to	   demonstrate	   continuities	   in	  foreign	   policy	   in	   spite	   of	   different	   decision-­‐making	   and	   international	  contexts.	   It	   is,	   however,	   a	   light	  version	   since,	   contrary	   to	  Mill’s	  model,	   the	  project	   does	   not	   verify	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   single	   variable,	   but	   of	   several	  variables,	  such	  as	  risk,	  uncertainty,	  risk	  management,	  and	  lack	  of	  control	  as	  determinants	  of	  similar	  foreign	  policy	  outcomes.	  68	  The	  purpose	  is	  to	  stress	  similarities	   in	   the	   ‘independent	   variables’,	   leading	   to	   similar	   outcomes:	  crises.	   Moreover,	   the	   cases	   selected	   are	   ‘least-­‐likely’	   cases,	   that	   is	   ‘hard	  cases.’	  They	  build	  on	  the	  assumptions	  that,	  if	  the	  predictions	  of	  a	  theory	  are	  satisfied	  there,	   ‘the	  theory	  will	  hold	   in	  other	  situations	  that	  are	  even	  more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  George	  and	  Bennett,	  Case	  Studies.	  68	  George	  and	  Bennett,	  Case	  Studies,	  p.	  153.	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favourable	  to	  the	  theory.’69	  The	  recent	  literature	  on	  risk	  and	  foreign	  policy,	  has	  positioned	  risk,	  uncertainty	  and	  lack	  of	  control	  as	  new	  elements.	  If	  the	  project	  manages	  to	  verify	  their	  presence	  before	  and	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	   the	  confidence	   in	  the	  validity	  of	   the	  hypotheses	  will	  be	  strengthened.	  The	  cases	  selected	  are	  certainly	  obvious	  cases	  of	  crises,	  but	  they	  have	  been	  selected	   exactly	   for	   their	   archetypal	   nature.	   In	   this	   sense,	   to	   paraphrase	  Levy,	  showing	  continuities	  among	  these	  case	  studies	  is	  a	  ‘Sinatra	  project:’	  if	  I	  can	  make	  it	  here,	  I	  can	  make	  it	  anywhere.	  	  
4.4	  THE	  HOW	  QUESTION:	  INTERROGATING	  THE	  HISTORICAL	  RECORD.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  ‘typical	  nature’	  of	  the	  crises	  considered,	  the	  project	  could	  rely	  on	  a	   wide	   (and	   always	   increasing)	   range	   of	   secondary	   sources,	   including:	  historical	  accounts,	  political	  science	  and	  international	  relations	  studies,	  and	  memoirs.	   Scholars	   have	   warned	   against	   the	   danger	   of	   considering	  secondary	   sources	   as	   a	   neutral	   data	   set.	   The	  work	   of	   historians	   is	   not	   ‘an	  unproblematic	   background	   narrative.’70 	  Even	   worse,	   using	   the	   work	   of	  political	  scientists	  as	  source	  of	  data	  has	  been	  compared	  to	  ‘brewing	  tea	  from	  already	  used	  tea	  bags.’71	  Memoirs	  are	  equally	  fraught	  with	  problems,	  due	  to	  their	   generally	   self-­‐serving	  nature72	  and	   to	  hindsight	  bias.73	  ‘Triangulation’	  provides	   a	   strategy	   to	   overcome	   the	   drawbacks	   of	   secondary	   sources.	  Generally	   understood	   as	   the	   use	   of	   multiple	   methods	   (qualitative	   and	  quantitative),	   triangulation	   has	   started	   to	   be	   promoted	   also	   as	   an	   ‘intra-­‐method’	  technique,	  as	  ‘data	  triangulation.’74	  Using	  multiple	  sources	  helps	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Levy,	  ‘Qualitative’,	  p.	  442.	  70	  Lustick,	  ‘History,’	  p.	  605.	  71	  Paul	  Schroeder,	  ‘History	  and	  International	  Relations	  Theory:	  Not	  Use	  or	  Abuse,	  but	  Fit	  or	  Misfit,’	  International	  Security,	  Vol.	  22,	  No.	  1	  (Summer	  1997),	  p.	  71.	  72	  George	  Orwell,	  ‘The	  benefit	  of	  Clergy:	  some	  note	  on	  Salvador	  Dalì,’	  1944	  [http://orwell.ru/library/reviews/dali/english/e_dali]	  (accessed	  30	  July	  2013).	  73	  Deborah	  Larson,	  ‘Sources	  and	  Methods	  in	  Cold	  War	  History:	  the	  need	  for	  a	  new	  theory-­‐based	  archival	  approach,’	  in	  Elman	  and	  Elman	  (Eds.),	  Bridges.	  74	  Seale,	  ‘Validity,’	  p.	  77.	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securing	  an	  ‘in-­‐depth	  understanding’	  and	  provides	  ‘rigor,	  breadth	  and	  depth	  to	  any	  investigation.’75	  	  	  In	   terms	   of	   documents	   and	   primary	   sources,	   three	   key	   problems	   can	   be	  identified.	   First,	   a	   researcher	   can	   be	   submerged	   by	   the	   amount	   of	  documents	   and	   resources	   available.	   The	   structured	   nature	   of	   the	   case	  studies	   helps	   in	   moderating	   this	   problem,	   permitting	   an	   approach	   to	   the	  document	   through	   an	   ‘interrogation	   technique.’76	  A	   second	   problem	   is	   the	  need	  to	  limit	  the	  account	  to	  what	  decision-­‐makers	  knew	  when	  the	  decisions	  were	  made.	  At	   the	   cost	  of	   appearing	  one-­‐sided,	   the	   study	   relies	   largely	  on	  American	   sources.	   A	   wider	   range	   of	   sources	   or	   an	   ‘international	   history	  approach’	  could	  provide	  the	  researcher	  with	  more	  information	  and	  detail	  on	  the	   situation	   than	   the	   decision-­‐makers	   possessed	   at	   the	   time.77	  A	   third	  problem,	   particularly	   relevant	   for	   this	   type	   of	   project,	   depends	   on	   US	  Presidents	   and	   decision-­‐makers’	   reticence	   in	   discussing	   domestic	   politics	  when	  dealing	  with	  foreign	  policy.78	  As	  Anthony	  Lake	  brilliantly	  put	  it:	  	   Like	   sex	   in	   Victorian	   times,	   the	   political	   implications	   of	   our	  national	   security	   decisions	   are	   seldom	   discussed	   in	   the	   polite	  company	   of	   the	   President’s	   foreign	   policy	   advisors.	   (Also,	   like	  sex	   in	   Victorian	   times,	   that	   doesn’t	   mean	   it	   isn’t	   on	   their	  minds).79	  	  The	   evidence,	   in	   other	  words,	   can	   be	   found.	   In	   this	   interrogation	   process,	  archives	   offer	   the	   most	   consistent	   source	   of	   data.	   Archives	   provide	   a	  database	   that	   is	   ‘comprehensive,	   coherent,	   accessible,	   reflective	   of	   what	  goes	   behind	   the	   scenes	   as	   well	   as	   what	   happens	   in	   public.’80	  The	   project	  relies	  on	  documents	  from	  three	  Presidential	  Libraries.	  The	  documents	  from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Norman	  Denzin	  and	  Yvonna	  Lincoln,	  ‘Introduction:	  entering	  the	  field	  of	  qualitative	  research,’	  in	  Denzin	  and	  Lincoln,	  The	  Landscapes,	  p.	  4.	  76	  Larson,	  ‘Sources,’	  p.	  343.	  77	  Craig	  and	  Logevall,	  America’s,	  p.	  6.	  78	  Craig	  and	  Logevall,	  America’s,	  p.	  10.	  79	  Anthony	  Lake,	  6	  Nightmares	  (New	  York:	  Little,	  Brown	  &	  Co.,	  2000),	  p.	  260.	  80	  John	  Lewis	  Gaddis,	  ‘Expanding	  the	  Data	  Base:	  historians,	  political	  scientists,	  and	  the	  enrichment	  of	  security	  studies,’	  International	  Security,	  Vol.	  12,	  No.	  1	  (Summer	  1987),	  p.	  12.	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the	  Kennedy	  Library	  where	  accessed	  through	  the	  Kennedy	  Library	  website.	  Research	  trips	  to	  Atlanta	  and	  Little	  Rock	  permitted	  access	  to	  the	  Carter	  and	  Clinton	   Libraries	   respectively.	   The	   National	   Security	   Archives	   and	   the	  Library	  of	  Congress	  were	  included	  in	  a	  second	  research	  trip.	  At	  the	  Library	  of	   Congress,	   the	   author	   was	   able	   to	   gain	   access	   to	   the	   largely	   neglected	  personal	  papers	  of	  former	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  Anthony	  Lake.	  Several	  on-­‐line	   collections	   were	   consulted	   in	   the	   research.	   These	   include:	   the	  
Documents	  from	  the	  US	  espionage	  Den	  collection,	  with	  documents	  seized	  by	  the	  Iranian	  hostage	  takers	  in	  the	  US	  Embassy	  in	  Tehran;	  81	  and	  the	  personal	  papers	   of	   Lord	  David	  Owen,	   available	   through	   the	  University	   of	   Liverpool	  website.	   Foreign	   Relations	   of	   the	   United	   States	   collections	   have	   proved	  extremely	   useful	   in	   the	   Cuban	   case	   study.	   The	   Public	   Papers	   of	   the	  Presidents	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  available	  on-­‐line,	  have	  been	  a	  useful	  source	  for	   the	   whole	   project.	   Furthermore,	   other	   sources	   from	   government	   and	  international	  organisations	  are	  included	  in	  the	  study.	  The	  project	  also	  relies	  on	  press	  and	  media	  material.	  Coupled	  with	  archival	  material,	  these	  sources	  help	   in	   establishing	   a	   reliable	   chronology	   and	   represent	   a	   ‘code	   book	   by	  which	   to	   decipher	   the	  meaning	   of	   a	   document.’	   They	   help	   the	   researcher	  reconstruct	   ‘the	   environment	   in	   which	   a	   document	   was	   written’,	   and,	  through	   that,	   the	   actor’s	   goals.82	  The	   project	   relies	   on	   the	   LexisNexis	   UK	  database,	  available	  through	  the	  Durham	  University	  Library	  website,	  and	  on	  articles	  from	  key	  American	  newspapers	  and	  periodicals.	  	  The	  written	   record	   is	  not	   the	  only	   evidence	  available.	   Interviews	  and	  oral	  history	   records	   form	   a	   key	   part	   of	   the	   project.	   Several	   Oral	   History	  Collections	   are	   available	   both	   at	   the	   Carter	   Library,	   and	   through	   the	  Kennedy	  Library	  website.	  The	  Foundation	  for	  Iranian	  Studies	  also	  provided	  a	   rich	   pool	   of	   interviews	   from	   both	   American	   and	   Iranian	   perspectives.	  Beyond	   oral	   history	   collections,	   the	   author	   conducted	   several	   elite	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews.	   This	   type	   of	   interviews	   represents	   a	   ‘third	   way’	  between	  the	  structured	  interview	  based	  on	  surveys	  and	  questionnaires,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  The	  volumes	  are	  available	  in	  PDF	  on	  the	  website	  archive.org.	  82	  Larson,	  “Sources,’	  pp.	  346-­‐347.	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the	   completely	   unstructured	   interview	   in	  which	   the	   interviewee	   is	   simply	  invited	   to	   talk.83	  The	   type	   of	   interviews	   selected	   seems	   to	   benefit	   the	  research	   project	   in	   three	   main	   ways.	   First,	   qualitative	   interviews	   aim	   at	  accessing	   an	   individual’s	   attitudes,	   values	   and	   priorities. 84 	  Second,	  qualitative	   interviews	   value	   the	   power	   of	   discovery.85	  Third,	   they	   put	   the	  archival	   record	   in	   context.	   They	   can	   help	   in	   explaining	   the	   origins	   of	   a	  certain	   documents	   or	   in	   identifying	   unknown	   ones86.	   With	   interviews,	   a	  trivial,	  but	  unavoidable	  issue	  is	  the	  ‘age’	  of	  the	  events	  under	  study,	  and	  the	  ensuing	  problem	  of	  finding	  interviewees.	  A	  second,	  more	  practical	  problem	  is	   the	   problem	   of	   access.	   This	   project,	   however,	   has	   accumulated	   a	   high	  number	  of	  interviews	  in	  person,	  through	  telephone	  or	  Skype	  conversations,	  and	  by	  email.	  The	  project	  used	  a	  ‘snowballing	  technique,’	  with	  one	  interview	  often	   leading	   to	   another	   one,	   and	   with	   others	   rapidly	   following.87	  The	  project	   has	   also	   identified	   ‘gatekeepers,’88	  that	   is	   people	   or	   institutions	  (such	   as	   the	   Wilson	   Center	   and	   the	   Council	   of	   Foreign	   Relations)	   with	  several	   contacts,	   and	   has	   often	   relied	   on	   ‘strong	   sources:’	   those	   ‘who	   left	  governmental	  service…for	  academia’	  and	  are	  ‘comfortable	  with	  the	  practice	  of	   scholarly	   research.’89	  Interviewees	   have	   been	   found	   for	   the	   three	   case	  studies	   among	   both	   former	   policy-­‐makers	   and	   academics.90	  The	   highlight	  has	   certainly	   been	   the	   interview	   with	   former	   President	   Jimmy	   Carter	   in	  Plains,	  Georgia.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Seale	  (Ed.),	  Researching.	  84	  Bridget	  Byrne,	  ‘Qualitative	  Interviewing,’	  in	  Seale	  (Ed.),	  Researching,	  p.	  181.	  85	  Robert	  L.	  Peabody,	  et	  al.	  ‘Interviewing	  Political	  Elites,’	  PS:	  Political	  Science	  
and	  Politics,	  Vol.	  23,	  No.	  3	  (Sep.	  1990),	  p.	  453.	  86	  Lebow,	  ‘Social	  Science,’	  p.	  131.	  	  87	  Peabody	  et	  al.,	  ‘Interviewing.’	  88	  Byrne,	  ‘Qualitative.’	  89	  Peabody	  et	  al.,	  ‘Interviewing,’	  p.	  453.	  90	  A	  complete	  list	  is	  included	  in	  the	  bibliography.	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4.5	  CONCLUSION	  
	  ‘International	  Relations	  experts,’	   Joseph	  Nye	   recently	  wrote,	   ‘all	   too	   rarely	  look	   seriously	   at	   the	   role	   of	   individuals.’91	  The	   point	   might	   be	   overstated	  and	  some	  IR	  scholars,	  including	  Hans	  Morgenthau,	  would	  beg	  to	  differ.	  Still,	  the	   tendency	   to	   look	   at	   overarching	   developments	  with	   little	   attention	   to	  detail	   is	  quite	   strong.	  This	  project	   looks	   at	   the	  US	  President	   and	  his	   inner	  circle	   in	   their	   effort	   to	   confront	   risk	   and	   uncertainty.	   The	   project	   started	  simply	  as	  a	  critique	  of	   the	  available	   literature	  on	  risk	  and	  of	   the	  sweeping	  claims	  it	  made.	  Throughout	  the	  research,	  however,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  risk	  represented	  both	  a	  relevant	  and	  a	  misrepresented	  concept	  in	  IR,	  and	  that	  an	  effort	  should	  have	  been	  made	  to	  provide	  clarity.	  Keeping	  as	  the	  main	  target	  a	   critique	   of	   the	   sociological	   claims	   to	   the	   novelty	   of	   risk,	   the	   project	   has	  reconceptualised	   risk,	   uncertainty,	   and	   risk	   management.	   It	   has	   provided	  operational	   definitions,	   and	   it	   has	   elaborated	   research	   hypotheses	   that,	   if	  verified,	  would	  help	  in	  questioning	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  stark	  Cold	  War/Post-­‐Cold	  War	  divide	  in	  the	  nature	  and	  practice	  of	  US	  foreign	  policy.	  To	  conduct	  this	   assessment,	   and	   in	   line	   with	   the	   main	   theoretical	   claims,	   the	   project	  adopts	  an	  interpretive	  methodology,	  a	  ‘constructivist	  light’	  interpretation	  of	  risk,	  and	  a	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making	  approach.	  	  	  The	  analysis	  will	  develop	  through	  three	  case	  studies	  with	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	   the	   Presidents’	   predicament,	   of	   the	   international	   context,	   and	   with	   a	  division	   of	   the	  main	   decisions	   into	   ‘risk	   vs.	   risk	   trade-­‐offs.’	   The	   first	   case	  study,	  in	  Chapter	  5	  will	   look	  at	  the	  Kennedy	  Administration’s	  approach	  to	  Cuba.	  After	  a	  description	  of	  the	  tense	  international	  context	  of	  the	  late	  1950s,	  the	  chapter	  will	  develop	   through	  a	  series	  of	   trade-­‐offs.	   It	  will	  portray	  how	  the	   island	   and	   its	   leader,	   Fidel	   Castro,	  moved	   from	   an	   electoral	   card,	   to	   a	  disturbance	   in	   the	   early	   days	   of	   Camelot,	   to	   a	   dangerous	   obsession,	   and	  finally	  to	  the	  site	  of	  the	  most	  dangerous	  crisis	  the	  world	  has	  ever	  faced.	  In	  a	  pattern	   that	  will	  be	  repeated	   in	  Chapter	   6	   and	  7,	   the	   focus	  will	  be	  on	   the	  ‘normality’	  period,	  on	  the	  calm	  before	  the	  storm	  of	  the	  Missile	  Crisis.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Nye,	  Presidential	  Leadership,	  p.	  xi.	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CHAPTER	  5:	  ‘I	  SHOULD	  HAVE	  SAID	  THAT	  WE	  DON’T	  CARE:’	  THE	  
KENNEDY	  ADMINISTRATION	  AND	  CUBA,	  1961-­‐1962	  	  
5.1	  INTRODUCTION	  	  In	  March	  1987,	  former	  members	  of	  the	  Kennedy	  Administration	  gathered	  at	  Hawks	   Cay,	   Florida	   for	   a	   conference	   to	   mark	   the	   25th	   anniversary	   of	   the	  Cuban	  Missiles	  crisis.	  Among	  those	  invited	  was	  former	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Robert	  McNamara.	  In	  the	  first	  session,	  he	  set	  the	  tone	  for	  what	  would	  prove	  a	  path-­‐breaking	  event:	  	   We	  should	  recognize	  that	  we	  didn’t	  then…give	  much	  thought	  to	  how	  Moscow	  will	  read	  what	  we	  are	  doing.	  We’d	  carried	  out	  the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs	  operation	  never	  intending	  to	  use	  American	  military	  force	   –	   but	   the	   Kremlin	   didn’t	   know	   that.	   We	   were	   running	  covert	  operations	  against	  Castro.	  We’d	  convinced	  them	  we	  were	  actively	   trying	   to	   overthrow	   the	   Cuban	   regime.	  We	   never	   had	  put	   adequate	   emphasis	   on	   how	   the	   Soviets	   were	   interpreting	  our	  actions	  and	  how	  they	  might	  respond.1	  	  	  In	   line	  with	  key	  claims	  made	  by	  this	  research	  project,	  McNamara’s	  remark	  seems	   to	   point	   towards	   a	   long-­‐term	   understanding	   of	   the	   origins	   of	   the	  Cuban	  Missile	   Crisis.	   The	   Bay	   of	   Pigs	   invasion,	   the	   covert	   operations,	   the	  strong	  posture	  against	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  on	  Cuba,	  and	  on	  other	  key	  decisions	  such	   as	   stepping	  up	   the	  Berlin	   crisis	   and	  deploying	   the	   Jupiter	  missiles	   in	  Turkey	   were	   made	   with	   little	   regard	   for	   both	   Soviet	   perceptions,	   and	  longer-­‐term	  risks.	  	  	  In	   this	   context,	   McGeorge	   Bundy	   famously	   wrote	   that	   ‘forests	   have	   been	  felled	  to	  print	  the	  reflections	  and	  conclusions	  of	  participants,	  observers,	  and	  scholars,’	  and	  at	  least	  four	  waves	  of	  scholarship	  can	  be	  identified.2	  A	  closer	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  James	  Blight	  and	  David	  Welch,	  On	  the	  Brink	  (New	  York:	  Farrar,	  Strauss	  and	  Giroux,	  1989),	  p.	  29.	  2	  The	  first	  wave,	  or	  ‘orthodox	  scholarship’	  includes	  the	  early	  accounts	  of	  the	  crisis,	  and	  the	  memoirs	  of	  Kennedy	  aides.	  Elie	  Abel,	  The	  Missile	  Crisis	  (New	  York:	  Lippincott,	  1966),	  Ted	  Sorensen,	  Kennedy	  (Pan	  Books,	  London,	  1965)	  and	  Arthur	  Schlesinger	  Jr.,	  One	  Thousand	  Days	  (London:	  Andre	  Deutsch,	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look	   at	   the	   literature,	   however,	   unveils	   two	   main	   problems.	   First,	  preponderant	  attention	  goes	  to	  the	  fateful	  ‘thirteen	  days.’	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  Graham	  Allison’s	  magisterial	  account	  of	   the	  crisis	   is,	   at	   least,	  partially	  responsible	   for	   this	   problem.	   Although	   mainly	   concerned	   with	   decision-­‐making	   models,	   Allison’s	   book	   was	   crucial	   in	   establishing	   which	   events	  should	   have	   been	   taken	   into	   account	   and	   which	   should	   have	   been	  discounted.3	  This	   project	   agrees	  with	   David	   Barrett	   and	  Max	  Holland	   that	  whereas	   the	   scholarship	   on	   those	   thirteen	   days	   is	   perhaps	   saturated,	   the	  months	   that	   preceded	   October	   1962	   remain	   ‘relatively	   understudied	   and	  insufficiently	  chronicled.’4	  Recent	  studies	  either	  treat	  issues	  in	  isolation,5	  or	  discuss	   the	   intervening	  months	  only	  marginally	  as	   the	   tense	  origins	  of	   the	  Missile	  Crisis,	  or	  the	  bitter	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs.	  The	  second	  problem	  is	   a	   certain	   inability	   of	   the	   literature	   to	   move	   beyond	   the	  ‘orthodox/revisionist’	  debate.	  Again,	  recent	  works	  suffer	  from	  this	  problem,	  trying	  to	  establish	  once	  and	  for	  all	  if	  President	  Kennedy	  launched	  a	  personal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1965).	  A	  second,	  revisionist	  wave	  includes	  J.	  F.	  Stone,	  ‘The	  brink,’	  New	  York	  
Review	  of	  Books,	  14	  April	  1966,	  Ronald	  Steel,	  ‘End	  Game:	  Review	  of	  Robert	  Kennedy,	  Thirteen	  Days,’	  New	  York	  Review	  of	  Books,	  13	  March	  1969,	  and	  James	  Nathan,	  ‘The	  Missile	  Crisis:	  his	  finest	  hour,’	  World	  Politics,	  27	  (January	  1975),	  pp.	  256-­‐281.	  A	  third	  wave	  was	  prompted	  by	  a	  series	  of	  conferences	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s	  and	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  initial	  opening	  of	  Soviet	  archives	  and	  of	  the	  participation	  of	  American	  and	  Soviet	  Officials	  in	  critical	  oral	  history	  conferences.	  See	  James	  Blight	  and	  David	  Welch,	  On	  the	  
Brink	  (New	  York:	  Farrar,	  Strauss	  and	  Giroux,	  1989).	  A	  fourth,	  more	  recent	  wave	  relies	  on	  documents	  from	  several	  countries,	  bringing	  together	  their	  perspective	  on	  the	  crisis.	  James	  G.	  Hershberg	  and	  Christian	  Ostermann,	  ‘The	  Global	  Missile	  crisis	  at	  50,’	  Cold	  War	  International	  History	  Project	  (CWHIP)	  
Bulletin,	  Issue	  17/18,	  Fall	  2012,	  Wilson	  Center.	  [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/bulletin-­‐no-­‐17-­‐18]	  (accessed	  24	  September	  2013).	  3	  Graham	  Allison,	  The	  Essence	  of	  Decision	  (Boston:	  Little	  Brown	  and	  Company,	  1971).	  	  4	  David	  M.	  Barrett	  and	  Max	  Holland,	  Blind	  over	  Cuba,	  (College	  Station:	  Texas	  A&M	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  p.	  x.	  5	  James	  G.	  Hershberg,	  ‘Before	  “the	  missiles	  of	  October:”	  did	  Kennedy	  plan	  a	  military	  strike	  on	  Cuba?’	  in	  James	  A.	  Nathan,	  The	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis	  
revisited	  (New	  York:	  St.	  Martin's	  Press,	  1992).	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vengeance	  against	  Cuba	  and	  was	  obsessed	  with	  Castro,	  or	   if	  Kennedy	  was	  the	  one	  trying	  to	  restrain	  ‘evil’	  actors	  such	  as	  the	  CIA	  and	  the	  military.6	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  twofold.	  First,	  the	  chapter	  will	  represent	  the	  ‘hardest’	  case	  of	  the	  thesis.	  In	  spite	  of	  claims	  as	  to	  the	  clarity	  and	  certainty	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  world,	  the	  chapter	  will	  repeatedly	  stress	  the	  uncertainty	  and	  the	  dangers	   inherent	   in	   the	  superpower	  confrontation.	  Uncertainty	  will	  be	  discussed	  both	  as	  a	  predominant	   condition	  of	   the	  Cold	  War	  confrontation,	  and	  as	  a	  variable	  affecting	  every	   choice.	   In	   line	  with	   the	   risk	  management	  framework	   set	   out	   in	   the	   previous	   chapters,	   the	   account	  will	   also	   identify	  the	   short-­‐termism,	   and	   minimalism	   inherent	   in	   the	   Kennedy	  Administration’s	   approach	   to	   Cuba.	   The	   decisions	   taken	   by	   the	  Administration	  will	   be	   interpreted	   as	   a	   series	   of	   risk	   vs.	   risk	   trade-­‐offs	   in	  which	   the	   management	   of	   (often	   self-­‐inflicted)	   political	   risks	   led	   to	   the	  dismissal	  of	  longer-­‐term	  countervailing	  risks.	  	  The	  chapter	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  two	  main	  parts.	  Part	  two	  will	  deal	  with	  the	  uncertainty	   of	   the	   late	   1950s,	   and	   with	   the	   Eisenhower	   Administration’s	  encounter	  with	  Castro’s	  Cuba.	  Part	   three	  will	  look	  more	  specifically	  at	  the	  trade-­‐offs	   faced	   by	   Kennedy	   and	   will	   often	   point	   out	   the	   uncertainty	  surrounding	   the	  President’s	   choices.	  The	  analysis	  will	   consider	  Kennedy’s	  Presidential	  campaign,	  the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs	  disaster,	  the	  rising	  tension	  with	  the	  Soviet	   Union,	   the	   stepping	   up	   of	   the	   harassment	   campaign	   against	   Cuba,	  and	   the	   American	   reply	   to	   the	   Soviet	   military	   build-­‐up	   in	   the	   Caribbean	  island.	  What	   the	   chapter	   will	   suggest	   is	   that	   from	   the	   Bay	   of	   Pigs	   to	   the	  Missile	  Crisis,	   the	  Kennedy	  Administration	  proved	  unable	  to	  reconcile	  and	  manage	  different	  political	  and	  strategic	  risks.	  The	  consistent	  answer	  to	  this	  conundrum	   was	   the	   selection	   of	   ‘short-­‐term’	   policies	   that	   were	   risk-­‐free	  only	   in	   the	  minds	   of	   the	   Kennedy	   Administration’s	  members.	   The	   reality	  was	  starkly	  different:	  while	  doing	  little	  to	  solve	  the	  problem	  of	  Cuba,	  these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Jim	  Rasenberg,	  The	  Brilliant	  Disaster	  (New	  York:	  Scribner,	  2011),	  Don	  Bohning,	  The	  Castro	  Obsession	  (Washington:	  Potomac	  Books,	  2006)	  and	  David	  Talbot,	  Brothers	  (New	  York:	  Pocket	  Books,	  2007).	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measures	   generally	   embarrassed	   the	   Administration,	   and	   did	   a	   lot	   to	  convince	   the	   Soviets	   that	   they	   risked	   losing	   their	   precious	   Cuban	   ally.	   In	  providing	  this	  account,	  the	  chapter	  will	  also	  achieve	  a	  secondary	  goal:	  it	  will	  rebalance	   (even	   if	  minimally)	   the	   literature	   on	   the	  Missile	   Crisis,	   shifting	  the	   attention	   from	   the	   thirteen	   days	   of	   the	   crisis	   to	   the	   eighteen	  months	  that	  preceded	  it.	  	  	  
5.2	  HISTORICAL	  BACKGROUND:	  THE	  EISENHOWER	  ADMINISTRATION,	  
AMERICAN	  DECLINE,	  AND	  ‘THEIR	  MAN’	  IN	  HAVANA	  	  
5.2.1	  Sputnik	  and	  sausages:	  Soviet	  victories	  and	  American	  uncertainty	  	  
Oh	  little	  Sputnik	  flying	  high	  
with	  made	  in	  Moscow	  beep.	  
You	  tell	  the	  world	  it’s	  a	  Commie	  sky,	  	  
and	  Uncle	  Sam’s	  asleep.	  7	  Mennen	  Williams,	  Gov.	  of	  Michigan.	  	  ‘What’s	   your	   hometown	   Senator?’	   quipped	   the	   Soviet	   Premier	   Nikita	  Khrushchev	  during	  his	  1958	  talks	  with	  Senator	  Hubert	  Humphrey	  (D-­‐Min)	  in	   Moscow.	   ‘It’s	   Minneapolis,	   Minnesota,’	   the	   Senator	   answered.	  Khrushchev	  then	  drew	  a	  red	  mark	  around	  the	  city	  on	  a	  map	  of	  the	  United	  States	   and	  added:	   ‘I	  must	  not	   forget	   that	  we	   shouldn't	  hit	   that	   town.’	  The	  exchange	  was	  a	  typical	  expression	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  confidence	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1950s.	  He	  made	  similar	  remarks	  such	  as	  the	  famous	  statement	  that	  the	  USSR	  was	  producing	  ‘missiles	  like	  sausages,’	  and	  that	  Soviet	  missiles	  could	  hit	   any	   spot	   in	   the	   world. 8 	  In	   hindsight,	   this	   was	   a	   massive	   -­‐	   and	  counterproductive	   -­‐	   bluff.	   To	   the	   American	   public	   and	   to	   American	  policymakers,	   however,	   these	   statements	   seemed	   to	   confirm	   dangerous	  historical	   trends.	   The	   Soviets	   had	   maintained	   their	   tight	   grip	   on	   Eastern	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Christopher	  Andrew,	  For	  the	  President’s	  Eyes	  only	  (London:	  Harper	  and	  Collins,	  1996),	  p.	  240.	  8	  Oleg	  Troyanovski,	  Interview,	  Cold	  War	  Project,	  George	  Washington	  University	  [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-­‐8/troyanovski2.html]	  (accessed	  8	  August	  2013).	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Europe,	  smashing	  on	  the	  streets	  of	  Budapest	   in	  1956	  dreams	  of	   ‘roll-­‐back’	  that	   had	   characterised	   the	   start	   of	   the	   decade.	   They	   seemed	   to	   have	  infiltrated	   the	  most	  secret	  corners	  of	  American	  espionage.9	  They	  postured	  as	  being	  ready	  to	  ‘bury’	  the	  West	  with	  Soviet	  advances	  in	  science	  and	  arms	  races.	   In	  October	  1957,	   the	   launch	  of	   the	   first	   Soviet	   satellite	  Sputnik	   had	  appeared	  as	  a	  terrifying	  tipping	  point.	  The	  Eisenhower	  Administration	  (and	  particularly	   the	   President)	   never	   understood	   the	   shock	   that	   Sputnik	  represented	   for	   the	   American	   people.	   It	   was	   not	   so	  much	   the	   satellite	   in	  itself,	   but	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   satellite	   ‘showed	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   powerful	  ballistic	  missile	  because	  nothing	  else	  could	  have	  placed	  in	  orbit	  so	  large	  an	  object.’ 10 	  Sputnik	   came	   to	   identify	   Russian	   cutting-­‐edge	   technological	  advances	  and	  American	  insecurity.	  The	  feat	  was	  repeated	  with	  the	  Soviet’s	  1959	  launch	  of	  Lunik	  1,	  the	  first	  man-­‐made	  object	  to	  orbit	  the	  sun.11	  	  	  In	  turn,	  the	  US	  seemed	  paralysed.	  The	  series	  of	  communist	  victories	  (real	  or	  imagined)	   had	   turned	   Eisenhower’s	   calm	   into	   aloofness,	   and	   his	  detachment	   into	   a	   liability.12 	  To	   be	   sure,	   since	   the	   early	   years	   of	   the	  Eisenhower	   Administration,	   the	   US	   government	   had	   achieved	   several	  successes.	   In	   terms	   of	   knowledge	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   the	   initially	   bleak	  outlook	  of	  the	  early	  1950s	  had	  substantially	  improved	  through	  advances	  in	  signal	  intelligence	  (SIGINT),	  infiltrations	  of	  Soviet	  embassies,	  and	  defections	  of	  Soviet	  officials.	  The	  picture,	  however,	  was	  far	  from	  being	  one	  of	  certainty	  and	  tranquillity.	  US	  intelligence	  on	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  remained	  unreliable.13	  As	  we	  have	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters,	   the	  problem	  was	  both	  one	  of	  lack	  of	  knowledge,	  and	  one	  of	   impossibility	  of	  knowing.	   In	  terms	  of	  Soviet	  capabilities	  and	  intentions,	  as	  James	  Killian,	  Chair	  of	  the	  President’s	  Foreign	  Intelligence	   Advisory	   Board,	   put	   it,	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   surprise	   attack	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Evan	  Thomas,	  The	  Very	  Best	  Men	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  2006).	  10	  McGeorge	  Bundy,	  Danger	  and	  Survival:	  choices	  about	  the	  bomb	  in	  the	  first	  
fifty	  years	  (New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  1988),	  p.	  334.	  11	  Fred	  Kaplan,	  1959	  (Hoboken:	  John	  Wiley	  and	  Sons,	  2009),	  p.	  1.	  12	  Michael	  Beschloss,	  Kennedy	  vs.	  Khrushchev	  (London:	  Faber	  and	  Faber,	  1991)	  and	  David	  Rothkopf,	  Running	  the	  World	  (New	  York:	  Public	  Affairs,	  2005),	  p.	  81.	  13	  Andrews,	  For	  the	  President’s.	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‘haunted	   Eisenhower	   throughout	   his	   Presidency.’14	  Khrushchev’s	   ‘atomic	  bragging’	   convinced	   the	   US	   that	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   enjoyed	   military	   and	  scientific	  superiority,	  ending	  the	  assumption	  of	  American	  primacy	  that	  had	  characterised	  the	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  world.	  	  	  Similarly,	  the	  US	  seemed	  unable	  to	  stop	  Soviet	  advances	  in	  the	  Third	  World.	  The	   Soviets	   seemed	   to	   be	   winning	   the	   battles	   for	   ‘hearts	   and	   minds’	   in	  various	   countries	   emerging	   from	   the	   yoke	   of	   either	   colonisation	   or	  authoritarianism.	   In	   spite	  of	  US	   ‘successes’	   in	  Guatemala	   and	   Iran,	   in	   fact,	  other	   countries	   seemed	   ready	   to	   jump	   on	   the	   Soviet	   bandwagon.	   In	  retrospect	  Soviet	  challenges	  in	  these	  countries	  appear	  either	  overstated	  or	  inconsequential.	   At	   the	   time,	   they	   appeared	   as	   part	   of	   a	   dangerous	  world	  trend.	   The	   Soviet	   Union	   seemed	   ready	   to	   ‘shift	   the	   balance	   of	   power’	   by	  winning	   newly	   independent	   countries	   over	   to	   its	   side. 15 	  Khrushchev	  thought	  that	  ‘under	  the	  cloak	  of	  nuclear	  fears,’	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  could	  take	  a	  leading	   role	   in	   promoting	   the	   causes	   of	   decolonisation	   and	   anti-­‐imperialism.16 	  Secretary	   of	   State	   John	   Foster	   Dulles	   explained	   the	   US	  predicament	   in	   a	   speech	   on	   the	   future	   of	   US	   foreign	   policy,	   in	   which	   he	  suggested	  that	  the	  enemy	  was	  free	  to	  choose	  the	  time,	  place	  and	  method	  of	  warfare.	   The	   US	   needed	   to	   adapt.17	  A	   report	   commissioned	   by	   President	  Eisenhower	   reached	   a	   similar	   conclusion.	   The	   US	   had	   to	   answer	   in	   kind	  aggressive	   Soviet	   plots.	   If	   the	   US	   was	   to	   survive,	   it	   had	   to	   abandon	  ‘acceptable	  norms	  of	  human	  conduct,’	  develop	  espionage	  services,	  and	  learn	  to	   ‘subvert,	   sabotage	   and	   destroy’	   its	   enemies.	   It	   was	   a	   ‘repugnant	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Andrews,	  For	  the	  President’s,	  p.	  199.	  15	  Herbert	  S.	  Dinerstein,	  The	  making	  of	  a	  Missile	  Crisis:	  October	  1962	  (London:	  The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1976).	  p.	  55.	  16	  Vladislav	  M.	  Zubok,	  A	  Failed	  Empire:	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  from	  
Stalin	  to	  Gorbachev	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  The	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  2007),	  p.	  127.	  17	  John	  Foster	  Dulles,	  ‘The	  Evolution	  of	  US	  foreign	  policy,’	  Department	  of	  
State	  Bulletin,	  Vol.	  XXX,	  No.	  761,	  25	  January	  1954	  [https://archive.org/stream/departmentofstat301954unit#page/105/mode/1up]	  (accessed	  25	  October	  2013).	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philosophy’	   but	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   enemy	   made	   it	   necessary.18	  In	   this	  worldwide	   confrontation	   without	   rules,	   Laos,	   Cuba,	   Congo,	   and	   Vietnam	  represented	   only	   some	   examples.	   In	   the	   1950s	   no	   place	   was	   more	  important	  than	  Cuba.	  	  
5.2.2	   Eisenhower	   and	   the	   Cuban	   revolution:	   from	   ‘wait	   and	   see’	   to	   a	  
nasty	  ‘tit	  for	  tat’	  	  In	  a	  1955	  state	  visit	  to	  Cuba,	  Vice	  President	  Richard	  Nixon	  praised	  the	  local	  dictator	  Fulgencio	  Batista	  as	  the	  Cuban	  Abraham	  Lincoln.	  19	  The	  Eisenhower	  Administration	  supported	  Batista’s	  dictatorship,	  as	  it	  did	  many	  other	  similar	  regimes	   in	   Latin	   and	   Central	   America,	   as	   long	   as	   they	   professed	   anti-­‐communist	   credentials.20	  In	   Cuba,	   the	   situation	   started	   to	   unravel	   in	   the	  years	   between	   1953	   and	   1957.	   The	   guerrilla	   forces	   led	   by	   Fidel	   Castro	  started	   their	   campaign	   in	   1956.	  When	   Castro’s	   victory	   seemed	   inevitable,	  the	   Eisenhower	   Administration	   and	   the	   CIA	   scrambled	   to	   prevent	   his	  triumph.	   In	  mid-­‐1958,	  US	  Ambassador	  Earl	   Smith	  had	  urged	  Cuban	  Prime	  Minister	  Gonzalo	  Guell	  to	  bribe	  the	  ‘mentally	  unbalanced’	  Castro	  brothers.21	  The	   US	   also	   tried	   to	   back	   an	   almost	   non-­‐existent	   ‘third	   force’	   between	  Batista	  and	  Castro.	  In	  the	  last	  months	  of	  the	  regime,	  with	  Castro	  established	  as	  the	  key	  leader	  of	  the	  opposition,	  the	  US	  changed	  strategy	  trying	  to	  plot	  at	  least	   three	   different	   coups	   to	   impede	   his	   victory.22	  Castro	   triumphantly	  entered	  Havana	  on	  the	  1st	  of	  January	  1959.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  CIA,	  Report	  of	  the	  Special	  Study	  Group	  on	  the	  Covert	  Activities	  of	  the	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency,	  30	  September,	  1954,	  [http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/45/doolittle_report.pdf]	  (accessed	  8	  August	  2013),	  pp.	  2-­‐3.	  19	  Lars	  Schoultz,	  That	  Infernal	  little	  Cuban	  Republic	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  press,	  2009),	  p.	  56.	  20	  Stephen	  G.	  Rabe,	  Eisenhower	  and	  Latin	  America	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1988)	  21	  Schoultz.	  That	  Infernal,	  p.	  77.	  22	  Jesus	  Arboleya,	  The	  Cuban	  Counterrevolution	  (Athens:	  Ohio	  University	  Center	  for	  International	  Studies,	  2000),	  pp.	  35-­‐38.	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Initially,	  the	  Eisenhower	  Administration	  adopted	  a	   ‘wait	  and	  see’	  approach	  towards	  the	  new	  Cuban	  leader.	  The	  Administration	  confronted	  a	  situation	  of	  ‘high-­‐level	   uncertainty.’	   23 	  	   The	   US	   was	   completely	   unaware	   of	   earlier	  contacts	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Castro.	  These	  included	  the	  travel	  of	  few	   former	   veterans	   of	   the	   Spanish	  Civil	  War	   to	   Cuba	   following	   a	   request	  from	  Raul	  Castro	  for	  help	  in	  creating	  a	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  cadre	  in	  the	  Cuban	  army,	  and	  a	  purchase	  of	  weapons	  from	  the	  Czechs	  in	  1960.24	  Although	  these	  factors	   largely	   represented	   ‘unknown	   unknowns’	   for	   the	   Administration,	  and	   in	   spite	   of	   later	   denials,25	  the	   US	   quickly	   moved	   towards	   a	   policy	   of	  confrontation.26	  	  	  As	   early	   as	   April	   1959,	   Director	   of	   the	   CIA	   Allen	   Dulles	   wrote	   to	   Vice-­‐President	  Nixon	   (ready	   to	  meet	  Castro	   in	   the	  US	  on	   the	  25th	  of	  April)	   that	  Castro	  was	   a	   paranoiac	   and	   that	   his	   criticism	   of	   the	   US,	   coupled	  with	   the	  lack	   of	   statements	   on	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   created	   concerns.27	  In	   a	   Deputies	  meeting	   CIA	  Deputy	  Director,	   General	   Charles	   Cabell	   stated	   that	   ‘the	   time	  was	   coming	   when	   this	   agency	   would	   be	   called	   upon	   to	   undertake	  paramilitary	  operations	  in	  Cuba.’28	  After	  his	  meeting	  with	  Castro,	  Nixon	  was	  somewhat	   baffled	   by	   the	   Cuban	   leader.	   He	   recognised	   his	   qualities	   as	   a	  ‘leader	   of	   men’	   and	   admitted	   to	   be	   unsure	   about	   Castro’s	   communist	  tendencies.29	  By	   December	   1959,	   however,	   J.	   C.	   King,	   Chief	   of	   the	   CIA’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Aleksandr	  Fursenko	  and	  Timothy	  Naftali,	  Khrushchev’s	  Cold	  War	  (New	  York:	  Norton	  and	  Company,	  2006),	  p.	  300.	  24	  Fursenko	  and	  Naftali,	  Khrushchev’s,	  p.	  296.	  25	  Philip	  Bonsal,	  Cuba,	  Castro,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  (Pittsburgh:	  University	  of	  Pittsburgh	  Press,	  1971),	  pp.	  145-­‐153,	  and	  Schlesinger,	  One	  Thousand,	  p.	  198.	  26	  See	  Thomas	  G.	  Paterson,	  Contesting	  Castro	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1994).	  27	  Allen	  Dulles,	  Memorandum	  for	  the	  Vice	  President,	  ‘Cuba,’	  13	  April	  1959,	  CIA	  Records	  Search	  Tool	  (CREST),	  [http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/5829/CIA-­‐RDP80B01676R002700060019-­‐9.pdf]	  (accessed	  8	  August	  2013).	  28	  Deputies	  Meeting,	  20	  April	  1959,	  CIA	  CREST,	  [http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/5829/CIA-­‐RDP80B01676R002400060129-­‐0.pdf]	  (accessed	  8	  August	  2013).	  29	  Memorandum,	  ‘Nixon	  meeting	  with	  Castro,’	  25	  April	  1959,	  Digital	  National	  Security	  Archive	  (DNSA),	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis	  Collection	  (CMCC).	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Western	   hemisphere	   division	   wrote	   Dulles	   that	   Cuba	   was	   ruled	   by	   a	  ‘dictatorship	  of	  the	  far	  left.’	  Accordingly,	  the	  US	  objective	  should	  have	  been	  ‘the	   overthrow	   of	   Castro…and	   his	   replacement	   with	   a	   junta.’	   King	   also	  identified	   four	  key	  steps	   to	  achieve	  this	  aim:	  a	  clandestine	  radio,	   intrusion	  and	  sabotage	  operations,	  the	  establishment	  of	  opposition	  groups	  backed	  by	  the	  US,	  and	  the	  ‘elimination	  of	  Fidel	  Castro.’30	  In	  January	  1960,	  the	  President	  made	   clear	   the	   need	   to	   quarantine	   Cuba.	   This	   was	   agreed,	   in	   spite	   of	  acknowledging	  the	  limited	  communist	  influence	  on	  the	  island.31	  	  	  The	   Soviet	   Union,	   in	   fact,	   still	   suffered	   from	   a	   ‘post-­‐Guatemala’	   shock.	  Operation	  PBSUCCESS	  to	  overthrow	  Jacobo	  Arbenz’s	  government	  had	  made	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  continue	  Stalin’s	  policy	  of	  largely	  ignoring	  developments	  in	  the	  Western	   Hemisphere.32	  As	   even	   the	   CIA	   acknowledged,	   in	   early	   1960,	  Castro	   seemed	   ‘not	   disposed	   to	   accept	   actual	   direction	   from	   any	   foreign	  source.’ 33 	  Gary	   Powers’	   U-­‐2	   incident,	   Eisenhower’s	   unwillingness	   to	  apologise,	   and	   the	   abortion	   of	   the	   Paris	   summit	   led	   to	   a	   change	   in	   Soviet	  policy.	   Soviet	   vice-­‐Prime	   Minister	   Anastas	   Mikoyan,	   visited	   Havana	   in	  February	  and	  reached	  largely	  economic	  agreements	  with	  Castro.	  Still,	  even	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  visit,	  according	  to	  Mikoyan’s	  son	  Sergo,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  did	   not	   have	   high	   expectations	   for	   the	   relations	   with	   Cuba. 34 	  Official	  diplomatic	   relations	   were	   re-­‐established.	   Castro,	   on	   his	   part	   had	   taken	  several	  measures	   that	  had	  antagonised	  US	   interests	   including	   land	   reform	  and	   expropriations.	   These	  measures	   led	   to	   an	   unprecedented	   pressure	   by	  private	  groups	  on	  the	  President	  to	  do	  something	  about	  Castro.35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  J.	  C.	  King,	  Memorandum	  for	  the	  DCI,	  via	  DD	  Plans,	  ‘Cuban	  problems,’	  11	  December	  1959,	  CIA	  CREST,	  [http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/5829/CIA-­‐RDP80R01731R000300250001-­‐5.pdf]	  (accessed	  8	  August	  2013).	  31	  A.	  J.	  Goodpaster,	  ‘Memorandum	  of	  conference	  with	  the	  President,’	  25	  January	  1960,	  CMCC,	  DNSA.	  32	  Dinerstein,	  The	  making.	  33	  CIA,	  National	  intelligence	  Estimate,	  ‘Communist	  influence	  in	  Cuba,’	  22	  March	  1960,	  CMCC,	  DNSA.	  34	  Sergo	  Mikoyan	  (Edited	  by	  Svetlana	  Savranskaya),	  The	  Soviet-­‐Cuban	  Missile	  
Crisis	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  p.	  70.	  35	  Schoultz,	  That	  infernal,	  p.	  98.	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In	  January,	  even	  before	  Mikoyan’s	  visit,	  CIA’s	  Task	  Force	  Branch	  4	  had	  been	  established	   with	   Jacob	   Esterline,	   former	   Guatemala	   station	   chief,	   as	   its	  head.36	  In	  March,	  Eisenhower	  had	  formally	  approved	  a	  plan	  based	  on	  King’s	  four	   points.	   By	   August,	   the	   operation	   was	   already	   in	   full	   swing.	   An	   anti-­‐Castro	  group	  within	   the	  United	  States	  was	  being	  created;	  Radio	  Swan	  had	  started	   to	   air	   anti-­‐Castro	   broadcasts	   from	   the	   Swan	   Islands;	   and	  paramilitary	  groups	  were	  training	  in	  the	  US;	  they	  would	  move	  to	  Guatemala	  in	   July.	  Assassination	  attempts	   (some	   involving	   the	  Mafia)	   and	  operations	  to	  discredit	  the	  Castro	  regime	  were	  under	  way.	  Eisenhower	  had	  remarked	  that	   costs	  were	   not	   a	   problem,	   but	   caution	   should	   have	   been	   exercised.37	  Soon,	   however,	   telegrams	   from	   the	   Brazilian	   Embassy	   warned	   Castro	   of	  these	   developments, 38 	  and,	   through	   media	   investigations,	   US	   training	  facilities	   became	   public	   knowledge.	   The	   tit	   for	   tat	   continued.	   American	  companies	   in	   Cuba	   refused	   to	   refine	   Soviet	   oil.	   Castro	   reacted	   by	   taking	  over	  the	  companies.	  The	  US	  counter-­‐replied	  with	  the	   ‘most	  unwise’	  move:	  cutting	  the	  Cuban	  sugar	  quota.39	  These	  two	  moves	  finally	  weakened	  Soviet	  scepticism.	  Khrushchev	  went	  out	  of	  his	  way	  to	  profess	  Soviet	  support,	  even	  mentioning	   the	   possibility	   of	   using	   Soviet	   missiles	   to	   defend	   Cuba. 40	  Although	  Castro	  gave	  a	  cold	  reception	  to	  this	  statement,	  it	  provided	  the	  US	  with	   an	   opportunity	   to	   denounce	   Soviet	   intrusion	   in	   the	   hemisphere.	   In	  October,	  the	  Eisenhower	  Administration	  imposed	  an	  economic	  embargo	  on	  Cuba,	  and	  later	  broke	  diplomatic	  relations.41	  By	  this	  time,	  Cuba	  had	  become	  a	  key	  foreign	  policy	  issue,	  and	  one	  actor	  had	  helped	  in	  dramatically	  raising	  the	  profile	  of	  Castro	  and	  of	   the	   fight	  between	  Cuba	  and	   the	  United	  States:	  Democratic	  Presidential	  candidate	  John	  Kennedy.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  James	  Blight	  and	  Peter	  Kornbluh,	  Politics	  of	  Illusion:	  The	  Bay	  of	  Pigs	  
invasion	  re-­‐examined	  (London:	  Lynne	  Rienner,	  1998),	  p.	  160.	  37	  Gordon	  Gray,	  ‘Memorandum	  of	  meeting	  with	  the	  President,’	  22	  August	  1960,	  CMCC,	  DNSA.	  38	  Telegram,	  Brazilian	  Embassy	  Havana	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State	  of	  Foreign	  relations,	  11	  August	  1960,	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis	  Revisited	  Collection	  (CMCRC),	  DNSA.	  39	  Bonsal,	  Cuba,	  p.	  151.	  40	  Dinerstein,	  The	  making,	  p.	  76.	  41	  Bonsal,	  Cuba.	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5.3	   THE	   KENNEDY	   ADMINISTRATION	   AND	   CUBA:	   FROM	   THE	  
CAMPAIGN	  TRAIL	  TO	  THE	  MISSILE	  CRISIS	  
	  
5.3.1	  Risk	  vs.	  risk	  trade-­‐off	  1:	  campaigning	  tough	  vs.	  open	  choice	  
	  At	   the	   start	   of	   the	   Presidential	   bid,	   John	   Kennedy	   had	   identified	   being	  outflanked	   from	   the	   right	   as	  his	  main	  political	   risk.	  The	  Democratic	  Party	  had	  accumulated	  a	  reputation	   for	  Cold	  War	  weakness.42	  Kennedy	  had	  also	  to	  guard	  against	  his	  father’s	  reputation	  as	  an	  appeaser43.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Republican	  Presidential	  candidate,	  Vice-­‐President	  Richard	  Nixon,	  seemed	  to	  have	   sent	   a	   clear	   message	   on	   the	   campaign.	   Selecting	   as	   running	   mate	  Henry	  Cabot	   Lodge	   Jr.,	   former	  US	  Ambassador	   to	   the	  UN,	   had	  meant	   that	  foreign	  policy	  and	  in	  particular	  experience	  in	  confronting	  the	  Soviets	  would	  play	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  the	  campaign.44	  In	  spite	  of	  a	  cordial	  relationship	  that	  dated	  back	  to	  the	  late	  1940s,45	  in	  the	  campaign	  Kennedy	  unleashed	  strong	  attacks	   on	   Nixon.	   The	   Democratic	   candidate	   plugged	   into	   the	   sense	   of	  uncertainty	   that	   pervaded	   the	   American	   people	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1950s,	  playing	   on	   three	   key	   themes:	   frustration,	   strategic	   inferiority	   and	  communist	  expansion.	  	  	  First,	   he	   repeated	   how	   a	   future	   Nixon	   Administration	  would	   have	  meant	  more	   of	   the	   same:	   more	   inaction	   and	   aloofness.	   This	   was	   even	   more	  worrisome,	   Kennedy	   argued,	   since	   Nixon	   would	   have	   added	   a	   dose	   of	  policy-­‐making	  inexperience	  to	  the	  already	  dreadful	  Republican	  record.	  In	  a	  press	   conference	   President	   Eisenhower	   famously	   confirmed	   the	   point,	  immediately	   damaging	   Nixon	   in	   the	   polls.	   Asked	   to	   name	   a	   ‘major	   idea’	  from	  Nixon	  that	  he	  had	  adopted,	  the	  reply	  of	  the	  President	  was:	  ‘If	  you	  give	  me	   a	   week,	   I	   might	   think	   of	   one,	   I	   don’t	   remember’.	   The	   exchange	   soon	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  See	  I.	  M.	  Destler,	  Leslie	  Gelb,	  and	  Anthony	  Lake,	  Our	  own	  worst	  enemy	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  1984),	  and	  Peter	  Wyden,	  Bay	  of	  Pigs	  (London:	  Jonathan	  Cape,	  1979),	  p.	  66.	  43	  George	  W.	  Ball,	  The	  Past	  has	  another	  pattern	  (New	  York:	  Norton	  and	  Company,	  1982),	  p.	  166.	  44	  Chris	  Matthews,	  Kennedy	  &	  Nixon	  (New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  2011),	  p.	  136.	  45	  Matthews,	  Kennedy	  &	  Nixon.	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became	   a	   Kennedy	   campaign	   advert, 46 	  and	   represented	   an	   ‘emotional	  concussion’	  for	  Nixon.47	  	  	  Furthermore,	   Kennedy	   had	  made	   Soviet	   strategic	   superiority	   and	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘missile	   gap’	   the	   centrepiece	   of	   his	   political	   career.	   The	   ‘gap	  myth’	  had	  emerged	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1950s	  when	  a	  National	  Intelligence	  Estimate	  and	  a	  report	   commissioned	   by	   the	   President	   from	   Rowan	   Gaither,	   President	   of	  the	  Ford	  Foundation,	  concluded	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  ahead,	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  number	  of	  missiles	   and	   technology.	  The	   conclusions	  of	   the	   report	  were	   so	   frightening	   that	   some	   members	   of	   the	   committee	   suggested	   the	  possibility	  of	  a	  preventive	  war	  while	  there	  was	  still	  time.48	  To	  be	  sure,	  these	  conclusions	   depended	   largely	   on	   Eisenhower’s	   refusal	   to	   reveal	   the	  information	   on	   Soviet	   ICBM	   programs	   that	   he	   had	   acquired	   through	   the	  flights	  of	  U-­‐2	  planes.	   In	   the	  debate	  over	   the	   ‘gap’	  Kennedy	   sided	  with	   the	  most	   hawkish	   elements.	   Relying	   on	   information	  provided	  by	   the	   reporter	  Joe	   Alsop, 49 	  and	   using	   data	   received	   by	   members	   of	   the	   Eisenhower	  Administration	  during	  his	  time	  in	  the	  Senate	  Foreign	  Relations	  Committee,	  Kennedy	  continuously	  stressed	  Soviet	  primacy	  in	  the	  arms	  race.50	  	  	  However,	   if	   at	   the	   start	   Kennedy’s	   criticisms	  might	   have	   come	   from	   real	  concerns,	  they	  later	  developed	  into	  a	  dangerous	  political	  gamble.	  By	  1960,	  in	   fact,	   scepticism	   was	   growing	   within	   and	   outside	   the	   Administration	  about	   the	  existence	  of	  a	  gap.	  General	  Earl	  Wheeler	  had	   told	  Kennedy	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  JFK	  Library,	  ‘Eisenhower	  on	  Nixon	  –	  JFK	  Campaign	  Spot,’	  [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7BSw7JgphFg]	  (accessed	  9	  August	  2013).	  47	  Matthews,	  Kennedy	  &	  Nixon,	  p.	  137.	  48	  Andrews,	  For	  the	  President’s,	  p.	  241.	  49	  Christopher	  A.	  Preble,	  ‘”Who	  Ever	  Believed	  in	  the	  'Missile	  Gap?”	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  National	  Security,’	  Presidential	  Studies	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  33,	  No.	  4	  (December	  2003),	  p.	  805.	  50	  John	  L.	  Helgerson,	  CIA	  Briefing	  of	  Presidential	  candidates,	  (Washington:	  Center	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Intelligence,	  1996),	  [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB116/cia/Chapter%203%20-­‐-­‐%20Into%20Politics%20With%20Kennedy%20and%20Johnson.htm]	  (accessed	  29	  August	  2013).	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there	  was	  no	  missile	  gap.	  During	  the	  campaign,	  Jerome	  Wiesner,	  a	  member	  of	   Eisenhower’s	   Permanent	   Science	   Advisory	   Committee	   had	  warned	   the	  candidate	   and	   his	   team	   to	   ‘downplay’	   the	   issue	   in	   their	   campaign.51	  Kennedy,	   however,	   understood	   that	   the	   gap	  was	   a	   political	  winner	   in	   the	  short-­‐term	   and	   kept	   coming	   back	   to	   the	   same	   message.	   Once	   in	   office,	  Kennedy	  soon	  received	  confirmation	  of	  the	  non-­‐existence	  of	  the	  gap.	  At	  that	  point,	   he	   found	  himself	   trapped	  by	  his	  own	  statements	  on	   the	  path	  of	   re-­‐armament.	  	  Kennedy’s	   predicament	   was	   nowhere	   as	   much	   of	   his	   own	   making	   as	   in	  respect	  of	  Cuba.	  Kennedy	  reserved	  the	  harshest	  attacks	  for	  the	  situation	  on	  the	   island	   as	   a	   symbol	   of	   the	   Eisenhower	   Administration’s	   failure	   in	  containing	   the	   spread	   of	   Communism.	   The	   relationship	   between	   John	  Kennedy	  and	  Fidel	  Castro	  had	  started	  on	  a	  surprisingly	  positive	  note,	  with	  the	  Senator	  lamenting	  the	  treatment	  reserved	  for	  the	  Cuban	  leader	  during	  his	   visit	   to	   the	   US.	   52 	  With	   the	   ‘tit-­‐for-­‐tat’	   between	   Castro	   and	   the	  Eisenhower	  Administration	  getting	  nastier,	  however,	  a	  conciliatory	  position	  on	  Cuba	  would	  have	  been	  politically	  untenable	  for	  any	  politician,	   let	  alone	  one	  who	  aspired	  to	  be	  President.53	  As	  on	  the	  ‘missile	  gap,’	  Kennedy	  decided	  to	  position	  himself	  at	  the	  very	  opposite	  extreme.	  	  	  For	  Kennedy,	  Cuba	  represented	  an	  ideal	  card.	  It	  permitted	  him	  to	  respond	  in	  kind	  to	  Nixon’s	  criticisms	  and	  to	  manage	  the	  risks	  of	  being	  attacked	  from	  the	  right.	  The	  Nixon	  camp	  had	  criticised	  Kennedy	  for	  the	  admission	  that	  he	  would	   have	   apologised	   for	   Powers’	   U-­‐2	   incident,54	  and	   for	   the	   statement	  that	  the	  islands	  of	  Quemoy	  and	  Matsu	  should	  not	  have	  been	  included	  in	  the	  defence	  of	  Taiwan.	  As	   John	  Seigenthaler,	  adviser	  to	  the	  Kennedy	  brothers,	  pointed	  out,	  to	  the	  dismay	  of	  the	  American	  public	  the	  two	  islands	  became	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Preble,	  ’Who	  ever’,	  pp.	  814-­‐815.	  52	  Beschloss,	  KvsK,	  p.	  101.	  53	  Lawrence	  Freedman,	  Kennedy’s	  wars:	  Berlin,	  Cuba,	  Laos,	  and	  Vietnam	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  p.	  123.	  54	  William	  Taubman,	  Sergey	  Khrushchev,	  and	  Abbott	  Gleason	  (Eds.),	  Nikita	  
Khrushchev	  (London:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  p.	  230.	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major	  foreign	  policy	   issue.55	  Kennedy	   ‘won’	  the	  first	  debate,	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	   Republican	   candidate	   conciliatory	   approach	   and	   to	   Kennedy’s	   better	  appearance	   on	   TV	   screens.56	  Still,	   Kennedy	   went	   all	   out	   against	   Cuba	   to	  deflect	   potential	   criticism.	   In	   a	   speech	   in	   Cincinnati	   on	   the	   6th	   of	   October	  1960	   (one	   day	   before	   the	   second	   debate),	   Kennedy	   attacked	   the	  Eisenhower	   Administration	   for	   permitting	   the	   development	   of	   a	  Communist	  menace	  ‘under	  our	  very	  noses,	  only	  90	  miles	  from	  our	  shores.’	  The	   hostile	   relations	   with	   Cuba	   should	   have	   been	   blamed	   on	   an	  Administration	  that	  lacked	  imagination	  and	  foresight.57	  In	  the	  third	  debate,	  however,	  Nixon	  brought	  back	  the	  discussion	  to	  the	  islands	  of	  Quemoy	  and	  Matsu.	   Kennedy,	   feeling	   the	   pressure,	   asked	   Goodwin	   to	   ‘prepare	   a	   real	  blast	  on	  Nixon.’	  The	  blast	  was	  a	  statement	  allegedly	  never	  double-­‐checked	  with	  the	  candidate.58	  The	  statement,	  made	  public	  the	  day	  before	  the	  fourth	  debate,	  read:	  	   We	  must	  attempt	  to	  strengthen	  the	  non-­‐Batista	  democratic	  anti-­‐Castro	  forces…who	  offer	  eventual	  hope	  of	  overthrowing	  Castro.	  Thus	   far	   these	   fighters	   for	   freedom	   have	   had	   virtually	   no	  support	  from	  our	  Government.59	  	  The	   statement	   landed	   like	   a	   bombshell	   on	   the	   American	   media	   and	   on	  Nixon.60	  Today,	  it	   is	  still	  uncertain	  to	  what	  extent	  Kennedy,	  as	  Presidential	  candidate,	  had	  been	  briefed	  by	  CIA	  Director	  Allen	  Dulles	  and	  CIA	  Director	  for	  Plans	  Richard	  Bissell	  on	  the	  preparations	  against	  Cuba.	  What	  is	  certain	  is	  that	  the	  candidate	  achieved	  his	  short-­‐term	  goal.	  The	  fourth	  debate,	  on	  the	  21st	  of	  October,	  was	  dominated	  by	  Cuba.	  Trying	  to	  contest	  Kennedy,	  Nixon,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  John	  Seigenthaler,	  Phone	  interview	  with	  the	  author	  (20	  September	  2012).	  56	  Matthews,	  Kennedy	  &	  Nixon,	  pp.	  147-­‐149.	  	  57	  John	  F.	  Kennedy,	  ‘Speech	  of	  Senator	  John	  F.	  Kennedy,	  Cincinnati,	  Ohio,	  Democratic	  Dinner,’	  6	  October	  1960,	  The	  American	  Presidency	  Project	  (APP),	  [http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25660]	  (accessed	  8	  August	  2013).	  58	  Richard	  Goodwin,	  Remembering	  America	  (New	  York:	  Little	  Brown,	  1988),	  p.	  134.	  59	  John	  F.	  Kennedy,	  ‘Statement	  on	  Cuba,’	  October	  20,	  1960,	  APP,	  [http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=74127]	  (accessed	  8	  August	  2013).	  60	  Helgerson,	  CIA.	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who	   in	  private	  was	   exercising	  pressure	   to	   speed-­‐up	   the	   invasion	  of	  Cuba,	  found	  himself	  exposing	  a	  relatively	  moderate	  position.61	  Nixon	  knew	  more	  but	  couldn’t	  talk;	  he	  simply	  ‘looked	  bad.’62	  	  Kennedy	   had	   understood	   some	   of	   the	   risks	   involved	   in	  making	   Cuba	   the	  main	  foreign	  policy	  issue.	  In	  particular,	  he	  realised	  the	  paper-­‐thin	  depth	  of	  his	   position.	   He	   confessed	   to	   Goodwin:	   ‘Of	   course	   we	   don’t	   say	   how	   we	  would	  have	  saved	  Cuba…What	  the	  hell,	  they	  never	  told	  us	  how	  they	  would	  have	   saved	   China.’63	  What	   he	   didn’t	   realise,	   however,	   were	   the	   long-­‐term	  risks.	  As	  Jim	  Rasenberg	  recently	  put	  it:	  	   With	   every	  word	   the	   candidate	   uttered	   against	   the	   scourge	   of	  Fidel	   Castro,	   with	   every	   argument	   he	   made…he	   was	   paving	   a	  road	   he	   would	   have	   to	   follow	   if	   and	   when	   he	   became	  President.64	  	  Posturing	  strong,	  he	  had	  exposed	  himself	  to	  future	  Republican	  accusations	  of	   weakness	   and	   inconsistencies.	   He	   had	   limited	   his	   options	   to	   a	   narrow	  path	   of	   confrontation,	   although	   some	   in	  Moscow	   and	   Havana	   had	   hoped,	  perhaps	   only	   on	   the	   surface,	   for	   a	   relaxation, 65 	  and	   he	   had	   turned	  momentarily	   into	  the	   idol	  of	   the	  Cuban	  exile	  community.	  When	  JFK	  finally	  won,	   CIA’s	   Howard	   Hunt	   remembered,	   ‘the	   Cuban	   Barrio	   in	   Miami	   went	  wild	  with	  joy.’66	  They	  would	  be	  sorely	  let	  down.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Presidential	  Candidates	  Debates,	  ‘Presidential	  Debate	  in	  New	  York,’	  21	  October	  1960,	  APP	  [http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29403]	  (accessed	  8	  August	  2013).	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5.3.2	   Risk	   vs.	   Risk	   trade-­‐off	   2:	   The	   Bay	   of	   Pigs,	   ‘military	   risk’	   vs.	  
‘political	  risk’	  	  After	   Kennedy’s	   narrow	   victory,	   the	   issues	   of	   Cuba	   and	   of	   Soviet	   gains	  maintained	  a	  key	  place	  among	  the	  President’s	  concerns.	  Two	  weeks	  before	  inauguration,	   Khrushchev	   gave	   a	   speech	   in	   which	   he	   suggested	   the	  possibility	   of	   peaceful	   coexistence	  with	   the	  West.	   This	  message,	   however,	  was	   lost	   on	   Kennedy.	   All	   the	   future	   President	   heard	   was	   Khrushchev’s	  pledge	   of	   support	   for	   ‘wars	   of	   national	   liberation’	   (which	   was	   actually	  meant	  for	  Chinese	  audiences).	  The	  speech	  provided	  a	  shock	  to	  the	  incoming	  president	   who	   made	   it	   a	   required	   reading	   for	   his	   team.	   The	   monolithic	  interpretation	   of	   communism	   added	   to	  Khrushchev’s	  message	   to	  make	   of	  Castro	   a	   Soviet	   puppet	   and	   it	   contributed	   in	   turning	   Cuba	   into	   a	   ‘life	   or	  death’	  issue;	  a	  status	  it	  probably	  did	  not	  deserve.67	  	  	  Kennedy	  entered	  office	  with	  the	  willingness	  to	  bring	  new	  faces,	  and	  a	  new	  spirit	   -­‐	   the	   bold	   spirit	   of	   the	   ‘New	   Frontier’	   –	   to	   Washington.	   Kennedy	  selected	   the	   outsider	   Robert	   McNamara,	   former	   President	   of	   Ford	  Motor	  Company,	  as	  the	  new	  Secretary	  of	  Defense.	  McGeorge	  Bundy,	  former	  Dean	  of	   Harvard	   University,	   became	   National	   Security	   Adviser.	   The	   relatively	  unknown	  Dean	  Rusk	  became	  Secretary	  of	  State.	  Adlai	  Stevenson,	  a	  leading	  figure	   of	   the	   Democratic	   Party,	   grudgingly	   accepted	   the	   UN	  Ambassadorship.	   A	   group	   of	   young	   and	   energetic	   personnel	   including	  Richard	   Goodwin,	   other	   ‘action	   intellectuals’	   including	   Arthur	   Schlesinger	  Jr.	   and	   many	   others	   in	   lower	   ranks,	   really	   suggested	   that	   the	   torch	   had	  passed	  to	  a	  new	  generation.	  It	  was	  also	  clear	  that	  this	  new	  generation	  was	  sceptical	  of	  the	  older	  one.	  	  
	  The	   effort	   to	   establish	   a	   clear	   break	   did	   not	   help	   the	   Kennedy	  Administration,	  especially	  on	  Cuba.	  During	  the	  transition,	  the	  Kennedy	  team	  refused	   for	   two	   months	   to	   discuss	   issues	   ‘at	   the	   working	   level’	   with	   the	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outgoing	   Eisenhower	   team.	   Thomas	   Mann,	   from	   the	   State	   Department,	  identified	  this	  as	  a	   ‘major	  mistake,’	  depriving	  Kennedy	  of	  time	  to	  think	  the	  plan	  through.	  This	  sounds	  particularly	  important	  since	  until	  November,	  CIA	  preparations	  were	  at	  an	  early	  stage.68	  As	  Mann	  himself	  admitted	  on	  another	  occasion,	   Kennedy	   had	   several	   chances	   to	   call	   the	   project	   off.69	  But	   the	  Administration	  did	  not	  or,	  perhaps,	  could	  not.	  The	  easy	  political	  gains	  of	  the	  campaign	   and	   the	   need	   to	  manage	   the	   risks	   inherent	   in	   being	   outflanked	  from	  the	  right,	  had	  led	  to	  harsh	  rhetoric	  against	  Castro.	  Now,	  Kennedy	  could	  not	  back	  down,	  the	  risks	  were	  too	  great.	  	  Among	   the	   reasons	   for	   Kennedy’s	   decision	   to	   proceed	   with	   the	   plan	   was	  certainly	  his	  fascination	  with	  the	  CIA	  and	  its	  men.	  70	  A	  second	  element	  was	  the	   Administration’s	   inexperience	   in	   terms	   of	   process	   and	   personnel.	   The	  decision-­‐making	   process	   was	   still	   unstructured	   and	   some	   of	   its	  characteristics	   reflected	   Kennedy’s	   preference	   for	   access,	   informality	   and	  speed. 71 	  Kennedy,	   George	   Ball	   remembered,	   was	   ‘the	   pragmatist	   par	  
excellence,’	  with	  a	  narrow	  focus	  on	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  results,	  and	  a	  total	  disregard	  for	   long-­‐range	   implications.	  72	  This	   was	   exemplified	   by	   decision-­‐making	  through	  Task	  Forces,	  although	  some	  understood	  that	  this	  choice	  meant	  that	  no	   one	   dealt	   with	   long-­‐term	   consequences.73	  Furthermore,	   Kennedy	   also	  wanted	   access	   to	   the	   agencies,	   with	   no	   intermediate	   bodies.	   In	   the	   NSC,	  Bundy	   shut	   down	   the	  Operation	  Coordinating	  Board	   –	   responsible	   for	   the	  integration	   of	   policies	   from	   various	   agencies	   -­‐	   and	   other	   committees,	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  (February	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  pp.	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blurring	   the	   distinction	   between	   policy	   and	   operations. 74 	  As	   Dulles	  recognised,	   those	   devising	   plans	   often	   ended	   up	   drawn	   into	   an	   excess	   of	  ‘salesmanship.’ 75 	  The	   new	   team	   also	   cancelled	   several	   committees	  established	   by	   the	   Eisenhower	   Administration	   to	   keep	   track	   of	   covert	  operations.76	  Without	  work	   in	   committees,	   the	   various	   agencies	  would	   be	  responsible	  for	  their	  own	  work,	  eschewing	  open	  confrontation.	  Kennedy,	  for	  example,	   asked	   the	   Joint	  Chiefs	  of	   Staff	   (JCS)	   to	   review	   the	  CIA	  plan.	  They	  gave	  a	  very	  hedged	  assessment,	  but,	  as	  Dean	  Rusk	  wrote,	  ‘they	  never	  looked	  at	  the	  plan	  as	  professional	  soldiers,’	  largely	  washing	  their	  hands	  of	  it.77	  	  	  Beyond	   process,	   most	   of	   the	   people	   involved	   were	   inexperienced.	   As	  Schlesinger	  wrote,	  members	  of	   the	  Cabinet	   listened	   ‘transfixed’	   to	  Bissell’s	  presentations,78	  and	   inexperience	  was	   particularly	   consequential	   for	   those	  opposing	   the	   plan.79 	  The	   most	   inexperienced	   of	   all	   was	   the	   President	  himself.	  	  	   For	  a	   lieutenant	  JG	  [junior	  grade]…in	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  to	  cancel	   an	   expedition	   that	   had	   been	   advocated,	   sanctioned	   and	  supported	  by	  the	  General	  who	  commanded	  the	  largest	  successful	  amphibious	   landing	   in	   history,	   would	   have	   been	   hard	   to	  explain.80	  	  Schlesinger’s	   remark	   points	   to	   the	   key	   element	   in	   Kennedy’s	   inability	   to	  stop	   the	   momentum	   behind	   the	   invasion:	   the	   risks	   involved.	   During	   the	  weeks	   that	   led	   to	   the	   invasion,	   three	   elements	   stood	   out:	   first,	   many	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advisers	  and	  the	  President	  himself	  reasoned	  -­‐	  often	  explicitly	   -­‐	   in	   terms	  of	  what	   could	   go	   wrong,	   that	   is	   in	   terms	   of	   risks,	   both	   domestically	   and	  militarily;	  second	  the	  political	  risks	  and	  strategic	  risk	  of	   the	   invasion	  were	  clearly	   spelled	   out	   for	   the	   President;	   third	   there	   is	   enough	   evidence	   to	  suggest	  that	  Kennedy	  focused	  on	  short-­‐term	  political	  risks.	  	  	  The	   President	   knew	   that	   inaction	   entailed	  massive	   risks	   on	   the	   domestic	  political	   side.	   First,	   had	   Kennedy	   cancelled	   the	   plan	   he	   would	   have	   been	  accused	  of	  weakness	  and,	  above	  all,	  he	  would	  have	  betrayed	  his	  campaign	  pledges.	  Kennedy	  had	  built	  his	  campaign	  on	  being	  tough	  on	  the	  communists	  and,	   especially,	   on	   Castro.	   One	   of	   the	   key	   factors	   in	   his	   mind	   was	   the	  potential	  public	  reaction.81	  Second,	  as	  CIA	  Director	  Allen	  Dulles	  pointed	  out,	  Kennedy	   faced	  a	   ‘disposal	  problem’	  what	   to	  do	  with	   the	   forces	   training	   in	  Guatemala	   if	   they	  were	  ordered	  to	  disband.	  Had	  the	   force	  made	   it	  back	  to	  Miami,	   rumours	  would	  have	  spread	  and	   the	  Republican	  Party	  would	  have	  had	   a	   field	   day.	   Republicans,	   Bundy	   later	   admitted,	  would	   have	   said:	   ‘We	  were	  all	   set	   to	  beat	  Castro…this	  antsy	  pantsy	  bunch	  of	   liberals’	   chickened	  out;	   there	  was	   a	   ‘political	   risk	   in	  not	   going	   through	  with	   the	  operation.’82	  Bissell	   boldly	   brought	   the	   same	  point	   to	  Kennedy	  when	  he	  presented	   the	  plan.	   He	   argued	   that	   such	   an	   operation	   entailed	   a	   willingness	   to	   pay	   a	  political	   price.	   ‘The	   alternative,’	   he	   added,	   ‘Would	   appear	   to	   be	   the	  demobilization	  of	  the	  paramilitary	  force…this	  course	  of	  action	  too	  involves	  certain	   risks.’83	  More	   generally	   a	   show	   of	   weakness	   would	   have	   been	   an	  unacceptable	  denial	  of	  Kennedy’s	  whole	   foreign	  policy	  approach	  of	  vigour	  and	   boldness;	   a	   risk	   Kennedy	   could	   not	   take.84	  Action	   was	   not	   risk-­‐free	  either.	  A	   full-­‐fledged	   invasion	  meant	  a	  willingness	   to	  confront	   risks	  at	   the	  international	   level.	  Many	  of	  Kennedy’s	   advisers,	   including	  Rusk,	  Goodwin,	  Schlesinger	   and	   Stevenson	   warned	   that	   an	   invasion,	   even	   if	   successful,	  would	  be	  disastrous	  for	  the	  US	  international	  position:	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The	   effect	   will	   be	   to	   spoil	   the	   new	   US	   image	   –	   the	   image	   of	  intelligence,	   reasonableness	   and	   honest	   firmness	   which	   has	  already	   had	   such	   an	   extraordinary	   effect	   in	   changing	   world	  opinion	  about	  the	  US.85	  	  More	   specifically,	   in	   Latin	   America,	   the	   Alliance	   for	   Progress	  was	   off	   to	   a	  rocky	   start.	   The	   plan	   aimed	   at	   improving	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   situation	   of	  countries	   in	   the	   region,	   and,	   by	   doing	   so,	   preventing	   the	   spread	   of	  revolution.	   An	   invasion	   would	   have	   brought	   back	   ghosts	   of	   ‘gunboat	  diplomacy,’	   would	   have	   exposed	   the	   plan	   as	   a	   scam,	   and	   would	   have	  markedly	  increased	  risks	  of	  social	  upheaval	  in	  the	  region.	  Kennedy	  was	  all	  too	   aware	   of	   the	   risks	   coming	   from	   Latin	   America	   and	   from	   its	   unstable	  governments.86	  	  	  On	   the	   strategic	   side,	   inaction	  would	   have	   created	   problems.	   Once	   again,	  Dulles	  and	  Bissell	  presented	  the	  plan	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  could	  go	  wrong	  if	  the	  invasion	  was	  called	  off.	  As	   they	  pointed	  out,	   time	  was	  running	  out;	  Castro	  would	   soon	   have	   become	   stronger,	   with	   deliveries	   of	   weapons	   from	   the	  Soviet	   Bloc.	   Furthermore,	   the	   ‘disposal	   problem’	   might	   have	   spurred	  serious	   troubles	   in	   Central	   America.	   As	   Erneido	   Oliva,	   one	   of	   the	  commanders	  of	  the	  force	  admitted,	  	  	   The	  problem	   that	  we	  would	  have	   created	   in	  Guatemala,	  would	  have	   been	   so	   great,	   Cuban	   fighting	   the	   Guatemalan	   army…the	  disposal	  problem…was	  a	  BIG	  problem.87	  	  Action,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  created	  two	  main	  problems	  on	  the	  strategic	  level.	  First,	  several	  elements	  within	  the	  Administration	  understood	  that	  the	  plan	  was	  too	  risky,	  and	  gave	  explicit	  or	  implicit	  estimates	  of	  the	  odds	  of	  success.	  The	   Pentagon	   had	   judged	   the	   chances	   of	   success	   as	   ‘fair.’	   With	   ‘fair’	   the	  military	  meant	  30%	  chance	  of	  success.	  The	  number	  was	  never	   included	   in	  the	  memorandum	  and	  ‘fair’	  was	  generally	  understood	  to	  mean	  much	  more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	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  Stephen	  G.	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than	   that.88	  Chester	   Bowles	   tried	   to	   convince	   Rusk	   to	   oppose	   the	   plan,	  writing	  that	  the	  chances	  of	  success	  were	  not	  greater	  than	  one	  out	  of	  three,	  making	   the	  operation	   ‘highly	   risky.’89	  As	  Senator	  William	  Fulbright	   (D-­‐AR)	  wrote	  to	  the	  President,	  going	  ahead	  with	  the	  plan	  entailed	  the	  possibility	  of	  failure	  of	  the	  invading	  force.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  US	  would	  have	  been	  compelled	  to	   intervene.	  An	   intervention	   ‘would	  have	  undone	  the	  work	  of	   thirty	  years	  trying	  to	  live	  down	  earlier	  interventions,’	  and,	  more	  problematically,	  would	  have	  made	   the	  US	   responsible	   for	   the	   restoration	  of	   order	   in	  Cuba,	  which	  would	  have	  proved	  an	  ‘endless	  can	  of	  worms.’90	  Beyond	  the	  confrontation	  in	  Cuba,	   a	   full-­‐fledged	   US	   invasion	   would	   have	   created	   a	   dreadful	   risk	  escalation	  with	   the	  USSR.	   Even	   if	   the	   Soviets	   decided	   to	   let	   Cuba	   go,	   they	  could	   have	   sought	   their	   reprisal	   in	  Berlin,	  where	  Kennedy	   feared	   that	   the	  Soviets	  might	  take	  advantage	  of	  US	  adventurism	  to	  try	  something	  similar.91	  Alternatively,	   the	   Soviets	   could	   have	   picked	   Laos,	   or	   a	   trouble	   spot	   in	   the	  Caribbean	   where	   authoritarian	   long-­‐time	   allies	   of	   the	   US	   feared	   popular	  unrest	   and	   other	   countries	   seemed	   ready	   to	   align	   with	   Castro. 92 	  The	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  possible	  Soviet	  reactions	  ranked	  highly	  among	  Kennedy’s	  concerns.	  	  What	   this	  maze	  made	  clear	  was	   that	   there	  was	  no	  easy	  choice.	  A	  decision	  represented	   trade-­‐offs	   in	   which	   reduction	   of	   risks	   in	   one	   sector	   entailed	  increased	  risks	  in	  another.	  Schlesinger	  lucidly	  identified	  the	  problem	  for	  the	  President:	  	   The	  trouble	  with	  the	  operation	  is	  that	  the	  less	  the	  military	  risk,	  the	  greater	  the	  political	  risk,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	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the	  utilization	  of	  the	  men	  under	  conditions	  of	  minimum	  political	  risk	  is	  clearly	  the	  thing	  to	  aim	  for.93	  	  Kennedy	   followed	  Schlesinger’s	   advice.	   In	   line	  with	  one	  of	   the	  hypotheses	  identified	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter,	   the	  President	   took	   several	  measures	   to	  reduce	   the	   political	   risks	   of	   the	   plan,	  with	   little	   regard	   for	   the	   increase	   in	  strategic	   risks.	   Kennedy	   would	   continue	   to	   repeat	   in	   meetings	   that	   the	  invasion	   should	   have	   been	   less	   spectacular,	   more	   as	   a	   work	   of	   Cubans	  themselves	  than	  as	  a	  World	  War	  Two	  style	  invasion.	  He	  imposed	  an	  infinite	  series	   of	   restrictions	   on	   the	   CIA,	   the	  military	   and	   the	   invading	   forces.	   He	  ordered	   a	   change	  of	   the	   landing	   site	   from	   the	  Trinidad	   area	   to	   the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs.	  He	  deprived	  the	  invading	  force	  of	  any	  weapon	  that	  might	  have	  shown	  the	   US	   hand	   and,	  when	   the	   first	   air	   strikes	   on	   the	   day	   before	   the	   inasion	  created	  a	  political	  uproar,	  with	  the	  media	  exposing	  the	  CIA	  cover	  story	  and	  with	  Stevenson	  threatening	  to	  resign,	  he	  called	  off	  additional	  ones.	  	  	  The	   reasons	   for	   these	  measures	   can	   be	   found	   in	   Kennedy’s	   conviction,	   in	  spite	  of	  Schlesinger’s	  advice,	  that	  it	  could	  have	  been	  possible	  to	  manage	  the	  political	   risks	   posed	   by	   the	   invasion	  with	   no	   strategic	   repercussions.	   Like	  Johnson	   in	   Neustadt’s	   analysis,	   Kennedy’s	   narrow	   focus	   on	   short-­‐run	  political	   tangibles	   dismissed	   longer-­‐term	   risks.	   In	   this	   context,	   Bissell	   and	  Dulles	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  convincing	  the	  President	  that,	  whereas	  inaction	  entailed	   clear	   risks,	   the	   invasion	   was	   virtually	   ‘risk-­‐free,’	   on	   both	   the	  political	  and	  the	  strategic	  side.	  For	  political	  risks,	  the	  American	  hand	  could	  be	   convincingly	   hidden,	   making	   the	   invasion	   look	   like	   a	   genuinely	   Cuban	  effort.	  On	  the	  strategic	  side,	  they	  guaranteed	  that	  no	  risk	  was	  involved.	  If	  the	  invading	   force	   succeeded,	   it	  would	  have	  ousted	  Castro,	  possibly	   through	  a	  general	  uprising.	  If	  it	  failed	  to	  break	  through	  or	  if	  it	  was	  beaten	  back,	  Bissell	  assured,	   the	   force	   could	  have	  moved	   to	   the	  Escambray	  Mountains	  nearby,	  starting	  a	  guerrilla	  campaign.	  Kennedy’s	  impressions	  were	  strengthened	  by	  the	   report	   on	   the	   CIA’s	   modified	   plan	   submitted	   in	   March,	   after	   the	  President	   had	   requested	   changes.	   In	   the	   report,	   only	   the	   positives	   of	   the	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new	   plan	   were	   identified.	   The	   swamp	   surrounding	   the	   landing	   area,	   for	  example,	   was	   convincingly	   portrayed	   as	   an	   insurmountable	   obstacle	   for	  Castro’s	  forces,	  but	  no	  one	  bothered	  to	  admit	  that	  it	  would	  have	  represented	  an	  equally	  insurmountable	  obstacle	  for	  any	  force	  trying	  to	  break	  out	  of	  the	  beachhead	  to	  reach	  the	  Escambray	  Mountains.	  Equally,	  no	  one	  pointed	  out	  that	  with	  the	  new	  landing	  site,	  the	  mountains	  were	  now	  eighty	  miles	  away.	  As	  Schlesinger	  concluded:	  	  	   Kennedy	  assumed	  that	   the	  guerrilla	  option	  had	  been	   left	   intact	  by	  the	  switch	  to	  Zapata.	  The	  briefing	  paper	  gave	  him	  no	  reason	  to	  suppose	  otherwise.94	  	  Few	   also	   noticed	   that	   the	   CIA,	   after	  more	   than	   two	   years	   of	  work	   on	   one	  plan,	  came	  up	  with	  the	  modified	  Zapata	  (Bay	  of	  Pigs)	  plan	  in	  less	  than	  three	  days.95	  	  	  As	   the	   invasion	   went	   ahead,	   the	   ‘shock	   effect’	   and	   the	   surprise	   that	   the	  invasion	   force	   should	  have	   created	  were	  nullified.	   Castro	   knew	  of	   the	  CIA	  plans,	   which	   had	   become	   public	   knowledge	   at	   least	   one	   year	   before	   the	  invasion.	  The	  Cuban	  leader	  even	  made	  this	  clear	  in	  a	  speech	  a	  week	  before	  the	   invasion,	   when	   he	   accused	   the	   ‘Central	   Agency	   of	   Cretins’,	   of	   getting	  ready	  to	  attack.96	  The	  internal	  uprising	  never	  occurred.	  Castro	  made	  sure	  of	  it,	  rounding	  up	  one	  100,000	  suspects	  as	  the	  invasion	  was	  taking	  place.97	  The	  Cuban	  brigade,	   confronted	  with	  Castro’s	   forces	  had	  no	   chance	   of	   reaching	  the	  mountains,	   surrounded	  as	   it	  was	  by	  swamps	  and	  with	  maps,	  provided	  by	   the	   CIA,	   that	   had	   allegedly	   been	   drawn	   in	   1895.98	  The	   last	   resort,	   on	  which	  the	  CIA	  had	  banked,	  never	  materialised.	  When	  PBSUCCESS	  was	  under	  way,	  and	  the	  rebels	  seemed	  close	  to	  defeat,	  Bissell	  had	  gone	  to	  Eisenhower	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and	  had	  convinced	  the	  President	  to	  let	  American	  planes,	  with	  pilots	  hired	  by	  the	  CIA,	   bomb	  Guatemalan	   cities,	   including	   the	   capital.	   This	   show	  of	   force	  was	  crucial	  in	  the	  Operation’s	  success.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  both	  Bissell	  and	  Dulles	  assumed	  that	  Kennedy	  would	  have	  preferred	  to	  call	  the	  US	  forces	  in,	  instead	  of	   accepting	   failure.	   Apart	   from	   an	   initial	   doubt,99	  the	   President	   never	  acceded	  to	  insistent	  CIA	  and	  JCS	  requests	  to	  use	  force.100	  The	  President	  had	  made	  up	  his	  mind.	  	  	  The	   end	   result	   was	   a	   middle	   way	   invasion	   that	   had,	   from	   the	   start,	   no	  chance	   of	   success.	   ‘We	   fell	   between	   the	   stools,’	   Thomas	   Mann	   later	  lamented.101	  In	  accepting	  the	   invasion	  and	  in	   imposing	  a	  series	  of	  changes,	  the	   administration	   had	   managed	   the	   political	   risks	   that	   inaction	   implied.	  However,	   it	  had	  dismissed	  short-­‐term	  strategic	  risks,	  such	  as	  the	  failure	  of	  the	   invasion,	   and	   the	   impossibility	   of	   masking	   US	   responsibility.102	  More	  crucially,	   it	   had	   also	   dismissed	   longer-­‐term	   ones,	   such	   as	   the	   damage	   to	  American	  international	  reputation	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  strengthening	  the	  Cuban-­‐Soviet	  bond.	  In	  his	  memoirs,	  Schlesinger	  wrote:	  	   The	  President	   had	   insisted	   that	   the	   political	   and	  military	   risks	  be	  brought	  into	  balance:	  given	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  operation,	  this	  was	  impossible,	  and	  someone	  should	  have	  said	  so.103	  	  	  The	   rest	   of	   the	   chapter	   will	   argue	   that,	   until	   the	   Missile	   Crisis,	  Kennedy’s	  policy	  towards	  Cuba	  was	  a	  failing	  and	  dangerous	  attempt	  to	  bring	   into	   balance	   military	   and	   political	   risks.	   And	   no	   one	   told	   the	  President	  either.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Freedman,	  Kennedy’s,	  p.	  144.	  100	  Freedman,	  Kennedy’s,	  p.	  144.	  101	  Mann,	  Interview,	  LBJ	  Oral	  History,	  p.	  21.	  102	  Memorandum	  No.	  3	  From	  the	  Cuba	  Study	  Group	  to	  President	  Kennedy,	  ‘Conclusions	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Study	  Group,’	  13	  June	  1961,	  Doc.	  233,	  Foreign	  
Relations	  of	  the	  United	  States	  (FRUS),	  Vol.	  X.	  103	  Schlesinger,	  One	  Thousand,	  pp.	  267	  and	  270.	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5.3.3	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk	  trade-­‐off	  3:	  revenge	  vs.	  modus	  vivendi	  	  After	  the	  failure,	  and	  in	  line	  with	  the	  cyclical	  nature	  of	  risk	  management,	  the	  situation	  in	  Cuba	  was	  re-­‐assessed	  and	  new	  risks	  were	  identified.	  On	  the	  19th	  of	   April,	   with	   the	   operation	   collapsing,	   Robert	   Kennedy	   wrote	   to	   his	  brother.	  ‘Our	  long-­‐range	  foreign	  policy	  objectives	  in	  Cuba’,	  he	  wrote,	  	  	   Are	   tied	   to	   survival	   far	   more	   than	   what	   is	   happening	   in…any	  other	  place	  in	  the	  world…our	  objective	  must	  be	  at	  the	  very	  least	  to	  prevent	  that	  island	  from	  becoming	  Mr.	  Khrushchev's	  arsenal.	  	  	  The	   path	   forward	   was	   clear.	   The	   US	   needed	   to	   increase	   the	   pressure	   on	  Cuba.	  He	  concluded:	  	  	   The	   time	  has	   come	   for	  a	   showdown	   for	   in	  a	  year	  or	   two	  years	  the	  situation	  will	  be	  vastly	  worse.	  If	  we	  don't	  want	  Russia	  to	  set	  up	  missile	  bases	  in	  Cuba,	  we	  had	  better	  decide	  now	  what	  we	  are	  willing	  to	  do	  to	  stop	  it.104	  	  Both	  Kennedys	  seemed	  to	  interpret	  the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs	  as	  a	  lost	  battle	  in	  what	  would	  have	  been	  a	  long	  war.	  Chester	  Bowles	  recorded	  the	  prevailing	  anger	  in	  his	  notes	  of	  the	  NSC	  meetings	  of	  those	  days.	  In	  the	  meeting	  on	  the	  20th	  of	  April,	  while	  the	  President	  was	  ‘shattered’,	  comments	  around	  the	  table	  were	  savage.	   Robert	   Kennedy	   turned	   aggressively	   on	   Bowles	   as	   soon	   as	   he	  suggested	   that	   the	   solution	   to	   the	   present	  mess	  was	   not	   to	   double-­‐up	   on	  what	  the	  US	  had	  been	  doing.	  There	  was	  a	  frantic	  search	  for	  a	  programme	  to	  grab	  on	  to.105	  A	  complete	  lack	  of	  ‘moral	  integrity’	  prevailed.106	  	  Among	   this	   fury,	   two	  main	   visions	   for	   the	   future	   of	   the	  US-­‐Cuba	   relations	  battled	   out.	   Bowles,	   Goodwin	   and	   officials	   in	   the	   State	   Department	  promoted	  a	  strategy	  aiming	  at	  a	  long-­‐term	  solution.	  If	  the	  US	  could	  not	  live	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Robert	  Kennedy,	  Memorandum	  to	  the	  President,	  19	  April	  1961,	  Doc.	  157,	  
FRUS,	  Vol.	  X.	  105	  Chester	  Bowles,	  Notes	  on	  the	  April	  20	  Meeting	  on	  Cuban	  Crisis,	  Doc.	  158,	  
FRUS,	  Vol.	  X.	  106	  Chester	  Bowles,	  Notes	  on	  the	  478th	  Meeting	  of	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  April	  22,	  Doc.	  166,	  FRUS,	  Vol.	  X.	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with	   Cuba	   -­‐	   and	   some	   suggested	   it	   should	   -­‐	   the	   aim	   should	   have	   been	   to	  increase	   pressure,	   avoiding	   any	   further	   international	   humiliation.107	  The	  Attorney	   General,	   McNamara	   and	   the	   President,	   aimed,	   conversely,	   at	   a	  quick	   fix	   to	   the	   problem.	   Responding	   to	   McNamara’s	   request,	   the	   JCS	  prepared	   an	   extremely	   detailed	   military	   plan	   for	   the	   overthrow	   of	   the	  Castro	  government	  through	  ‘the	  application	  of	  military	  force.’108	  In	  mid-­‐May	  it	   was	   already	   clear	   which	   of	   these	   schools	   had	   won.	   At	   the	   483rd	   NSC	  meeting	   it	   was	   ‘agreed	   that	   US	   policy	   toward	   Cuba	   should	   aim	   at	   the	  downfall	   of	   Castro’.	   The	  meeting	   set	   out	   a	   series	   of	  measures	   to	   improve	  intelligence	  on	  Cuba	  and	  the	  relations	  with	  the	  Cuban	  exiles,	  but	  it	  was	  also	  understood	  that	  these	  measures	  were	  not	  sufficient	  to	  cause	  the	  downfall	  of	  Castro.	  For	  this	  reason,	  it	  was	  also	  	   Agreed	   that	   the	   United	   States	   should	   not	   undertake	   military	  intervention	   in	   Cuba	   now,	   but	   should	   do	   nothing	   that	   would	  foreclose	  the	  possibility	  of	  military	  intervention	  in	  the	  future.109	  	  Kennedy’s	  predicament	  had	  not	  changed	  from	  the	  pre-­‐Bay	  of	  Pigs	  situation:	  the	  campaign	  against	  Castro	  posed	  serious	  risks.	  The	  exiles	  or	  the	  CIA	  could	  not	  overthrow	  Castro	  on	   their	  own,	  and	  US	   forces	  should	  have	  been	  used.	  Kennedy	  still	  faced	  the	  same	  strategic	  risks	  of	  confrontation	  if	  the	  US	  hand	  became	   too	   visible	   and	   the	   same	   political	   risks	   if	   he	   tried	   to	   learn	   to	   live	  with	   Cuba.	   The	   end	   result,	   as	   with	   the	   Bay	   of	   Pigs,	   was	   a	   policy	   falling	  ‘between	  the	  stools.’	  Trapped	  between	  the	  strategic	   impossibility	  of	  an	  all-­‐out	  campaign	  and	  the	  political	  impossibility	  of	  establishing	  a	  modus	  vivendi,	  Kennedy	   proceeded	   on	   a	   path	   of	   confrontation,	   with	   scant	   chances	   of	  success.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  Memorandum,	  From	  the	  President's	  Assistant	  Special	  Counsel	  (Goodwin)	  to	  the	  President's	  Special	  Assistant	  for	  National	  Security	  Affairs	  (Bundy),	  April	  26,	  1961,	  Doc.	  179,	  FRUS,	  Vol.	  X.	  108	  Memorandum,	  From	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  to	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  McNamara,	  Doc.	  178	  FRUS,	  Vol.	  X.	  109	  Record	  of	  action	  of	  the	  NSC	  at	  its	  483rd	  meeting	  on	  May	  16th,	  1961,	  CMCC,	  DNSA,	  italics	  by	  the	  author.	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These	   developments	   were,	   at	   best,	   unfortunate.	   In	   the	   same	   days,	   Castro	  and	   the	   Cuban	   government	  were	   launching	   a	   ‘peace	   initiative’.	   Before	   the	  Bay	   of	   Pigs,	   Castro	   had	   already	   let	   the	  media	   know	   that	   if	   US	   companies	  agreed	   to	   restore	   the	   purchases	   of	   Cuban	   sugar,	   the	   Cuban	   government	  might	  arrange	  compensation	  for	  their	  losses.	  Roger	  Hilsman	  from	  the	  State	  Department	  Bureau	  of	   Intelligence	  and	  Research	  dismissed	  the	  offer.110	  On	  the	  27th	  of	  April,	  Castro	  and	  the	  Cuban	  President	  Dorticos	  made	  a	  statement	  stressing	   their	   willingness	   to	   ‘participate	   in	   any	   discussion…in	   order	   to	  arrive	   at	   a	   satisfactory	   solution	   of	   the	   tension.’111	  In	   May,	   Castro	   proved	  willing	   to	  exchange	  prisoners	   from	  the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs	   invasion	   for	  bulldozers	  (others	  say	  farm	  tractors,	  most	  of	  the	  confusion	  was	  created	  by	  Castro’s	  use	  of	   the	   Spanish	  word	   tractores).	   Private	   citizens	   such	   as	   Eleanor	  Roosevelt	  picked	  up	  the	  offer,	  but	  the	  US	  government	  refused	  to	  support	  it.112	  In	  mid-­‐June,	  Castro	  discussed	  with	  a	  group	  of	  American	   journalists	   the	  possibility	  of	   compensation	   for	   US	   companies.	   In	   July,	   Carlos	   Lechuga,	   Cuban	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  UN,	  approached	  the	   journalist	  Tad	  Szulc,	  who	  was	  well	  connected	   to	   the	   Kennedys,	   and	   admitted	   that	   the	   bad	   state	   of	   Cuban-­‐US	  relations	   had	   made	   the	   help	   from	   the	   Soviets	   inevitable,	   but	   ‘a	   friendlier	  attitude	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   US’	   would	   have	   helped	   the	   non-­‐Communists	  elements	  in	  the	  regime.113	  This	  ‘peace	  initiative’,	  famously	  culminated	  in	  the	  meeting	  between	  Che	  Guevara	   and	  Richard	  Goodwin,	   in	  which	   the	   former	  ‘clearly	  speaking	  for	  the	  Cuban	  government’	  admitted	  that	  Cuba	  and	  the	  US	  could	   have	   tried	   to	   reach	   a	   modus	   vivendi.114 	  Relating	   his	   meeting	   to	  Kennedy,	  Goodwin	  suggested	  the	  President	  should:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  Roger	  Hilsman,	  Memorandum	  to	  CIA	  Director	  Allen	  Dulles,	  ‘Castro	  “offer”	  to	  discuss	  indemnification	  of	  nationalized	  US	  property,’	  10	  March,	  1961,	  CIA	  CREST	  [http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/5829/CIA-­‐RDP80B01676R000800090057-­‐5.pdf]	  (accessed	  29	  August	  2013).	  111	  White,	  The	  Cuban,	  p.	  52.	  112	  Circular	  Telegram	  From	  the	  Department	  of	  State	  to	  All	  Posts,	  May	  20,	  1961,	  5,	  Doc.	  224,	  FRUS,	  Vol.	  X.	  113	  Memorandum	  of	  Conversation,	  Tad	  Szulc-­‐Carlos	  Lechuga,	  July	  13,	  1961,	  Doc.	  246,	  FRUS,	  Vol.	  X.	  114	  Dick	  Goodwin,	  Memorandum	  for	  the	  President,	  ‘Conversation	  with	  Comandante	  Ernesto	  Guevara	  of	  Cuba’,	  22	  August	  1961,	  CMCC,	  DNSA.	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   Pay	  little	  public	  attention	  to	  Cuba.	  Do	  not	  allow	  them	  to	  appear	  as	   the	   victims	   of	   US	   aggression.	   Do	   not	   create	   the	   impression	  that	  we	   are	   obsessed	  with	   Castro	   –	   an	   impression	  which	   only	  strengthens	  Castro’s	  hand.115	  	  	  By	  the	  time	  Goodwin	  wrote	  those	  words,	  however,	  it	  was	  already	  too	  late.	  	  
	  
5.3.4	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk	  trade-­‐off	  4:	  showing	  ‘weakness’	  vs.	  raising	  the	  stakes	  
5.3.4.1	  Trade-­‐off	  4a:	  tough	  with	  the	  Soviets	  vs.	  cornering	  Khrushchev	  	  On	   the	  4th	  of	   June	  1961,	  Kennedy	  met	  with	  Khrushchev	   in	  Vienna.	  During	  the	  summit,	  President	  Kennedy	  let	  Khrushchev	  drag	  him	  into	  an	  ideological	  discussion	   and	   no	   specific	   issue	   was	   addressed.	   The	   summit	   had	   been	   a	  tough	  lesson	  for	  the	  President.	  After	  living	  through	  the	  ‘worst	  experience’	  of	  his	   life,	  Kennedy	  confessed	  to	  the	  reporter	   James	  Reston	  his	  main	   fear	   for	  the	  post-­‐Vienna	  relations	  between	  the	  US	  and	  the	  USSR:	  	   I	   think	  he	  did	   it	   because	  of	   the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs.	   I	   think	  he	   thought	  that	  anyone	  who	  was	  so	  young	  and	  inexperienced	  as	  to	  get	  into	  that	  mess	  could	  be	  taken,	  and	  anyone	  who	  got	  into	  it,	  and	  didn’t	  see	  it	  through	  had	  no	  guts.	  So	  he	  just	  beat	  the	  hell	  out	  of	  me.	  So	  I’ve	   got	   a	   terrible	   problem.	   If	   he	   thinks	   I’m	   inexperienced	   and	  have	   no	   guts,	   until	   we	   remove	   those	   ideas	   we	   won’t	   get	  anywhere	  with	  him.116	  	  Demonstrating	   resolve	   became	   the	   new	   imperative.	   The	   President	   had	  already	   increased	   the	   US	   level	   of	   armament	   in	   his	   decision	   to	   shift	   US	  nuclear	  posture	   from	  Mutual	  Assured	  Destruction	   to	   ‘flexible	  response.’117	  Now,	   he	   took	  measures	   and	   adopted	   policies	   aimed	   at	   demonstrating	   an	  even	   more	   aggressive	   approach	   towards	   the	   Soviet	   Union.	   Managing	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  Dick	  Goodwin,	  Memorandum	  for	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  President,	  22	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  CMCC,	  DNSA.	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  (London:	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risks	  of	  appearing	  weak	  meant	   that	  he	  had	   to	   raise	   the	  stakes	  of	   the	  Cold	  War.118	  	  	  In	   June,	   Kennedy	   humiliated	   Khrushchev	   during	   a	   press	   conference	   by	  exposing	   the	   weaknesses	   of	   the	   Soviet	   economy.119 	  When	   Khrushchev	  renewed	  his	  ultimatum	  on	  Berlin,	  Kennedy	  went	  on	  TV	  on	  the	  25th	  of	   July	  with	  a	  bold	  address	   to	   the	  nation.	  He	   increased	  military	  spending	  by	  over	  $3	   billion,	   ‘dispatched	   reinforcements	   to	   Europe,	   tripled	   draft	   calls,	   and	  mobilised	   reserves	   and	   national	   guardsmen.’120	  On	   the	   21st	   of	   October	   he	  famously	  let	  the	  Soviets	  know	  through	  Deputy	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Roswell	  L.	  Gilpatric	  that	  if	  a	  missile	  gap	  existed,	  it	  was	  in	  the	  US	  favour.	  In	  the	  same	  days,	  at	  a	  lunch	  with	  Soviet	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  US	  Mikhail	  Menshikov,	  Paul	  Nitze	  boasted	  that	  ‘there	  would	  be	  nothing	  left	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  after	  an	  American	  nuclear	  strike,’	  making	  a	  similar	  point	   in	  a	  public	  speech.121	  The	  humiliation	   went	   beyond	   simple	   statements.	   One	   of	   the	   key	   factors	  convincing	  Khrushchev	   to	  deploy	   the	  missiles	  was	   the	  willingness	   to	   give	  the	  Americans	   ‘back	  some	  of	  their	  own	  medicine,’122	  that	   is	   to	  get	  revenge	  for	   the	  American	  deployment	  of	  missiles	   in	  Turkey.	  On	   this	   issue,	   as	  with	  the	   Bay	   of	   Pigs	   and	   the	   ignored	   peace	   initiative,	   political	   risks	   and	   the	  willingness	  not	  to	  appear	  weak,	   led	  to	  the	  dismissal	  of	   long-­‐term	  strategic	  risks.	  	  The	  deployment	   of	   nuclear	  missiles	   in	   Europe	  had	  been	  decided	  upon	  by	  the	  Eisenhower	  Administration	  as	  a	  way	  of	  strengthening	  the	  NATO	  alliance	  after	  the	  bruises	  of	  the	  Suez	  Crisis	  and	  Sputnik.	  Many	  soon	  realised	  that	  the	  Jupiters	  were	   obsolete	   and	  would	   probably	   do	  more	   harm	   than	   good.	   As	  with	   the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs,	   the	  buck	  passed	   to	   the	  Kennedy	  Administration:	   the	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deployment	   could	   have	   still	   been	   called	   off.	   In	   February,	   Kennedy	   had	  established	   a	   task	   force	   under	  Dean	  Acheson	   to	   study	   the	   issue.	   The	   task	  force	  identified	  concerns	  with	  the	  missiles	  and	  suggested	  that	  the	  US	  should	  have	  made	  clear	  to	  Turkey	  that	  the	  money	  spent	  for	  the	  Jupiters	  could	  have	  been	   spent	   in	   a	  more	   cost-­‐effective	  way.	   The	   Polaris	   nuclear	   submarines	  were	   getting	   ready	   and	   they	   would	   have	   provided	   a	   better	   nuclear	  deterrent.	   In	   March,	   Kennedy	   asked	   the	   head	   of	   the	   State	   Department’s	  Policy	  Planning	  Staff,	  George	  McGhee,	  former	  Ambassador	  to	  Turkey,	  if	  the	  Turks	   would	   allow	   cancellation	   of	   the	   deployment.	   In	   spite	   of	   McGhee’s	  scepticism,	   the	   Administration	   seemed	   to	   move	   towards	   a	   cancellation.	  Vienna	   changed	   everything.123	  Asked	   an	   opinion	   immediately	   after	   the	  summit,	   the	   Supreme	   Allied	   Commander	   Europe	   sent	   a	   telegram	   to	  McNamara.	  The	  deployment,	  he	  wrote:	  	   Was	   considered	   important	  militarily,	   but	  was	   perhaps	   of	   even	  greater	   significance	   from	   a	   psychological	   or	   political	  standpoint…I	  believe	  the	  program	  continues	  to	  be	  of	  value…this	  is	  the	  time	  to	  create	  strength,	  not	  reduce	  it.124	  	  In	   a	   meeting	   convened	   to	   discuss	   the	   deployment,	   everybody	   agreed.	  Secretary	   of	   State	   Rusk	   admitted	   that	   the	   talks	   in	   Vienna	   compelled	   a	  change	   in	  US	  approach.	  Paul	  Nitze	   thought	   that	  Vienna	  had	   reinforced	   the	  desirability	   of	   going	   ahead	   and	   that	   it	   was	   unwise	   to	   ask	   the	   Turks	   to	  reconsider.	  The	  deployment	  proceeded.	  	  	  During	   the	   Cuban	   Missile	   crisis,	   Kennedy	   famously	   seemed	   to	   have	   lost	  track	  of	   the	   Jupiter	  decision.125	  Yet,	   it	   seems	   clear	   that	   the	  President	   took	  the	   decision	   to	   continue	   with	   the	   deployment	   of	   the	   missiles	   after	  considering	  the	  negative	  implications	  of	  a	  cancellation.	  Kennedy	  refused	  to	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accept	   the	   risk	   of	   appearing	  weak	   and	   the	   political	   risks	   of	   upsetting	   the	  Turks.126	  It	  is	  also	  clear,	  that	  in	  taking	  the	  decision,	  the	  Administration	  had	  dismissed	  clear	  warnings.	  Soviet	  officials	  at	  various	   levels	  had	  made	  clear	  their	   concern.	   In	   January	   1960,	   Soviet	   Ambassador	   to	   Turkey	  Nikiu	  Rijov	  had	  complained	  to	  Turkish	  authorities	  that	  the	  deployment	  of	  the	  missiles	  represented	   a	   ‘dangerous	   adventure.’	   The	  message	   had	   reached	   the	   State	  Department.127	  In	   the	   immediate	  aftermath	  of	   the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs,	  Khrushchev	  had	   written	   an	   irate	   letter	   to	   Kennedy	   in	   which	   he	   accused	   the	   US	   of	  aggression.	  After	  Kennedy’s	  defiant	  reply,	  the	  Soviet	  Prime	  Minister	  wrote	  back,	   establishing	   an	   analogy	   between	   Cuba	   and	   Turkey.128 	  In	   Vienna,	  Khrushchev	  made	  the	  analogy	  explicit.	  He	  asked	  Kennedy	  how	  could	  a	  tiny	  island	  such	  as	  Cuba	  be	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  And	  added:	  ‘What	  about	  Turkey	  and	  Iran?...They	  have	  US	  bases	  and	  rockets.	  If	  the	  US	  believes	  that	  it	  is	  free	  to	  act	  then	  what	  should	  the	  USSR	  do?’129	  	  	  To	  what	  extent	  Khrushchev	  feared	  the	  presence	  of	  missiles	  in	  Turkey	  is	  still	  unknown.	   The	   Soviet	   Premier’s	   son	   admitted	   that	   his	   father	   was	   ‘less	  troubled	   by	   the	  military	   implications	   of	   the	   Jupiters,	   than	   by	   the	   political	  inequality	   they	   represented.’	   The	   uselessness	   of	   the	   weapon	   offended	  him.130	  What	   is	   certain	   is	   that	  with	   his	   inflamed	   rhetoric,	   with	   the	   public	  humiliation,	   and	   with	   the	   decision	   to	   deploy	   (the	   first	   battery	   became	  operative	  on	  the	  22nd	  of	  October	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  Missile	  Crisis),	  Kennedy	  discounted	   long-­‐term	   risks,	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   manage	   short-­‐term	   ones.	  Developments	  in	  Cuba	  equally	  seemed	  to	  promise	  confrontation.	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5.3.4.2	  Trade-­‐off	  4b:	  Operation	  Mongoose	  and	  the	  new	  risk-­‐free	  illusion	  	  Nine	   days	   after	   the	   Vienna	   summit,	   the	   Taylor	   Commission	   (including	  Robert	  Kennedy,	  Dulles	  and	  Gen.	  Maxwell	  Taylor)	  presented	   its	   report	  on	  the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs	  invasion.	  The	  report	  made	  two	  main	  points.	  First,	  it	  warned	  the	   President:	   ‘there	   can	   be	   no	   long-­‐term	   living	   with	   Castro	   as	   a	  neighbor.’131	  The	  second	  point	  correctly	  exposed	  the	  main	  contradictions	  in	  the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs	  plan.	  An	  operation	  as	  big	  as	  the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs	  could	  not	  have	  been	  ‘prepared	  and	  conducted	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  all	  U.S.	  support	  of	   it	  and	  connection	  with	  it	  could	  be	  plausibly	  disclaimed.’	  Plausible	  deniability	  had	  ceased	  to	  exist	  as	  early	  as	  November	  1960.	  ‘Once	  the	  need	  for	  the	  operation	  was	  established,	  its	  success	  should	  have	  had	  the	  primary	  consideration.’132	  The	   lesson	   was	   clear,	   and	   similar	   to	   the	   one	   Schlesinger	   had	   offered:	  reconciling	  the	  political	  and	  strategic	  risks	  of	  the	  operation	  was	  impossible;	  the	  President	  should	  have	  chosen	  which	  way	  to	  go.	  	  	  He	   did	   not.	   The	   Administration’s	   reaction	   to	   the	   report	   was	   paradoxical.	  Kennedy	   stripped	   the	   CIA	   of	   the	   oversight	   of	   Cuban	   operations,	   but	   he	  didn’t	  scrap	  the	  plans.	  The	  President	  brought	  changes	  to	  his	  Administration	  and	   put	   himself	   more	   strongly	   in	   charge	   of	   foreign	   policy,	   placing	   loyal	  advisers	  in	  key	  positions.	  Arleigh	  Burke,	  Chief	  of	  Naval	  Operation	  and	  critic	  of	   Kennedy’s	   management	   of	   the	   Bay	   of	   Pigs,	   retired	   in	   August	   1961.	  General	   Maxwell	   Taylor	   was	   called	   back	   to	   duty	   and	   given	   the	   post	   of	  military	  representative	  to	  the	  President.	  Taylor	  and	  Robert	  Kennedy	  were	  added	   to	   the	   Special	   Group	   to	   create	   the	   Special	   Group	   Augmented.	   CIA	  Director	   Allen	   Dulles	   was	   substituted	   by	   John	   McCone,	   a	   hard-­‐line	  Republican	   selected,	   in	   spite	   of	   doubts	   as	   to	   his	   suitability	   for	   the	   job,	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  131	  Memorandum	  No.	  4	  From	  the	  Cuba	  Study	  Group	  to	  President	  Kennedy,	  ‘Recommendations	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Study	  Group’,	  13	  June	  1961,	  Doc.	  234,	  
FRUS,	  Vol.	  X.	  132	  Memorandum	  No.	  3	  From	  the	  Cuba	  Study	  Group	  to	  President	  Kennedy,	  ‘Conclusions	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Study	  Group,’	  13	  June	  1961,	  Doc.	  233,	  FRUS,	  Vol.	  X.	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cover	   Kennedy’s	   right-­‐flank.133	  With	   these	   changes	   out	   of	   the	   way,	   the	  Administration	  decided	  to	  step	  up	  its	  operations	  against	  Cuba.	  	  	  During	   the	   summer	   of	   1961,	  military	   plans	   on	   Cuba	  were	   developed	   and	  refined,	   the	   possibility	   of	   including	   Cuban	   exiles	  within	   the	   US	   army	  was	  taken	  into	  account	  and	  psychological	  warfare	  operations	  were	  stepped	  up.	  There	  is	  convincing	  evidence	  that	  the	  US	  government	  might	  have	  been	  re-­‐considering	   the	   assassination	   of	   Fidel	   Castro.134	  As	   the	   Church	   Committee	  would	  later	  uncover,	  National	  Security	  Action	  memorandum	  100	  requested	  the	  State	  Department	  to	  prepare	  contingencies	  for	  the	  elimination	  of	  Castro,	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  to	  prepare	  an	  invasion	  in	  that	  event.135	  This	  evidence	  is	  baffling	  not	  only	  in	  moral	  terms,	  but	  also	  in	  practical	  ones.	  In	  the	  same	   period,	   most	   agencies	   of	   government	   were	   advising	   that	   the	  assassination	   of	   Castro	   would	   have	   had	   limited	   impact.	   The	   Pentagon	  concluded	   that	   the	   demise	   of	   Castro	   would	   not	   have	   freed	   Cuba	   from	  communist	   influence;	   even	   worse,	   it	   could	   have	   created	   a	   ‘martyrdom	  effect.’	  136	  A	   NIE	   reached	   similar	   conclusions	   in	   November.137	  Once	   again,	  the	  Administration	  went	  down	  a	  path	  that	  had	  little	  chance	  of	  success	  from	  the	   start.	   Everyone	   was	   ‘hysterical,’	   McNamara	   would	   recall.138	  Hysteria	  would	  soon	  reach	  a	  whole	  new	  level.	  	  	  At	  an	  NSC	  meeting	  on	  November	  3rd,	  the	  President	  authorised	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  programme	  designed	  to	  undermine	  Castro,	  codenamed	  Operation	  Mongoose.	   The	   plan	   coincided	   perfectly	   with	   Kennedy’s	   priorities.	   It	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  Barret	  and	  Holland,	  Blind,	  p.	  3	  and	  Seigenthaler,	  Phone	  interview	  with	  the	  author.	  134	  Freedman,	  Kennedy’s,	  p.	  151.	  135	  Church	  Committee,	  Alleged	  Assassination	  plots	  involving	  foreign	  leaders,	  1975,	  p.	  135	  [http://history-­‐matters.com/archive/contents/church/contents_church_reports_ir.htm]	  (accessed	  9	  August	  2013).	  136	  Memorandum	  for	  Mr.	  Park	  F.	  Wollan,	  ‘What	  would	  happen	  if	  Castro	  died?’	  6	  October	  1961,	  CMCC,	  DNSA.	  137	  CIA,	  ‘The	  situation	  and	  prospects	  in	  Cuba,’	  National	  Intelligence	  Estimate,	  28	  November	  1961,	  CMCC,	  DNSA.	  138	  Church	  Committee,	  Alleged,	  pp.	  140-­‐141.	  
	   148	  
represented	   a	   clandestine	   effort	   that	   promised	   big	   results	   with	   little	   US	  exposure.	   More	   specifically,	   like	   the	   landing	   force	   that	   could	   easily	   have	  turned	   into	   a	   guerrilla	   force,	   Mongoose	   was	   presented	   as	   virtually	   ‘risk-­‐free.’	  Robert	  Kennedy	  wrote,	  describing	  the	  program:	  	   My	  idea	   is	   to	  stir	   things	  up	  on	  island	  with	  espionage,	  sabotage,	  general	   disorder…Do	   not	   know	   if	   we	   will	   be	   successful	   in	  overthrowing	   Castro	   but	   we	   have	   nothing	   to	   lose	   in	   my	  estimate.139	  	  Richard	  Goodwin	   concurred:	   ‘the	   beauty	   of	   such	   an	   operation…is	   that	  we	  cannot	  lose,’	  he	  wrote	  to	  the	  President.140	  To	  be	  sure,	  there	  was	  no	  beauty	  in	  Mongoose	  and	  it	  was	  far	  from	  risk-­‐free.	  	  	  General	  Edward	  Lansdale,	  having	  earned	  his	   reputation	   in	   the	  Philippines	  and	  South	  East	  Asia,	  was	  called	  back	  to	  Washington	  to	  head	  Mongoose.	  The	  Kennedys	   had	   a	   sense	   of	   fascination	   with	   him,	   not	   different	   from	   their	  previous	   fascination	   with	   Bissell.	   Furthermore,	   Lansdale’s	   appointment	  could	  take	  the	  action	  out	  of	  the	  CIA’s	  hands	  after	  the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs	  debacle.	  141	  The	  extent	  of	  Operation	  Mongoose	   is	  hard	   to	  grasp.	  The	  plan	  consisted	  of	  six	  main	  phases.	  From	  Phase	  I,	  the	  start	  of	  the	  operations,	  in	  March	  1962,	  to	  Phase	  VI	   in	  October	  1962	  with	  the	   ‘touchdown	  play,’	   the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  regime.	   To	   this,	   Lansdale	   added	   32	   very	   specific	   tasks	   assigned	   to	   the	  various	  agencies	  of	  government.	  The	  State	  Department	  should	  have	  looked	  into	  the	  possibility	  of	   isolating	  Cuba	  within	  the	  hemisphere.	  The	  Pentagon	  should	  have	  continued	   the	  development	  of	   contingency	  plans	   for	   invasion	  and	  internal	  uprising.	  The	  CIA	  should	  have	  conducted	  sabotage	  operations	  and	  improved	  intelligence	  collection.	  	  	  The	  plan	   seemed	  well	   structured	  and,	   at	   face	  value,	   convincing.	  But	   there	  were	   several	   problems	   with	   it.	   The	   first	   problem	   was	   that	   most	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139	  Doc.	  270,	  Editorial	  Note,	  FRUS,	  Vol.	  X.	  140	  Richard	  Goodwin,	  Memorandum	  for	  the	  President,	  11	  November	  1961,	  
CMCC,	  DNSA.	  141	  Talbot,	  Brothers,	  p.	  97.	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people	   involved,	   from	   CIA	   Director	   John	   McCone142	  to	   the	   Cuban	   exiles	  actually	   disagreed	   with	   the	   project,	   and	   thought	   that	   success	   was	  unlikely.143	  Second,	  Lansdale	  soon	  lost	  control	  of	  his	  own	  creation.	  The	  CIA	  kept	  trying	  (and	  failing)	  in	  its	  sabotage	  efforts	  and	  assassination	  attempts,	  some	   including	   the	  Mafia.	   The	   Joint	   Chiefs	   kept	   on	   developing	  more	   and	  more	   aggressive	   military	   contingencies,	   and	   part	   of	   the	   Department	   of	  Defense,	   certainly	   spurred	   on	   by	   Lansdale,	   went	   on	   what	   can	   only	   be	  defined	  as	  a	  ‘covert	  action	  binge.’	  On	  the	  2nd	  of	  February,	  Brigadier	  General	  William	   Craig	   sent	   a	   memorandum	   to	   Lansdale	   with	   the	   title	   ‘Ideas	   in	  support	   of	   the	   project’.	   The	   ideas,	   aimed	   at	   harassing	   and	   discrediting	  Castro,	   had	   intriguing	   names	   such	   as	   ‘Operation	   “Phantom”’,	   ‘Operation	  “True	   Blue,”’	   ‘Operation	   “Good	   time,”’	   but	   demonstrated	   little	   beyond	   a	  fervid	   imagination.	   Lansdale	   himself	   suggested	   operation	   ‘Elimination	   by	  Illumination’	  according	  to	  which	  convincing	  Cubans	  of	  the	  second	  coming	  of	  Christ	  would	  have	  led	  to	  the	  ousting	  of	  Castro.	  	  	  The	  third	  problem	  with	  the	  whole	  Operation,	  the	  problem	  that	  had	  besieged	  the	  Kennedy	  Administration	  from	  the	  start	  when	  it	  came	  to	  Cuba,	  was	  the	  contradiction	   between	   political	   risks	   and	   strategic	   risks.	   First,	   as	   Sam	  Halpern	   would	   later	   argue	   there	   was	   a	   ‘basic	   contradiction’	   in	   the	  Administration’s	  policy:	  	   Things	  were	  supposed	   to	  be	  quiet.	  Not	  a	   lot	  of	  publicity,	   just	  a	  lot	  of	  damage	  inflicted	  on	  the	  Cuban	  regime.	  However	  –	  and	  this	  is	  the	  contradiction	  –	  they	  also	  wanted	  ‘boom	  and	  bang.’	  	  	  Robert	  Kennedy	  would	  repeatedly	  accuse	   the	  CIA	  and	  others	  of	  not	  doing	  enough	   about	   Cuba.	   And	   yet,	   as	   soon	   as	   some	   efforts	   succeeded	   and,	  inevitably,	  made	  the	  news,	  Robert	  Kennedy	  savagely	  attacked	  CIA	  officials	  for	  embarrassing	  the	  Administration.144	  The	  CIA	  was	  soon	  resentful	  of	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  John	  McCone,	  ‘Memorandum	  for	  the	  record,’	  12	  January	  1961,	  Doc.	  287,	  
FRUS,	  Vol.	  X.	  143	  Robert	  A.	  Hurwitch,	  Memorandum	  of	  Conversation,	  Doc.	  308,	  FRUS	  Vol.	  X.	  144	  Blight	  and	  Kornbluh,	  Politics,	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  114.	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double-­‐track	   approach. 145 	  Second,	   the	   plan	   was	   geared	   more	   towards	  political	  needs	   than	   strategic	   realities.	   Lansdale,	   always	  able	   in	   telling	   the	  Kennedys	   what	   they	   wanted	   to	   hear,146	  had	   assured	   the	   President	   that	  everything	  would	  have	  been	  over	  by	  October	  1962.	  As	  Halpern	  concluded:	  ‘You	   don’t	   have	   to	   be	   a	   magician	   or	   a	   brain	   surgeon	   to	   figure	   [the	  connection	   between]	   a	   big	   victory	   parade	   in	   Havana’	   and	   the	   November	  Congressional	   elections.	   On	   paper,	   the	   plan	   seemed	   perfect;	   it	   looked	  ‘marvellous’,	  except	  it	  had	  ‘no	  connection	  with	  reality.’147	  And,	  it	  should	  be	  added,	  it	  was	  fraught	  with	  risks,	  and	  once	  again	  no	  one	  told	  the	  President.	  	  
5.3.5	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk	  trade-­‐off	  5:	  Plans	  of	  invasion	  vs.	  Cold	  War	  sensitivity	  
and	  ‘crisis	  avoidance’	  	  In	  January,	  as	  Lansdale	  worked	  on	  his	  Cuban	  project,	  Kennedy	  had	  agreed	  to	  be	  interviewed	  by	  Alexei	  Adzhubei,	  Khrushchev’s	  son	  in	  law.	  Asked	  why	  the	   US	   government	   was	   so	   fixated	   with	   Cuba,	   Kennedy	   immediately	  stressed	   the	   political	   risks	   that	   the	   Cuban	   issue	   posed:	   ‘If	   I	   run	   for	   re-­‐election	   and	   the	   Cuban	   question	   remains	   as	   it	   is	   –	   Cuba	  will	   be	   the	  main	  problem	   of	   the	   campaign	   [and]	  we	  will	   have	   to	   do	   something.’	   He	   added	  that	   Cuba	  was	   as	   important	   for	   the	   US	   as	   Hungary	  was	   for	   the	   USSR.	   As	  Aleksandr	   Fursenko	   and	   Timothy	   Naftali	   suggest,	   the	   ‘Hungary	   analogy’	  created	  a	  shock	  in	  Moscow.	  Soviet	  authorities	  concluded	  that	  the	  US	  aimed	  at	   invasion.148	  Robert	   Kennedy	   was	   equally	   insensitive	   in	   a	   conversation	  with	   his	   Soviet	   contact,	   and	   (unknown	   to	   Kennedy)	   KGB	   agent,	   Georgi	  Bolshakov.	  He	  confessed	  that	  the	  President	  was	  under	  enormous	  pressure	  from	   the	   JCS	   and	   that	   ‘in	   extremis’	   the	   US	  might	   have	   had	   to	   ‘probe’	   the	  Soviet	   forces.	   In	   Moscow,	   these	   words	   set-­‐off	   alarms	   of	   pre-­‐emptive	  strike.149	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In	   February	   and	   March	   scepticism	   about	   Mongoose	   had	   grown.	   The	  Administration,	   however,	   seemed	   to	   move	   towards	   a	   more	   bellicose	  position,	   relying	   openly	   on	   military	   might.	   General	   Lyman	   Lemnitzer,	  Chairman	   of	   the	   JCS,	   replied	   to	   McNamara’s	   enquiries	   suggesting	   that	   a	  military	   action	   on	   Cuba	   could	   be	   easily	   justified.	   A	   fake	   attack	   on	  Guantanamo,	  or	   a	   ‘remember	   the	  Maine’	   type	  of	   incident	   could	  be	   staged.	  The	  US	  could	  also	  have	  blamed	  a	  Cuban	  MiG	  for	  the	  downing	  of	  a	  US	  civilian	  airplane. 150 	  The	   military,	   Robert	   Kennedy	   was	   told,	   believed	   that	   the	  presence	   of	   Castro	   in	   the	   hemisphere	   was	   unacceptable.	   Without	  intervention	  the	  Soviets	  could	  have	  easily	  taken	  ‘a	  page’	  from	  the	  US	  book	  to	   establish	   a	   base	   in	   Cuba.	   The	   Pentagon	   and	   the	   JCS	   were	   drafting	  contingency	   plans	   for	   an	   invasion.	   To	   reduce	   the	   reaction	   time,	   the	   pre-­‐positioning	  of	  forces	  and	  material	  was	  already	  under	  way.	  In	  the	  briefing	  it	  was	  stressed	  that	  in	  case	  an	  internal	  revolt	  became	  impossible,	  the	  military	  should	   have	   supported	   a	   ‘Cover	   and	   Deception’	   plan,	   to	   convince	   Cuban	  authorities	   that	   an	   invasion	   was	   actually	   under	   way.	   This	   might	   have	  created	  a	  rushed	  reaction,	  freeing	  the	  US	  from	  the	  need	  to	  find	  a	  pretext	  for	  invasion.151	  	  	  The	   military	   plans	   were	   tested	   in	   a	   series	   of	   unprecedented	   military	  exercises	   in	   March-­‐April	   1962.	   Between	   the	   9th	   of	   April	   and	   the	   24th	   the	  Marines	  carried	  out	  Lantphibex	  I-­‐62,	  a	  massive	  amphibious	  landing	  against	  the	  Island	  of	  Vieques,	  Puerto	  Rico.	  From	  the	  19th	  of	  April	  to	  the	  11th	  of	  May,	  another	  exercise,	  Quick	  Kick,	  simulating	  an	  invasion	  of	  Cuba,	  involved	  more	  than	  40000	   troops,	   300	   aircraft	   and	   seventy-­‐nine	   ships.152	  In	   the	   summer	  two	  others	  would	  be	  carried	  out	  Jupiter	  Springs,	  the	  airborne	  component	  of	  the	   invasion	  of	   Cuba,	   and	  Swift	  Strike	   II,	   the	   largest	   peace-­‐time	  war	   game	  ever.153	  As	  McNamara	  would	  admit	  twenty-­‐five	  years	  later,	  no	  one	  thought,	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at	  the	  time,	  how	  the	  Cubans	  or	  the	  Soviets	  would	  perceive	  these	  exercises.	  Some	  were	  even	  eager	  for	  a	  confrontation.	  Gen.	  William	  Gray	  stated	  that:	  ‘If	  Soviet	   agents	   picked	   up	   rumblings	   of	   these	   [invasion]	   plans,	   perhaps	  they…would	  consider	  them	  evidence	  of	  intent.	  So	  much	  the	  better.’	  He	  was	  pleased	   that	   the	   plans	   focused	   communists’	   attention	   on	   saving	   Castro	  more	  than	  exporting	  revolution.154	  	  	  The	  Soviet	  decision	  to	  send	  the	  missiles	  to	  Cuba	  was	  taken	  precisely	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1962.	  Both	  Khrushchev	  and	  Castro	  by	   that	   time	   feared	  a	  second	  Bay	  of	  Pigs,	   this	   time	  backed	  by	   full	  US	   support.	   To	   reach	   this	   conclusion	  they	   could	   rely	   on	   several	   pieces	   of	   evidence.	   Castro	   later	   argued	   that	   6	  months	   before	   the	   crisis	   (that	   is,	   April	   1962),	   Cuba	   had	   received	   ‘an	  accumulation	   of	   information	   that	   a	   new	   invasion	  was	   being	   prepared.’155	  First,	  the	  Cubans	  were	  more	  than	  aware	  of	  the	  extent	  and	  purposes	  of	  the	  military	  exercises.	  Second,	  in	  spite	  of	  Castro’s	  repression,	  3000	  rebels	  were	  hiding	   in	   the	   Escambray	   Mountains	   (ten	   times	   more	   than	   Castro	   had	  needed	  for	  his	  revolution).	  Raul	  Castro	  feared	  a	  ‘second	  civil	  war.’156	  Third,	  the	  State	  Department	  had	  also	  been	  quite	  active	  against	  Cuba.	  The	  embargo	  strengthened	   by	   the	   Kennedy	   Administration	   had	   crippled	   the	   Cuban	  economy.	   Internationally,	  Cuba	  was	  more	   isolated	   then	  ever.	  At	   the	  Punta	  del	  Este	  meeting,	   the	  US	  had	  managed	   to	   convince	  other	   countries	  within	  the	   Organisation	   of	   American	   States	   to	   expel	   Cuba	   from	   the	   organisation	  and	   to	   declare	   ‘Marxism-­‐Leninism’	   incompatible	   with	   life	   in	   the	  Western	  Hemisphere.	  Work	  was	  being	  done	   to	  develop	  a	   legal	   cover	   for	  a	  possible	  invasion.157 	  When	   Cuba	   communicated	   this	   information	   to	   the	   Soviets,	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Moscow	   started	   to	   link	   this	   with	   Kennedy’s	   Hungary	   reference.	   Both	  Havana	  and	  Moscow	  concluded	  that	  an	   invasion	  was	  approaching.	  Several	  Soviet	  officials	  agreed	  that	  the	  defence	  of	  Cuba	  was	  the	  primary	  reason	  for	  the	  missiles’	  deployment	  and	  they	  were	  not	  afraid	  to	  admit	  that	  ‘irrational’	  and	  ‘emotional’	  reasons	  might	  have	  been	  behind	  the	  decision.158	  As	  Anastas	  Mikoyan	  confided	  to	  Dean	  Rusk:	  	   You	   Americans	   must	   understand	   what	   Cuba	   means	   to	   us	   old	  Bolsheviks.	  We	  have	  been	  waiting	  all	  our	   lives	   for	  a	  country	  to	  go	  Communist	  without	  the	  Red	  Army,	  and	  it	  happened	  in	  Cuba.	  It	  makes	  us	  feel	  like	  boys	  again.159	  	  The	   unacceptability	   of	   losing	   Cuba	   convinced	   Khrushchev	   to	   make	   an	  unprecedented	  Soviet	  move.	  Certainly,	  Khrushchev	  had	  in	  mind	  Berlin,	  the	  missiles	   in	   Turkey,	   the	   nuclear	   balance	   and,	   perhaps,	   his	   domestic	  difficulties,	   although	   the	   latter	   was	   completely	   discounted	   by	   Soviet	  officials.160 	  The	   Kennedy	   Administration’s	   policies	   on	   the	   Jupiters	   had	  already	  made	  deployment	  more	  likely.	  If	  we	  include	  -­‐	  and	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  do	   otherwise	   -­‐	   the	   defence	   of	   Cuba	   among	   the	   reasons	   behind	   the	  deployment,	   it	   becomes	   clear	   how	   ‘ugly’	   and	   ridden	  with	   long-­‐term	   risks	  Mongoose	  and	  Kennedy’s	  policies	  towards	  Cuba	  were.	  	  	  There	   is	   evidence,	   in	   fact,	   that	   the	   Kennedy	   Administration	   never	   really	  considered	   invading	   Cuba,	   that	   the	   Administration	  might	   have	   had	   plans,	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  Khrushchev	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  ‘romantic’	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  he	  interpreted	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  a	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  communism	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  Mikoyan	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  the	  nuclear	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but	  it	  had	  no	  intention	  to	  invade,161	  and	  that	  Mongoose	  was	  a	  ‘psychological	  salve	   for	   inaction.’162	  If	   we	   believe	   these	   statements,	   and	   the	   evidence	  seems	   to	   point	   in	   this	   direction,	   the	   Kennedy	   Administration	   kept	   on	  stretching	   its	   muscles	   on	   Cuba	   for	   domestic	   political	   reasons.	   These	  compelled	   Kennedy	   to	   appear	   strong	   with	   Cuba	   and	   to	   face	   down	  Khrushchev’s	   challenges.	   As	   some	   have	   argued:	   ‘Lansdale’s	   Cuba	   show,	  starbursts	   and	   all,	  was	   supposed	   to	   dazzle	   the	   American	   people,’	   and	   the	  critics	   of	   the	   Administration. 163 	  Kennedy,	   however,	   was	   aware	   of	   the	  strategic	   risks	  entailed	   in	   the	  decisive	  action	  called	   for	  by	   the	  military.	  As	  with	  the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs,	  the	  President	  settled	  for	  a	  useless	  and	  dangerousthird	  way:	  doing	  too	  little	  to	  solve	  the	  problem	  of	  Cuba,	  but	  just	  enough	  to	  alarm	  the	  Cubans	  and	  the	  Soviets.	  	  
5.3.6	   Risk	   vs.	   Risk	   trade-­‐off	   6:	   domestic	   pressures	   and	   international	  
embarrassment	  vs.	  ‘crisis	  readiness’	  
	  In	   the	   summer,	   evidence	   of	   a	   Soviet	  military	   build-­‐up	   in	   Cuba	   started	   to	  emerge.	   Officials	   met	   to	   review	   Mongoose	   after	   its	   Phase	   I.	   With	   even	  Lansdale	   growing	   sceptical	   of	   the	   possibility	   of	   inciting	   revolt	   without	   a	  clear	  US	  commitment,164	  this	  could	  have	  been	  a	  good	  moment	  to	  close	  the	  operation	   altogether.	   Once	   again,	   the	   Administration	   chose	   a	  middle	  way	  measure	  continuing	  a	  low-­‐level	  campaign	  against	  Cuba	  with	  the	   ‘modified’	  plan	   B.	   Attempts	   at	   killing	   Castro	   continued.165	  The	   approval	   of	   the	   new	  course	  seemed	  to	  boost	  all	  the	  rivalries	  that	  had	  been	  muted	  in	  the	  previous	  months.	  With	  increasing	  reports	  of	  Soviet	  shipments	  to	  Cuba,	  some	  started	  to	   think	   that	   it	   was	   time	   to	   get	   tough.	   In	   a	   Special	   Group	   Augmented	  meeting,	   two	   visions	   seemed	   to	   battle	   out.	   McNamara	   expressed	   ‘strong	  feelings’	  that	  every	  possible	  aggressive	  action	  should	  have	  been	  considered.	  The	  Attorney	  General	  also	  considered	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  staged	  attack	  on	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  and	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  On	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  Brink.	  162	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  and	  Welch,	  On	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  p.	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  163	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  Brothers,	  p.	  99.	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Guantanamo	  to	  give	  the	  US	  a	  pretext.	   In	  spite	  of	  these	  isolated	  explosions,	  McCone	  was	  frustrated	  at	  the	  Administration’s	  unwillingness	  to	  step-­‐up	  the	  game.	   In	   particular,	   he	   noted	   that	   both	   Bundy	   and	   the	   State	   Department	  were	  still	  pointing	  out	  the	  possible	  repercussions	  of	  any	  rushed	  decision	  on	  Cuba.	   Their	   main	   concern	   was	   the	   uncertainty	   as	   to	   a	   possible	   Soviet	  reaction;	   surprisingly	   they	   linked	  American	   actions	   in	   Cuba	  with	   possible	  Soviet	   actions	   elsewhere,	   but	   they	   failed	   to	   consider	   Soviet	   reactions	   in	  Cuba	  itself.	  166	  	  Within	   the	   Administration,	   uncertainty	   remained	   as	   to	   Soviet	   intentions	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	  missiles.	  Schlesinger	  wrote	  to	  Bundy	  that,	  contrary	  to	  previous	   evidence,	   it	   appeared	   that	   Raul	   Castro’s	   visit	   to	   Moscow	   in	   the	  spring	   had	   been	   extremely	   successful	   and	   that	   the	   USSR	   had	   decided	   to	  make	   a	   ‘major	   investment’	   in	   Cuba.	   A	   Current	   Intelligence	   Memorandum	  read	  that	  the	  speed	  and	  magnitude	  of	  the	  influx	  of	  personnel	  and	  material	  from	   a	   Bloc	   country	   to	   a	   non-­‐Bloc	   one	   was	   ‘unprecedented.’167	  The	   CIA	  warned	   that	   the	   Soviet	   stakes	   in	   Cuba	   had	   increased	   dramatically.	   Cuba	  could	  have	  provided	  the	  Soviets	  with	  a	  military	  base	  from	  which	  to	  threaten	  the	  US.	  Discussing	  the	  reasons	  behind	  this	  action,	  the	  CIA	  admitted	  that	  the	  Soviet’s	   ‘chief	  motive’	   for	   a	   possible	   deployment	  would	   be	   the	   defence	   of	  the	   island	   from	   a	   US	   invasion.168 	  All	   these	   documents,	   however,	   after	  identifying	   unprecedented	   movements	   of	   material,	   and	   a	   perfectly	   good	  rationale	  for	  the	  USSR	  to	  install	  missiles	  in	  Cuba,	  discounted	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  deployment.	  The	  USSR,	  it	  was	  argued,	  recognised	  that	  such	  a	  decision	  would	   have	   been	   far	   too	   provocative	   and	   such	   a	  move	   would	   have	   been	  unprecedented.	  Many	  had	  noticed	  that	  the	  Soviet	  commitment	  in	  itself	  was	  unprecedented	  but	  had	  failed	  to	  make	  the	  connection.	  The	  Administration	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  Operation,	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was	   also	   blindsided	   by	   personal	   contacts.	   Soviet	   Ambassador	   to	   the	   US	  Anatoly	   Dobrynin	   was	   unaware	   of	   the	   deployment.	   Even	   more	   crucial,	  Robert	   Kennedy	   had	   naively	   come	   to	   trust	   his	   backdoor	   contact	   Georgi	  Bolshakov.	   Bolshakov	   had	   already	   betrayed	   RFK’s	   trust	   when	   he	   had	  convinced	   the	   President’s	   brother	   –	   and	   hence	   the	   President	   -­‐	   of	   the	  possibility	   of	  mollifying	   Khrushchev	   before	   the	   Vienna	   Summit.	   Now,	   the	  KGB	   agent	   guaranteed	   that	   the	   USSR	   would	   not	   deploy	   offensive	  weapons. 169 	  Furthermore,	   the	   President	   had	   also	   relied	   on	   Premier	  Khrushchev’s	   promises	   that	   there	   would	   be	   no	   developments	   before	   the	  election.	  As	  Robert	  Kennedy	  would	  later	  confess	  to	  Dobrynin,	  the	  President	  had	   ‘staked	  his	  political	  career’	  on	  Soviet	  promises.170	  Only	  McCone	  would	  continue	   to	   repeat	   warnings	   of	   imminent	   Soviet	   missiles	   in	   Cuba	  throughout	  the	  summer	  and	  autumn,	  but	  his	  reports	  were	  dismissed	  as	  too	  politicised.	  	  	  In	   this	   context,	   rumours	   and	   the	   clear	   rivalries	   emerging	   within	   the	  Administration	   soon	   led	   to	   leaks171	  and	   to	   public	   pressure	   to	   do	  more	   on	  Cuba.	   Senator	   Homer	   Capehart	   (R-­‐Ind.)	   was	   the	   first	   to	   launch	   a	   public	  alarm	  on	  the	  Soviet	  build-­‐up	  and	  to	  accuse	  the	  President	  of	  inaction.172	  On	  the	   31st	   of	   August,	   Republican	   Senator	   from	   New	   York	   Kenneth	   Keating	  took	  the	   floor	  of	   the	  Senate	  openly	  to	  attack	  the	  Administration	  regarding	  the	   Soviet	   build-­‐up.	   ‘More	   ominous	   reports,’	   Keating	   stated,	   ‘suggest	   that	  the	  Soviets	  are	  constructing	  missile	  bases	  and	  sending	  over	  technicians	  to	  man	  them.’	  Other	  reports	  he	  argued,	  suggest	   that	   they	  might	  be	  aiming	  at	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  81.	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  pledges	  also	  represented	  a	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  Fursenko	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  Security	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  House,’	  27	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  (accessed	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  p.	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disturbing	  US	  operations	  at	  Cape	  Canaveral	  (a	  point	  made	  by	  McCone	  in	  a	  meeting	   a	   few	   days	   earlier).173	  Other	   Senators	   jumped	   on	   Keating’s	   train.	  Senator	   Goldwater,	   who	   in	   1962	   had	   written	   Why	   not	   Victory?	   a	   book	  calling	  for	  the	  elimination	  of	  communism	  from	  the	  Western	  hemisphere,174	  described	  Kennedy	  as	  weak,	  ‘a	  very	  poor	  poker	  player,’	  and	  a	  traitor	  to	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine.175	  Bob	  Dole,	  war	  hero	  and	   first-­‐time	  Republican	  Senator	  from	   Kansas,	   joined	   the	   chorus,	   charging	   that	   the	   Administration	   was	  letting	   the	   Soviets	   establish	   a	   base	   in	   Cuba. 176 	  The	   environment	   got	  extremely	   excited.	   Keating	   came	   to	   represent	   political,	   media	   and	   public	  frenzy	  towards	  the	  missiles.	  Several	  newspapers	  and	  magazines,	   including	  the	  Examiner,	   the	  New	  Republic,	   and	  Tribune	   attacked	   the	   Administration	  even	  invoking	  a	  Kennedy	  favourite,	  the	  Munich	  analogy.	  Leading	  journalists	  such	  as	  Arthur	  Krock	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  were	  equally	  critical	  telling	  the	  public	   that	   a	   crisis	   was	   approaching. 177 	  The	   Senate	   held	   emergency	  meetings	  of	   the	  Senate	  Foreign	  Relations	  and	  Armed	  Services	  committees,	  and	   passed	   a	   Resolution	   (86-­‐1)	   sanctioning	   the	   use	   of	   force	   to	   counter	  Cuban	  belligerence	  and	  subversion	  in	  the	  Western	  hemisphere.178	  	  	  The	  Kennedy	  Administration	  was	  cornered.179	  Secretly,	  the	  Administration	  was	   still	   relying	   on	   Mongoose,	   shifting	   its	   focus	   from	   concerns	   over	   the	  Soviet	  build-­‐up,	  to	  its	  long-­‐term	  goal	  of	  removing	  Castro.	  Under	  attack	  from	  several	  quarters,	  in	  early	  September	  Kennedy	  sent	  a	  request	  to	  Congress	  for	  a	   ‘stand-­‐by	  authority’	   to	   call	  up	  150,000	   reservists,	   and	  gave	   the	  order	   to	  start	   the	   pre-­‐positioning	   of	   material	   in	   Florida.	   These	   moves	   further	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increased	   the	   Soviet	   invasion	   scare,	   convincing	   Khrushchev	   to	   add	   the	  tactical	   nuclear	  missiles,	   Tatyanas,	   to	   the	   Soviet	   deliveries.180	  With	   public	  tension	   rising	   and	   with	   the	   military	   repeatedly	   tasked	   to	   develop	  contingency	  plans	   for	  a	  possible	   invasion	  of	  Cuba,	   the	  Administration	  had	  still	   time	   to	  mismanage	   the	   risks	   involved	   in	   the	   Cuba	   issue.	   The	   choices	  made	   gave,	   once	   again,	   precedence	   to	   short-­‐term	   and	   domestic	   political	  risks,	  and	  to	  US	  appearances,	  but	  considerably	  affected	  the	  ability	  to	  detect	  the	   missiles,	   and	   the	   President’s	   freedom	   of	   choice	   once	   they	   were	  discovered.	  	  	  First,	  with	  Congressional	   elections	  approaching,	   the	  Republican	  Party	  had	  made	  clear	   that	  Cuba,	  which	  had	  always	  represented	  the	   ‘administration’s	  heaviest	  political	  cross,’	  would	  be	  the	  key	  issue.181	  On	  the	  4th	  of	  September,	  Robert	  Kennedy	  confessed	  to	  his	  brother	  his	  fears	  of	  future	  developments.	  In	   particular,	   he	   warned	   the	   President	   of	   the	   probability	   that	   something	  could	  go	  wrong	  in	  the	  future;	  of	  future	  risks.	  ‘I	  don’t	  think,’	  he	  argued,	  ‘that	  this	   is	   just	   a	   question	   about	  what	  we	   are	   going	   to	   do	   about	   this	   [now].	   I	  think	   it’s	   a	   question	   of	   Cuba	   in	   the	   future…eventually	   it’s	   very	   likely	   that	  they	  will	  establish	  a	  naval	  base	  for	  submarines,	  or	  that	  they’ll	  put	  surface-­‐to-­‐surface	  missiles	   in.’182	  Bundy	   and	   Rusk	   disagreed	  with	   such	   prediction	  suggesting	   that	   it	   was	   unlikely	   based	   on	   past	   Soviet	   behaviour.183	  The	  President	   focused	  on	  the	  short-­‐term	  risks	  posed	  by	  Cuba.	   In	  spite	  of	  clear	  warnings	   from	   McNamara	   that	   statements	   on	   the	   Soviet	   build-­‐up	   might	  have	  been	  used	  later	  to	  attack	  the	  President	  or	  to	  constrain	  his	  options,184	  Kennedy	   and	   other	   members	   of	   the	   Administration	   went	   on	   the	   record	  trying	   to	  stop	   the	   tide	  of	  criticisms.	  Kennedy	  replayed	  the	  1960	  campaign	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  180	  Michael	  Dobbs,	  One	  minute	  to	  midnight	  (London:	  Arrow	  Books,	  2009),	  p.	  59.	  181	  Sorensen,	  Kennedy,	  p.	  739.	  182	  Fursenko	  and	  Naftali,	  Khrushchev’s,	  p.	  453.	  183	  This	   assessment	  missed	  what	   at	   the	   time	  was	   an	   ‘unknown	   unknown.’	  The	  USSR	  had	  moved	  medium	   range	  missiles	   to	   East	   Germany	  during	   the	  Berlin	  crisis	  in	  the	  Spring	  of	  1959.	  See	  Zubok,	  A	  failed,	  p.	  144.	  184	  Ernest	  May	  and	  Philip	  Zelikow,	  The	  Kennedy	  tapes,	  (London:	  Norton	  and	  Company,	  2002),	  p.	  4.	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with	  strong	  statements	  on	  Cuba	  to	  dodge	  political	  risks.	  On	  the	  same	  day,	  he	  publicly	   affirmed	   that	   the	   Soviet	  weapons	   in	  Cuba	  were	  only	  defensive,	   if	  offensive	   weapons	   were	   to	   be	   discovered,	   the	   ‘gravest	   issues	   would	  arise.’185	  On	   the	   13th,	   he	   stated	   that	   the	   White	   House	   would	   have	   done	  anything	   to	  protect	  US	  security.	  Some	  have	  criticised	   these	  statements	   for	  being	   too	   vague	   and	   for	   failing	   in	   deterring	   Khrushchev. 186 	  The	   real	  problems	  would	  emerge	  in	  the	  longer-­‐term.	  A	  frustrated	  Kennedy	  admitted	  in	   the	   first	  ExComm	  meeting	   that	   those	   statements	  had	   trapped	  him.	   In	   a	  dangerous	  boomerang	  effect,	  the	  political	  risks	  that	  he	  had	  tried	  to	  fend-­‐off,	  had	  come	  back	  to	  haunt	  him:	  	   Last	  month	   I	   said	  we	  weren’t	   going	   to	   [allow	   it].	   Last	  month	   I	  should	  have	   said	   that	  we	  don't	   care.	  But	  when	  we	  said	  we	  are	  not	  going	  to,	  and	  then	  they	  go	  ahead	  and	  do	  it,	  and	  then	  we	  do	  nothing,	   then...our	   risks	   increase…They've	   got	   enough	   to	   blow	  us	   up	   anyway.	   I	   just	   think	   it's	   just	   a	   question	   of...a	   political	  struggle	  as	  much	  as	  military.187	  	  McNamara	   would	   concur.	   ‘This	   is	   a	   domestic	   political	   problem’,	   he	  admitted. 188 	  The	   missiles	   did	   not	   change	   the	   military	   balance,	   but	  represented	  a	  political	  move	  that	  the	  President	  had	  to	  reverse.189	  Kennedy	  recognised	   that	   the	  discovery	  of	   the	  missiles	  was	  a	   ‘horror,’	  embarrassing	  him	   before	   the	   elections.	   Furthermore,	   after	   the	   quarantine	   decision,	  Kennedy	   would	   return	   to	   the	   point,	   suggesting	   that	   he	   had	   no	   other	  alternative,	  suggesting	  that	  leaving	  the	  Soviet	  challenge	  unanswered	  –	  after	  he	   had	   pledge	   to	   take	   strong	   countermeasures	   -­‐	   would	   have	   meant	  impeachment.190	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  185	  President	  Kennedy’s	  statement	  on	  Cuba,	  4	  September	  1962,	  Editorial	  Note,	  Doc.	  411,	  FRUS,	  Vol.	  X.	  186	  Blight	  and	  Welch,	  On	  the	  Brink,	  p.	  301.	  187	  May	  and	  Zelikow,	  The	  Kennedy,	  p.	  62.	  188	  James	  A.	  Nathan,	  ‘The	  Heyday	  of	  the	  New	  Strategy:	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis	  and	  the	  Confirmation	  of	  Coercive	  diplomacy,’	  in	  Nathan,	  The	  Cuban	  
Missile,	  p.	  13.	  189	  Robert	  McNamara,	  Blundering	  into	  Disaster	  (London:	  Bloomsbury,	  1987),	  p.	  9.	  190	  National	  Secuirty	  Archives,	  ‘Audio	  clips,’	  27	  October	  1962.	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Second,	  the	  Administration	  had	  time,	  at	  the	  start	  of	  October,	  for	  some	  extra	  military	   exercises,	   one	   envisaged	   an	   amphibious	   landing	   in	   the	   Island	   of	  Vieques	   to	   oust	   a	   dictator	   called	  Ortsac	   (Castro	   in	   reverse).	   Furthermore,	  the	   US	   also	   started	   to	   pre-­‐position	   its	   Navy	   for	   a	   blockade	   of	   Cuba	   to	   be	  carried	  out	  in	  mid-­‐October.	  On	  the	  6th	  of	  October,	  forces	  were	  taken	  to	  the	  highest	   state	   of	   readiness	   and	   Commander	   in	   Chief	   Atlantic	   Command	  (CINCLANT)	   Admiral	   Dennison	   told	   McNamara	   that	   these	   preparations	  could	   have	   been	  masked	   telling	   the	  media	   that	  Phibriglex-­‐62	   (an	   exercise	  scheduled	   for	   mid-­‐October)	   was	   being	   anticipated. 191 	  These	   moves	  convinced	  some	  scholars	  that	  the	  US	  was	  ready	  to	  invade	  Cuba,	  regardless	  of	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  missiles.192	  More	  recent	  evidence	  has	  suggested	  that	  even	   in	   this	  case,	   the	  President	  was	  unwilling	   to	  start	  a	  war.193	  Still,	   these	  moves	  further	  convinced	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  of	  the	  imminence	  of	  the	  invasion,	  leading	  Soviet	  officials	  to	  step	  up	  the	  deliveries	  and	  the	  work	  on	  the	  missile	  bases.	  On	  the	  US	  part,	   the	  plans	  devised	  at	  this	  stage	  -­‐	  blockade,	  air	  strike	  and	   invasion	   -­‐	   provided	   the	   only	   alternatives	   seriously	   considered	   at	   the	  start	   of	   the	   crisis,	   put	   the	  military	   on	   a	  war	   footing,	   and	   constrained	   the	  President’s	  freedom	  of	  action.	  	  	  Finally,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  August,	  U-­‐2	  flights	  had	  spotted	  the	  deployment	  of	  SA-­‐2	  missiles	   in	   Cuba.	   This	   report	   increased	   the	   tension	   within	   the	  Administration	  with	  some,	  like	  McCone,	  pointing	  out	  that	  the	  SA-­‐2	  missiles	  were	   put	   there	   to	   protect	   something;	   that	   is	   nuclear	  missiles.	   Others	   had	  discounted	   the	   possibility.	   Still	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   SA-­‐2	   increased	   the	  scepticism	   towards	   U-­‐2	   overflights	   in	   Cuba.	   The	   scepticism	   had	   become	  dread	   after	   two	   U-­‐2	   incidents.	   On	   the	   30th	   of	   August,	   a	   U-­‐2	   had	   violated	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  191	  Robert	  Dennison,	  Cinclant	  Historical	  account	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Crisis,	  1963,	  
CMCC,	  DNSA,	  p.	  39.	  192	  Hershberg,	  ‘Before’.	  More	  recently	  Hershberg	  admitted	  that	  he	  might	  have	  been	  mistaken.	  CWHIP	  Bulletin,	  Vol.	  17/18.	  193	  James	  G.	  Hershberg,	  ‘More	  New	  Evidence	  on	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis:	  More	  documents	  from	  Russian	  Archives,’	  CWHIP	  Bulletin,	  Issue	  8/9	  Part.	  5,	  Winter	  1996,	  [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHPBulletin8-­‐9_p5.pdf]	  (accessed	  22	  September	  2013).	  
	   161	  
Soviet	   air	   space	   for	   9	   minutes,	   leading	   to	   Soviet	   protests.	   On	   the	   8th	   of	  September	   a	   U-­‐2	  manned	   by	   Chinese	  Nationalists	   had	   been	   downed	   over	  Mainland	  China.	  This	  incident	  had	  been	  a	  major	  ‘source	  of	  embarrassment’	  for	  the	  Administration.194	  The	  overflights	  posed	  strategic	  risks	  and	  political	  risks.	  Had	   another	  U-­‐2	   been	   downed	   over	   Cuba,	   this	  would	   have	   led	   to	   a	  major	   international	  uproar,	   it	   could	  have	   led	   to	   tension	  with	   the	  USSR	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  an	  election	  year,	  it	  could	  have	  constrained	  US	  overflights	  in	  Cuba	  and	  elsewhere,	  and	   it	  could	  have	   increased	  the	  domestic	  uproar	  to	   invade	  Cuba.	   Khrushchev	   had	   also	   complained	   in	   a	   private	   exchange	   with	   the	  President	   about	   the	   overflights	   and	   the	   ‘buzzing	   of	   the	   ships	   sailing	   in	  international	   waters.’ 195 	  Rusk	   and	   Bundy	   were	   ‘hypervigilant	   about	  protecting	   the	  President’	   especially	   since	   several	  military	   and	   intelligence	  officials	  had	  voiced	  their	  intention	  to	  force	  Kennedy	  to	  take	  action.196	  	  	  Still,	  stopping	  the	  overflights	  entailed	  the	  risk	  of	  delaying	  the	  discovery	  of	  potential	   missiles.	   Many	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   restrictions	  made	   no	   sense	  since	  the	  US	  was	  accused	  of	  all	  sorts	  of	  overflights	  anyway.197	  However,	   in	  line	   with	   one	   of	   the	   hypotheses	   of	   the	   project,	   between	   short-­‐term	  ‘tangibles’	  and	  longer-­‐terms	  risks,	  the	  Administration	  chose	  once	  again	  the	  former.	  Overcoming	   the	   opposition	  of	   the	  CIA,	  with	   full	   knowledge	  of	   the	  White	   House,	   Bundy	   and	   Rusk	   decided	   to	   limit	   the	   flights,	   to	   change	   the	  type	  of	  flight,	  and	  to	  modify	  the	  route,	  staying	  away	  from	  the	  SA-­‐2.	  The	  CIA,	  on	   its	   part,	   became	   more	   cautious	   in	   making	   requests.	   As	   Barrett	   and	  Holland	   have	   convincingly	   argued,	   this,	   coupled	   with	   the	   bad	   seasonal	  weather	   in	   Cuba,	   created	   the	   ‘photo	   gap.’198	  When	   convincing	   reports	   of	  missiles	   in	   Cuba	   accumulated,	   a	   flight	   was	   again	   delayed	   for	   reasons	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  194	  ABC	  Issues	  and	  Answers,	  ‘Interview	  with	  Paul	  Nitze,’	  9	  September	  1962,	  
CMCC,	  DNSA.	  195	  ‘Message	  From	  Chairman	  Khrushchev	  to	  President	  Kennedy,’	  Moscow,	  September	  28,	  1962,	  FRUS,	  Vol.	  VI,	  Doc.	  56.	  See	  also	  Dobrynin,	  In	  
Confidence,	  p.	  70.	  196	  Barrett	  and	  Holland,	  Blind,	  p.	  8.	  197	  Memorandum	  Prepared	  by	  Acting	  Director	  of	  Central	  Intelligence	  Carter	  Washington,	  August	  30,	  1962,	  Doc.	  397,	  FRUS,	  Vol.	  X.	  198	  Barrett	  and	  Holland,	  Blind,	  p.	  9.	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‘plausible	  deniability.’	  A	  pilot	  from	  the	  Pentagon	  was	  trained	  to	  fly	  the	  CIA’s	  U-­‐2	  plane	  to	  make	  a	  potential	  cover	  story	  more	  credible.199	  The	   flight	  was	  finally	   conducted	   on	   the	   14th	   of	   October,	   more	   than	   a	   month	   after	   the	  discovery	  of	  the	  SA-­‐2.	  On	  the	  16th	  the	  President	  was	  notified	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  missiles,	  starting	  the	  Missile	  Crisis,	  or	  at	  least	  the	  American	  part	  of	  it.	  	  
5.4	  CONCLUSION	  	  
Mr.	  Khrushchev	  said	  we	  will	  bury	  you	  
I	  don't	  subscribe	  to	  this	  point	  of	  view	  
It	  would	  be	  such	  an	  ignorant	  thing	  to	  do	  
If	  the	  Russians	  love	  their	  children	  too.200	  Sting,	  The	  Russians.	  	  In	   1971,	   John	   Kenneth	   Galbraith,	   US	   Ambassador	   to	   India	   during	   the	  Kennedy	  Administration,	  wrote	   an	   article	   in	  Foreign	  Policy	   describing	   the	  1960s	  as	  a	  bad	  decade.	  Discussing	  the	  Kennedy	  Presidency	  and	  the	  missile	  crisis	  he	  wrote:	  	   In	  the	  Cuban	  missile	  crisis	  President	  Kennedy	  had	  to	  balance	  the	  danger	  of	  blowing	  up	  the	  planet	  against	  the	  risk	  of	  political	  attack	  at	   home	   for	   appeasing	   the	   Communists.	   This	   was	   not	   an	  irresponsible	   choice:	   to	   ignore	   the	   domestic	   opposition	   was	   to	  risk	   losing	   initiative	  or	  office	   to	  men	  who	  wanted	  an	   even	  more	  dangerous	  policy…We	  were	  in	  luck,	  but	  success	  in	  a	   lottery	  is	  no	  argument	  for	  lotteries.201	  	  This	  chapter	  has	  tried	  to	  show,	  how	  the	  whole	  Kennedy	  policy	  against	  Cuba	  -­‐	  and	  not	  only	  the	  thirteen	  days	  of	  the	  missiles	  crisis	  -­‐	  was	  characterised	  by	  blunders,	  by	   contradictions	  and,	   above	  all,	   by	  an	   inability	   to	   reconcile	   the	  political	  risks	  that	  Cuba	  posed	  to	  the	  Administration,	  and	  the	  strategic	  risks	  for	  the	  US,	  and	  for	  the	  Cold	  War	  confrontation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  199	  Barrett	  and	  Holland,	  Blind,	  p.	  21.	  200	  Sting,	  ‘The	  Russians,’	  The	  Dream	  of	  the	  Blue	  Turtles,	  1985	  [http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/sting/russians.html]	  (accessed	  11	  August	  2013).	  201	  John	  Kenneth	  Galbraith,	  ‘The	  Plain	  Lessons	  of	  a	  bad	  decade,’	  Foreign	  
Policy,	  1	  January	  1971	  [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/the_plain_lessons_of_a_bad_decade]	  (accessed	  10	  October	  2013).	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In	   line	  with	  the	   first	  hypothesis	  of	   the	  project,	   this	  chapter	  has	  shown	  the	  prevailing	   uncertainty	   as	   to	   Soviet	   intentions	   in	   the	   late	   1950s.	  Furthermore,	   the	   chapter	   has	   also	   identified	   other	   dimensions	   of	  uncertainty.	  These	  included:	  the	  President’s	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  possibility	  of	  Soviet	  adventurism	  in	  the	  Western	  hemisphere,	  a	  high	  number	  of	  ‘unknown	  unknowns’	   in	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   crisis,	   and	   the	   uncertainty	   as	   to	   the	  locus	  and	  type	  of	  Soviet	  reactions	  to	  American	  decisions.	  Berlin,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  was	  one	  of	  Kennedy’s	  main	  concerns.	  Strengthening	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  first	   hypothesis,	   the	   chapter	   has	   also	   identified	   the	   tendency	   of	   decision-­‐makers	  to	  reason,	  and	  to	  present	  their	  arguments	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  could	  go	  wrong	  –	  that	  is	  of	  risk	  -­‐	  often	  relying	  on	  explicit	  or	  implicit	  odds.	  	  	  The	  discussion	  of	  the	  various	  decisions	  on	  Cuba	  has	  confirmed	  the	  second	  hypothesis:	  the	  minimalism	  of	  risk	  management,	  the	  presence	  of	  risk-­‐trade-­‐offs	   and	   the	   predominance	   of	   short-­‐term	   (often	   political)	   risks.	   The	  President	   recognised	   the	   unacceptable	   risks	   involved	   in	   solving	   once	   and	  for	   all	   the	   problem	   of	   Cuba.	   Still	   the	   obsession	  with	   the	   island	   remained.	  The	  pressure	  to	  ‘do	  something’	  led	  to	  a	  balancing	  act	  between	  the	  domestic	  political	   risks	   posed	   by	   Castro,	   and	   the	   strategic	   risks	   inherent	   in	   an	  escalation	   of	   the	   Cold	  War	   confrontation.	   The	   end	   result	   was	   a	   series	   of	  middle	   way	   measures.	   The	   chapter	   has	   discussed	   these	   measures	   as	   the	  result	  of	  difficult	  Presidential	   trade-­‐offs.	  The	  chapter	  has	  shown	  President	  Kennedy	  often	  bowing	  to	  domestic	  criticism,	  taking	  measures	  domestically	  appealing	   and	   allegedly	   ‘risk-­‐free’	   in	   the	   short-­‐term,	   but	   dangerous	   both	  politically	  and	  strategically	  in	  the	  longer	  one.	  	  	  Kennedy	  had,	  in	  a	  sense,	  cornered	  himself	  with	  his	  campaign	  statements	  on	  Cuba.	  Once	  he	  entered	  the	  White	  House,	  he	  had	  to	  confront	  the	  weight	  of	  his	  campaign	  promises.	  Political	  risks	  meant	  that	  he	  could	  not	  have	  ‘chickened	  out’	   from	   the	   Bay	   of	   Pigs,	   a	   plan	   approved	   by	   one	   of	   the	  most	   successful	  Generals	   and	  Presidents	   in	   history.	   Still,	   strategic	   risks	   imposed	   limits	   on	  American	  activism,	  making	  a	  full-­‐scale	  invasion	  too	  risky.	  Imposing	  a	  series	  of	  limits	  on	  the	  invasion	  and	  living	  the	  illusion	  of	  a	  ‘risk-­‐free’	  operation,	  he	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obtained	   the	  worst	  of	  both	  worlds.	  The	  US	  was	  correctly	   identified	  as	   the	  main	  actor	  behind	   the	   invasion,	   leading	   to	  world	   embarrassment.	  But	   the	  US	  had	  also	  failed	  in	  its	  endeavour,	   leaving	  the	  Administration	  humiliated,	  the	   Cuban	   exiles	   disillusioned,	   and	   the	   Soviets	   emboldened	   by	   a	   weak	  President.	   Kennedy’s	   performance	   at	   the	   Vienna	   summit	   confirmed	   the	  feeling.	   Whereas	   some	   lessons	   of	   the	   failure	   were	   learnt,	   the	   most	  important	  was	  not.	  The	  Administration	  proved	  unable	  to	  reconcile	  political	  risks	  and	  strategic	  risks.	  	  If	   Operation	   Mongoose	   and	   all	   the	   other	   policies	   of	   the	   Kennedy	  Administration	   aimed	   genuinely	   at	   overthrowing	   Castro	   or	   creating	   the	  context	   for	   an	   invasion,	   they	   clearly	   failed.	   If	   they	   were	   simply	   a	   ‘safety	  valve’	   to	   ease	   public	   and	   domestic	   pressure,	   they	   also	   failed.	   They	   failed	  domestically,	   since	   Cuba	   remained,	   from	   the	   end	   of	   1961	   onwards,	   the	  Administration’s	  Achilles’	  heel,	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  American	  disapproving	  of	   Kennedy’s	   policies.202 	  But	   more	   crucially,	   the	   policies	   failed	   at	   the	  international	   level.	   Sabotage,	   assassination	   attempts,	   military	   plans,	  military	   exercises	   and	   Kennedy’s	   bravado	   in	   various	   statements	   and	  interviews,	  convinced	  the	  Cubans	  and	  the	  Soviets	  that	  the	  US	  was	  ready	  for	  a	   confrontation	   and,	   more	   specifically,	   ready	   for	   invasion.	   Finally,	   as	   the	  Soviet	   build-­‐up	   mounted,	   there	   was	   time	   for	   more	   short-­‐term	  measures.	  The	   Administration	   postured	   strong	   with	   domestic	   critics.	   Many	   officials	  guaranteed	  that	  there	  were	  no	  offensive	  weapons	  in	  Cuba	  and	  that	  the	  US	  would	   take	   aggressive	   action	   if	   some	  were	   discovered,	   limiting	   American	  choices	   at	   the	   start	   of	   the	   crisis.	   In	   September	   and	   October,	   the	  Administration	   conducted	  military	   exercises	   that	   -­‐	   or	   so	   it	   seems	   -­‐	   were	  never	  meant	   to	   be	   turned	   into	   real	   action,	   but	   increased	   the	   pace	   of	   the	  confrontation.	  Finally,	  imprisoned	  by	  domestic	  pressure	  and	  by	  the	  risks	  of	  international	   embarrassment	   the	   Administration	   decided	   to	   reduce	   the	  overflight	   of	   Cuba,	   delaying	   the	   discovery	   of	   the	  missiles	   for	   at	   least	   one	  month.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  202	  Freedman,	  Kennedy’s,	  p.	  161.	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  Schlesinger,	  A	  Thousand,	  p.	  270.	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CHAPTER	  6:	  ‘WE	  ARE	  STICKING	  WITH	  THE	  SHAH:’	  THE	  CARTER	  
ADMINISTRATION	  AND	  IRAN,	  1977-­‐1979	  	  
6.1	  INTRODUCTION	  	   The	   Shah	  was	   surrounded	   by	   puffery	   and	   could	   not	   bear	   to	   be	  blamed,	   Carter	   was	   self-­‐effacing	   and	   quite	   ready	   to	   admit	   his	  mistakes…While	  the	  Shah	  looked	  formidable	  but	  was,	  at	  his	  core,	  insecure	  and	  indecisive,	  Jimmy	  Carter	  came	  off	  as	  soft	  but	  was…a	  “tough	  son	  of	  a	  bitch.”	  	  In	  the	  words	  of	  David	  Harris,	  Carter	  and	  the	  Shah	  ‘couldn’t	  have	  been	  much	  less	   alike’	   and	   yet,	   they	   ended	   up	   ‘wrapped	   around	   each	   other	   tumbling	  through	  political	   free-­‐fall.’1	  In	  any	  account	  of	  the	  Carter	  Administration,	  the	  ‘debilitating	  agony’2	  of	  the	  Iran	  hostage	  crisis	  tends	  to	  play	  a	  prominent	  role.	  The	   crisis	   features	   heavily	   in	   studies	   of	   the	   Carter	   Administration,3	  in	   the	  numerous	  memoirs	  of	  its	  former	  members,4	  and	  obviously	  in	  those	  of	  former	  US	  personnel	  in	  Iran.5	  It	  also	  represents	  the	  culmination	  of	  several	  historical	  studies	   of	   the	   relations	   between	   the	   US	   and	   Iran.6	  More	   recently,	   several	  authors	  have	  looked	  back	  at	  the	  hostage	  crisis	  as	  the	  first	  battle	  between	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  David	  Harris,	  The	  Crisis:	  the	  President,	  the	  Prophet	  and	  the	  Shah	  –	  1979	  and	  
the	  coming	  of	  militant	  Islam	  (New	  York:	  Little	  Brown,	  2004),	  p.	  52.	  2	  John	  Dumbrell,	  The	  Carter	  Presidency:	  a	  re-­‐evaluation	  (Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  p.	  7.	  3	  Betty	  Glad,	  An	  Outsider	  in	  the	  White	  House	  (London:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  and	  Scott	  Kaufman,	  Plans	  Unraveled	  (DeKalb:	  Northern	  Illinois	  University	  Press,	  2008).	  4	  Zbigniew	  Brzezinski,	  Power	  and	  Principle	  (London:	  Weidenfeld	  and	  Nicolson,	  1983),	  Cyrus	  Vance,	  Hard	  Choices	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  1983),	  Jimmy	  Carter,	  Keeping	  Faith	  (London:	  Bantam	  Books,	  1982),	  Jimmy	  Carter,	  White	  House	  Diary	  (New	  York:	  Farrar,	  Strauss	  and	  Giroux,	  2010),	  and	  Hamilton	  Jordan,	  Crisis:	  the	  last	  year	  of	  the	  Carter	  presidency	  (New	  York:	  Putnam’s	  Sons,	  1982).	  5	  William	  Sullivan,	  Mission	  to	  Iran	  (New	  York:	  Norton	  and	  Co.,	  1981),	  John	  D.	  Stempel,	  Inside	  the	  Iranian	  Revolution	  (Lexington:	  Clark	  Publishing,	  2009),	  and	  Robert	  E.	  Huyser	  (Gen.),	  Mission	  to	  Tehran	  (London:	  Andre	  Deutsch,	  1987).	  6	  James	  A.	  Bill,	  The	  Eagle	  and	  the	  Lion	  (London:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1988),	  and	  Barry	  Rubin,	  Paved	  with	  Good	  Intentions	  (New	  York:	  Penguin	  Books,	  1981),	  and	  Gary	  Sick,	  All	  Fall	  Down	  (New	  York:	  Penguin	  Books,	  1986).	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US	   and	   radical	   Islam. 7 	  In	   the	   winter	   of	   2012,	   the	   crisis	   also	   became	  ‘mainstream’	   with	   Ben	   Affleck’s	   movie	   Argo,	   telling	   the	   story	   of	   the	   CIA	  mission	  to	  rescue	  the	  few	  US	  Embassy	  officials	  that	  had	  managed	  to	  escape	  with	  help	  from	  the	  Canadian	  Embassy.8	  	  The	  main	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  not	  to	  explore	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  ‘battle’	  in	  Iran,	  but	  to	  understand	  how	  it	  came	  into	  existence.	  In	  line	  with	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  adopted	  in	  the	  project,	  the	  present	  analysis	  will	  try	  to	  understand	  how	  Iran	  travelled	  the	  whole	  continuum	  from	  being	  an	  absolute	  ‘non-­‐issue’	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   the	   incoming	   Carter	   Administration,	   to	   a	   major	  foreign	   policy	   concern	   and,	   eventually,	   to	   the	   centre	   of	   an	   unprecedented	  crisis.	  Before	  plunging	  deep	  into	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  decisions	  that	  signposted	  this	   evolution,	   however,	  Part	   two	   of	   the	   chapter	   will	   provide	   a	   historical	  background.	   The	   chapter	   will	   briefly	   present	   the	   situation	   of	   uncertainty	  characterising	  the	  US’	  position	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s.	  The	  chapter	  will	  then	  move	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  why	  Iran	  did	  not	  figure	  as	  a	  prominent	  issue	  in	  the	  initial	  plans	  of	  the	  Administration	  through	  a	  look	  at	  the	  Nixon-­‐Kissinger-­‐Ford	  era.	  The	  analysis	  will	   suggest	   that	   the	  Carter	  Administration	   found	   itself,	   at	   the	  same	   time,	   completely	   tied	   to	   the	   government	   of	   Iran	   and	   completely	  ignorant	  of	  what	  was	  going	  on	  inside	  the	  country.	  Uncertainty,	  for	  the	  Carter	  Administration	  meant	  not	  only	  a	  lack	  of	  information,	  but	  a	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  on	  how	   to	  obtain	   that	   information;	   a	  problem	  not	  only	  of	   lacking	   the	   right	  answers,	   but	   of	   not	   having	   the	   chance	   to	   ask	   the	   right	   questions.9	  Having	  established	   this	   background,	  Part	   three	   will	   proceed	  with	   a	   discussion	   of	  the	  main	  decisions	   taken	  by	  the	  Carter	  Administration	  on	   Iran.	  The	  core	  of	  the	  chapter	  will	  consist	  of	  the	  series	  of	  trade-­‐offs	  faced	  by	  President	  Carter	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  David	  Faber,	  Taken	  Hostage:	  America’s	  first	  encounter	  with	  radical	  Islam,	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  Mark	  Bowden,	  Guests	  of	  the	  
Ayatollah:	  the	  first	  battle	  in	  America’s	  war	  with	  radical	  Islam	  (New	  York:	  Atlantic	  Monthly,	  2006),	  and	  Harris:	  The	  Crisis.	  8	  Ben	  Affleck,	  Argo,	  2012	  [http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1024648/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1]	  (accessed	  12	  August	  2013).	  9	  Paul	  Pillar,	  ‘I	  served	  in	  the	  CIA	  for	  28	  years	  and	  I	  can	  tell	  you:	  America’s	  Screw-­‐ups	  come	  from	  bad	  leaders,	  not	  from	  lousy	  spies,’	  Foreign	  Policy,	  Vol.	  191	  (Jan/Feb	  2012),	  pp.	  51-­‐55.	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when	  dealing	  with	  Iran.	  The	  chapter	  will	   look	  at	  the	  Presidential	  campaign,	  at	  the	  decisions	  on	  arms	  transfers,	  at	  Carter’s	  commitment	  to	  human	  rights,	  at	  the	  policy	  towards	  the	  Iranian	  opposition	  and	  the	  Shah	  in	  the	  first	  months	  of	  the	  Revolution,	  at	  the	  choices	  made	  once	  the	  revolution	  went	  under	  way,	  and	  in	  its	  immediate	  aftermath,	  and	  finally,	  at	  the	  decision	  to	  admit	  the	  Shah	  in	  New	  York.	  As	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  final	  escalation	  and	  the	  final	  loss	  of	  control	  –	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  hostage	  taking	  –	  will	  represent	  not	  so	  much	  the	  outcome	   of	   a	   faithful	   decision,	   but	   the	   end	   of	   a	   slow	   process	   of	  mismanagement	  of	  risks,	  and	  of	  accumulation	  of	  ‘countervailing’	  risks.	  	  	  
6.2	   HISTORICAL	   BACKGROUND:	   NIXON,	   KISSINGER,	   AND	   FORD,	  
KNOWING	  THE	  SHAH,	  ‘UNKNOWING	  IRAN’	  
	  
6.2.1	  American	  uncertainty:	  Team	  B,	  the	  new	  Cold	  War,	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  
certainties	  
	  On	  the	  day	  of	  Jimmy	  Carter	  inauguration,	  the	  CIA	  achieved	  an	  unprecedented	  technological	   breakthrough.	   The	   satellite	   KH-­‐11	   started	   to	   send	   real	   time	  images	  directly,	   in	  digital	  to	  CIA’s	  computers.	  On	  paper,	  this	  meant	  that	  the	  President	  could	  track	  Soviet	  capabilities	  and	  developments	  around	  the	  world	  as	   they	   happened.10	  As	   for	   the	  Kennedy	  Administration,	   however,	   the	   Cold	  War	  of	   the	  1970s	  went	   far	  beyond	  a	  bean	  counting	  exercise.	  First,	  even	  on	  this	  ‘exercise’	  there	  was	  plenty	  of	  disagreement	  and	  right-­‐wing	  groups	  were	  pushing	  for	  a	  stronger	  stand	  against	  the	  USSR.	  In	  May	  1976,	  President	  Gerald	  Ford	   had	   famously	   given	   the	   chance	   to	   these	   groups	   to	   make	   their	   case	  through	  the	  CIA	  Team	  B	  exercise.	  A	  Team	  B	  of	  experts	  presented	  a	  report	  of	  both	   Soviet	   capabilities	   and	   intentions	   bashing	   the	   allegedly	   biased	  assumptions	   of	   CIA	   officials	   (Team	   A).	   Although	   in	   hindsight,	   Team	   B’s	  forecasts	  would	  prove	  massively	   inflated	   –	   if	   not	   false	   –	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1970s,	  they	  helped	  spreading	  doubts	  about	  détente	  and	  about	  Soviet	   intentions	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Christopher	  Andrew,	  For	  the	  President’s	  Eyes	  only	  (London:	  Harper	  and	  Collins,	  1996),	  pp.	  426-­‐427.	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Washington’s	  corridors.11	  Second,	  the	  Cold	  War	  confrontation	  had	  expanded	  to	  every	  area	  of	  the	  globe	  and	  its	  nature	  had	  changed.	  It	  was	  no	  longer	  only	  a	  matter	   of	   arms	   races,	   nor	   of	   risk	   of	   imposition	   of	   a	   ‘pax	   sovietica.’	   In	   US	  officials’	   eyes,	   the	   problem	   was	   that	   the	   increasingly	   disruptive	   nature	   of	  Soviet	   efforts	  made	   the	  maintenance	   of	   order,	   and	   the	  management	   of	   the	  various	   developments	   almost	   impossible.12	  To	   be	   sure,	   America’s	   tendency	  to	  see	  a	  hidden	  Soviet	  hand	  behind	  every	  world	  development	  only	  increased	  uncertainty	  and	  concern.	  Similarly,	   the	   tendency	  to	  view	  the	  Cold	  War	  as	  a	  pure	   zero	   sum	   game	  meant	   that	   every	   US	   loss,	   and	   every	   minimal	   Soviet	  victory	  was	  interpreted	  as	  a	  dangerous	  trend.	  Furthermore,	  additional	  global	  issues	   were	   starting	   to	   emerge,	   such	   as	   energy	   crisis,	   high	   technology	  exports,	   illegal	   drug	   trafficking,	   and	   terrorism.13	  The	   Cold	  War	  was	   ‘out	   of	  focus:	  there	  was	  no	  consensus	  on	  what	  it	  was	  about,	  or	  how	  important	  it	  was	  in	  US	  priorities,	  or	  how	  to	  gauge	  who	  was	  winning	  it.’	  As	  Nancy	  Mitchell	  put	  it,	   the	   Carter	   Administration	   would	   drown	   in	   these	   uncertainties.14	  Third,	  through	   the	   late	   1960s	   and	   early	   1970s,	   the	   US	   had	   also	   lost	   most	   of	   its	  domestic	  Cold	  War	  certainties.	  As	  John	  Ranelagh	  succinctly	  put	  it:	  	  	   With	   Vietnam	   came	   a	   demystification	   of	   public	   authority	   and	  with	  Watergate	  came	  a	  multiplication	  and	  intensification	  of	  the	  change	  in	  public	  attitudes	  towards	  politics	  and	  the	  politicians.15	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Campbell	  Craig	  and	  Fredrik	  Logevall,	  America’s	  Cold	  War	  (London:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  p.	  287.	  See	  also	  James	  Mann,	  The	  Rise	  of	  the	  
Vulcans	  (London:	  Penguin	  Books,	  2004),	  pp.	  73-­‐75;	  and	  Anne	  Hessing	  Cahn,	  ‘Team	  B:	  the	  trillion-­‐dollar	  experiment,’	  Bulletin	  of	  the	  Atomic	  Scientists,	  Vol.	  49,	  No.	  3	  (April	  1993),	  pp.	  22,	  24-­‐27	  [http://www.proudprimate.com/Placards/teamb-­‐cahn.htm]	  (accessed	  14	  August	  2013).	  12	  Memo,	  Brzezinski	  to	  President,	  ‘NSC	  Weekly	  Report	  #57,’	  5	  May	  1978,	  Collection	  33,	  Brzezinski	  Donated,	  Box	  41,	  Folder	  7,	  Jimmy	  Carter	  Library,	  Atlanta	  (JCL).	  13	  John	  Ranelagh,	  The	  Agency:	  the	  rise	  and	  decline	  of	  the	  CIA	  (London:	  Sceptre,	  1988),	  p.	  641.	  On	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  the	  1970s	  see	  also	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad,	  The	  Global	  Cold	  War	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  chapters	  7	  and	  8.	  14	  Nancy	  Mitchell,	  ‘The	  Cold	  War	  and	  Jimmy	  Carter,’	  in	  Melvyn	  P.	  Leffler	  and	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad	  (Eds.),	  Cambridge	  History	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Vol.	  III	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  p.	  68.	  15	  Ranelagh,	  The	  Agency,	  p.	  629.	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With	   the	   public	   growing	   skeptical	   of	   Presidential	   wisdom,	   Congress	   had	  moved	   to	   curtail	  what	   had	   been	   for	   decades	   the	   President’s	   personal	   turf:	  foreign	   policy.	   Through	   investigation	   in	   Committees,	   such	   as	   the	   1975	  Church	   Committee,	   Congress	   increasingly	   questioned	   the	   actions	   of	   the	  White	  House	  and	  of	  the	  CIA,	  uncovering,	  in	  the	  meantime,	  America’s	  darkest	  secrets. 16 	  Furthermore,	   Congress	   moved	   from	   the	   benign	   tendency	   of	  ‘looking	   over	   the	   President	   shoulder,’	   towards	   a	   ‘codeterminative	   role,’	  imposing	   limits	   on	   both	   CIA’s	   covert	   operations,17	  and	   on	   White	   House	  decisions,	   especially	   in	   the	   field	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   arms	   transfers.18	  Congress	   pushed	   the	   White	   House	   to	   accept	   the	   inclusion	   of	   a	   Bureau	   of	  Human	   Rights	   and	   Humanitarian	   Affairs	   within	   the	   State	   Department.19	  In	  1974	   the	   amendment	   of	   the	   Foreign	   Assistance	   Act	   restricted	   sales	   of	  weapons	  to	  countries	  that	  grossly	  violated	  human	  rights.	  In	  1975,	  the	  Harkin	  Amendment	  extended	  similar	  restrictions	  in	  the	  area	  of	  economic	  aid.20	  The	  exposure	  of	  American	  misdeeds,	  the	  retrenchment	  of	  the	  presidency	  and	  of	  the	   intelligence	   community,	   and	   the	   increased	   complexity	   of	   the	  international	  agenda	  had	  created	  a	  state	  of	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  America’s	  role	  in	   the	  world.	  The	  US	  government	  had	   cut	   its	  presence	   in	   several	   countries	  and	   it	   had	   come	   to	   rely	  more	  and	  more	  on	   local	   governments	   to	   foster	  US	  interests.	  This	  was	  particularly	  true	  in	  Iran.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Thomas	  M.	  Franck	  and	  Edward	  Weisband,	  Foreign	  Policy	  by	  Congress	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1979),	  p.	  123-­‐124.	  17	  Ranelagh,	  The	  Agency,	  chapter	  18.	  18	  Franck	  and	  Weisband,	  Foreign	  Policy,	  pp.	  83-­‐85.	  19	  Kaufman,	  Plans,	  p.	  29.	  20	  Clair	  Apodaca,	  ‘Human	  Rights	  Policy	  and	  Foreign	  Assistance,’	  Ritsumeikan	  
International	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  3	  (2005),	  pp.	  66-­‐67.	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6.2.2	  Knowing	  the	  Shah,	  unknowing	  Iranian	  
6.2.2.1	  Coups,	  cuts,	  and	  political	  intelligence	  	  	  After	   decades	   of	   good	   reputation,21	  the	   1953	   coup	   to	   overthrow	   Prime	  Minister	   Mohammad	   Mossadegh	   and	   re-­‐install	   the	   Shah	   on	   the	   Peacock	  throne	   compromised	   the	   Iranian	   image	  of	   the	  US.22	  In	   the	   early	  1960s,	   the	  Kennedy	   Administration	   had	   exercised	   timid	   pressure	   for	   reform	   on	   the	  Shah’s	  regime.23	  The	  monarch’s	  reply	  was	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘White	  Revolution,’	  a	  series	  of	  Western	   inspired	  reforms	   including	   land	  reform	  and	  voting	  rights	  that	   enraged	   traditional	   sectors	   of	   the	   Iranian	  population.24	  After	   an	   initial	  wave	  of	  uprising,	  the	  Shah	  seemed	  to	  have	  decisively	  cracked	  down	  on	  those	  opposing	  his	  programs,	  exiling	  Ayatollah	  Ruhollah	  Khomeini	  in	  the	  process.	  ‘The	  United	  States	  started	  to	  concern	  itself	  less	  with	  Iran’s	  domestic	  politics	  and	  more	  with	  its	  strength	  as	  an	  ally.’25	  More	  properly,	  since	  the	  late	  1960s,	  the	   strain	  put	  by	   the	  Vietnam	  War	  on	  US	  economic	   and	  military	   resources	  had	  also	  affected	  the	  US	  presence	   in	  Iran,	  causing	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  USAID	  missions,	   the	   reduction	   of	   the	   Peace	   Corps	   (eventually	   phased	   out	  completely	   by	   Ambassador	   Richard	   Helms	   in	   the	   early	   1970s),	   and	   the	  reduction	   of	   the	   gendarmerie	   mission	   advisers,	   spread	   throughout	   the	  country.	   As	   John	   Stempel	   noted,	   these	   were	   the	   only	   Americans	   trying	   to	  look	   outside	   Tehran.26	  Political	   officers	   assigned	   to	   the	   Tehran	   Embassy	  decreased	   from	  21	   in	  1963,	   to	  six	   from	  1973	  to	   the	  Revolution,	  preventing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Bill,	  The	  Eagle.	  22	  Scholars	  disagree	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  coup	  on	  America’s	  reputation.	  According	  to	  the	  historian	  James	  Bill,	  after	  the	  coup,	  American	  reputation	  was	  tarnished	  but	  not	  fatally	  compromised.	  Gary	  Sick	  and	  Stephen	  Kinzer	  consider	  the	  coup	  a	  fatal	  blow	  to	  US-­‐Iran	  relations.	  Paul	  Pillar	  recently	  concluded	  that	  it	  was	  an	  ‘attitude	  shaping’	  event.	  See	  Sick,	  All	  Fall,	  p.	  8,	  Stephen	  Kinzer,	  All	  the	  Shah’s	  Men	  (New	  York:	  John	  Wiley	  and	  Sons,	  2008),	  and	  Bill,	  The	  Eagle,	  p.	  97.	  Paul	  Pillar,	  ‘The	  Role	  of	  Villain:	  Iran	  and	  US	  Foreign	  Policy,’	  Political	  Science	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  128,	  No.	  3	  (Summer	  2013),	  p.	  223.	  23	  Stempel,	  Inside,	  p.	  70.	  24	  See	  Amin	  Saikal,	  The	  Rise	  and	  fall	  of	  the	  Shah:	  Iran	  from	  autocracy	  to	  
religious	  rule	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  and	  Michael	  Ledeen	  and	  William	  Lewis,	  Debacle:	  the	  American	  failure	  in	  Iran	  (New	  York:	  A.	  Knopf,	  1980).	  25	  Stempel,	  Inside,	  p.	  70.	  26	  Stempel,	  Inside,	  p.	  74.	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any	  type	  of	   in-­‐depth	  analysis.27	  Two	  other	  elements	  contributed	  to	  the	   lack	  of	  analysis.	  	  	  The	   first	   was	   the	   lack	   of	   interest	   in	   Iran	   among	   Foreign	   Service	   officials.	  ‘Generalists’	   with	   knowledge	   of	   a	   wider	   area	   had	   better	   career	   prospects	  than	  officers	  with	   in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  one	  country.	  Career	  prospects	  were	  also	   improved	   by	   ‘going	   along’	   with	   the	   Ambassador	   and	   with	   the	  conventional	  wisdom.28	  The	  second,	  crucial	  element	  was	   the	  biased	  nature	  of	   political	   intelligence	   community’s29	  activities	   in	   Iran.	   Since	   the	   casual	  discovery,	   in	   the	   1950s,	   of	   the	   possibility	   of	   spying	   on	   the	   Soviet	   Union’s	  missile	   bases	   from	   within	   the	   Iranian	   territory,	   the	   collection	   of	   this	  information	  had	  become	  America’s	  main	  concern.	  Bases	  along	   the	   Iranian-­‐Soviet	  border	  monitored	   ‘every	  blast	   the	  Soviets	  ever	  emitted.’30	  The	  Shah	  cooperated	  with	  the	  US,	  but	  this	  cooperation	  came	  at	  a	  high	  cost.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	   that	   several	   ‘countervailing	   risks’	  were	   dismissed.	   In	   the	   trade-­‐off,	  the	  United	  States	  diverted	  most	  of	  its	  intelligence	  resources	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  Soviet	  moves.	  As	  Helms	  recalled:	  	   When	   you	   come	   down	   to	   it…some	   decisions	   have	   to	   be	  made	  about	   your	   priorities…Some	   might	   say	   that	   you	   should	   be	  spending	  your	  time	  reporting	  fully	  on	  Iran,	  but	  Iran	  is	  not	  going	  to	  damage	  the	  national	  security	  interests	  of	  the	  United	  States	  by	  a	  nuclear	  attack…it	   is	   just	   a	  question	  of	  how	  much	  money	  and	  time	  you	  can	  spend	  on	  such	  a	  target	  with	  limited	  resources.31	  	  	  The	   composition	   of	   the	   intelligence	   community	   reflected	   these	   concerns:	  ‘There	   were	   usually	   ten	   CIA	   case	   officers	   in	   Iran	   at	   any	   given	   time,’	   the	  historian	   James	   Bill	   wrote,	   ‘of	   these,	   six	   or	   seven	   would	   be	   primarily	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Stempel,	  Inside,	  p.	  74.	  28	  Rubin,	  Paved,	  p.	  183.	  	  29	  Meaning	  both	  intelligence	  and	  Foreign	  Service	  personnel.	  	  30	  William	  Burr,	  ‘Interview	  with	  Armin	  Meyer,’	  Foundation	  for	  Iranian	  
Studies	  Oral	  History	  Archive	  (FISOHA),	  29	  March	  1985	  [http://fis-­‐iran.org/en/oralhistory/Meyer-­‐Armin],	  FISOHA	  interviews	  are	  available	  through	  previous	  registration	  with	  the	  Foundation,	  pp.	  44-­‐45.	  	  31	  William	  Burr,	  ‘Interview	  with	  Richard	  Helms,’	  FISOHA,	  10	  June	  1985	  [http://fis-­‐iran.org/en/oralhistory/Helms-­‐Richard],	  p.	  33.	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concerned	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  or	  China.’32	  Inevitably,	  the	  small	  amount	  of	  information	   collected	   on	   the	   domestic	   political	   situation	   in	   Iran	   focused	  mainly	   on	   communist	   threats	   to	   the	   regime.	   Some	   reports	   identified	   an	  ‘explosive	  potential’	   in	  Iran	  and	  suggested	  that	  many	  groups	  felt	   left	  out	  of	  the	  crash	  modernisation	  program,	  but	  concluded	  confirming	  the	  Shah’s	  tight	  grip	  on	  the	  throne.33	  	  	  Furthermore,	  due	   to	   the	   importance	  of	   the	   information	  on	   the	  Soviets	  and	  since	   the	   future	   of	   the	   listening	   stations	   depended	   on	   the	   Shah’s	  unpredictable	  behaviour,	  both	  the	  intelligence	  community	  and	  the	  Embassy	  became	  increasingly	  concerned	  with	  the	  ‘happiness’	  of	  the	  Shah.	  Officers	  in	  Iran	  limited	  their	  activities	  and	  contacts.	  This	  effort	  strengthened	  dynamics	  already	  in	  place.	  First,	  instead	  of	  adapting	  to	  Iran,	  Embassy	  and	  intelligence	  personnel	  transplanted	  mini-­‐American	  communities	  in	  the	  country,	  living	  in	  an	  ‘English	  speaking	  middle	  class	  American	  world,’	  inside	  Tehran.34	  Second,	  as	   Bill	   wrote,	   Americans	   relied	   heavily	   on	   staff	   and	   local	   contacts	   from	  religious	  minorities,	   Armenian	   Catholics	   in	   particular	   -­‐	   what	   Bill	   calls	   the	  ‘Armenian	   mafia.’35	  This	   prevented	   most	   Americans	   from	   understanding	  and	  getting	  in	  touch	  with	  the	  predominant	  Islamic	  culture.	  The	  few	  contacts	  made	  by	  Embassy	  officers	  were	  simply	  passed	  on	  to	  the	  incoming	  personnel	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Bill,	  The	  Eagle,	  pp.	  401-­‐402.	  33	  Memo,	  American	  Embassy	  Tehran	  (Richard	  Helms)	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  State,	  ‘Iran	  modernizing	  monarchy:	  an	  assessment,’	  8	  July	  1976,	  Documents	  
from	  the	  US	  Espionage	  Den	  (DED),	  Vol.	  7,	  [http://ia700409.us.archive.org/10/items/DocumentsFromTheU.s.EspionageDen/v07_text.pdf]	  (accessed	  13	  August	  2013),	  p.	  42.	  All	  volumes	  come	  from	  the	  website	  archive.org.	  Page	  numbers	  refer	  to	  those	  PDF	  files,	  if	  no	  page	  number	  is	  mentioned	  it	  means	  that	  the	  files	  do	  not	  show	  one.	  See	  also	  several	  reports	  by	  Richard	  Helms	  included	  in	  the	  recent	  Wikileaks,	  Public	  
Library	  of	  US	  Diplomacy	  –	  Kissinger	  Cables	  collection.	  Such	  as:	  Richard	  Helms	  to	  Department	  of	  State,	  ‘Iran	  Country	  Assessment,’	  6	  April	  1973	  [http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973TEHRAN02150_b.html]	  (accessed	  12	  August	  2013).	  34	  William	  Burr,	  ‘Interview	  with	  Michael	  Metrinko,’	  FISOHA,	  29	  August	  1988,	  [http://fis-­‐iran.org/en/oralhistory/Metrinko-­‐Michael],	  p.	  115.	  35	  Bill,	  The	  Eagle,	  p.	  390.	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reducing	   the	   possibility	   of	   extending	   the	   web	   of	   knowledge.	   36 	  The	  unprecedented	   level	   of	   politicisation	   of	   the	   Embassy	   had	   even	   more	  dramatic	  consequences.37	  The	  suppression	  of	  critical	  cables	  reached	  a	  whole	  new	   level	   during	   Helms’	   tenure.	   Helms	   later	   denied	   the	   charges,38	  but	  during	  his	  tenure	  he	  certainly	  felt	  the	  pressure.	  As	  he	  put	  it	  in	  a	  cable:	  	  	   Foreign	  contact	  with	  dissidents	  or	  identification	  with	  their	  point	  of	  view,	  is	  not	  only	  discouraged,	  but	  if	  pursued	  vigorously	  could	  probably	  result	  in	  one	  being	  PNG’ed.39	  	  Understanding	  the	  will	  of	  the	  Shah	  became	  the	  main	  aim	  of	  political	  officers;	  and	   this	   was	   considered	   a	   success.	   ‘Reporting	   from	   the	   mission	   on	   most	  topics,’	   a	  memo	   concluded	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1970s,	   ‘is	   very	   satisfactory.’	   Only	   a	  quick	  reference	  was	  made	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  such	  a	  reporting	  was	  increasingly	  dependent	   on	   SAVAK,	   the	   Shah’s	   secret	   service,	   and	   on	   the	   information	   it	  spoon-­‐fed	   to	   US	   officials.40	  Such	   environment	   prevented	   an	   unbiased	   in-­‐depth	  analysis.	  In	  Tehran,	  the	  ‘conventional	  wisdom’	  was	  a	  dogma	  never	  to	  be	  questioned.	  As	  an	  Embassy	  officer	  confirmed:	  	  	   At	   this	   Embassy,	   the	   ambassador	   is	   God.	   The	   deputy	   chief	   of	  mission	   is	   a	   demy	   god.	   The	   political	   counsellor	  who	  writes	   up	  my	  efficiency	  report	  is	  also	  possessed	  of	  divine	  attributes.	  Who	  am	  I	  to	  question	  their	  wisdom	  about	  Iran?41	  	  The	   dogma	   had	   become	   even	   more	   entrenched	   due	   to	   developments	   in	  Washington.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  See	  several	  documents	  in	  DED,	  Vol.	  17,	  [http://ia700409.us.archive.org/10/items/DocumentsFromTheU.s.EspionageDen/v17_text.pdf]	  (accessed	  13	  August	  2013).	  37	  Bill,	  The	  Eagle,	  p.	  396.	  	  38	  Burr,	  ‘Interview	  with	  Helms,’	  FISOHA,	  p.	  12.	  39	  That	  is,	  made	  ‘persona	  non	  grata.’	  Memo,	  Ambassador	  Helms	  to	  Ambassador	  Claude	  G.	  Ross,	  ‘Post	  memorandum	  for	  inspectors,’	  July	  10,	  1974,	  DED,	  Vol.	  8,	  [http://ia700409.us.archive.org/10/items/DocumentsFromTheU.s.EspionageDen/v08_text.pdf]	  (accessed	  29	  August	  2013),	  pp.	  71-­‐75.	  40	  Memorandum,	  David	  N.	  Blee	  to	  Ambassador	  Little,	  ‘Part	  1:	  Reporting	  Assessment,	  FOCUS:	  Iran,’	  4	  Nov.	  1976,	  DED,	  Vol.	  8,	  pp.	  137-­‐141	  41	  Bill,	  The	  Eagle,	  p.	  395.	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6.2.2.2	   The	   Nixon-­‐Kissinger-­‐Ford	   triumvirate:	   from	   ‘total	   commitment’	   to	  
secrets	  and	  lies	  	  Gary	  Sick	  suggested	  that	  the	  main	  turning	  point	  in	  US-­‐Iran	  relations	  was	  the	  meeting	  between	  Nixon,	  Kissinger	  and	  the	  Shah	  on	  the	  30th	  and	  31st	  of	  May	  1972.	  In	  this	  meeting	  the	  total	  commitment	  to	  the	  Shah	  took	  the	  shape	  of	  a	  carte	   blanche	  when	   it	   came	   to	   arms	   sales.42	  As	   Sick	  wrote,	   it	  was	   not	   the	  strengthening	   of	   the	   alliance	   that	   was	   wrong.	   With	   the	   US	   entangled	   in	  Vietnam,	   public	   opinion	   opposed	   to	   any	  military	   intervention,	   the	   British	  withdrawing	  from	  East	  of	  Suez,	  and	  with	  Persian	  oil	  becoming	  a	  key	  factor,	  there	  was	  an	  ‘inescapable	  logic’	  in	  asking	  Iran	  to	  play	  a	  new	  security	  role.43	  The	  relationship	  went	  sore	  when	  it	  came	  to	  arming	  the	  Shah	  for	  such	  role.	  First,	   in	   spite	  of	  widespread	  opposition	  within	   the	  Nixon	  Administration	   -­‐	  especially	  from	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  James	  Schlesinger	  -­‐	  the	  Shah	  was	  given	  complete	   freedom	   to	   purchase	   any	   American	   weapon	   system	   he	   wanted,	  short	   of	   nuclear	   ones.	   In	   a	   telegram	   to	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State	   Bill	   Rogers,	  Kissinger	   brushed	   aside	   every	   concern	   and	   warned	   against	   further	  interference.	  ‘Decisions	  on	  the	  acquisition	  of	  military	  equipment,’	  the	  memo	  read,	   ‘should	   be	   left	   primarily	   to	   the	   government	   of	   Iran.’44	  Supporters	   of	  the	  Shah	  were	  elated.45	  Others	  were	  less	  enthusiastic.	  The	  decision,	  George	  Ball	  would	  later	  write,	  equalled	  ‘giving	  the	  keys	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  liquor	  store	  to	  a	  confirmed	  alcoholic.’46	  	  	  The	   situation,	   in	   fact,	   had	   soon	   got	   out	   of	   control.	   Playing	   on	   the	   Shah’s	  greed,	   US	   companies	   convinced	   the	   Iranian	   government	   to	   buy	   weapons	  Iran	  did	  not	  need,	  putting	  unbearable	  strain	  on	  the	  economy.	  Furthermore,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Sick,	  Al	  Fall,	  p.	  15.	  See	  also	  Stephen	  McGlinchey,	  ‘Richard	  Nixon’s	  road	  to	  Tehran:	  the	  making	  of	  the	  US-­‐Iran	  arms	  agreement	  of	  May	  1972,’	  Diplomatic	  
History,	  Vol.	  37,	  No.	  4	  (2013),	  pp.	  841-­‐860.	  43	  Sick,	  All	  fall,	  p.	  15.	  44	  Memo,	  Kissinger	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Follow-­‐up	  on	  the	  President’s	  talk	  with	  the	  Shah	  of	  Iran,’	  15	  June	  1972,	  DED,	  Vol.	  7,	  p.	  42.	  45	  Letter,	  Jack	  C.	  Miklos	  to	  D.	  Beck	  (Minister-­‐Counselor	  Embassy	  Tehran),	  26	  July,	  1972,	  DED,	  Vol.	  8,	  p.	  45.	  46	  George	  Ball,	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  Past	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  (London:	  Norton	  and	  Company,	  1982),	  p.	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the	   military	   could	   not	   absorb	   the	   high	   number	   of	   weapons,	   and	   it	   was	  almost	  impossible	  to	  find	  Iranians	  who	  knew	  how	  to	  use	  them.47	  The	  Shah	  started	  to	  divert	  skilled	  labour	  from	  civilian	  uses	  to	  military	  projects.	  As	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  build-­‐up	  grew,	  the	  Shah	  hired	  a	  high	  number	  of	  foreign	  experts	  and	   workers,	   increasing	   the	   resentment	   of	   unemployed	   Iranians. 48	  Contracts	   with	   American	   companies	   also	   increased	   the	   presence	   of	  Americans	   (often	   Vietnam	   veterans),	   whose	   questionable	   behaviour	  appalled	  the	  Iranian	  population.	  49	  Military	  expenditures	  and	  contracts	  also	  added	  significantly	  to	  the	  country’s	  inflation	  and	  corruption.	  	  	  Furthermore,	   and	   this	  was	   the	   second	  crucial	  decision,	   the	   ‘alcoholic’	  was	  given	   free	   credit	   to	   buy	   weapons.	   In	   May	   1970,	   after	   a	   meeting	   of	   the	  CENTO	   foreign	  ministers	   in	  Washington,	  Nixon	  met	  privately	  with	   Iranian	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  US	  Aldeshir	  Zahedi.	  ‘Tell	  the	  Shah,’	  Nixon	  reportedly	  told	  the	  Ambassador,	  ‘you	  can	  push	  [us]	  as	  much	  as	  you	  want	  [on	  oil	  prices].’50	  Increased	  oil	   revenues	   in	   Iran,	  Nixon	   thought,	   could	  only	  mean	   increasing	  weapons	   purchase	   from	   the	   Shah	   and	   the	   strengthening	   of	   the	   link	   with	  Iran.	   The	   Shah	   banked	   on	   increased	   oil	   revenues.	   The	   pace	   of	   Iranian	  industrialisation	  skyrocketed,	  and	  with	  it	  social	  problems.	  A	  high	  number	  of	  peasants	   moved	   to	   the	   city	   hoping	   to	   share	   the	   fruits	   of	   modernisation,	  creating	   a	  massive	  demographic	   dislocation.	  Members	   of	   the	  middle	   class	  turned	  hostile,	  as	  they	  could	  not	  find	  jobs	  adequate	  to	  their	  skills,	  and	  had	  no	   access	   to	   political	   circles.	   The	   pace	   of	   modernisation	   also	   exposed	  weaknesses	   in	   the	   bureaucracy	   and	   in	   social	   service,	   and	   increased	   the	  divide	  between	   rich	   and	  poor.51	  In	   an	  effort	   to	   strengthen	   the	   regime,	   the	  Shah	   co-­‐opted	   or	   repressed	   members	   of	   the	   liberal	   and	   leftist-­‐moderate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Andrew	  S.	  Cooper,	  The	  Oil	  Kings	  (Oxford:	  One	  World	  Publications,	  2011),	  p.	  72.	  48	  Saikal,	  The	  rise,	  p.	  207.	  49	  Saikal,	  The	  rise,	  pp.	  185-­‐186.	  50	  Cooper,	  The	  Oil,	  p.	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opposition,	  making	  sure	   that	   real	  opposition	  would	  come	   from	  those	  who	  could	  appeal	  to	  the	  impoverished	  and	  disillusioned	  masses.52	  	  	  The	  Shah	  also	  indulged	  in	  pure	  demonstrations	  of	  megalomania,	  such	  as	  the	  celebration	   of	   the	   2500	   years	   of	   Persian	   monarchy	   in	   1971.	   At	   the	  international	   level,	   the	   event	   represented	   a	   PR	   masterpiece.	   The	   Shah	  invited	   ‘everybody	   who	   was	   anybody	   in	   the	   US,	   in	   media,	   politics	   and	  everything	  else’,	  playing	  with	  their	  vanity	  and	  making	  them	  oblivious	  to	  the	  political	   situation	   in	   Iran.53	  Iranians	  hated	   it	   for	   its	   staggering	   cost,	   for	   its	  Western	   nature,	   and	   for	   the	   dismissal	   of	   the	   Islamic	   heritage.54	  The	   1977	  international	   art	   festival	   in	   Shiraz,	   with	   shocking	   and	   highly	   offensive	  performance	   such	   as	   a	   staged	   rape,	   had	   similar	   effects.55 	  Resentment	  against	  the	  corruption	  brought	  by	  the	  West	  increased,	  as	  did	  attacks	  against	  Americans.	   Even	   more	   problematically,	   the	   oil	   bonanza	   did	   not	   last.	  According	  to	  Andrew	  Scott	  Cooper,	  during	  the	  Ford	  Administration,	  the	  US	  feeling	   the	   strain	  of	  high	  oil	  prices	   convinced	  Saudi	  Arabia	   to	  pump	  oil	   in	  the	  market.	  With	   the	   price	   of	   oil	   decreasing,	   the	   Shah,	  who	   had	   assumed	  increasing	  oil	   revenues	   in	  his	   ambitious	  budgets,	  was	   left	  with	   a	  dreadful	  economic	  balance.56	  	  What	  is	  key	  here	  is	  that	  due	  to	  the	  abysmal	  intelligence	  reporting	  from	  Iran,	  to	   the	   vested	   interests	   of	  many	   of	  Washington’s	   heavyweights,	   and	   to	   the	  secrecy	   of	   many	   of	   the	   Nixon-­‐Kissinger	   era	   deals,	   the	   incoming	   Carter	  Administration	  was	   completely	   unaware	  of	   developments	   inside	   Iran.	   The	  transition	  papers	  also	  presented	  a	  very	  biased	  picture	  of	  the	  Shah	  as	  a	  ruler	  loved	  by	  his	  people	  and	  supported	  by	  key	  sectors	  of	  society,	  with	  opposition	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	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  University	  Press,	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  p.	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  September	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  (New	  York:	  Simon	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coming	  only	   from	  small	   terrorist	  groups.	  The	  report	  omitted	  the	  problems	  of	  Iran’s	  economy	  and	  the	  country’s	  difficulty	  in	  absorbing	  US	  weapons.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  incoming	  administration	  was	  advised	  not	  to	  reduce	  these	  sales.	  	  	   A	   significant	   change	   in	   this	   policy	   of	   forthcomingness	  would…entail	   a	  definite	   risk	   that	   the	   Shah	  would	   counter	  with	  actions	   against	  our	  military	   and	   intelligence	  assets	   in	   Iran	  and	  very	  probably	  on	  our	  economic	  and	  commercial	  interests.57	  	  The	  Carter	  Administration	  started	  to	  operate	  in	  an	  ‘information	  vacuum.’58	  	  	  
6.3	  IRANIAN	  REVOLUTION	  AND	  AMERICAN	  RISK	  MANAGEMENT:	  FROM	  
EARLY	  COMMITMENTS	  TO	  THE	  FINAL	  TRAGEDY	  
	  During	  the	  1976	  Presidential	  campaign,	  Iran	  was	  barely	  mentioned.	  In	  the	  second	  Presidential	  debate	  on	  foreign	  policy,	  candidate	  Carter	  condemned	  the	   Ford	   Administration	   for	   turning	   the	   United	   States	   into	   the	   ‘arms	  merchant	  of	  the	  world.’	   ‘As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,’	  Carter	  added,	  ‘Iran	  is	  going	  to	  get	   80	   F-­‐14s	   before	   we	   even	   met	   our	   own	   Air	   Force	   orders…This	   is	   a	  ridiculous	   situation	   and	   it	   ought	   to	   be	   changed.’59	  Since	   then,	   Iran	   had	  disappeared.	   In	   the	   fall	   of	   1976,	   future	   Secretary	   of	   State,	   Cyrus	   Vance,	  provided	   Carter	   with	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   Administration’s	   prospective	  foreign	  policy	  goals.	  Iran	  was	  nowhere	  to	  be	  found.60	  Although	  Iran	  was	  not	  a	  main	  concern	  for	  the	  Presidential	  candidates,	  the	  Shah	  was	  following	  with	  attention	  the	  US	  elections.	  As	  early	  as	  May	  1976,	  the	  monarch	  was	  making	  enquiries	   about	   Carter	   who	   was	   campaigning	   on	   issues	   that	   were	  prominent	   in	  the	  US	  relations	  with	  Iran:	  weapons	  sales	  and	  human	  rights.	  ‘Ask	  the	  US	  Ambassador	   for	   information	  about	   this	  man	  Jimmy	  Carter,’	  he	  told	  Court	  Minister	  Asadollah	  Alam,	  ‘he	  seems	  to	  be	  making	  a	  clean	  sweep	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	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of	   the	  Democratic	   primaries.’61	  Alam	  grudgingly	  wrote	   in	   his	   diary	   in	   July	  1976	  that	  Carter	  would	  probably	  end	  up	  winning	  the	  Presidency.	  If	  that	  was	  going	   to	  be	   the	  case,	  he	  added,	   ‘who	  knows	  what	   sort	  of	   calamity	  he	  may	  unleash	  on	  the	  world.	  He	  is	  no	  more	  than	  an	  ignorant	  peasant	  boy.’	  ‘Carter’,	  he	  put	  it,	  ‘may	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  an	  even	  greater	  ass	  than	  Ford.’62	  	  	  As	   Carter	   entered	   the	  White	   House,	   he	   surrounded	   himself	   with	   officials	  from	   two	   main	   groups:	   ‘hard-­‐core’	   followers	   who	   had	   been	   loyal	   to	   him	  from	  the	  start,	  and	  were,	  like	  him,	  outsiders;	  and	  officials	  more	  used	  to	  life	  in	  Washington	  who	  had	  also	  demonstrated	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  loyalty	  to	  the	  new	   President.	   The	   first	   group	   -­‐	   sometimes	   defined	   as	   the	   ‘Georgian	  Mafia’63	  -­‐	  included	  Press	  Secretary	  Jody	  Powell,	  and	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  Hamilton	  Jordan.	  The	  second	  included:	  the	  tough	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  Zbigniew	  Brzezinski	   –	   one	   of	   the	   first	   to	   join	   Carter’s	   campaign	   –	   and	   Secretary	   of	  State	  Cyrus	  Vance.	  Other	  key	  members	  of	  the	  new	  Administration	  included	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Harold	  Brown,	  Vice	  President	  Walter	  Mondale,	  and	  the	  new	   Director	   of	   the	   Central	   Intelligence	   Agency,	   Stansfield	   Turner.	   As	   is	  well	   known,	   several	   rivalries	   developed	  within	   the	   Administration,	   above	  all	   the	   famous	  Vance-­‐Brzezinski	   split.64	  The	  point	   to	   be	  made	  here	   is	   that	  this	   selection	   of	   personnel	   clearly	   aimed	   at	   establishing	   a	   break	  with	   the	  previous	  Nixon-­‐Kissinger	   era.	   In	   terms	   of	   policies	   towards	   Iran,	   however,	  the	  break	  was	  not	  so	  clear.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Asadollah	  Alam,	  The	  Shah	  and	  I	  (London:	  New	  World,	  1991),	  p.	  500.	  62	  Alam,	  The	  Shah,	  p.	  484.	  63	  Dumbrell,	  The	  Carter,	  p.	  29.	  64	  For	  a	  more	  exhaustive	  discussion	  of	  Carter’s	  selection	  of	  personnel	  and	  of	  the	  various	  rivalries	  see	  David	  Rothkopf,	  Running	  the	  World	  (New	  York:	  Public	  Affairs,	  2005);	  and	  Dumbrell,	  The	  Carter.	  For	  great	  emphasis	  on	  the	  Vance/Brzezinski	  rivalry	  see	  Glad,	  An	  Outsider,	  and	  Kaufman,	  Plans.	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6.3.1	   Risk	   vs.	   risk	   trade-­‐off	   1:	   campaigning	   promises	   vs.	   the	   Shah’s	  
happiness	  
6.3.1.1	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk	  trade-­‐off	  1a:	  Arms	  transfers	  and	  AWACs	  vs.	  political	  risks,	  
Soviet	  hands,	  and	  regime	  change	  	  The	  Shah	  accepted	  Carter’s	  victory	  with	  equanimity.	  After	  all,	  he	  reasoned,	  ‘we’re	   spending	   so	   much	   money	   on	   US	   military	   and	   supply	   that	   no	   US	  government…could	   afford	   to	   deny	   us.’ 65 	  Immediately	   after	   Carter’s	  elections,	   a	   Congressional	   Delegation	   had	   visited	   Iran.	   The	   Delegation’s	  report	  stressed	  the	  crucial	  strategic	  importance	  of	  Iran	  and	  of	  the	  Strait	  of	  Hormuz,	   for	   the	   flow	   of	   oil	   to	   the	   Western	   World.	   The	   report	   had	   also	  looked	   at	   the	  human	   rights	   and	   social	   situation	   in	   the	   country	   suggesting	  that	  there	  were	  causes	  for	  both	   ‘optimism	  and	  dismay.’	  Only	  two	  Senators	  were	   highly	   critical	   of	   the	   situation	   and	   warned	   against	   measures	   in	  support	  of	   the	  Shah:	  Senator	  Thomas	  Eagleaton	   (D-­‐MO)	  and	  Senator	   John	  Culver	  (D-­‐IA).	  66	  A	  critical	  assessment	  of	  Iran	  came	  also	  from	  the	  NSC.	  In	  the	  first	   days	   in	   office,	   President	   Carter	   called	   for	   a	   review	   of	   US	   military	  posture	   in	   Presidential	   Review	   Memorandum	   10	   (PRM-­‐10).	   National	  Security	   Advisor	   Zbigniew	   Brzezinski	   asked	   William	   Odom,	   his	   military	  assistant,	  and	  Samuel	  Huntington,	  working	  in	  the	  NSC,	  to	  identify	  the	  likely	  areas	  of	  confrontation	  between	  the	  US	  and	  the	  USSR.	  Odom	  and	  Huntington	  concluded	   that	   the	   Persian	   Gulf	   was	   the	   most	   critical	   area	   and	   that	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  might	  also	  exploit	  domestic	  problems	  in	  Iran.67	  	  	  The	  first	  meeting	  between	  the	  Shah	  and	  the	  new	  administration,	  however,	  seemed	   to	   confirm	   the	   King’s	   impression.	   Secretary	   of	   State	   Cyrus	   Vance	  met	   the	   Shah	   in	   Tehran	   and	   emphasised	   the	   importance	   of	   US	   military	  relations	  with	  Iran.	  Carter	  had	  decided	  to	  go	  ahead	  with	  the	  pending	  sale	  of	  160	   F-­‐16s.	   Vance	   made	   reference	   to	   the	   need	   for	   the	   Administration	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Alam,	  The	  Shah,	  p.	  524	  66	  Ira	  Shapiro,	  The	  Last	  Great	  Senate	  (New	  York:	  Public	  Affairs,	  2012),	  pp.	  75-­‐76.	  67	  Christian	  Emery,	  US	  Foreign	  Policy	  and	  the	  Iranian	  Revolution	  (New	  York	  :	  Palgrave	  MacMillan,	  2013),	  pp.	  29-­‐30.	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reduce	   arms	   transfers	   and	   to	   the	   possibility	   that	   the	  US-­‐Iran	   relationship	  might	   create	   trouble	   for	   the	   Administration	   in	   Congress.	   The	   meeting,	  however,	  was	   cordial	   and	   the	   Shah	  was	   ‘unperturbed’	   by	   Vance’s	   hints.68	  Vance	  went	  back	   to	  Washington	  charmed	  by	   the	  Shah’s	  expertise.69	  A	   few	  days	   after	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State’s	   return,	   Carter	   published,	   in	   line	   with	  campaign	  promises,	  Presidential	  Directive	  13,	  a	  set	  of	  measures	   to	  reduce	  conventional	   arms	   transfers.	   The	   Directive	   defined	   arms	   transfers	   as	   an	  ‘exceptional	  foreign	  policy	  implement’	  to	  be	  used	  only	  to	  promote	  national	  security	  interests.	  The	  directive	  established	  a	  series	  of	  restrictions	  on	  arms	  transfers	   and,	   more	   importantly,	   raised	   the	   profile	   of	   the	   issue.	   Only	   the	  President	  directly	  could	  make	  and	  approve	  exceptions	  to	  the	  restrictions.70	  Such	  provision	  strongly	  elevated	  the	  political	  risks	  for	  the	  President.	  Being	  the	  one	   to	  decide	  on	   the	  hardest	   cases,	   the	  President	   ‘would	  be	  unable	   to	  dissociate	   himself	   from	   an	   unpopular	   or	   controversial	   decision.’ 71 	  A	  showdown	  among	  multiple	  political	  and	  strategic	  risks	  was	  just	  around	  the	  corner.	  	  	  In	  his	  May	  meeting,	  Vance	  had	  promised	  the	  Shah	  that	  the	  Administration	  would	   submit	   to	  Congress	   the	  proposal	   for	   the	   sale	  of	  AWACs	   (Airbourne	  Warning	  and	  Control	  Systems)	  to	  Iran.	  In	  July	  the	  proposal	  was	  sent	  to	  the	  Hill.	   Congress,	   however,	   was	   furious.	   One	   year	   earlier,	   Congress	   had	  exposed	  how	  Washington	  had	  lost	  control	  on	  the	  sales	  of	  weapons	  to	  Iran.72	  Carter	   himself	   had	   campaigned	   against	   this	   ‘bonanza’	   but	   now	   was	  submitting	  a	  request	  for	  a	  new	  massive	  sale.	  Several	  Senators	  sent	  letters	  to	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  Vance,	  Hard,	  p.	  318-­‐319.	  69	  Telegram,	  Vance	  to	  President	  Carter,	  ‘Evening	  Report	  to	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  President,’	  13	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  Carter,	  ‘Presidential	  Directive/	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  transfers	  policy,’	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  (accessed	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  Sick,	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  Fall,	  p.	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  Senate,	  ‘US	  Military	  sales	  to	  Iran,’	  Staff	  Report	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  Subcommittee	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Foreign	  Assistance	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  Foreign	  Relations,	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  July	  1976	  (Washington:	  US	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	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  p.	  viii.	  Reports	  (unless	  otherwise	  specified)	  are	  accessed	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  Hathi	  Trust	  website	  [http://www.hathitrust.org]	  (accessed	  24	  September	  2013).	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Carter	   complaining	   that	   the	   sale	   violated	   PD-­‐13. 73 	  The	   various	   risks	  involved	  in	  the	  sale	  were	  clearly	  spelled	  out	  in	  Senate	  hearings.	  Interpreting	  the	  general	  mood,	  Senator	  Culver	  argued:	  	  	   If	  we	  are	  to	  have	  a	  policy	  that	  approves	  sales	  only	  in	  exceptional	  cases…it	  makes	  little	  sense	  to	  me	  to	  turn	  around,	  before	  the	  ink	  is	   dry	   on	   that	   piece	   of	   paper,	   and	   exempt	   Iran	   from	   these	  guidelines.74	  	  More	   specifically,	   the	   sale	   of	   AWACs	   entailed	   strategic	   risks	   and	   political	  risks.	  On	  the	  political	  side,	   the	  sale	  exposed	  stark	  inconsistencies	  between	  Carter’s	  campaign	  pledges	  and	  his	  first	  measures	  in	  office.	  Senator	  Eagleton	  stated	   that	   the	   deal	   was	   born	   ‘in	   the	   atmosphere	   of	   secret	   deals	   of	   the	  previous	   Administration,’	   and	   violated	   the	   policy	   of	   restraint	   Carter	  promoted.75	  	  The	   media	   had	   largely	   maintained	   a	   Watergate-­‐era	   outlook	   towards	   the	  presidency.76	  According	  to	  some,	  the	  media	  had	  also	  been	  hostile	  to	  Carter	  from	   the	   start,	  due	   to	   the	   candidate’s	   rough	   style	   in	  dealing	  with	   them	  on	  the	   campaign	   trail.77	  When	   the	   first	   inconsistencies	   emerged,	   the	   media	  went	   on	   the	   attack.	   A	   story,	   by	  Watergate	   hero	   Bob	  Woodward,	   revealed	  that	   the	   AWACs	  were	   actually	   part	   of	   the	   secret	   dealings	   of	   the	   previous	  Administration,	  and,	  in	  particular,	  of	  the	  IBEX	  project,	  a	  secret	  radar	  system	  to	   be	   provided	   to	   Iran.	   The	   project	   had	   involved	   massive	   corruption	   of	  Iranian	  middlemen	  and	  the	  death	  of	  three	  Americans	  working	  for	  Rockwell,	  the	   company	   in	   charge	   of	   the	   project.78	  CIA	   director	   Stansfield	   Turner’s	  sudden	   ‘change	   of	   heart’	   worsened	   the	   Administration’s	   position.	   He	   first	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	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  1/20/77	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  1/20/81,	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  Senate,	  ‘Sale	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  July	  18,	  22,	  25,	  27	  and	  September	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  (Washington:	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  Government	  Printing	  Office,	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  p.	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  US	  Senate,	  ‘Sale	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  p.	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  Destler,	  Leslie	  Gelb,	  and	  Anthony	  Lake,	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  own	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  (New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  1984),	  p.	  154.	  	  77	  Brzezinski,	  Power,	  p.	  6.	  78	  Bob	  Woodward,	  ‘IBEX:	  Deadly	  symbol	  of	  US	  Arms	  sales	  problem,’	  The	  
Washington	  Post,	  2	  January	  2,	  1977.	  
	   183	  
declared,	   in	   a	   report	   for	   the	   General	   Accounting	   Office,	   that	   he	   had	  reservations	   about	   the	   deal.	   At	   the	   time	   of	   the	   hearings,	   however,	  ‘convinced’	  by	  other	  members	  of	  the	  Administration,	  he	  backed	  the	  sale.	  The	  
Washington	   Post	   and	   other	   ‘inconsistency	   hungry’	   media,79	  went	   on	   the	  attack	  suggesting	  that	  manoeuvres	  such	  as	  Turner’s	  one	  revived:	  	   Charges,	   often	   heard	   during	   the	   period	   Henry	   A.	   Kissinger	  presided	  over	   the	  national	   security	   intelligence	   system,	   that	   the	  product	   of	   the	   CIA	   was	   being	   modified	   to	   conform	   with	   the	  political	  decisions	  of	  the	  policymakers.80	  	  The	  Administration	  that	  had	  relied	  on	  a	  clear	  break	  with	  previous	  practices	  was	  politically	  exposed.	  	  	  The	  sale	  also	  entailed	  strategic	  risks.	  First,	  in	  the	  short-­‐term,	  the	  AWACs,	  a	  brand	  new	   technology,	   could	   end	  up	   in	   Soviet	   hands.	   Second,	   the	   system,	  introducing	  a	  new	  weapon	  in	  the	  region,	  could	  open	  possibilities	  of	  regional	  arms	   races	   (something	   that	   the	  PD-­‐13	  was	  meant	   to	  avoid).	  The	   sale	  also	  posed	   direct	   risks	   for	  US	   security.	   In	   the	   short-­‐term,	   the	   sale	   implied	   the	  continuous	  presence	  of	  American	  personnel	   in	  Iran.	  A	  deterioration	  of	   the	  situation	   could	   create	   a	   ‘hostage	   potential.’ 81 	  In	   the	   long-­‐term,	   the	  instability	  of	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  posed	  risks.	  Senator	  Culver	  warned:	  	   Iran	   is	   an	   autocratic	   government	   with	   rule	   by	   one	   man…the	  Iranian	  Government	  could	  change	  and	  we	  never	  know	  in	  exactly	  which	  direction	  this	  armada	  of	  military	  power	  will	  be	  pointed.82	  	  Senator	   and	   former	   Presidential	   candidate	   Hubert	   Humphrey	   (D-­‐MN)	  charged	   that	   the	  only	   justification	  provided	   for	   the	  sale	  had	  been	  a	  short-­‐term	  ‘political’	  one:	  ‘turning	  Iran	  down	  will	  seriously	  strain	  our	  relationship	  with	   the	   Shah.’	   Senator	   Eagleton	   concurred.	   In	   his	   opinion,	   the	   pressure	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Thomas	  L.	  Hughes,	  ‘Carter	  and	  the	  management	  of	  contradictions,’	  
Foreign	  Policy,	  No.	  31	  (Summer	  1978),	  pp.	  34-­‐55.	  80	  Laurence	  Stern,	  ‘CIA	  Chief	  alters	  Iran	  radar	  stand,’	  The	  Washington	  Post,	  18	  July	  1977.	  81	  US	  Senate,	  ‘Sale	  of	  AWACS,’	  p.	  21.	  82	  US	  Senate,	  ‘Sale	  of	  AWACS,’	  p.	  7.	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that	   such	  a	   justification	  exercised	  had	   taken	  precedence	   ‘over	   careful	   and	  sober	   risk	   analysis.’ 83 	  As	   we	   have	   seen,	   the	   deep	   uncertainty	   as	   to	  developments	   in	   Iran	   certainly	   played	   a	   role	   in	   the	   Administration’s	   risk	  analysis.	   Still,	   it	   seems	   clear	   that	   the	   Administration	   considered	   and	  dismissed	   countervailing	   risks.	   In	   the	   hearings,	   Alfred	  Atherton,	   Assistant	  Secretary	   for	  Near	  Eastern	  Affairs,	  acknowledged	  the	  trade-­‐off	   inherent	   in	  the	   sale.	   ‘One	   has	   to	  make	   judgments	   and	   calculate	   the	   risks,’	   he	   told	   the	  Senate,	  ‘in	  our	  judgment,	  the	  risks	  of	  this	  do	  not	  outweigh	  the	  advantages.’	  First,	   he	   suggested	   that	   even	   a	   possible	   successor	   regime	  would	   continue	  the	   current	   policies.	   Then,	   contradictorily,	   he	   added	   that	   Iran	  was	   a	   very	  stable	  regime	  with	  succession	  provided	  for.	  ‘In	  our	  judgment,’	  he	  continued,	  ‘one	  can	  assume	  with	  a	  fair	  amount	  of	  assurance,	  though	  obviously	  not	  100-­‐percent	  assurance,	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  worst-­‐case	  development	  is	  not	  going	  to	  occur.’84	  	  Atherton	  was	  not	  alone.	  No	  one	   in	   the	  Administration	  had	  considered	   the	  long-­‐term	  strategic	  risks,	  but	  even	  the	  short-­‐term	  political	  risks	  were	  soon	  dismissed.	  Vance	  warned	  Carter	  that	  the	  decision	  was	  a	  ‘political	  decision,’	  to	  be	  made	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  future	  relations	  with	  Congress.85	  But	  the	  Administration	  went	  on.	  After	  further	  debate,	  and	  a	  reduction	  in	  a	  number	  of	   AWACs,	   the	   sale	   was	   accepted.	   The	   Administration	   had	   identified	   its	  ‘target	  risk,’	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  weakened	  relationship	  with	  the	  Shah	  due	  to	  a	  reduction	  of	  US	   ‘forthcomingness,’	  and	   it	  had	  rejected	  or	  overlooked	  the	  ‘countervailing’	   risks.	  Even	  before	   the	   final	  decision,	  Carter	  had	  reassured	  the	  Shah:	  	  	   I	   have	   approved	   a	   new	   set	   of	   policy	   guidelines	   on	   the	   foreign	  sale	   of	   military	   equipment…however,	   I	   wish	   to	   give	   you	   my	  personal	   assurances	   that	   this	   policy	   will	   not	   disturb	   the	   close	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  US	  Senate,	  ‘Sale	  of	  AWACS,’	  p.	  37	  and	  p.	  4.	  84	  US	  Senate,	  ‘Sale	  of	  AWACS,’	  p.	  37	  and	  p.	  4.	  85	  Letter,	  Hamilton	  Jordan	  to	  Carter,	  undated,	  filed	  1	  Aug.	  1977,	  Box	  CO-­‐31,	  WHCF,	  Subject	  File,	  Countries,	  Folder	  –	  CO	  71	  Executive	  1/20/77-­‐8/31/77,	  JCL.	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security	   relationship	   which	   has	   developed	   between	   our	   two	  countries.86	  	  Later,	  while	  the	  debate	  on	  AWACS	  was	  raging,	  Carter	  made	  sure	  to	  remind	  the	   Shah	   how	   much	   he	   cherished	   Iran’s	   friendship,	   adding	   that	   he	   had	  approved	  for	  Iran	  sales	  of	  military	  equipment,	  which,	  in	  dollar	  volume,	  was	  ‘greater	  by	  half	  than	  that	  approved	  for	  any	  other	  nation	  in	  the	  world.’87	  The	  Shah	  was	   flattered.	   ‘I	  have	  no	  cause	   for	   complaint,’	   he	  would	   comment	   to	  Alam.88	  It	  could	  be	  argued,	  that	  such	  commitment	  was	  inconsequential.	  The	  delivery	  of	  the	  AWACs	  was	  supposed	  to	  start	  in	  1981	  but	  was	  prevented	  by	  the	  Revolution.89	  What	  is	  suggested	  here,	  however,	   is	  that	  faced	  with	  risks	  on	  both	  sides,	  the	  Administration	  sided	  with	  the	  Shah.	  This	  attitudes	  would	  be	  responsible	  for	  ‘wrapping’	  the	  destiny	  of	  Carter	  with	  that	  of	  the	  Shah:	  	   In	   Iranian	   eyes,	   it	  was	   the	   arms	   sales	   program	  more	   than	   any	  other	  aspect	  of	  the	  alliance	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Iran	  that	  compromised	  the	  Shah’s	  image	  with	  Iranians	  and	  led	  them	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  Shah	  was	  America’s	  ‘man.’90	  	  As	  Gary	  Sick,	  a	  member	  of	  Carter’s	  National	  Security	  Council	  staff,	  recently	  suggested,	  Carter	  ‘had	  no	  desire	  to	  damage	  the	  relations	  with	  Iran	  or	  to	  see	  anything	  go	  wrong,’	  and	  if	  this	  involved	  giving	  the	  Shah	  almost	  everything	  he	   wanted,	   so	   be	   it. 91 	  The	   same	   conclusion	   can	   be	   drawn	   from	   the	  Administration	  human	  rights	  policies	  towards	  Iran.	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  Telegram,	  Vance	  to	  Am.	  Emb.	  Tehran,	  ‘Message	  for	  the	  Shah	  from	  President	  Carter,’	  24	  May	  1977,	  Plains	  Files,	  Box	  23,	  Folder	  9.	  87	  Letter,	  Jimmy	  Carter	  to	  the	  Shah	  of	  Iran,	  15	  July,	  1977,	  Plains	  Files,	  Box	  23,	  Folder	  9,	  JCL.	  88	  Alam,	  The	  Shah,	  p.	  545.	  89	  Rubin,	  Paved,	  p.	  198	  90	  Rubin,	  Paved,	  p.	  260.	  91	  Gary	  Sick,	  Interview	  with	  the	  author,	  16	  July	  2012,	  New	  York.	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6.3.1.2	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk	  trade-­‐off	  1b:	  human	  rights,	  ‘pounding	  the	  table’	  vs.	  ‘seeing	  
sense’	  	  By	   the	   mid-­‐1970s,	   the	   Shah	   had	   completely	   abandoned	   his	   White	  Revolution,	   to	   fall	   back	   on	   pure	   repression.	   In	   1975,	   he	   abandoned	   the	  already	   farcical	   two-­‐party	   system	   and	   established	   a	   single	   Party,	   the	  Resurgence	  Party;	  membership	  was	   compulsory.92	  In	   1976,	   however,	  with	  violence	  increasing	  and	  with	  people	  looking	  for	  protection	  in	  the	  mosques,	  even	  the	  Shah	  realised	  the	  failure	  of	  his	  repressive	  strategy.	  He	  went	  back	  to	  stressing	  the	  achievements	  of	  the	  White	  Revolution,	  he	  gave	  the	  new	  single	  Party	   two	   ‘competing’	   wings,	   he	   substituted	   members	   of	   the	   elites	   with	  technocrats,	  he	  invited	  international	  organisations,	  such	  as	  the	  International	  Commission	  of	  Jurists,	  to	  Iran	  to	  advise	  on	  reforms,	  and	  relaxed	  controls	  on	  the	   media	   and	   on	   personal	   freedoms.93	  To	   this	   day	   it	   is	   unclear	   whether	  these	  measures	   built	   on	   international	   developments,	   on	   the	   increased	   US	  attention	  to	  human	  rights,	  or	  on	  the	  prospects	  of	  Carter’s	  election.	  	  	  As	  we	  have	   seen,	   ‘Congress	   lit	   the	  human	   rights	   candle	   long	  before	   it	  was	  seized	  by	  candidate	  Carter,’	  94	  still,	  the	  candidate’s	  concern	  was	  real.	  Human	  rights	   and	   equality	   appealed	   to	   Carter	   as	   a	   person,	   since	   his	   childhood	   in	  racially	  divided	  Plains.95	  In	   the	  campaign,	  as	  Arthur	  Schlesinger	   Jr.	   argued,	  ‘the	   new	   President,	   in	   a	   remarkable	   display	   of	   leadership,	   seized	   the	  standard	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  succeeded	  in	  presenting	  it	  to	  the	  world	  as	  if	  it	  had	  been	  American	  property	  all	  along,’96	  regardless	  of	  the	  dark	  times	  of	  the	  1970s.	   The	   first	   measures	   after	   Carter’s	   election	   seemed	   to	   confirm	   the	  trend.	  Even	  the	  hard-­‐line	  Brzezinski,	  acknowledged	  that	  human	  rights	  could	  play	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   increasing	   America’s	   ‘ideological	   impact,’	   infusing	  ‘greater	   historical	   optimism.’	   Human	   rights	   could	   have	   been	   the	   right	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  Bill,	  The	  Eagle,	  p.	  196.	  93	  Bill,	  The	  Eagle,	  p.	  222.	  94	  Franck	  and	  Weisband,	  Foreign	  Policy	  by	  Congress,	  p.	  98.	  95	  Jimmy	  Carter,	  An	  Hour	  before	  daylight	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  2001),	  p.	  77.	  96	  Arthur	  Schlesinger	  Jr.	  ‘Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  American	  Tradition,’	  Foreign	  
Affairs,	  Vol.	  57,	  No.	  3	  (1978),	  p.	  513.	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message	   to	   send	   out,	   especially	   to	   the	   Third	   World97.	   Carter’s	   Inaugural	  Address	   confirmed	   the	  point.	   ‘Our	   commitment	   to	   human	   rights,’	   the	   new	  President	  proclaimed,	  ‘must	  be	  absolute.’	  Through	  human	  rights	  the	  United	  States	   could	   find	   new	   consensus	   at	   home,	   and	   renewed	   respect	   abroad.98	  Once	   in	   office,	   Carter	   raised	   the	   profile	   of	   human	   rights.	   The	   Bureau	   of	  Humanitarian	   Intervention	   and	  Human	  Rights	  was	   given	   a	   new	   life	   under	  Patricia	   Derian,	   a	   combative	   human	   rights	   activist,	   deputy	   director	   of	  Carter’s	   1976	   Campaign.	   Furthermore,	   Warren	   Christopher,	   Deputy	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  became	  director	  of	  an	  interagency	  group	  with	  the	  task	  of	  including	  human	  rights	  considerations	  in	  lending	  and	  aid	  decisions.99	  	  When	  it	  came	  to	  Iran,	  however,	  the	  pattern	  was	  not	  different	  from	  the	  one	  chosen	  on	  arms	  transfers.	  In	  the	  first	  May	  meeting	  with	  the	  Shah,	  Vance	  had	  made	  reference	  to	  human	  rights.	  The	  Shah	  had	  not	  been	  impressed.	  ‘He	  had	  no	  objections	  to	  our	  human	  rights	  policy,’	  Vance	  reported,	  ‘as	  long	  as	  it	  was	  a	   question	   of	   general	   principle	   and	   not	   directed	   at	   him.’100	  No	   significant	  change	  emerged	  from	  the	  meeting.	  Still,	  the	  election	  of	  Carter,	  ‘the	  champion	  of	  human	  rights,’	  and	  Vance’s	  visit	  had	  emboldened	  the	  Iranian	  opposition.	  Some	  had	  even	  interpreted	  Vance’s	  visit	  as	  an	  aut-­‐aut	  to	  the	  Shah:	  liberalise	  or	   go.101	  More	   generally,	   opposition	   groups	   thought	   that	   President	   Carter	  would	  bring	  visible	  change	  to	  Iran,	  or	  that	  activists	  would	  have	  been	  able	  to	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  of	  Human	  Rights	  Policy	  (London:	  Hamilton	  Press	  1986).	  For	  a	  different	  interpretation	  suggesting	  that	  Carter	  did	  what	  he	  could	  in	  difficult	  circumstances	  see	  Robert	  Strong,	  Working	  in	  the	  world:	  Jimmy	  Carter	  and	  
the	  Making	  of	  American	  Foreign	  Policy	  (Baton	  Rouge:	  Louisiana	  State	  University	  Press,	  2000).	  100	  Vance,	  Hard,	  p.	  319.	  101	  Bill,	  The	  Eagle,	  p.	  228.	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operate	   under	   the	   US	   protective	   ‘umbrella.’ 102 	  New	   political	   groups	  emerged,	   including	   the	   revived	  Liberation	  Movement	  of	  Iran	  (LMI),	  headed	  by	  Mehdi	   Bazargan.	   Activists	  wrote	   letters	   complaining	   about	   the	   regime.	  Security	   forces	   allowed	   unprecedented	   gatherings	   and	   criticisms	   of	   the	  regime	  went	  unpunished.103	  In	  late	  October,	  religious	  ceremonies	  to	  mourn	  the	  death	  of	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini’s	  son	  became	  political	  occasions	  to	  criticise	  the	   regime.	   They	  were	   repressed	   only	  when	   they	   turned	   into	   full-­‐fledged	  demonstrations.104	  Change,	   however,	   was	   not	   on	   the	   cards.	   The	   Shah	   had	  welcomed	   Vance’s	   business-­‐like	   attitude.	   As	   Alam	   wrote:	   ‘Carter	   is	  beginning	  to	  see	  sense.	  He’s	  no	  longer	  preaching	  the	  same	  old	  nonsense	  he	  did	  during	  the	  election.’105	  	  Within	   the	   Administration,	   the	   risks	   inherent	   in	   the	   human	   rights	   policy	  were	   clear.	   In	   July	   1977,	  Warren	   Christopher	   had	   already	   identified	  what	  could	   go	   wrong	   in	   the	   push	   for	   human	   rights.	   Presidential	   Review	  Memorandum	  28,	  the	  key	  document	  on	  the	  issue,	  made	  clear	  that	  in	  pushing	  human	   rights	   concerns,	   the	   Administration	   should	   have	   acknowledged	  potential	   conflict	   with	   other	   interests,	   such	   as	   national	   security,	   and	   the	  need	   to	   avoid	   difficulties	   with	   the	   target	   government.	   The	   choices	   in	   this	  field	  could	  expose	  the	  Administration	  to	  both	  political	  and	  strategic	  risks:	  	   Our	   security	   assistance	   is	   a	  matter	   of	   great	   sensitivity	   both	   to	  the	   regime	   who	   receives	   it…and	   to	   the	   American	   public	   and	  Congress	  who	  watch	   it	   closely	  as	  an	   index	  of	  priority	  we	  place	  on	  human	  rights.106	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  (London:	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  Vol.	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  No.	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  (2003),	  p.	  304.	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  Alam,	  The	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  p.	  540.	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  Warren	  Christopher,	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  (accessed	  12	  August	  2013).	  
	   189	  
In	  this	  sense,	  ‘to	  be	  perceived	  as	  supporting	  a	  repressive	  regime,	  necessarily	  and	   substantially	   impeaches	   the	   credibility	   of	   our	   human	   rights	   policy.’107	  The	  Administration’s	  approach	  to	  the	  Shah,	  however,	  continued	  to	  be	  one-­‐sided.	  	  In	  November,	  Carter	  was	  ready	  to	  receive	  the	  Shah	  at	  the	  White	  House.	  The	  talking	  points	  prepared	  by	  Vance	   identified	  many	  problems	  of	   the	  US-­‐Iran	  relationship:	   human	   rights	   were	   not	   in	   the	   six	   most	   important.108	  More	  specifically,	  Vance	  suggested	  that	  the	  US	  should	  have	  shown	  appreciation	  of	  the	   recent	  moves	   towards	   liberalisation	  made	   by	   the	   Shah.	   Human	   rights	  groups	   had	   often	   been	   ‘uncritical’	   in	   their	   charges	   and	   some	   had	   ‘gravely	  exaggerated	   the	   situation.’ 109 	  When	   the	   Shah	   arrived	   in	   Washington,	  supporters	  of	  the	  regime	  and	  groups	  opposing	  it	  clashed	  outside	  the	  White	  House.	  Police	  forces	  used	  tear	  gas	  to	  separate	  them.	  The	  gas	  made	  it	  through	  to	   the	  White	  House	   lawn,	  where	  Carter	   and	   the	  Shah	  wiped	   their	   tears	   as	  they	  welcomed	  each	  other.	  When	  the	  first	  meeting	  occurred,	  human	  rights	  were	   not	   discussed.	   Some	   of	   the	   more	   activist	   members	   of	   the	  Administration	   questioned	   Carter’s	   commitment.	   In	   a	   hand-­‐written	   note	  delivered	   to	   Hamilton	   Jordan,	   Heidi	   Hanson	   from	   the	   State	   Department	  lamented:	  	  	   Rumor	  has	  it	  in	  my	  office…President	  Carter	  and	  the	  Shah	  talked	  about	  everything	  but	  Human	  rights…The	  bureaucrats	  here	  have	  to	  know…that	  human	  rights	  is	  still	  a	  part	  of	  our	  foreign	  policy	  –	  no	  matter	  who	  we’re	  talking	  with.110	  	  In	   the	  meeting	   the	   following	  day,	  Carter,	   admittedly,	   told	   the	  Shah	   that	  he	  was	   aware	   of	   opposition	   to	   his	   rule.	   ‘Rights	   are	   not	   always	   honoured	   in	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Iran,’	   the	   President	   stated,	   and	   this	   was	   damaging	   Iran’s	   reputation.	   The	  Shah	  did	  not	  budge.	  Asked	  if	  there	  was	  anything	  that	  he	  could	  do,	  he	  replied:	  ‘No.’	  The	  dissidents	  were	  fomented	  by	  communists	  and	  outside	  powers,	  and	  he	  needed	  to	  protect	  his	  country.111	  More	  generally,	  the	  impression	  was	  that	  the	  pressure	  had	  been	  mild.	  Asked	   if	   the	   theme	  had	  been	  discussed,	  Press	  Secretary	   Jody	   Powell	   replied	   that	   the	   US	   preferred	   to	   avoid	   specific	  judgments	   on	   countries. 112 	  Human	   rights	   were	   reviewed	   as	   a	   general	  concern	  of	  the	  President.113	  Carter	  ‘never	  really	  pounded	  the	  table.’114	  	  	  As	  Christopher	  had	  warned,	  this	  choice	  entailed	  domestic	  political	  risks	  and	  long-­‐term	   strategic	   risks.	   On	   the	   domestic	   front,	   both	   Congress	   and	   the	  media	   started	   to	   discuss	   openly	   the	   hypocrisy	   of	   the	   Administration.	   ‘To	  human	   rights	   partisans,’	   the	   Washington	   Post	   accused,	   ‘the	   reception	  accorded	   to	   the	   Shah	   already	   has	   been	   taken	   as	   a	   proof	   that	   the	  Administration	  is	  following	  a	  double	  standard.’115	  Brzezinski	  had	  identified	  the	  same	  problem.	  In	  Congress,	  he	  had	  warned:	  	  	   The	   feeling	   is	  growing	   that	  much	   is	  being	  done	  and	  said	  about	  communist	   countries,	   over	   whom	   we	   have	   limited	   leverage	  while	  almost	  nothing	  is	  being	  done	  in	  regard	  to	  countries	  which	  depend	  upon	  us.116	  	  Political	   pressures	   and	   inconsistencies	  were	   not	   the	   only	   risks	   dismissed.	  With	  its	  benevolent	  approach	  to	  the	  Shah,	  the	  Administration	  had	  created	  a	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deadly	  mixture	  of	  disillusionment	  and	  hatred	  in	  the	  Iranian	  opposition	  and	  population.	  After	  the	  November	  meeting,	   the	  Shah	  returned	  to	  Tehran	  and	  cracked	   down	   harshly	   on	   the	   opposition.	   Riot	   police	   and	   men	   in	   civilian	  clothes	   working	   for	   SAVAK	   arrested	   220	   students	   and	   beat	   hundreds.	  Apparently,	   the	   repression	   occurred	   for	   no	   other	   reason	   than	   the	   Shah’s	  anger	   at	   the	   demonstrations	   in	   Washington.117	  The	   opposition	   that	   had	  hoped	   to	   be	   protected	  by	  Carter’s	   human	   rights’	   umbrella,	   realised	   that	   it	  had	   been	   left	   naked	   in	   the	   confrontation	   with	   the	   Shah’s	   power.	   As	  moderate	  Ayatollah	  Hossein-­‐Ali	  Montazeri	  would	  later	  state:	  	   We	  didn’t	  expect	  Carter	  to	  defend	  the	  Shah…for	  he	  is	  a	  religious	  man	  who	  has	  raised	  the	  slogan	  of	  defending	  human	  rights.	  How	  can	  Carter,	  the	  devout	  Christian,	  defend	  the	  Shah?118	  	  Similarly,	   Bazargan,	   leader	   of	   the	   LMI	   and	   future	   Prime	   Minister	   in	   the	  Revolutionary	   government,	   was	   shocked.	   ‘Following	   the	   Shah’s	   visit	   to	  Washington,’	   he	   stated,	   ‘repression	   again	   seemed	   the	  order	  of	   the	  day.’119	  Few	  failed	  to	  notice	  the	  connection	  between	  Carter’s	  support	  and	  the	  Shah’s	  repression.	  	  	  In	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  opposition,	  Carter’s	  December	  visit	  to	  Iran	  was	  even	  more	  consequential.	  The	  opposition	  still	  hoped	  that	  the	  US	  President	  could	  rein	  in	  the	  Shah’s	  repressive	  policies.	  On	  the	  29th	  of	  December,	   Iranian	  opposition	  leaders	  had	  sent	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  UN	  Secretary	  General,	  Kurt	  Waldheim,	  with	  a	  copy	   to	   Carter,	   requesting	   help	   in	   promoting	  human	   rights.	   The	   appeal	   to	  the	   UN	   was	   publicised	   in	   Tehran	   just	   before	   Carter’s	   arrival,	   but	   the	  President	   ignored	   it.120	  Most	   of	   the	   29	   opposition	   leaders	  who	  had	   signed	  the	   letter	   were	   arrested.121	  Carter’s	   New	   Year’s	   Eve	   toast	   for	   the	   Shah	  famously	   confirmed	   the	   total	   commitment	   to	   the	   monarch,	   and	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  Jonathan	  C.	  Randal,	  ‘Shah	  moves	  to	  defuse	  Iranian	  dissent,’	  The	  
Washington	  Post,	  4	  March	  1978.	  118	  Rubin,	  Paved,	  p.	  197.	  119	  Kurzman,	  ‘The	  Qum,’	  p.	  304.	  120	  Stempel,	  Inside,	  pp.	  94-­‐95.	  	  121	  Richard	  Cottam,	  ‘Goodbye	  to	  America's	  Shah,’	  Foreign	  Policy,	  Vol.	  34	  (Spring	  1979),	  p.	  13.	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disregard	   for	   human	   rights.	   Carter	   described	   the	   issues	   discussed	   by	   the	  two	   leaders,	   and	   defined	   human	   rights	   as	   a	   cause	   ‘shared	   deeply	   by	   our	  people	   and	   by	   the	   leaders	   of	   our	   two	   nations.’	   He	   famously	   concluded	  describing	  Iran	  as	  an	  ‘island	  of	  stability’	  due	  to	  the	  enlightened	  leadership	  of	  the	   Shah;	   a	   leader	   loved	   by	   his	   people	   and	   the	   best	   host	   to	   spend	   the	  festivities	  with.122	  Some	  have	  attributed	  the	  flamboyant	  nature	  of	  the	  toast	  to	  Carter’s	  Southern	  penchant	   for	  exaggeration.123	  In	  Tehran,	  however,	   the	  consequences	   were	   massive.	   As	   with	   the	   November	   visit,	   the	   Shah	   was	  emboldened.	  The	  toast	  and	  Carter’s	  presence	  boasted	  his	  confidence.124	  He	  could	   do	   away	   with	   liberalisation	   and	   have	   a	   free	   hand	   in	   repressing	   of	  opposition.125	  Any	  hope	  of	   the	  opposition	  was	  dashed.	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini	  thundered	  from	  exile	  that	  Carter	  used	  the	  ‘logic	  of	  bandits’.	  He	  pretended	  to	  treat	   human	   rights	   as	   inalienable,	   but	   then	   refused	   to	   listen.	   Carter,	  according	  to	  Khomeini,	  could	  not	  stress	  human	  rights	  concerns	  in	  a	  country	  where	  the	  US	  had	  military	  bases.126	  	  	  
6.3.2	   Risk	   vs.	   Risk	   trade-­‐off	   2:	   the	   Shah	   and	   the	   military	   bases	   vs.	  
knowing	  Iran	  	  As	  we	   have	   seen,	   the	   Carter	  Administration	   entered	   office	  with	   very	   little	  knowledge	  of	  Iran;	  uncertainty	  predominated.	  On	  arms	  transfer,	  the	  short-­‐term	   goal	   of	   the	   Shah’s	   happiness	   had	   made	   the	   Administration	   dismiss	  short-­‐term	   and	   long-­‐term	   risks	   identified	   in	   Congress.	   With	   the	   same	  attitude,	   the	   Administration	   had	   watered	   down	   its	   human	   rights	  commitment	   to	   please	   the	   Shah	   and	  maintain	   the	   ‘special	   relationship.’	   In	  doing	  this,	  it	  had	  first	  raised	  expectations	  and	  then	  dashed	  the	  hopes	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  Jimmy	  Carter,	  ‘Tehran,	  Iran	  Toasts	  of	  the	  President	  and	  the	  Shah	  at	  a	  State	  Dinner,’	  31	  December	  1977,	  [http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7080]	  (accessed	  13	  August	  2013).	  123	  Steven	  Hochman,	  Interview	  with	  the	  Author,	  3	  August	  2011,	  Carter	  Center,	  Atlanta.	  See	  also	  Harris,	  The	  Crisis,	  pp.	  73-­‐75.	  124	  Sullivan,	  Mission,	  p.	  130.	  125	  Bill,	  The	  Eagle,	  p.	  236	  126	  Bill,	  The	  Eagle,	  p.	  234.	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opposition.	  As	  Vance	  would	  argue	   in	  his	  memoirs,	   the	  Administration	  had	  ‘decided	   early	   on’	   that	   it	   was	   US	   interest	   to	   support	   the	   Shah. 127	  Unquestioned	   support	   became	   the	   default	   position	   of	   the	   Administration	  and	   it	   shaped	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   Administration	   and	   the	   intelligence	  community	   initially	   looked	   to	   Iran.	   To	   be	   sure,	   by	   the	   time	   the	  Administration	   took	  office	  biases	   and	  problems	   in	  US	  political	   intelligence	  were	   so	   entrenched	   that	   they	   would	   have	   proved	   extremely	   resistant	   to	  change.	  	  	  Looking	   at	   the	   intelligence	   performance,	   it	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   how	   the	  Carter	  Administration	  had	  demonstrated	  a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  potential	  causes	  of	   intelligence	   failure.	   In	  a	  memo	  to	   the	  President,	  Henry	  Owen,	  US	  diplomat	  and	  Brookings’	  Director	  of	  Foreign	  Policy	  Studies,	  wrote	   that	   the	  key	   in	   avoiding	   failures	   was	   to	   look	   at	   more	   than	   one	   source	   of	  intelligence.128	  Similarly,	   in	  1977	  South	  Africa	  had	  gone	  extremely	  close	   to	  the	  development	  of	  nuclear	  capabilities.	  The	  US	  intelligence	  community	  had	  been	  blind-­‐sided.	   In	  a	  post-­‐mortem	  report,	  Brzezinski	  wrote	  to	  Carter	  that	  US	  intelligence	  had	  dismissed	  reports	  from	  other	  countries,	  that	  it	  had	  a	  too	  narrow	   focus,	   and	   that	   it	   did	   not	   take	   seriously	   threats	   ‘outside	   the	  USSR	  and	  China.’	  129	  The	  same	  problems	  had	  characterised	  and	  would	  continue	  to	  characterise	  the	  US	  approach	  to	  Iran.	  	  	  As	   to	   the	   ‘communist	   threat,’	   it	   is	   certainly	   true,	   as	   President	   Carter	   has	  recently	  suggested,	  that	  people	  looking	  back,	  today,	  at	  the	  Iranian	  crisis	  tend	  to	   forget	   that	   it	   took	   place	   in	   a	   Cold	   War	   setting,	   defined	   by	   Cold	   War	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  Vance,	  Hard,	  p.	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  Memo,	  Henry	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  President,	  ‘Intelligence	  Estimating,’	  15	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  1977,	  Folder	  –	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  Collection	  7,	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  Brzezinski	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  Subject	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  Human	  Rights	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  through	  Intel.	  Oversight	  Board:	  1/78-­‐12/80,	  JCL.	  129	  Memo,	  Brzezinski	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  President,	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  Security	  Council	  Weekly	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  24,’	  19	  August	  1977,	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  Brzezinski	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  Subject	  File,	  Box	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  [Trips]-­‐Four	  Power	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  through	  Weekly	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  the	  President	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  Folder	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  Weekly	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priorities. 130 	  Equally,	   the	   narrow	   focus	   on	   the	   Cold	   War	   had	   been	   a	  traditional	  feature	  of	  US	  intelligence	  in	  Iran.	  But	  it	  is	  also	  clear	  that	  the	  new	  Administration’s	   approach	   influenced	   the	   collection	   of	   intelligence.	  Stansfield	   Turner’s	   famous	   preference	   for	   signal	   intelligences	   (SIGINT)	   as	  opposed	   to	   human	   intelligence	   (HUMINT),	   and	   his	   firing	   of	   several	  intelligence	   officers	   in	   their	   50s	   reduced	   the	   level	   of	   expertise	   across	   the	  board.131	  Furthermore,	   during	   the	   Carter	   Administration,	   détente	   and	   the	  possible	   signing	   of	   a	   new	   SALT	   (Strategic	   Army	   Limitations	   Talks)	   treaty	  made	  the	  Iranian	  listening	  stations	  crucial.	  	  	  In	  his	  first	  meeting	  with	  William	  Sullivan,	  future	  Ambassador	  to	  Iran,	  Carter	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  record	  of	  SAVAK	  was	  certainly	  not	  inspiring,	  but	  the	  information	  received	  from	  the	  listening	  stations	  in	  Iran	  was	  so	  important	  as	  to	  trump	  any	  other	  consideration.132	  The	  scant	  intelligence	  collected	  on	  the	  internal	   political	   developments	   would	   equally	   follow	   patterns	   established	  throughout	  the	  Seventies.	  Attention	  would	  continue	  to	  be	  focused	  mainly	  on	  Soviet	   inspired	   threats,	   or	   on	   a	   hidden	   Soviet	   hand	   behind	   any	   Iranian	  event.	   If	   this	   proved	   impossible,	   the	   intelligence	  would	   still	  warn	   that	   the	  main	  dangers	  could	  come	  from	  leftist	  groups.	  A	  farcical	  example	  may	  suffice.	  After	   having	   overlooked	   the	   power	   of	   the	   religious	   leadership	   and	   after	  having	  been	  swept	  aside	  by	  the	  revolution,	  in	  March	  1979,	  the	  CIA	  was	  still	  focusing	   on	   Soviet	   involvement	   and	   warning	   that	   leftist	   groups	   were	  challenging	   the	   government	   of	   Bazargan,	   Prime	   Minister	   appointed	   by	  Khomeini.133	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  President	  Jimmy	  Carter,	  Interview	  with	  the	  author,	  30	  July	  2011,	  Plains	  (GA).	  131	  Ranelagh,	  The	  Agency,	  pp.	  637-­‐644.	  132	  Sullivan,	  Mission,	  p.	  21.	  133	  CIA,	  ‘Soviet	  Involvement	  in	  the	  Iranian	  Crisis,’	  March	  1979,	  NLC-­‐25-­‐42-­‐10-­‐8-­‐9	  and	  CIA,	  “Iran:	  the	  Leftist	  challenge	  to	  the	  Bazargan	  Government”,	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  1979,	  NLC-­‐25-­‐42-­‐10-­‐9-­‐8.	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Some	  have	  defined	  this	  problem	  as	  a	  general	   ‘Cold	  War	  myopia’	   impeding	  US	  understanding	  of	  developments,	  especially	  in	  Third	  World	  countries.134	  When	  it	  came	  to	  Iran,	  however,	  these	  policies	  were	  strengthened	  by	  precise	  choices	   in	   Washington.	   There	   was	   an	   explicit	   recognition	   of	   the	   risks	  involved	   in	   these	   policies	   but	   the	   effort	   to	   manage	   the	   ‘target	   risk,’	   the	  probability	   of	   affecting	   the	   Shah’s	   friendship,	   trumped	   all	   ‘countervailing	  risks.’	   In	   particular,	   building	   on	   the	   policies	   of	   the	   Nixon	   era,	   and	  duplicating	   the	   choices	   made	   on	   arms	   transfers	   and	   human	   rights,	   the	  Administration	   adopted	   a	   ‘do	   not	   disturb’	   attitude	  when	   dealing	  with	   the	  Shah.	   The	   focus	   of	   the	   political	   intelligence	   community	   remained	   on	   the	  monarch.	  ‘To	  a	  considerable	  degree,’	  Michael	  Hornblow,	  from	  NSC,	  wrote:	  	   The	  state	  of	  US	  relations	  with	  Iran	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  personal	  relationship,	  which	  the	  Ambassador	  is	  able	  to	  establish	  with	  the	  shah,	   and	   this	   will	   be	   Ambassador	   Sullivan's	   principal	  objective.135	  	  	  If	   this	   was	   Sullivan’s	   objective,	   he	   certainly	   achieved	   it.	   In	   spite	   of	   the	  suggestion	   that	   he	   made	   an	   effort	   to	   go	   beyond	   the	   ‘ring	   around	   the	  Embassy,’136	  what	  Sullivan	  did	  was	  arguably	  too	  little	  and	  certainly	  too	  late.	  As	   Harold	   Saunders	   from	   the	   State	   Department	   later	   admitted,	   the	   US	  ability	   to	   ‘maintain	   contacts	   with	   all	   elements	   of	   the	   society’	   had	   been	  limited	   and	   the	   US	   did	   that	   largely	   out	   of	   ‘sensitivity	   to	   our	   relationship	  with	  the	  Iranian	  government.’137	  Even	  more	  consequential	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  the	   Embassy	   was	   largely	   the	   only	   source	   on	   which	   Washington	   relied.	  Sullivan’s	   accounts	   of	   his	   meetings	   with	   the	   Shah	   soon	   became	   the	   only	  window	   through	  which	   the	  US	   looked	  at	   Iran138.	   Somewhat	   tautologically,	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  author,	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  Carter	  Center,	  Atlanta.	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  Ambassador	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  Sullivan,	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  (Washington:	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the	  Administration	  chose	  to	  rely	  exclusively	  on	  an	  Embassy	  of	  which	  it	  had	  previously	   set	   the	   agenda.	   This	   narrow	   window	   excluded	   other	   sources.	  First,	  the	  press	  was	  largely	  ignored,	  as	  Barry	  Rubin	  pointed	  out:	  	   A	   full	   year	   before	   the	   revolution	   began,	   the	   best	   American	  newspapers	   were	   telling	   the	   story	   of	   a	   country	   with	   a	   harsh	  dictatorial	   government,	   severe	   economic	   difficulties	   and	   an	  unhealthy	  emphasis	  on	  importing	  weapons.139	  	  Second,	   the	  Administration	  dismissed	   information	   from	  other	  US	  posts	   in	  Iran.	  From	  the	  spring	  of	  1977,	  Michael	  Metrinko	  recalled,	  the	  consulates	  in	  Iran	   witnessed	   unprecedented	   rates	   of	   work,	   due	   to	   capital	   flight.	  Businessmen	   had	   lost	   faith	   in	   the	   regime	   and	   were	   sending	   their	   capital	  abroad.	   Later	   the	   work	   increased	   even	   more,	   since	   many	   of	   the	   Iranian	  former	  contacts	  of	  the	  American	  Embassy	  were	  requesting	  visas	  to	  flee	  the	  country.	  Political	  officers	  from	  the	  Embassy	  would,	  then,	  contact	  the	  staff	  at	  the	   consulates	   to	   activate	   the	   visa	   procedures,	   but	   they	   never	   bothered	  asking	   why	   their	   contacts	   needed	   a	   visa	   in	   the	   first	   place.140	  Third,	   the	  Administration	   missed	   a	   sweeping	   religious	   revival.	   Between	   1956	   and	  1976,	   the	   urban	   population	   had	   trebled,	   but	   many	   of	   the	   new	   migrants	  were	   left	   largely	   outside	   of	   the	   economic	   boom	  and	   found	   comfort	   in	   the	  Mosques.	  Data	  on	  such	  trends	  were	  available	  in	  1976.141	  Moreover,	  the	  two	  main	   best-­‐selling	   books	   at	   the	   time	  were	   the	   Koran	   and	   the	   ‘Keys	   to	   the	  Garden	  of	  Heaven’	  a	  book	  representing	  a	   ‘fossilized	   traditional	  Shi’ism,’	   in	  the	   words	   of	   moderate	   religious	   authorities. 142 	  And	   yet	   no	   one	   paid	  attention.	  To	  be	  sure,	  this	  last	  point	  might	  appear	  as	  the	  result	  of	  hindsight	  bias.	   As	   Gary	   Sick	   recently	   put	   it,	   there	  was	   no	   historical	   precedent	   for	   a	  religiously	  inspired	  revolution.143	  And	  yet,	  these	  policies	  were	  strengthened	  by	  developments	  in	  Washington	  and	  some,	  including	  Sick,	  had	  identified	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139	  Rubin,	  Paved,	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risks	   involved	   in	  a	  narrow	  focus	  on	   leftist	  groups	  and	  on	  the	  happiness	  of	  the	  Shah.	  	  	  
6.3.3	   Risk	   vs.	   Risk	   trade-­‐off	   3:	   early	   warning	   vs.	   ‘Presidential	  
cheerleading’	  	  In	  January	  1979,	  a	  House	  of	  Representative	  report	  divided	  the	  blame	  for	  US	  failure	   in	  equal	  parts	  between	  US	  intelligence	   in	  Iran	  and	  US	  policymakers	  in	  Washington.	  ‘Policymakers	  confidence	  in	  the	  Shah,’	  the	  report	  read,	  	   Which	   intelligence	   did	   not	   challenge,	   in	   turn,	   skewed	  intelligence:	   as	   US	   policy	   in	   the	   Persian	   Gulf	   became	   more	  dependent	  on	   the	  Shah,	   risk	  of	  offending	   the	  Shah	  by	  speaking	  with	  the	  opposition	  became	  less	  acceptable.	  144	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Administration	  selection	  of	  a	  target	  risk	  –	  ‘offending	  the	  Shah’	   –	   had,	   in	   turn,	   hindered	   the	   intelligence	   effort.	   In	   this	   context,	   the	  second	   half	   of	   1977	   was	   the	   time	   in	   which	   the	   Shah’s	   regime	   started	   to	  unravel.	   In	   November,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   the	   Shah	   had	   come	   back	   from	  Washington	   and	   had	   cracked	   down	   on	   the	   opposition.	   The	   restart	   of	  repression	   only	   emboldened	   the	   opposition.	   Furthermore,	   the	   Shah	   had	  started	   alternating	   between	   waves	   of	   repression,	   and	   moments	   in	   which	  controls	   were	   relaxed.	   This	   was	   interpreted	   as	   a	   sign	   of	   increasing	  difficulties.145	  In	  Washington,	   some	   started	   to	   sound	   the	   alarm.	   Gary	   Sick	  wrote	   to	   Brzezinski	   in	   November	   1977	   that	   the	   situation	   was	   rapidly	  worsening.	  The	   ‘‟foreign	  conspiracy”	   theory’,	  Sick	  wrote,	   ‘is	   clearly	  wrong,	  the	   Embassy	   has	   been	   struck	   by	   the	   extraordinary	   organization	   displayed	  by	  the	  opposition	  forces.’	  Experts,	  he	  warned,	  argue	  that	  the	  opposition	  runs	  deeper	   than	   previously	   thought.	   Perhaps,	   he	   concluded,	   ‘the	   Shah	   is	   truly	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running	   scared.’ 146 	  William	   Odom,	   military	   assistant	   to	   Brzezinski,	  recognised	   that	   the	   time	   had	   come	   for	   ‘hardnosed	   analysis	   about	   the	  internal	  situation’	  of	  Iran.147	  These	  warnings	  fell	  on	  deaf	  ears.	  	  	  A	  few	  days	  after	  Carter’s	  departure	  from	  Tehran,	  on	  the	  7th	  of	  January,	  and	  with	   the	   Shah	   riding	   the	   wave	   of	   Carter’s	   backing,	   Iranian	   newspapers	  published	   an	   article,	   most	   likely	   forged	   by	   the	   government,	   defining	  Khomeini	   as	   a	   foreigner	   and	   a	   tool	   of	  British	   espionage.	  The	   reaction	  was	  immediate.	   A	   massive	   demonstration	   took	   place	   in	   Qom	   on	   the	   8th.	   The	  police	   opened	   fire	   killing	   two	   dozen	   people. 148 	  The	   death	   of	   these	  demonstrators	  started	   the	  40	  days	  cycle	  of	  mourning,	   typical	  of	   the	  Shi’ite	  tradition.	   Approximately	   40	   days	   later,	   in	   fact,	   a	   second	   massive	  demonstration	  erupted	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Tabriz.	  Sick	  was	  appalled	  by	  the	  scale	  of	   the	   riots	   and	  wrote	   that	   they	  were	   the	  work	   of	   the	   ‘true	   threat	   to	   the	  regime;’	   the	   ‘reactionary	  Muslim	   right-­‐wing.’149	  In	  May,	   Sick	   again	  warned	  that	  the	  Shah	  was	  showing	  signs	  of	  weakness,	  while	  the	  religious	  opposition	  seemed	   emboldened	   by	   the	   increasing	   chaos.	   Sick	   suggested	   two	   main	  interpretations.	  According	  to	  the	  first,	  religious	  leaders,	  defeated	  in	  the	  past	  by	   the	   Shah,	   were	   simply	   another	   ‘interest	   group’	   that	   could	   be	   defused	  through	   accommodation.	   According	   to	   the	   second,	   much	   scarier,	   theory,	  religious	   leaders	  had	   ‘uncovered	  a	  deep	   layer	  of	  class	  hostility.’	   If	   this	  was	  the	  case,	  demonstrations	  could	   ‘topple	  or	  cripple	  the	  present	  regime.’	   ‘The	  fact,’	   Sick	   concluded,	   ‘is	  no	  one	  knows,’	   but	  he	   admitted	  great	   concern	   for	  long-­‐term	   prospects. 150 	  Within	   the	   Administration,	   however,	   the	  management	   of	   risks	   followed	   the	   established	   pattern:	   the	   target	   risk	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remained	   the	   need	   to	   avoid	   upsetting	   the	   Shah;	   long-­‐term	   developments	  were	  excluded.151	  	  	  In	   July,	   human	   rights	   concerns	  were,	   once	   again,	   trumped	   by	   the	   need	   to	  help	   the	   Shah.	   The	   objections	   of	   the	   State	   Department’s	   Human	   Right	  Bureau	   did	   not	   prevent	   the	   Administration	   from	   selling	   the	   Shah	   crowd-­‐control	   equipment,	   including	   tear	   gas.152	  On	   the	   5th,	   the	   Policy	   Review	  Committee	  convened	  to	  review	  the	  Administration’s	  arms	  transfer	  policy	  to	  Iran.	   Leslie	   Gelb,	   from	   the	   State	   Department,	   warned	   that	   the	  Administration	   needed	   to	   balance	   congressional	   interests	   and	  responsiveness	   to	   the	   Shah.	   The	   probability	   of	   something	   going	  wrong	   in	  Iran	  was	  clearly	  the	  main	  concern.	  The	  Shah	  seemed	  in	  trouble,	  Brzezinski	  argued,	  and	  the	  US	  needed	  to	  show	  total	  support;	  the	  US	  had	  to	  ‘capitalize’	  on	   this	   opportunity.	   In	   a	   repetition	   of	   the	   AWACs	   decision,	   the	   trade-­‐off	  inherent	   in	   this	   short-­‐term	  capitalisation	  was	  dismissed.	  Brzezinski	   stated	  that	  military	   support	   to	   the	   Shah	   strengthened	   US	   national	   interests.	   The	  only	  thing	  the	  Administration	  had	  to	  do	  was	  to	  continue	  with	  the	  sale	  and	  to	  educate	  Congress.153	  Even	  more	   important,	   the	  US	  should	  not	  consider	   the	  possibility	   and	   the	   nature	   of	   a	   post-­‐Shah	   regime	   to	   avoid	   ‘self-­‐fulfilling	  prophecies.’154	  A	   CIA	   study	   confirmed	   Brzezinski’s	   position.	   In	   spite	   of	   a	  provocative	   title,	   ‘Iran	   after	   the	   Shah,’	   the	   study	   focused	  mainly	   on	   Iran’s	  traditional	  social	  groups	  and	  their	  possible	  influence.	  Even	  more	  reassuring,	  the	   study	   was	   famously	   prefaced	   by	   the	   assessment:	   Iran	   ‘is	   not	   in	   a	  revolutionary	  or	  even	  a	  pre-­‐revolutionary	  situation.’155	  The	  Embassy	  in	  Iran	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concurred.	  Charles	  Naas,	  political	  officer	  in	  Tehran,	  wrote	  to	  Vance	  that	  the	  uncertain	  political	  mood	  in	  the	  country	  should	  not	  have	  led	  to	  despair.156	  	  Demonstrations,	  however,	  characterised	  the	  summer	  in	  Tehran.	  On	  the	  19th	  of	  August,	  the	  burning	  of	  the	  Rex	  Cinema	  in	  Abadan	  caused	  the	  death	  of	  an	  estimated	  430	  people.	  The	  opposition	  blamed	  the	  SAVAK	  and	  the	  regime’s	  delayed	  response	  for	  the	  deaths.	  The	  regime	  blamed	  the	  opposition.157	  The	  Shah	  only	  reiterated	  that	  the	  ‘deep	  plot’	  against	  his	  regime	  was	  fostered	  by	  foreign	   powers,158but	   named	   a	   new	   government.	   Jafar	   Sharif-­‐Emami,	   the	  man	  selected	  to	  head	  the	  new	  government	  had,	  at	  best,	  a	  mixed	  reputation.	  He	  was	  known	  for	  being	  a	  pious	  and	  moderate	  person,	  but	  he	  had	  also	  been	  President	   of	   the	   Pahlavi	   Foundation,	  which	   coupled	   a	   façade	   of	   charitable	  work	  with	  astonishing	   levels	  of	   corruption.159	  In	  September,	   faced	  with	  an	  increasing	   number	   of	   demonstrations,	   the	   new	   government	   declared	  martial	   law.	   The	   announcement	   had	   been	   made	   late	   in	   the	   evening	   of	  September	   7	   and	   the	   demonstrators	   had	   gathered	   on	   the	   morning	   of	  September	  8.	  Defying	  martial	   law,	  demonstrators	  marched	   to	   Jaleh	  Square	  in	  Tehran.	  A	  number	  of	  people	  anywhere	  between	  sixty-­‐four	  and	  4000	  were	  killed160	  and,	  more	   generally,	   the	   Iranian	   population	  was	   ‘appalled	   by	   the	  carnage.’161	  Finally	   Carter	  made	   his	   voice	   heard	   in	   Tehran,	   but	   the	   choice	  only	  compounded	  the	  Iranian	  shock.	  President	  Carter	  had	  taken	  some	  time	  off	   from	   the	   Camp	   David	   negotiations	   to	   call	   the	   Shah,	   reaffirming	   US	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  156	  Telegram,	  Naas	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Uncertain	  Political	  Mood:	  religious	  developments,	  tougher	  royal	  line	  on	  demonstrations,’	  1	  August	  1978,	  DED,	  
Vol.	  25,	  [http://ia700409.us.archive.org/10/items/DocumentsFromTheU.s.EspionageDen/v25_text.pdf]	  (accessed	  13	  August	  2013).	  	  157	  James	  Buchan,	  Days	  of	  God	  (London:	  John	  Murray,	  2012),	  p.	  207.	  	  158	  BBC,	  SWB,	  Part	  4,	  9	  September	  1978.	  159	  Ervand	  Abrahamian,	  A	  History	  of	  Modern	  Iran	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  pp.	  127-­‐128.	  160	  The	  estimate	  of	  4000	  victims	  seems	  admittedly	  overblown,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  consensus	  in	  the	  literature.	  Many	  agree	  on	  a	  number	  between	  64	  and	  84	  deaths.	  See	  Abrahamian,	  A	  History,	  p.	  160;	  and	  Gholam	  Reza	  Afkhami,	  The	  
life	  and	  Times	  of	  the	  Shah	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2009),	  p.	  465.	  161	  Stempel,	  Inside,	  p.	  123.	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support.	  The	  news	  soon	  spread	  in	  Tehran,	  reinforcing	  the	  image	  of	  Carter	  as	  an	  enemy	  of	  Iran.	  162	  	  The	  phone	  call	  was	  in	  line	  with	  a	  shift	  occurring	  in	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  Carter	  Administration.	  The	  Jaleh	  Square	  massacre	  had	  confirmed	  that	  the	  ‘business	  as	  usual	  attitude’	  had	  become	  untenable.	  Confirming	   the	  cyclical	  nature	  of	  risk	   management,	   a	   reassessment	   of	   the	   Iranian	   situation	   led	   to	   the	  identification	   of	   a	   new	   target	   risk.	   The	   problems	   of	   the	   Shah	   were	  interpreted	   as	   a	   ‘crisis	   of	   confidence.’	  Having	   identified	   its	   target	   risk,	   the	  need	   to	   avoid	   a	   breakdown	   of	   the	   Shah,	   the	   Administration	   proceeded	   to	  dismiss	   other	   countervailing	   risks	   inherent	   in	   its	   policies.	   As	   the	   Shah’s	  troubles	   increased,	   members	   of	   the	   Administration	   continued	   to	   restate	  publicly	  their	  confidence	  in	  the	  Shah.	  On	  the	  10th	  of	  October,	  Carter	  went	  on	  the	   record	   remarking	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   a	   strong	   Iran	   for	   the	   whole	  Western	  world	  and	  stressing	  his	  appreciation	  for	  the	  Shah’s	  moves	  towards	  democracy.163	  	  	  In	  Washington,	  most	  of	  the	  senior	  members	  of	  the	  Administration	  were	  still	  buying	   the	  Shah’s	   claims	   that	  only	   communists	  and	  other	  extremists	  were	  opposing	  his	  regime.164	  ‘Presidential	  cheerleading’	  of	  the	  Shah	  -­‐	  as	  Bill	  called	  it165	  -­‐	   continued.	   Several	   high	   level	   envoys	   travelled	   to	   Iran	   to	   strengthen	  the	  monarch	  and	  gauge	  his	  pulse.	  High-­‐level	  visits	  were	  considered	  the	  best	  option	  for	  the	  Shah’s	  dangerous	  predicament.166	  Not	  everybody	  agreed.	  The	  Shah	   himself	   had	   recognised	   that	   both	   the	   visits	   and	   the	   statements	   of	  support	  were	  becoming	  counterproductive.	  US	  statements	  were	  turning	  him	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  162	  Vance,	  Hard,	  p.	  326.	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  President	  Carter,	  ‘Press	  Conference,’	  10	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  1978,	  Department	  of	  
State	  Bulletin,	  November	  1978,	  [http://www.archive.org/details/departmentofstata7878unit]	  (accessed	  13	  August	  2013),	  p.	  12.	  164	  Glad,	  An	  Outsider,	  p.	  168.	  165	  James	  A.	  Bill,	  ‘Iran	  and	  the	  crisis	  of	  '78,’	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  57,	  No.	  2	  (Winter	  1978),	  p.	  342.	  166	  Memo,	  Dodson	  C.	  to	  Cabinet,	  ‘PRC	  Meeting	  on	  Secretary	  Blumenthal’s	  Trip	  to	  the	  Middle	  East,	  Nov.	  9,	  1978,’	  6	  November	  1978,	  NLC-­‐20-­‐19-­‐2-­‐4-­‐3,	  JCL.	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into	   a	   US	   puppet;	   he	   seemed	   dependent	   on	   the	   US.	   The	   frequent	   visits	  increased	  the	  US	  profile	  in	  Iran	  and	  overcrowded	  the	  Tehran	  circuit	  due	  to	  the	   massive	   security	   measures	   applied	   for	   each	   visit.167	  But	   the	   practice	  continued.	  Even	  more	  worrisome,	  such	  staunch	  attitudes	  of	  support	  for	  the	  Shah	  had	  been	  accompanied,	  especially	  throughout	  1978,	  by	  the	  dismissal	  of	  the	  opposition.	  	  	  
6.3.4	  Risk	   vs.	   Risk	   trade-­‐off	   4:	   the	   opposition’s	   grandiose	   projects	   vs.	  
the	  Shah’s	  faltering	  rule	  	  	  In	  his	  memoirs	  Vance	  wrote	  that	  as	  late	  as	  October	  1978:	  	  	   The	   Shah’s	   failing	   self-­‐confidence	   was	   the	   main	   reason	   I	  hesitated	  to	  recommend	  that	  Sullivan	  get	  in	  touch	  with	  the	  most	  important	  opposition	  leaders.168	  	  The	  evidence,	  however,	  suggests	  that	  the	  treatment	  of	  the	  opposition	  went	  well	   beyond	   simple	   hesitation.	   Managing	   the	   risks	   inherent	   in	   the	   Shah’s	  failing	   self-­‐confidence,	   the	   Administration	   dismissed	   long-­‐term	  countervailing	  risks	  inherent	  in	  the	  dismissal	  of	  several	  openings	  and	  pleas	  coming	  from	  the	  opposition.	  	  The	   pattern	   had	   been	   established	   at	   the	   end	   of	   1977.	   Shortly	   before	   the	  Shah’s	  meeting	   with	   Carter	   in	  Washington,	   Sadegh	   Ghotbzadeh,	   a	   leading	  figure	  in	  the	  opposition,	  had	  approached	  Robert	  Mantel,	  a	  State	  Department	  official.	   Ghotbzadeh	   had	   made	   clear	   that	   opposition	   to	   the	   Shah	   was	  widespread	  in	  Iran,	  but	  that	  the	  Carter	  Administration,	  with	  its	  emphasis	  on	  human	  rights,	  was	  still	  in	  time	  to	  disentangle	  itself	  from	  identification	  with	  the	  regime.169	  The	  State	  Department	  official	  ignored	  the	  meeting	  and	  did	  not	  report	   it	   to	   his	   superiors	   until	   more	   than	   a	   year	   later.170	  1978	   was	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  167	  Sick,	  ‘Chronology	  –	  November	  1978,’	  NLC-­‐25-­‐37-­‐6-­‐1-­‐7,	  JCL.	  168	  Vance,	  Hard,	  p.	  326.	  169	  Memo,	  Robert	  Mantel	  to	  Henry	  Precht,	  ‘Contact	  with	  Sadegh	  Ghotbzadeh	  in	  November	  1977,’	  Jan.	  17,	  1979,	  DED,	  Vol.	  18,	  [http://ia700409.us.archive.org/10/items/DocumentsFromTheU.s.EspionageDen/v18_text.pdf]	  (accessed	  13	  August	  2013).	  170	  Harris,	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  p.	  88.	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crucial	   year.	   At	   the	   start	   of	   the	   year,	   Ibrahim	   Yazdi,	   Khomeini’s	  spokesperson	  in	  the	  US,	  and	  Richard	  Cottam,	  a	  scholar	  sympathetic	  towards	  groups	  opposing	  the	  Shah,	  were	  ready	  to	  meet	  with	  the	  State	  Department.	  No	   one	   came	   forward.	   A	   meeting	   would	   have	   violated	   the	   policy	   of	  unquestioned	  support	  for	  the	  Shah.	  According	  to	  Sick:	  ‘Yazdi	  and	  Cottam	  felt	  insulted	   and	   concluded	   that	   their	   doubts	   about	   the	   US	   government’s	  attitude	   toward	   the	   opposition	   had	   been	   amply	   confirmed.’171	  However,	   it	  was	  in	  Tehran	  that	  the	  real	  ‘rebuffing’	  occurred.	  	  As	   early	   as	   May	   1978,	   Bazargan,	   leader	   of	   the	   LMI,	   approached	   John	  Stempel,	  political	  officer	  at	   the	  Tehran	  Embassy.	  The	  movement,	  Bazargan	  suggested,	  was	  clearly	  open	  to	  a	  compromise.	  The	  basis	  would	  be	  the	  1906	  constitution	  and	  a	   return	   to	   the	  constitutional	  monarchy	  guaranteed	  by	   it.	  The	  bottom	  line	  was	  that	  the	  LMI	  was	  ready	  to	  accept	  the	  monarchy	  if	   the	  Shah	  was	  ready	  to	  relinquish	  part	  of	  his	  power.	  The	  opening	  was	  received	  with	  incredulity	  and	  more	  generally	  dismissed.	  Stempel	  did	  not	  know	  whom	  the	  group	  represented	  or	  how	  trustworthy	  it	  was.172	  Other	  meetings	  with	  a	  similar	  pattern	  occurred.	  	  	  In	   September,	   the	   Embassy	   dismissed	   a	   clear	   call	   for	   help	   from	   the	  opposition.	  Khomeini	  had	  been	  put	  under	  house	  arrest	  in	  exile	  in	  Iraq.	  The	  LMI	  suspected	  US	  involvement	  but	  asked	  for	  help.	  The	  large	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  hated	  the	  Shah,	  Bazargan	  reported,	  and	  the	  US	  should	  step	  in	  to	  help	  Iran	  though	  a	  difficult	  transition.	  LMI	  representatives	  asked	  for	  a	  high	  level	   meeting	   with	   the	   US	   government	   in	   which	   opposition	   leaders,	  including	  leaders	  of	  the	  religious	  opposition,	  could	  explain	  their	  view.	  Once	  again,	   they	   were	   rebuffed.	   Stempel,	   this	   time,	   replied	   that	   the	   US	   started	  from	   the	   premise	   that	   the	   Shah	   had	   a	   ‘key	   role	   in	   the	   future	   political	  developments,’	  and	   that	  he	  represented	   the	  only	   ‘force	  of	  stability	  and	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  171	  Sick,	  All	  Fall,	  p.	  64.	  172	  Memorandum	  of	  Conversation,	  ‘Bazargan-­‐Tavakoli-­‐Stempel,’	  30	  May	  1978,	  DED,	  Vol.	  24	  [http://ia700409.us.archive.org/10/items/DocumentsFromTheU.s.EspionageDen/v24_text.pdf]	  (accessed	  13	  August	  2013),	  p.	  12.	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major	  factor	  towards	  democratic	  change.’	  More	  generally,	  Stempel	  ridiculed	  the	  LMI	  representatives.	  He	  replied	  that	  ‘the	  idea	  of	  such	  a	  meeting	  seemed	  premature	   and	   somewhat	   grandiose.’	   In	   his	   report,	   he	   added	   that	   LMI	  representatives	   believed	   that	   the	  US	   ‘could	   do	   anything	   it	  wanted	   to	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  Shah;’	  something	  he	  found	  ridiculous.173	  What	  emerges	  from	  these	   meetings	   is	   that	   the	   opposition	   was	   still	   fragmented.	   Secular	   and	  liberal	   leaders	   were	   leading	   the	   anti-­‐Shah	   opposition	   in	   Tehran	   and,	  although	  distrusting	  the	  Shah,	  they	  did	  not	  aim	  at	  a	  complete	  overthrow	  of	  the	   regime.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   as	   David	   Buchan	   has	   recently	   written,	   the	  ‘religious	  protest	  was	  faltering’:	  	  	   While	  successful	   in	  spreading	   the	  clerical	  protest	  beyond	  Qom,	  the	   demonstrations	   had	   never	   mustered	   more	   than	   a	   few	  thousand	  or	  gained	  a	  firm	  foothold	  in	  the	  capital.174	  	  	  The	  opposition	   to	   the	  Shah	  had	  not	  yet	  coalesced	  around	  Khomeini.	  To	  be	  sure,	   years	   of	   mistrust	   between	   the	   US	   and	   Iran	   would	   have	   made	   a	  proactive	   US	   role	   extremely	   difficult,	   but	   not	   totally	   impossible.175	  These	  conversations,	   however,	   were	   reported	   to	   the	   Embassy	   and,	   then,	   to	  Washington.	   In	   the	   process,	   the	   attitude	   did	   not	   change,	   and	   officials	  generally	   underestimated	   the	   possibilities	   of	   the	   opposition.	   Reporting	   to	  Washington,	  Naas	  and	  Sullivan	  dismissed	  months	  of	  openings	  from	  the	  LMI	  as	  an	   ‘effort	  to	  get	  USG	  to	  pull	  LMI	  chestnuts	  out	  of	   fire.’176	  In	  October,	   the	  LMI	   came	  back	   to	  have	  a	   reply	  on	   its	   request	   for	  a	  high	   level	  meeting.	  No	  meeting	  was	  in	  sight.	  	  	  After	   the	   appointment	   of	   Sharif-­‐Emami	   as	   Prime-­‐Minister,	   the	   pattern	  continued.	  Even	  more	  consequential,	  US	  officials	  extended	  their	  dismissive	  attitude	  to	  religious	  groups,	  and	  to	  both	  secular	  and	  religious	  efforts	  to	  form	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  173	  Memorandum	  of	  Conversation,	  ‘Bazargan-­‐Tavakoli-­‐Stempel,’	  25	  September	  1978,	  DED,	  Vol.	  24,	  pp.	  31-­‐33.	  174	  Buchan,	  Days,	  p.	  206.	  175	  John	  Limbert,	  Email	  interview	  with	  the	  author,	  17	  May	  2013.	  176	  Telegram,	  Sullivan	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Khomeini	  placed	  under	  house	  arrest.	  Lberation	  movement	  of	  Iran	  (LMI)	  seeks	  further	  US	  contacts,’	  25	  September	  1978,	  DED,	  Vol.	  24,	  pp.	  27-­‐30.	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a	   coalition	   government.	   On	   the	   11th	   of	   October,	   Ayatollah	   Mohammad	  Kazem	   Shariat’madari	   –	   a	   leading	   figure	   of	   the	   moderate	   religious	  opposition	  -­‐	  had	  sent	  an	  envoy	  to	  the	  Embassy	  to	  ascertain	  the	  US	  position	  on	   the	   new	   government.	   A	   potentially	   unprecedented	   deal,	   the	   envoy	  suggested,	   was	   in	   offing	   between	   moderate	   religious	   leaders	   headed	   by	  Shariat’madari	  and	  the	  Iranian	  Government.	  The	  deal	  included	  the	  effort	  to	  convince	   Khomeini	   (now	   in	   Paris)	   to	   ‘go	   easy’	   on	   the	   opposition.	   The	  religious	   leadership	   was	   concerned	   that	   the	   situation	   of	   the	   country	   was	  deteriorating	   to	   the	   point	   where	   it	   endangered	   religious	   leaders’	   goals.	  Stempel’s	   reply	   was	   that,	   in	   the	   Administration’s	   mind,	   the	   ‘stability	   and	  continuity	  represented	  by	  the	  Shah	  ‘provided	  the	  best	  hope	  for	  a	  successful	  political	  liberalization.’177	  	  Certainly,	  as	  the	  Shariat’madari	  opening	  makes	  clear,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1978	  a	  determinant	   variable	   was	   the	   attitude	   of	   Khomeini,	   around	   whom	   the	  opposition	   was	   coalescing.	   Still,	   the	   US	   could	   have	   probably	   made	   a	  difference.	   On	   the	   22nd	   of	   October,	   Bazargan	   and	   other	   members	   of	   the	  opposition	  flew	  to	  Paris	  to	  ascertain	  Khomeini’s	  attitude	  and	  to	  ask	  for	  the	  Ayatollah’s	   moderation.	   In	   the	   meantime,	   an	   agreement	   between	   the	  opposition	  and	  Sharif-­‐Emami	  seemed	  close.	  The	  most	  contested	  point	  was	  that	  the	  Shah	  would	  ‘reign	  instead	  of	  rule’,	  relinquishing	  some	  of	  his	  power.	  On	  this	  point,	  however,	  Sharif-­‐Emami	  admitted	  that	  the	  Shah	  was	  exercising	  too	   much	   pressure	   on	   him,	   and	   certainly	   would	   request	   to	   remain	  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief.178	  Two	  days	  later,	  in	  fact,	  the	  Shah	  gave	  clear	  signs	  of	  unwillingness	   to	   share	   power.	   He	   imposed	   all	   the	   ministers	   on	   Sharif-­‐Emami	   and	   the	   opportunity	   was	   lost.179	  The	   impression	   from	   Sullivan’s	  telegram	  is	  that	  had	  the	  Administration	  offered	  a	  cohesive	  policy	  and	  had	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  177	  Telegram,	  Sullivan	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Possible	  religious	  deal	  with	  GOI,’	  DED,	  Vol.	  25,	  p.	  71,	  [http://ia700409.us.archive.org/10/items/DocumentsFromTheU.s.EspionageDen/v25_text.pdf]	  (accessed	  16	  August	  2013).	  178	  William	  Sullivan,	  Telegram	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Elements	  of	  GOI	  agreement	  with	  religious	  opposition,’	  DED,	  Vol.	  25,	  pp.	  95-­‐99.	  179	  William	  Sullivan,	  Telegram	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  ‘Political	  Developments,’	  29	  October	  1978,	  DED,	  Vol.	  25,	  pp.	  100-­‐101.	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showed	  conviction	  in	  its	  approach,	  the	  monarch	  might	  have	  accepted	  a	  deal.	  As	  Barry	  Rubin	  wrote:	  	  	   Rather	   than	   passively	   await	   the	   results	   of	   the	   Shah’s	  endeavours,	   the	   United	   States	   might	   have	   chosen…to	   commit	  American	   prestige	   and	   influence	   in	   negotiations	   for	   a	   reform	  government	  with	  moderate	  opposition	  participation.	  180	  	  The	   Embassy	  was	   initially	   shocked	   by	   the	   existence	   and	   the	   strength	   of	   a	  ‘non-­‐communist	  opposition.’	  The	  absence	  of	  a	  red	  hand,	  as	  Naas	  would	  later	  admit,	  ‘flew	  in	  the	  face	  of	  everything	  we	  had	  believed	  for	  a	  long	  time.’181	  To	  this	   shock,	   the	   Embassy	   replied	   first	  with	   incredulity,	   often	   ridiculing	   the	  secular	  opposition’s	  projects	  and,	   later,	  with	  a	  more	  sceptical	  approach	  on	  the	  opposition’s	  prospects.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  Embassy’s	  behaviour	  built	  on	   (and	   was	   mutually	   reinforced	   by)	   policies	   in	   Washington.	   With	   these	  choices,	  when	  the	  Administration	  finally	  woke	  up	  to	  trouble	   in	   Iran,	   it	  had	  already	  lost	  the	  confidence	  of	  the	  opposition	  movements.182	  	  	  
6.3.5	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk	  trade-­‐off	  5:	  risks	  of	  inaction	  vs.	  risks	  of	  action	  	  In	  a	  telegram	  to	  Washington	  on	  the	  2nd	  of	  November	  1978,	  Sullivan	  warned	  the	   Administration	   that	   the	   possibility	   of	   abdication	   should	   not	   be	   totally	  excluded	   and	   asked	   guidance	   from	   Washington:	   military	   government	   or	  coalition	   government.	   The	   telegram	   finally	   sent	   the	   Administration	   into	  ‘crisis	   mode.’	   The	   Special	   Coordination	   Committee	   (SCC)	   -­‐	   the	   committee	  established	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Administration	  to	  deal	  with	  crucial	  issues	  and	  crisis	  management,183	  chaired	  by	  Brzezinski	  –	  for	  the	  first	  time	  convened	  to	  discuss	  Iran.	  The	  immediate	  reaction,	  however,	  was	  again	  support.	  As	  Vance	  suggested,	   the	   Administration	   started	   to	   be	   paralysed	   by	   a	   ‘brooding	   fear	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  180	  Rubin,	  Paved,	  p.	  231.	  181	  Burr,	  ‘Interview	  with	  Charles	  Naas,’	  FISOHA,	  31	  May	  1988,	  p.	  207.	  182	  For	  a	  similar	  analysis	  see	  Rubin,	  Paved,	  p.	  271.	  183	  Jimmy	  Carter,	  ‘Presidential	  Directive/NSC-­‐2:	  The	  National	  Security	  Council	  System,’	  20th	  January	  1977	  [http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd02.pdf]	  (accessed	  16	  August	  2013).	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that	   any	   action	   that	   implied	  we	  did	   not	   expect	   the	   Shah	   to	   survive	  would	  contribute	   to	   his	   paralysis	   of	   will.’184	  Brzezinski	   reported	   strong	   external	  pressure	  from	  interest	  groups	  led	  by	  the	  Rockefellers	  and	  criticism	  that	  the	  US	   was	   not	   doing	   enough	   for	   the	   Shah.185	  The	   message	   to	   Sullivan	   was	  paradoxical.	   Largely	   based	   on	   Brzezinski’s	   points	   in	   the	   meeting,	  186 	  it	  restated	  US	  support	  ‘without	  reservations,’	  making	  clear	  that	  the	  US	  had	  no	  desire	   to	   second-­‐guess	   the	   Shah,	   but	   it	   suggested	   that	   it	   was	   time	   for	  decisive	   action	   to	   restore	   order.	   Only	   with	   order	   restored,	   the	   message	  added,	   could	   the	  Shah	  go	  back	   to	   thinking	  about	   liberalisation.187	  In	   short,	  the	  message	  told	  the	  Shah	  to	  both	  crack-­‐down	  and	  liberalise.	  After	  the	  SCC	  meeting,	  Vance	  gave	  a	  press	  conference	  in	  which	  he	  restated	  the	  message	  of	  support	  for	  the	  Shah.	  Brzezinski	  placed	  a	  phone	  call	  to	  the	  Shah	  in	  which	  he	  pledged	  US	  support	  and	  advised	  the	  Shah	  to	  exert	  strong	  leadership.	  As	  Sick	  admits,	  the	  government	  was	  speaking	  with	  one	  voice.188	  Contrary	  to	  studies	  portraying	   the	   Administration	   as	   paralysed	   by	   rivalries	   or	   subject	   to	  Brzezinski’s	   predominance 189 ,	   several	   meetings 190 	  and	   telegrams 191	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  whole	  Administration	  was	  still	  focused	  on	  managing	  one	   target	   risk	   -­‐	   the	  need	   to	   avoid	   any	   impression	  of	   reduced	   faith	   in	   the	  Shah’s	  chances	   -­‐	  and	  on	  adopting	  minimal	  measures,	  hoping	   that	   the	  Shah	  could	  ease	  the	  troubles	  on	  his	  own.	  	  	  The	  situation	  in	  Iran,	  however,	  turned	  desperate.	  After	  a	  pathetic	  attempt	  to	  appease	  the	  opposition	  in	  a	  TV	  message	  on	  the	  6th	  of	  November,	  192	  the	  Shah	  established	   a	  military	   government,	   but	   deprived	   it	   of	   any	   power.	   He	   also	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  p.	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  State	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  et	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  ‘Message	  to	  Foreign	  Ministers,’	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  JCL.	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acted	   against	   elements	   of	   the	   establishment	   such	   as	   former	   leaders	   of	  SAVAK,	  losing	  the	  support	  of	  his	  last	  followers	  and	  giving	  the	  opposition	  the	  impression	  of	  being	  both	  weak	  and	  a	  traitor.193	  Perceiving	  danger,	  on	  the	  9th	  of	  November,	  Sullivan	  sent	  the	  famous	  ‘Thinking	  the	  Unthinkable	  Telegram.’	  For	  the	  first	  time,	  Sullivan	  suggested	  that	  the	  US	  might	  have	  to	  think	  about	  an	   Iranian	   future	   without	   the	   Shah,	   and	   that	   a	   compromise	   between	   the	  military	   and	   the	   religious	   leadership	   might	   be	   the	   only	   acceptable	   way	  forward,	   with	   Khomeini	   returning	   as	   a	   ‘Gandhi-­‐like	   figure.’194	  To	   be	   sure,	  Sullivan’s	  forecast	  was	  way	  off	  the	  mark,	  but	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  telegram	  on	  US	  policy	  were	  minimal.	  The	  prospect	  of	  the	  ‘unthinkable’	  did	  not	  move	  the	  Administration.	  	  	  With	  the	  stream	  of	  reports	  from	  Sullivan	  getting	  worse,	  the	  Administration	  found	   itself	   in	   a	   condition	   of	   deep	   uncertainty.	   More	   specifically,	   the	  consequences	   of	   traditional	   intelligence	   biases,	   of	   recent	   dynamics	   and	   of	  the	   dismissal	   of	   the	   opposition	   -­‐	   like	   Beck’s	   boomerang	   effect	   -­‐	   had	  proverbially	  come	  back	  to	  haunt	  the	  centres	  of	  decision.	  Sick	  complained	  to	  Brzezinski	  that	  the	   ‘lack	  of	  hard	  information’	  on	  developments	   in	  Iran	  was	  staggering.195	  Similarly,	   Brzezinski	   wrote	   to	   Carter	   that	   the	   intelligence	  community	   had	   been	   ‘ill-­‐prepared’	   for	   developments	   in	   Iran,	   and	   that	   the	  ‘seeds’	   of	   the	   crisis	   had	   been	   visible	   for	   months.196	  In	   the	   Policy	   Review	  Committee	  (PRC)	  meeting	  on	  November	  6,	  Vance	  and	  Brzezinski	  agreed	  that	  one	  of	  the	  main	  problems	  had	  been	  a	  lack	  of	  information	  on	  the	  opposition	  and	   its	   strength.	   Stansfield	   Turner,	   the	   CIA	   director,	   tried	   to	   justify	   the	  intelligence	  performance	  pointing	  the	  finger	  at	  the	  long-­‐established	  alliance	  with	  the	  Shah	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  had	  hindered	  intelligence	  collection.197	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Turner’s	  response	  was,	  at	  least,	  partially	  correct.	  Unsatisfied,	  Brzezinski	  convinced	  Carter	  to	  write	  a	  note	  to	  the	  main	  cabinet	  members	  to	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  Sick,	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  –	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  1978,’	  NLC-­‐25-­‐37-­‐6-­‐1-­‐7,	  JCL	  195	  Sick,	  All	  Fall,	  p.	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  Zbigniew	  Brzezinski,	  Memorandum	  for	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  President,	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  Intelligence	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  10	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  10,	  1978,	  NLC-­‐15-­‐71-­‐5-­‐7-­‐5,	  JCL.	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  PRC	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complain	   about	   the	   intelligence	   performance. 198 	  In	   spite	   of	   his	   strong	  position,	  however,	  even	  Brzezinski	  remained	  more	  concerned	  about	  Soviet	  moves	   than	   about	   Iranian	   ones.	   He	   told	   Carter	   that	   the	   Administration	  should	  have	   improved	   intelligence	  on	  Soviet	   (not	   Iranian)	   capabilities	  and	  intentions, 199 	  and	   that	   it	   should	   have	   warned	   the	   Soviets	   that	   any	  interference	  would	  have	  represented	  a	   ‘matter	  of	   the	  utmost	  gravity.’200	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  Iran’s	  turmoil,	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  both	  Iranian	  and	  Soviet	  moves	  prevailed.	   The	   press	   soon	   picked	   up	   the	   leaked	   Presidential	   note,	   and	  assaulted	  Turner	   for	   the	   intelligence	   failure	  and	   the	  Administration	   for	   its	  approach	  to	  Iran.201	  	  With	  no	  clear	  policy	  and	  under	  pressure,	  the	  Administration	  started	  to	  split	  on	   the	   Iranian	   issue.	   Vance	   and	   others	   at	   State,	   building	   on	   Sullivan’s	  scenario,	   started	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	   US	   might	   have	   to	   move	   towards	  brokering	   an	   agreement.202 	  Brzezinski	   demonstrated	   only	   contempt	   for	  Sullivan’s	   ‘Pollyannaish’	   scenario.203	  He	  started	   to	   rely	  on	  private	   channels	  to	  the	  Shah,	  through	  Iranian	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  US	  Ardeshir	  Zahedi	  and	  to	  hope	  for	  an	  ‘iron	  fist’	  solution.204	  By	  the	  start	  of	  December	  1978,	  the	  choice	  confronting	  the	  Administration	  was	  clear.	  The	  US	  could	  either	  take	  an	  active	  role	   or	   could	   continue	   on	   its	   path	   of	  minimalism	   and	   inaction.	  On	   the	   6th,	  Sullivan	  wrote	  that:	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  p.	  366.	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An	   active	   US	   intervention	   into	   the	   center	   of	   the	   negotiations	  process	   would	   signal	   to	   sophisticated	   Persians	   that	   the	   US	   is	  prepared	   to	   accept	   some	   solution	   in	   Iran	   which	   foresees	  something	   other	   than	   the	   position	   which	   the	   Shah	   currently	  offered.	  	  Certainly,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  difficult	  to	  convince	  the	  opposition	  (especially,	  one	  could	  argue,	  after	  one	  year	  of	  total	  rebuffing),	  but	  that	  could	  be	  the	  most	  feasible	   alternative. 205 	  The	   day	   after	   Sullivan’s	   telegram,	   however,	   the	  Administration	   showed	   all	   its	   doubts	   when	   Carter	   replied	   to	   a	   question	  regarding	  the	  Shah’s	  chances	  of	  survival	  with:	  ‘I	  don't	  know.	  I	  hope	  so.	  This	  is	  something	  that	   is	   in	   the	  hands	  of	   the	  people	  of	   Iran.’	  206	  The	  reply	  was	  a	  honest	  assessment,	  but	   it	  had	  a	  massive	  effect	   in	   Iran.	  The	  opposition	  was	  emboldened,	  and	  the	  King	  was	  ‘plunged	  into	  deep	  depression’.207	  	  In	  December,	  in	  fact,	  the	  demonstrations	  had	  turned	  massive.	  The	  month	  of	  Moharram,	   in	  which	  Muslims	   commemorate	   the	   assassination	   of	   Hossein,	  brought	  millions	  of	  people	  onto	  the	  streets	  of	  Tehran.	  The	  US	  media	  started	  to	  report	  on	  the	  crisis	  with	  extreme	  attention.	  According	  to	  the	  Washington	  
Post,	   the	   demonstrations	   showed	   impressive	   organisational	   skills	   and	   an	  ability	   to	   maintain	   order.	   They	   were	   ‘an	   unmistakable	   show	   of	   no	  confidence	   in	   the	   monarch.’	   Demonstrators	   talked	   to	   journalists	   and	  admitted	   that	   they	   were	   dismayed	   by	   the	   monarch’s	   and	   by	   the	   US	  government’s	  behaviour.	  ‘The	  Shah	  should	  have	  got	  the	  message	  a	  long	  time	  ago	  –	  15	  years	  ago.	  Maybe	  his	  palace	   is	   so	  big	  he	  cannot	  hear	   the	  people.’	  Others	  added,	  ‘more	  than	  the	  Shah,	  the	  Americans	  should	  get	  the	  message.’	  Some	   were	   even	   helping	   the	   ‘communications’	   with	   the	   Administration.	  Banners	  read	   ‘No	  communists,	  we	  are	  Muslims.’208	  The	  US	  government	  did	  not	  listen.	  Carter,	  once	  again,	  went	  on	  the	  record	  exposing	  the	  US	  choice	  of	  a	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  of	  the	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  Correspondents	  Association,’	  7	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  [http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30273]	  (accessed	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  Memo,	  Sullivan	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  the	  White	  House,	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  8,	  1978.	  NLC-­‐2-­‐15-­‐4-­‐1-­‐8	  208	  Jonathan	  C.	  Randal,	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  march	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minimalist	  position	  and	  suggesting	  that	  he	  had	  complete	  faith	  in	  the	  Shah’s	  ability	  to	  stay	  on	  the	  throne.	  209	  As	  Sullivan	  reported,	  however,	  the	  Shah	  was	  unable	  to	  make	  up	  his	  mind.	  Sullivan	  encouraged	  a	  more	  active	  role	  for	  the	  US,	  through	  a	  national	  coalition	  or	  a	  Council	  of	  Notables.210	  In	  line	  with	  this	  effort,	   Henry	   Precht	   from	   the	   State	   Department	   met	   with	   Ibrahim	   Yazdi,	  who	   warned	   that	   the	   stubborn	   support	   for	   the	   Shah	   posed	   risks	   for	   the	  future	  US-­‐Iran	  relations	  and	  for	  the	  safety	  of	  Americans	  in	  Iran.211	  	  Confirmation	   of	   the	   need	   to	   move	   forward	   also	   came	   from	   an	   unlikely	  source.	  At	  the	  start	  of	  December,	  Brzezinski	  had	  asked	  George	  Ball	  to	  have	  a	  look	   at	   the	   Iranian	   situation	   and	   to	   file	   a	   report.	   To	   Brzezinski’s	   dismay,	  Ball’s	   report	   suggested	   a	   policy	   not	   too	   dissimilar	   from	   the	   State	  Department’s.	  In	  the	  SCC	  meeting	  on	  the	  13th	  of	  December,	  Ball	  warned	  that	  the	   Shah	   had	   been	   ‘irreparably	   damaged’	   and	   suggested	   the	   creation	   of	   a	  Council	   of	   Notables	   with	   reduced	   powers	   for	   the	   Shah.	   In	   particular,	   Ball	  stressed	  the	  immediate	  necessity	  of	  establishing	  a	  ‘disavowable	  channel’	  to	  Khomeini,	  who,	  by	   that	   time,	   led	   the	  opposition.	   ‘There	   is	  no	  easy	  or	   risk-­‐free	  way	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  situation,’	  Ball	  added,	  ‘it	  is	  necessary	  to	  balance	  the	  risks	   on	   either	   side.’	   Brzezinski	   antagonised	   Ball	   throughout	   the	   meeting	  suggesting	   a	   ‘wait	   and	   see’	   attitude.212	  In	   his	   memoirs,	   Brzezinski	   hinted	  that	   his	   suggestions	   of	   restraint	  were	   based	  not	   so	  much	  on	   cool	   analysis	  but	   on	   his	   preference	   for	   a	   military	   government.	   Arguing	   in	   favour	   of	   a	  military	   government	   or	   a	  military	   solution	  was	   hard.	   The	   only	   possibility	  was	  presenting	  it	  as	  a	  last	  resort.	  In	  his	  arguments,	  then,	  he	  would	  proceed	  to	   discredit	   other	   solutions,	   simply	   to	   make	   the	   ‘iron	   fist’	   option	   more	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palatable.213	  Ball	  and	  Warren	  Christopher,	  who	  was	  substituting	   for	  Vance,	  stressed	  the	  urgency	  of	  a	  decision,	  suggesting	  that	  there	  was	  only	  a	  narrow	  window	   of	   opportunity.	   With	   Secretary	   of	   Defense	   Brown	   supporting	  Brzezinski,	  however,	  caution	  won	  the	  day.	  Carter	  agreed;	  he	  was	  unwilling	  to	  tell	  another	  head	  of	  state	  what	  to	  do.214	  	  	  Lower	   ranking	   officials	   within	   the	   Administration	   perceived	   the	   risks	  inherent	  in	  inactivity.	  On	  the	  28th	  of	  December,	  in	  a	  Mini-­‐SCC	  meeting,	  David	  Aaron,	   from	   NSC,	   and	   Harold	   Saunders	   from	   State	   agreed	   that	   although	  senior	  officials	  found	  the	  prospects	  of	  an	  active	  role	  ‘unappetising;’	  the	  time	  had	   come	   to	   make	   a	   decision. 215 	  On	   the	   same	   day,	   however,	   the	  Administration	  confirmed	  its	  lack	  of	  any	  long-­‐term	  plan.	  Sullivan	  had	  asked	  for	   instructions	   on	   which	   was	   the	   best	   alternative	   among	   military	   rule,	  civilian	  government,	  and	  a	  Council	  of	  Notables.	  The	  Administration’s	   reply	  was	  that	  the	  Shah	  could	  do	  as	  he	  felt.216	  The	  only	  decision	  taken	  was	  to	  send	  General	   Robert	   Huyser,	   Deputy	   US	   European	   Commander,	   to	   Iran	   as	   a	  strong	  sign	  of	   the	  Administration’s	  support	   for	  the	  government.	   In	  spite	  of	  some	   uncertainty	   surrounding	   Huyser’s	   instructions,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	  General	  should	  have	  convinced	  the	  military	  to	  support	  the	  government	  and,	  in	  case	  of	  failure,	  he	  should	  have	  helped	  staging	  a	  coup.217	  In	  the	  first	  days	  of	  January,	   the	   Shah	   had	   finally	   named	   a	   new	   Prime	   Minister,	   Shahpour	  Bakhtiar.	   Being	   a	   ‘puppet’	   of	   the	   Shah,	   he	   started	   from	   an	   unpromising	  position,	   but	   the	   Administration	   maintained	   the	   behaviour	   that	   had	  characterised	  its	  approach	  to	  Iran:	  rejection	  of	  the	  opposition,	  blind	  support	  for	  the	  government,	  and	  Cold	  War	  myopia.	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First,	   no	   contact	  with	   the	   opposition	  was	   established.	   After	   a	   few	   days	   in	  Iran,	  even	  Huyser	  understood	  that	  contacts	  with	  Khomeini	  were	  necessary.	  He	  wrote	  to	  Washington	  that	  the	  Iranian	  military	  agreed	  that	  contacts	  with	  Khomeini	   needed	   to	   have	   the	   ‘highest	   priority,’	   and	   that	   the	   Bakhtiar	  government	  could	  not	  succeed	  without	   this	   ingredient.218	  A	  cohesive	  block	  now	   seemed	   to	   support	   this	   option,	   including	   Sullivan,	   Vance,219and	   US	  personnel	   in	   Iran.	   Organised	   with	   speed	   and	   efficiency	   in	   a	   clear	  demonstration	  that	  action	  was	  possible,	  the	  Eliot	  Mission	  aimed	  at	  a	  direct	  meeting	  between	  former	  State	  Department	  official	  Ted	  Eliot	  and	  Khomeini	  to	  urge	  the	  Ayatollah	  to	  moderate	  his	  demands	  and	  to	  give	  Bakhtiar	  time	  to	  work.	   Brzezinski	   takes	   credit	   in	   his	   memoirs	   first	   for	   having	   delayed	   the	  mission,	   and	   second	   for	   having	   convinced	   Carter	   –	   who	   was	   meeting	   in	  Guadeloupe	   with	   the	   leaders	   of	   Western	   Europe	   -­‐	   to	   cancel	   it.	   As	   usual,	  Brzezinski	  argued	  that	  a	  meeting	  would	  have	  demoralised	  Bakhtiar	  and	  the	  military. 220 	  Only	   an	   indirect	   contact	   was	   established	   through	   Warren	  Zimmerman,	  a	  political	  officer	  at	  the	  American	  Embassy	  in	  Paris,	  who	  knew	  nothing	  about	  Iran	  and	  less	  about	  Khomeini.221	  	  	  The	  abortion	  of	  the	  mission	  entailed	  both	  strategic	  and	  political	  risks	  for	  the	  Administration.	  Surprisingly,	  the	  Shah	  himself	  made	  some	  of	  the	  risks	  clear.	  Shocked	  by	  the	  decision,	  the	  Shah	  had	  asked	  Sullivan	  how	  the	  US	  expected	  to	   influence	  the	  revolutionary	   leadership	   if	   they	  refused	  to	  talk	  with	  them.	  Sullivan’s	  only	  reply	  at	  the	  time	  had	  been	  a	  vitriolic	  telegram	  to	  Carter	  that	  almost	  cost	  him	  his	   job.	  From	  this	  point,	  Carter	  completely	   lost	  confidence	  in	   his	   Ambassador. 222 	  The	   President,	   in	   fact,	   had	   agreed	   with	   the	  cancellation.	  He	  wrote	  in	  his	  diary	  at	  the	  time.	  ‘We’re	  sticking	  with	  the	  Shah	  until	  we	  see	  some	  clear	  alternative.’223	  Clear	  alternatives	  were	  in	  sight,	  and	  had	   been	   in	   sight	   for	   the	   previous	   two	   years,	   but	   the	   Administration	  was	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still	   unable	   to	   change	   course.	   This	   failing	   policy	   also	   confronted	   the	  Administration	   with	   short-­‐term	   political	   risks.	   The	   media,	   in	   fact,	   were	  attacking	   the	   Administration.	   The	   US,	   the	   Washington	   Post	   wrote,	  interpreting	  the	  general	  mood,	  was	  one	  of	  the	  few	  countries	  to	  continue	  ‘its	  policy	   of	   all	   out	   support	   for	   the	   Shah,	   even	   at	   the	   risk	   of	   jeopardizing	   the	  lives	   of	   US	   nationals’	   in	   Iran,	   ‘where	   protests	   are	   turning	   increasingly	  xenophobic.’224	  	  	  Second,	   the	  Administration	  demonstrated	  again	  a	  penchant	   for	   short-­‐term	  measures	   and	   minimalism.	   The	   Shah	   left	   Iran	   on	   the	   16th	   of	   January,	  completely	   discredited	   by	   the	   strength	   of	   the	   Revolution.	   The	   State	  Department	   Bureau	   of	   Intelligence	   and	   Research	   had	   forewarned	   the	  Administration	  suggesting	  that	  in	  the	  Iranian	  chaos	  Bakhtiar’s	  chances	  were	  slim	  since	  he	  did	  not	  have	  the	  support	  of	  Khomeini	  or	  of	  other	  Ayatollahs.225	  The	  Administration	  knew	  that	  Bakhtiar’s	   chances	  were	  extremely	   low	  and	  that	   his	   moves	   to	   win	   the	   opposition’s	   support	   were	   a	   ‘strategy	   of	  desperation,’	   and	   yet	   it	   desperately	   put	   all	   its	   weight	   behind	   this	   last	  horse.226	  Carter	  went	   repeatedly	   on	   the	   record	   stressing	   two	  main	   points.	  First,	   the	   US	   had	   full	   confidence	   in	   Bakhtiar	   and	   hoped	   for	   positive	  developments.227	  Again,	  the	  media	  exposed	  the	  foolishness	  of	  this	  position,	  stressing	   how	   the	   US	   had	   remained	   the	   only	   country	   with	   any	   faith	   in	  Bakhtiar.228	  Second,	   the	   US	   and	   the	   ‘American	   people’	   did	   not	   have	   the	  resources,	  the	  capacity,	  or	  the	  willingness	  to	  deliberately	  interfere	  with	  the	  situation	  in	  Iran.	  ‘We	  have	  no	  desire	  nor	  ability,’	  he	  stated:	  	  	   To	   intrude	  massive	  forces	   into	  Iran…to	  determine	  the	  outcome	  of	  domestic	  political	   issues.	  This	   is	   something	   that	  we	  have	  no	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intention	  of	  ever	  doing	  in	  another	  country.	  We've	  tried	  this	  once	  in	  Vietnam.	  It	  didn't	  work	  well,	  as	  you	  well	  know.229	  	  The	   Vietnam	   analogy	   came	   up	   several	   times	   in	   Carter’s	   interviews	   and	  public	  speeches	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  US	  minimalism	  and	  inaction.230	  As	  often	  during	   the	   Iran	  debate,	   these	  statements	  presented	   the	  choice	  as	   trade-­‐off	  between	  a	  risky	  choice	  and	  a	  risk-­‐free	  choice.	  The	  President	  often	  described	  the	  Administration’s	  policy	  as	  one	  of	  neutrality.231	  As	  Ball	  had	  understood,	  however,	   there	  was	   no	   risk-­‐free	   alternative.	  What	   the	   Administration	   did	  not	   realize	   was	   that	   with	   its	   choices	   it	   was	   already	   taking	   sides.	   In	  particular,	   the	   Administration	   seemed,	   once	   again,	   to	   take	   the	   side	   of	  repression.	   With	   strikes	   and	   demonstrations	   crippling	   the	   Bakhtiar	  government,	   in	   a	   replay	   of	   the	   ‘tear	   gas	   decision,’	   the	   Administration	  arranged	  the	  shipment	  of	  200,000	  barrels	  of	  gasoline	  and	  diesel	  to	  Iran,	  ‘to	  keep	   military	   and	   government	   vehicles	   running.’232	  In	   Iran,	   the	   decision	  confirmed	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Administration	  as	  an	  enemy	  of	  the	  Revolution.	  To	  be	   sure,	   Brzezinski’s	   push	   for	   a	   military	   solution	   ran	   against	   this	  minimalism,	  but	  his	  position	   came	  not	   from	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	   the	  Iranian	   situation,	   but	   from	   the	   conviction	   that	   either	   the	   Soviets	   were	  behind	  the	  Iranian	  turmoil,	  or	  they	  could	  take	  advantage	  from	  it.233	  	  Connected	   to	   this	   point,	   the	   third	   choice	   made	   by	   the	   Administration	  reduced	  Bakhtiar’s	   chances,	  with	  a	   final	  dash	  of	   ‘Cold	  War	  myopia.’	   In	   the	  instructions	   for	   Sullivan	   and	   Huyser	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   new	   government,	  Brzezinski	   wrote	   that	   ‘basic	   US	   support’	   remained	   unchanged.	   But	   the	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  (accessed	  16	  August	  2013),	  p.	  30.	  232	  Jim	  Hoagland,	  ‘Hill	  Report	  on	  Iran	  faults	  Carter,’	  The	  Washington	  Post,	  25	  January	  1979.	  233	  See	  Zbigniew	  Brzezinski,	  ‘Interview	  with	  CBS,’	  2	  May	  1978,	  Coll.	  13,	  NSA,	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  2,	  JCL;	  and	  Brzezinski,	  ‘NSC Weekly	  Report	  #57.’	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instructions	   also	   made	   clear	   that	   the	   new	   government	   should	   have	   been	  prevented	  from	  including	  any	  opposition	  leaders,	  either	  secular	  or	  religious,	  and	  should	  have	  put	  a	  premium	  of	  the	  attitude	  towards	  the	  West.234	  With	  no	  credibility	  and	  no	  chances	  to	  extend	  his	  support,	  Bakhtiar	  was	  doomed.	  On	  the	   1st	   of	   February,	   the	   Revolution	   was	   completed	   with	   the	   return	   of	  Khomeini	   to	   Iran	   and	   the	   appointment,	   by	   Khomeini,	   of	   a	   parallel	  government,	   with	   Bazargan	   as	   Prime	   Minister.	   With	   its	   short-­‐term	  measures,	   its	   minimalism,	   and	   with	   its	   continuous	   efforts	   to	   manage	   the	  target	   risks	   of	   a	   weakened	   Iranian	   government,	   the	   Administration	   had	  chosen	  the	  wrong	  side	  of	  the	  Revolution.	  	  	  
6.3.6	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk	  trade-­‐off	  6:	  Revolutionary	  Government	  vs.	  the	  Shah	  
6.3.6.1	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk	  trade-­‐off	  6a:	  ‘smoke	  signals’	  vs.	  bombshells	  
	  One	  day	   after	   the	  departure	   of	   the	   Shah,	  Harold	   Saunders,	   from	   the	   State	  Department,	   had	   been	   summoned	   by	   Congress	   to	   justify	   the	   dreadful	  performance	   of	   the	   Administration.	   Saunders	   had	   argued	   that	   the	  Administration	   had	   always	   been	   committed	   to	   a	   ‘free,	   stable	   and	  independent,’	   Iran	   and	   that	   the	   Administration	   was,	   now,	   ready	   to	  cooperate	  with	   the	   new	   government.	   The	   effort	   backfired.	   In	  what	  would	  soon	  become	  a	  popular	   refrain,	  Congressmen	   from	   the	   right	   criticised	   the	  Administration	  for	  not	  having	  done	  enough	  for	  the	  Shah.	  Congressman	  Paul	  Findley	  (R-­‐IL)	  criticised	  the	  Administration	  for	  its	  intelligence	  performance	  and	   for	  a	   lack	  of	   ‘great	  power’	  attitude.	  From	  the	   left,	  Congressman	  Gerry	  Studds	  (D-­‐Mass)	  charged	  that	  the	  US	  had	  been	  crucial	  in	  keeping	  in	  power	  ‘one	   of	   the	  most	   absolute,	   brutal,	   and	   total	   dictators,’	   arming	   him	   for	   the	  previous	  30	  years.	  Deep	  anti-­‐Americanism	  was	  more	  than	  understandable:	  	   When	  was	  the	  last	  time	  we	  were	  committed	  to	  a	  free	  Iran?	  How	  could	   you	   convince	   any	   Iranian	   we	   were	   committed	   to	   a	   free	  Iran?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  234	  Memo,	  Brzezinski	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State	  and	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  ‘Guidance	  to	  Sullivan/Huyser,’	  19	  January	  1979,	  Collection	  33,	  Brzezinski	  donated,	  Box	  20,	  Folder	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  JCL.	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‘It	  seems	  to	  me,’	  Congressman	  Donald	  Pease	  (D-­‐OH)	  concluded,	  	  	   That	  we	  are	  at	  this	  point	  putting	  the	  best	  light	  that	  we	  can	  on	  a	  bad	   situation	   by	   saying,	  well,	   things	   have	   gone	  wrong,	   but	  we	  agree	  on	  basics	  and	  sooner	  or	  later	  we	  will	  get	  back	  together.	  235	  	  This	  was	  precisely	  the	  policy	  chosen	  by	  the	  Administration.	  It	  started	  from	  the	   assumption	   that	   all	   was	   well	   for	   the	   US	   in	   Iran.	   And,	   even	   more	  problematic,	   it	   tried	   to	   make	   amends	   for	   previous	   mistake	   with	   a	  vengeance;	   what	   Bill	   calls	   ‘suffocation	   by	   embrace.’236 	  US	   officials	   and	  businessmen	  started	  to	  return	  in	  force	  to	  Iran,	  building	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  new	  government	  and	  the	  people	  would	  be	  grateful.	  237	  	  	  This	   conclusion,	   however,	   built	   on	   extremely	   shaky	   foundations.	   The	  situation	   of	   the	   US	   and	   of	   the	   intelligence	   community	   was	   one	   of	   deep	  uncertainty.	   Uncertainty	   concerned	   both	   lack	   of	   knowledge	   of	   (and	  impossibility	   of	   knowing)	   the	   situation	   in	   Iran;	   and	   uncertainty	   as	   to	   the	  consequences	   of	   possible	   US	   action.	   As	   to	   the	   latter,	   the	   options	   were	  spelled	  out	  in	  a	  tense	  SCC	  meeting	  on	  the	  11th	  of	  February.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	   Chapter	   3,	   uncertainty	   led	   to	   the	   development	   of	   options.	   After	  suggestions	   from	  Huyser,	   three	  options	  were	   taken	   into	  account.	  Option	  A	  assumed	   accommodation	   between	   the	  military	   and	  Bazargan,	  with	   the	  US	  trying	  to	  extract	  concessions.	  Option	  B	  assumed	  no	  role	  for	  the	  US	  with	  the	  military	   remaining	   in	   the	   barracks	   to	   let	   the	   political	   situation	   play	   out.	  Option	  C	  assumed	  a	  military	  coup.	  In	  spite	  of	  concerns	  that	  the	  military	  did	  not	  have	  the	  willingness	  or	  ability	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  coup,	  Brzezinski	  remained	  of	   the	   opinion	   that	   the	   US	   should	   have	   acted	   ‘like	   a	   big	   power.’	   This,	   he	  acknowledged,	   might	   have	   created	   a	   dangerous	   risk	   of	   escalation	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  235	  US	  House	  of	  Representative,	  ‘US	  Policy	  toward	  Iran,	  January	  1979,’	  Subcommittee	  on	  Europe	  and	  the	  Middle	  East,	  Committee	  on	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  96th	  Congress,	  First	  session,	  January	  1979	  (Washington:	  US	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1979),	  p.	  33,	  p.	  40	  and	  p.	  48.	  236	  Bill,	  The	  Eagle,	  p.	  272.	  237	  ‘Iran	  Update,’	  16	  July,	  1979,	  DED,	  Vol.	  4	  [http://ia700409.us.archive.org/10/items/DocumentsFromTheU.s.EspionageDen/v04_text.pdf]	  (accessed	  16	  August	  2013).	  [http://ia700409.us.archive.org/10/items/DocumentsFromTheU.s.EspionageDen/v04_text.pdf]	  (accessed	  16	  August	  2013),	  p.	  12.	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short-­‐term,	  but	   it	  could	  have	  strengthened	  the	  US	  role	   in	  the	  region	   in	  the	  longer-­‐term. 238 	  	   Brzezinski	   continued	   to	   push	   for	   a	   military	   solution.	  However,	   even	   on	   this	   score,	   as	   on	   contacts	   with	   Khomeini,	   Huyser	  disappointed	  him,	  stressing	  that	  the	  only	  chance	  of	  a	  military	  solution	  was	  through	   ‘total	   material	   support’	   from	   the	   US.239	  This	   solution	   had	   always	  been	   unacceptable	   for	   Carter	   who	   had	   a	   keen	   sense	   of	   the	   possibility	   of	  escalation.240	  More	   generally,	   uncertainty	   as	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	   Soviet	  reaction	  and	  as	  to	  the	  consequences	  of	  a	  stronger	  involvement	  ranked	  high	  among	   the	  officials	   at	   the	  meeting.	  As	   to	   lack	  of	  knowledge,	   the	  US	   lacked	  the	  information	  and	  had	  no	  possibility	  of	  collecting	  it.	  ‘We	  simply	  don’t	  have	  the	   bios,’	   Henry	   Precht	   wrote,	   ‘ignorance	   of	   events	   in	   Iran	   is	   massive.’241	  Questions	   such	   as	   ‘What	   is	   an	   Ayatollah?’	   were	   the	   norm	   at	   meetings	  attended	  by	  senior	  foreign	  policy	  officials.242	  	  Furthermore,	   the	   US	   efforts	   to	   collect	   information	   were	   rebuffed.	   The	  Embassy	   in	   Iran	   had	   been	   a	   ‘symbol	   of	   everything	   the	   nascent	   upheaval	  hated	  and	  feared,’243	  a	  den	  of	  spies.	  After	  an	  attack	  on	  the	  14th	  of	  February,	  Ambassador	  Sullivan	  had	  left	  the	  country.	  The	  Embassy	  had	  been	  reinforced	  with	  new	  defensive	  installations.	  Officials	  were	  now	  working	  in	  a	  reinforced	  compound.	   ‘Americans	   inside	   saw	   these	   changes	   as	   purely	   defensive;	   the	  picture	   they	   presented	   strongly	   encouraged	   suspicion.’244	  US	   personnel,	  reduced	   throughout	   the	   revolution,	   now	   flooded	   Iran,	   many	   lured	   by	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  238	  SCC,	  Minutes,	  11	  February	  1979.	  239	  Memo	  for	  the	  record,	  ‘Secure	  Conference	  Phone	  Call	  with	  General	  Huyser	  in	  Europe	  and	  General	  Jones	  and	  Deputy	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Duncan,’	  11	  February,	  1979,	  Collection	  33,	  Brzezinski	  donated,	  Box	  29,	  Folder	  15,	  JCL.	  240	  Dumbrell,	  The	  Carter,	  p.	  166.	  241	  Letter,	  Henry	  Precht	  to	  Laingen,	  ‘Official-­‐Informal-­‐Confidential,’	  20	  July	  1979,	  DED,	  Vol.	  15,	  [http://ia700409.us.archive.org/10/items/DocumentsFromTheU.s.EspionageDen/v15_text.pdf]	  (accessed	  16	  August	  2013),	  p.	  127.	  242	  Henry	  Precht,	  ‘The	  Iranian	  Revolution:	  an	  oral	  history	  with	  Henry	  Precht,	  then	  State	  Department	  Desk	  Officer,’	  Middle	  East	  Journal,	  Vol.	  58,	  No.	  1	  (Winter	  2004),	  p.	  16.	  243	  Bowden,	  Guests,	  p.	  4.	  244	  Bowden,	  Guests,	  p.	  7.	  
	   219	  
possible	   career	  prospects	   inherent	   in	   a	  dangerous	  post	   such	  as	  Tehran.245	  Efforts	  at	  collecting	  information,	  however,	  went	  nowhere.	  And	  what	  is	  more,	  these	   efforts	   were	   coupled	   with	   a	   remarkable	   lack	   of	   good	   signs	   from	  Washington.	  The	  new	  chargé	  d’affaires	  in	  Tehran,	  Bruce	  Laingen,	  had	  soon	  lamented	   that	   the	   Administration	  was	   not	   sending	   positive	   signals	   to	   the	  new	   government.	   ‘Public	   noises	   from	   the	   government	   concerning	   us,’	   he	  wrote,	  ‘have	  recently	  been	  generally	  positive.’	  ‘I	  am	  cordially	  received	  at	  all	  levels,’	   he	   added.	   For	   this	   reason,	   the	   Iranian	   government	   was	   expecting	  some	  positive	  ‘smoke	  signals’	  from	  the	  US.246	  But	  none	  had	  been	  received.	  	  	  The	  US	   soon	   remained	   the	   only	   great	   power	   not	   officially	   recognising	   the	  Revolution.	  In	  a	  SCC	  meeting,	  the	  Administration	  had	  concluded	  that	  no	  note	  of	   recognition	   would	   be	   sent	   to	   the	   new	   government.	   It	   was	   against	   US	  practice	   and	   it	   was	   considered	   unnecessary	   for	   the	   new	   government.247	  Washington	  delayed	   the	  nomination	  of	  a	  new	  Ambassador.	  More	  crucially,	  the	   US,	   building	   on	   the	   assumption	   of	   the	   ‘irrationality’	   of	   the	   clerics,	  continued	   to	   refuse	   to	  meet	  with	   Khomeini,	   although	   other	   great	   powers,	  including	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  did.	  The	  Administration	  had	  also	  betrayed	  early	  promises	   to	   the	   Revolutionary	   Government,	   such	   as	   the	   delivery	   of	   spare	  parts.	   Furthermore,	   Iranian	   authorities	   charged,	   US	   officials	   in	   Iran	  continued	  to	  provide	  visas	  to	  the	  former	  Shah’s	  men	  and	  to	  US	  contacts,	  but	  not	   to	  people	  with	  medical	  needs.	  When	   the	  US	  policy	  on	  visas	  changed	   it	  did	   not	   improve	   the	   situation.	   US	   personnel	   started	   to	   consider	   visa	  applications	   only	   if	   the	   applicant	   satisfied	   US	   intelligence	   needs. 248	  ‘Unfortunately,’	   Bazargan	   told	   Laingen,	   ‘the	   US	   had	   not	   responded	   in	   any	  positive	  way	   that	   the	   PGOI	   [Provisional	   Government	   of	   Iran]	   could	   use	   to	  demonstrate	   the	   worth	   of	   its	   relationship	   with	   US	   to	   the	   Iranian	   people.’	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  Vol.	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  247	  SCC,	  ‘Summary	  of	  conclusions,’	  13	  February	  1979,	  Collection	  33,	  Brzezinski	  donated,	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  29,	  Folder	  18,	  JCL.	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‘You	  have	  only	  given	  lip	  service	  to	  better	  relations,’	  he	  added,	  ‘and	  we	  have	  only	  heard	  promises	  from	  you.’249	  	  	  Noises	  from	  Washington	  were	  far	  from	  encouraging.	  When	  the	  nomination	  of	   a	  new	  Ambassador	   seemed	  close	  and	  a	  meeting	  with	  Khomeini	   seemed	  possible,250	  the	  US	  Senate	  passed	   the	   Javits	  Resolution	  (from	  Congressman	  Jacob	  Javits,	  R-­‐NY,	  who	  presented	  it)	  condemning	  executions	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  new	  regime.	  For	  the	  Iranian	  government,	  the	  resolution	  was	  a	  clear	  sign	  of	   US	   hypocrisy.	  Where	   was	   the	   Senate	   when	   the	   firing	   squads	   were	   the	  Shah’s	   ones?251	  Foreign	   Minister	   Yazdi	   defined	   the	   resolution	   as	   a	   direct	  intervention	   in	   Iran’s	   internal	  affairs	  and	  a	  source	  of	  deep	  concern	   for	   the	  new	   government.252	  The	   resolution	   was	   particularly	   hideous	   since	   Javits’	  wife	  used	  to	  work	  for	  the	  Shah.253	  Similarly,	  Senator	  Henry	  Jackson	  (D-­‐WA)	  on	  Meet	  the	  Press	  assured	  the	  public	  that	  the	  revolution	  was	  not	  going	  to	  last	  and	   Iran	  was	  on	   the	  path	   towards	  disintegration.254	  As	  Laingen	  wrote,	   the	  interview	   ‘hit	   the	  upper	   levels	  of	   the	   foreign	  ministry	  as	  a	  bombshell.’255	  If	  these	   developments	   were	   certainly	   beyond	   the	   Administration’s	  possibilities	  of	  control,	  no	  clear	  positive	  smoke	  signal	  followed.	  	  This	   choice	   was	   remarkably	   short-­‐sighted.	   The	   moderates,	   such	   as	  Bazargan,	  were	  the	  only	  ones	  willing	  to	  continue	  a	  cordial	  relationship	  with	  the	  US,	  but	  the	  rise	  of	  fundamentalism	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  US	  ‘forthcomingness’	  continuously	  undermined	   their	  position.	  The	  new	  government,	   the	  Deputy	  Prime	   Minister	   told	   Laingen,	   was	   having	   difficulties	   in	   ‘controlling	   the	  emotionalism’	   of	   the	   Iranian	   press	   and	   public	   opinion.	   The	  US	   could	   have	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  to	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  State,	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  Bazargan,’	  12	  August	  1979,	  DED,	  Vol.	  18,	  pp.	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  ‘Interview	  with	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  p.	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  BBC,	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  Part	  4,	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  169	  254	  Ira	  Shapiro	  has	  recently	  written	  that	  from	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Carter	  Administration,	  Jackson’s	  ‘overriding	  priority’	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  to	  become	  Carter’s	  main	  adversary	  on	  national	  security.	  Shapiro,	  The	  Last,	  p.	  60.	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  Bruce	  Laingen,	  Telegram	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	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  in	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  US,’	  28	  October	  1979,	  DED,	  Vol.	  7,	  pp.	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done	  more	  to	  solve	  the	   ‘misunderstanding.’	  Private	  expressions	  of	  support	  (from	  Laingen)	  were	   fine,	  but	  US	  officials	  should	  have	  done	  more	   to	  make	  public	   the	   ‘private	   expressions	   of	   understanding.’256	  In	   this	   sense,	   the	   US	  government	   adopted	   contradictory	   and	   short-­‐term	   policies.	   Starting	   from	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  US	  position	  in	  Iran	  was	  relatively	  safe,	  it	  made	  the	  contacts	  with	  the	  moderates	  in	  Iran	  visible.	  This	  discredited	  the	  moderates	  in	   the	   eyes	   of	   the	   Iranian	  population	   and	  of	   the	   clerics.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	  however,	   it	   refused	   policies	   that	   could	   strengthen	   the	   hands	   of	   the	  moderates	  and	  could	  demonstrate	  the	  value	  of	  cooperation	  with	  the	  US.	  The	  situation	   slightly	   improved	   in	   the	   following	   months	   with	   meetings	   with	  Yazdi,	   and	   at	   the	   military	   level.	   Furthermore,	   as	   Mark	   Gasiorowski	   has	  demonstrated,	   several	  meetings	   occurred	  with	   the	   purpose	   of	   intelligence	  exchanges.	  257	  From	   May	   1979	   onwards,	   the	   US	   shared	   information	   with	  Iranian	  authorities	  on	   local	  uprisings	   in	   Iran	  and,	   in	  October	  1979,	   on	   the	  possibility	   of	   an	   Iraqi	   attack.258	  Similarly,	   as	   Christian	   Emery	   has	   recently	  suggested,	  the	  United	  States	  continued	  the	  policy	  of	  meeting	  with	  moderate	  figures	   in	   Iran	   but	   these	   meetings	   were	   informed	   more	   by	   US	   Cold	   War	  needs	   than	   by	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   volatile	   situation	   in	   Iran.259	  The	  admission	  of	  the	  Shah	  to	  New	  York	  derailed	  any	  positive	  development.	  	  
6.3.6.2	   Risk	   vs.	   Risk	   trade-­‐off	   6b:	   the	   Shah	   in	  New	  York	   vs.	   the	   Americans	   in	  
Iran	  	  When	  the	  Shah	  left	   Iran,	   the	  Administration	  extended	  an	  invitation	  to	  take	  refuge	   in	   the	  United	  States.	  The	  Shah	  had	   refused,	  preferring	   to	   remain	   in	  the	  Middle	   East.	   According	   to	   Vance,	   the	   decision	   aimed	   at	   punishing	   the	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  State,	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  DED,	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  Mark	  Gasiorowski,	  ‘US	  Intelligence	  Assistance	  to	  Iran,	  May-­‐October	  1979,’	  Middle	  East	  Journal,	  Volume	  66,	  No.	  4	  (Autumn	  2012),	  pp.	  613-­‐627.	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  also	  David	  Crist,	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  War	  (New	  York:	  Penguin	  Books,	  2012),	  Chapter	  1.	  259	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  Policy.	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Administration	   for	   previous	   mistakes,	   and	   at	   humiliating	   Carter260.	   More	  likely,	   the	   Shah	   remained	   in	   the	   Middle	   East	   with	   hopes	   of	   eventually	  regaining	   the	   throne.	  261	  The	   Shah	   had	   stopped	   first	   in	   Egypt	   and	   then	   in	  Morocco,	  where	   it	  was	  clear	   that	   the	  King	  was	  not	  welcomed.	  At	   the	  same	  time,	   Henry	   Kissinger	   had	   started	   a	   campaign	   to	   pressure	   the	  Administration	   to	   admit	   the	   Shah:	   ‘We	   owe	   the	   Shah	   of	   Iran	   at	   least	   the	  decency	  of	  recognizing	  that	  he	  was	  a	  good	  friend.’262	  When	  the	  difficulties	  in	  Morocco	   increased,	   the	   Pahlavis	   unleashed	   all	   their	   resources.	   Princess	  Ashraf,	   the	   sister	   of	   the	   Shah,	   contacted	   David	   Rockefeller,	   a	   long-­‐time	  friend	  of	  the	  Shah,	  and	  Henry	  Kissinger.	  The	  group	  increased	  the	  pressure.	  The	  Administration	  was	  not	  convinced.	  Carter	  and	  his	  advisers	  understood	  that	   the	   admission	   entailed	   a	   risk	   of	   hostage	   taking,263	  and	   imperilled	   the	  long-­‐term	  relationship	  with	  the	  Revolutionary	  Government.	  	  	  Pressure	   from	   the	  Kissinger	   group	   increased.	   The	  New	  York	   attorney	   and	  Washington	   ‘wise	  man’	   John	  McCloy	  wrote	  to	  the	  State	  Department	  and	  to	  Brzezinski,	   to	  push	   for	  admission.	  Any	   failure	   to	  do	  so,	  he	  warned,	  or	   ‘any	  equivocation’	  would	  be	  taken	  as	  ‘persuasive	  evidence	  of	  our	  unreliability	  as	  protector	  of	  our	  former	  allies.’	  McCloy	  explicitly	  dismissed	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  trade-­‐off,	   between	   the	   admission	  of	   the	   Shah	  and	   risks	   for	   the	  Americans.	  The	  problem	  for	  the	  US	  government,	  he	  wrote,	  was	  not	  so	  much	  	   Convenience	  or	  inconvenience,	  or	  even	  of	  risk	  to	  its	  property	  or	  its	  personnel.	  It	  relates	  to	  the	  integrity,	  the	  standing	  and	  in	  the	  longer	   range,	   perhaps,	   to	   the	   security	   of	   the	   United	   States	  itself.264	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  ‘AM-­‐Iran-­‐Kissinger,’	  Collection	  33,	  Brzezinski	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  Letters	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  to	  Warren	  Christopher	  and	  Zbigniew	  Brzezinski,	  16-­‐27	  April	  1979,	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	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  CO-­‐31,	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  Confidential	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The	  Administration	  confirmed	  its	  refusal,	  showing	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  Iranian	   government’s	   suspicions.	   265 	  McCloy,	   Kissinger,	   and	   Rockefeller	  established	  a	  sort	  of	  ‘committee’	  to	  increase	  the	  pressure	  both	  publicly	  and	  privately.	   Every	   few	   weeks,	   Kissinger	   would	   release	   a	   public	   statement	  condemning	  the	  Administration.	  ‘A	  man	  who	  for	  37	  years	  was	  a	  friend	  of	  the	  United	  States,’	  he	  made	  clear	  at	  a	  Harvard	  Business	  School	  dinner,	   ‘should	  not	  be	  treated	  like	  a	  Flying	  Dutchman	  who	  cannot	  find	  a	  port	  of	  call.’266	  The	  committee	  also	  arranged	  the	  travel	  of	  the	  Shah	  to	  Mexico,	  making	  the	  issue	  harder	   to	   ignore.	   Questioned	   by	   Vance	   on	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	   Shah’s	  admission,	  Laingen	  was	  clear.	  He	  wrote	   that	   Iran	  depended	  on	  the	   ‘whims	  and	   ultimate	   control	   of	   the	   Ayatollah.’	   In	   the	   prevailing	   atmosphere	   of	  suspicion,	   the	   US	   remained	   a	   ‘convenient	   scapegoat.’	   Giving	   refuge	   to	   the	  Shah	  would	  trigger	  demonstrations	  against	  the	  Embassy,	  with	  the	  risk	  that	  the	  attacks	  might	  even	  go	  beyond	  the	  one	  in	  February.	  To	  be	  sure,	  Laingen	  was	   not	   opposed	   to	   the	   admission	   in	   itself,	   but	   he	   warned	   that	   the	  Administration	   needed	   to	   look	   at	   long-­‐term	   risks.	   ‘We	   need	   some	   added	  cushion,’	  he	  wrote,	   ‘before	  we	  accept	  whatever	   risks	   there	  may	  be	   for	  our	  interests	  in	  doing	  what	  I	  believe	  we	  eventually	  should	  do	  –	  allow	  the	  Shah	  refuge	  in	  the	  US.’267	  	  In	   August,	   Princess	   Ashraf	   wrote	   a	   letter	   to	   Carter	   criticising	   the	  Administration	   for	   its	   subservience	   to	   the	   Ayatollah’s	   blackmail.	   268	  Rockefeller	   and	   Kissinger	   started	   to	   call	   Brzezinski	   daily	   to	   push	   for	  admission.	   According	   to	   Thomas	   Pickering,	   Assistant	   Secretary	   of	   State	   at	  the	   time,	   the	   intensity	   of	   this	   pressure	   ‘bulldozed,’	   ‘completely	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overwhelmed’	   the	   Administration.	   269 	  As	   Brzezinski	   made	   clear	   in	   his	  memoirs,	  serious	  political	  risks	  were	  also	  involved	  in	  the	  decision.	  Kissinger	  had	  started	  to	  play	  with	  Carter’s	  political	  fortunes.	  He	  linked	  the	  admission	  of	   the	   Shah	   to	   a	   positive	   attitude	   towards	   the	   incoming	   SALT	   vote.270	  The	  administration,	   however,	   had	   assured	   Yazdi	   that,	   in	   spite	   of	   strong	  pressures	  there	  had	  been	  no	  change	  of	  policy.	  271	  	  The	  discovery	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  illness	  completely	  altered	  the	  scenario.	  Laingen	  wrote	   to	   Vance	   that	   news	   of	   the	   illness	  would	   not	   have	   any	   ‘ameliorative	  effect’	   on	   Iranian	   reaction.272	  The	   Shah’s	   sickness,	   however,	   fully	   exposed	  the	  political	  risk	  that	  declining	  admission	  entailed.	  ‘Mr.	  President,’	  Hamilton	  Jordan	  told	  Carter,	  ‘if	  the	  Shah	  dies	  in	  Mexico,	  can	  you	  imagine	  the	  field	  day	  that	  Kissinger	  will	  have	  with	  it?	  He	  will	  say	  first	  that	  you	  caused	  the	  Shah’s	  downfall	   and	   now	   you’ve	   killed	   him.’	   The	   President	   initially	   rejected	   the	  political	   argument.	   According	   to	   Jordan,	   the	   President	   exploded:	   ‘To	   hell	  with	   Henry	   Kissinger.	   I	   am	   the	   President	   of	   this	   country.’273	  One	   by	   one,	  however,	   his	   advisors	   shifted	   sides	   and	   started	   to	   support	   the	   admission.	  Carter	  was	  the	  last	  to	  concede.	  ‘What	  are	  you	  guys	  going	  to	  advise	  me	  to	  do,’	  he	   asked	   his	   main	   advisors	   on	   the	   19th	   of	   October,	   ‘if	   they	   overrun	   our	  Embassy	  and	  take	  our	  people	  hostage?’274	  	  President	  Carter	  recently	  suggested	  that	  two	  main	  factors	  contributed	  to	  his	  acceptance:	  the	  humanitarian	  concerns	  and	  the	  assurances	  from	  the	  Iranian	  authorities	   that	   the	   security	   of	   the	   Americans	   could	   be	   guaranteed.275	  If	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  269	  James	  Blight,	  Janet	  M.	  Lang,	  Hussein	  Banai,	  Malcolm	  Byrne,	  and	  John	  Tirman,	  Becoming	  Enemies	  (New	  York:	  Rowan	  and	  Littlefield,	  2012),	  p.	  92.	  270	  Brzezinski,	  Power,	  p.	  474.	  271	  State	  Department,	  Telegram	  to	  (unclear),	  ‘PGOI	  suspicions	  about	  the	  Shah,’	  date	  unclear	  (after	  30	  July),	  DED,	  Vol.	  7,	  p.	  276.	  272	  Telegram,	  Laingen	  to	  Newsom,	  20	  September	  1979,	  DED,	  Vol.	  2,	  [http://ia700409.us.archive.org/10/items/DocumentsFromTheU.s.EspionageDen/v02_text.pdf]	  (accessed	  16	  August	  2013).	  273	  Jordan,	  Crisis,	  p.	  31.	  274	  Jordan,	  Crisis,	  p.	  27.	  275	  Jimmy	  Carter,	  interview	  with	  the	  author,	  30	  July	  2011.	  	  
	   225	  
doubts	  have	  emerged	  as	  to	  the	  humanitarian	  necessity	  of	  the	  admission,276	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  evidence	  reveals	  that	  assurances	  are	  nowhere	  to	  be	  found.	  Gary	  Sick,	  William	  Quandt	  and	  Henry	  Precht	  have	  all	  recently	  confirmed	  this	  point.277In	   the	   admission	   decision,	   the	   Administration	   confirmed	  many	   of	  the	   traits	   that	   had	   characterised	   its	   policy	   towards	   Iran	   from	   the	   start:	  short-­‐termism,	   the	   primacy	   of	   the	   Shah,	   the	   dismissal	   of	   the	   opposition’s	  concerns,	  and	  a	  disregard	  for	  longer-­‐term	  risks.	  	  	  Laingen	  and	  Precht	  met	  with	   Iranian	  authorities	   the	  day	  before	   the	  Shah’s	  admission	  to	  the	  US	  to	  communicate	  the	  decision.	  As	  if	  the	  situation	  was	  not	  sensitive	  enough,	  Brzezinski	  had	  made	  clear	  that	  the	  two	  envoys	  should	  not	  give	   the	   impression	   of	   asking	   for	   approval;	   the	   US	   needed	   to	   show	  decisiveness.278	  When	  Laingen	  related	  the	  news	  of	  the	  admission	  to	  Deputy	  Prime	  Minister	  Abbas-­‐Amin	  Entezam,	  Yazdi	   and	  Bazargan,	  he	   stressed	   the	  humanitarian	   concerns,	   but	   the	   reaction	  was	   ‘mixed,’	   ‘generally	   subdued.’	  Entezam	   and	  Bazargan	   proved	   concerned,	   Yazdi	   started	   to	   emphasize	   the	  problem	   that	   this	   could	   create	   for	   the	   US	   in	   Iran.	   However,	   he	   suggested	  some	  measures	  that	  could	  have	  eased	  Iranian	  rage.	  First,	  he	  understood	  that	  Mexico	   was	   not	   ideal,	   but	   the	   Shah	   could	   have	   gone	   to	   Western	   Europe.	  Second,	   if	   the	  US	  decided	   to	  proceed,	   he	   suggested	   that	   treatment	  outside	  New	   York	   might	   have	   been	   ‘marginally	   better.’	   Iranians,	   he	   warned,	  considered	  New	  York	  a	  centre	  of	   ‘Rockefeller	  and	  Zionist	   influence.’	  Third,	  to	   reduce	   Iranian	   scepticism	   Iranian	   doctors	  might	   have	   visited	   the	   Shah.	  Fourth,	   the	   monarch	   should	   have	   pledged	   to	   refrain	   from	   any	   political	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activity.279	  Regardless	  of	  the	  precautionary	  measures	  taken,	  however,	  Yazdi	  had	  warned	  Laingen	  that	  the	  US	  was	  opening	  a	  ‘Pandora’s	  box’	  and	  that	  the	  ensuing	  chaos	  would	  have	  been	  beyond	  his	  control.280	  	  	  The	  Shah	  was	  admitted;	  and	  only	  the	  fourth	  condition	  was	  accepted.	  Chaos	  ensued.	  Demonstrations	  threatened	  the	  Embassy	  on	  the	  1st	  of	  November.281	  Khomeini	  took	  advantage	  of	   the	  situation	  calling	  for	  attacks	  on	  the	  US	  and	  suggesting	   that	   the	   moderates	   had	   been	   discredited.	   On	   the	   same	   day,	  Khomeini’s	   words	   seemed	   to	   receive	   confirmation.	   In	   Algiers,	   for	   the	  celebrations	   of	   Algerian	   independence,	   Brzezinski	   met	   with	   Yazdi	   and	  Bazargan.	   Although	   it	   is	   still	   unclear	   who	   invited	   whom,	   the	   meeting	  represented	  the	  final	  straw.	  Photos	  of	  handshakes	  and	  smiles	  between	  Yazdi	  and	  Brzezinski	  were	  published	   in	  all	   Iranian	  newspapers,	   condemning	   the	  moderates.	  On	   the	   4th,	   the	   ‘Muslim	   students	   followers	   of	   the	   Imam’s	   line’	  broke	  into	  the	  American	  compound	  to	  sit-­‐in	  and	  make	  a	  statement.282	  They	  thought	  they	  were	  going	  to	  stay	  there	  for	  two	  or	  three	  days.	  They	  stayed	  for	  444,	   keeping	   US	   personnel	   hostage,	   changing	   the	   history	   of	   US-­‐Iran	  relations,	  and	  sealing	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  Carter’s	  Presidency.	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6.4	  CONCLUSION	  
To	  sum	  up,	  we	  gambled	  on	  the	  Shah,	  	  
and	  for	  many	  years,	  our	  gamble	  paid	  off.	  	  
I	  have	  no	  regrets	  on	  this	  score.283	  Anthony	  Parsons.	  	  Describing	   the	   Algiers	   meeting	   in	   his	   memoirs,	   Brzezinski	   acknowledged	  that	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  meeting	  presented	  risks	  on	  both	  sides.	  If	  he	  refused	  the	  meeting,	  refusal	  might	  have	  been	  interpreted	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  hostility;	  if	  he	  accepted,	   conspiracy	   theories	  might	   have	   flourished.284	  This	   recognition	   is	  particularly	   surprising	   since,	   in	   its	   approach	   to	   Iran,	   the	   Carter	  Administration	  had	  consistently	  dismissed	  risks	  inherent	  in	  its	  choices.	  	  	  In	   line	  with	   the	   first	   hypothesis	   set	   out	   in	  Chapter	   3,	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	  Carter	   Administration’s	   polices	   has	   suggested	   that	   uncertainty	   played	   a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  initial	  posture	  of	  the	  Administration.	  The	  Administration	  seemed	  unsure	  as	   to	  America’s	   role	   in	   the	  world	  and	   tried	   to	   chart	   a	  new	  course.	   When	   it	   came	   to	   Iran,	   the	   Administration	   operated	   in	   an	  informational	  vacuum.	  The	  cuts	  of	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  Nixon-­‐Kissinger-­‐Ford	  triumvirate	  and	  vested	  interests	  in	  Washington	  meant	  that	  the	  Administration	  was	  not	  only	  unable	  to	  gather	  the	  right	  answers,	  but	  also	  unable	  to	  ask	  the	  right	  questions.	  Developments	  in	  Iran	  represented	  an	  ‘unknown	   unknown.’	   Beyond	   this	   background,	   uncertainty	   also	   played	   an	  ‘active’	   part	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   as	   President	   Carter	   worried	  about	  the	  consequences	  of	  his	  own	  actions	  and	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  US	  intervention	  spiraling	  out	  of	  control.	  In	  particular,	  a	  Vietnam-­‐like	  escalation	  and	  the	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  a	  possible	  Soviet	  involvement	  made	  Carter	  unsure	  about	  any	  strong	  commitment.	  Beyond	   the	   role	  played	  by	  uncertainty,	   the	  analysis	  has	  also	  stressed	  how	  decision-­‐makers	  focused	  on	  the	  risks	  posed	  by	  the	  various	  decisions	  regarding	  Iran.	  Carter	  and	  the	  White	  House	  focused	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  ‘something	  going	  wrong’	  and	  on	  the	  weakening	  of	  both	  the	   US	   strategic	   positions	   and	   the	   Administration’s	   positions	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  domestic	   critics.	   In	   line	   with	   the	   second	   hypothesis,	   the	   chapter	   has	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identified	  key	  features	  of	  risk	  management	  in	  the	  Administration’s	  approach	  to	   Iran	   including:	   minimalism,	   short-­‐termism,	   the	   tendency	   to	   cyclically	  reassess	  the	  problem,	  and	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  limited	  possibilities	  open	  to	  decision-­‐makers.	  More	   specifically,	   the	   analysis	   has	   spelled	   out	   the	   trade-­‐offs	  inherent	  in	  Carter’s	  choices,	  identifying	  the	  risks	  targeted	  and	  on	  those	  dismissed.	  	  In	   its	   first	   months	   in	   office,	   the	  White	   House,	   certainly	   influenced	   by	   the	  positive	   reports	   of	   the	   Ford	   years,	   sided	   with	   the	   Shah.	   In	   spite	   of	   some	  misgivings	  in	  quarters	  of	  the	  Administration,	  the	  White	  House	  dismissed	  the	  political,	   short-­‐term	   risks	   inherent	   in	   the	   arms	   sales	   and	   ridiculed	   those	  who	   pointed	   out	   strategic,	   long-­‐term	   risks.	   To	   appease	   the	   Shah	   and	   to	  maintain	  the	  political	  ties	  with	  the	  monarch,	  the	  White	  House	  also	  watered	  down	   its	   commitment	   to	   human	   rights.	   With	   this	   choice,	   the	   Carter	  dismissed	  short-­‐term	  political	  risks,	  coming	  from	  accusations	  of	  hypocrisy,	  and	   long-­‐term	   risk	   in	   ignoring	   the	   calls	   for	   help	   from	   the	   opposition.	   The	  Administration,	   admittedly	   replicating	   past	   practices,	   dismissed	   the	   risks	  inherent	   in	   inadequate	   intelligence	  and	   in	   the	   full	   reliance	  on	   the	  Shah	   for	  information	   as	   to	   developments	   in	   Iran.	   When	   signs	   of	   crisis	   started	   to	  emerge,	  the	  Administration	  decided	  to	  maintain	  a	  business	  as	  usual	  attitude,	  ‘capitalising’	   on	   the	   monarch.	   With	   this	   choice,	   signs	   of	   the	   incoming	  revolution	  were	  ignored.	  	  	  As	   the	   business	   as	   usual	   attitude	   became	   untenable,	   the	   default	   reply	  became	  blind	   support.	   The	  Administration	   tried	   to	  manage	   the	   target	   risk	  inherent	   in	   the	   failing	   Shah’s	   confidence.	   The	   Shah,	   however,	   was	   losing	  control	   on	   Iran,	   and	   American	   behavior	   dismissed	   the	   long-­‐term	   risks	  inherent	  in	  inaction.	  In	  particular,	  many	  elements	  within	  the	  Administration	  dismissed	   the	  risks	   inherent	   in	   the	  rebuffing	  of	   the	  opposition,	  of	   its	  pleas	  for	   help,	   and	   of	   its	   plans	   to	   ease	   the	   crisis.	   Unable	   to	   chart	   a	   long-­‐term	  course,	  the	  Administration	  relied	  on	  short-­‐term	  and	  unlikely	  measures,	  such	  as	  total	  support	  for	  Bakhtiar.	  The	  minimalism,	  and	  the	  illusion	  of	  neutrality,	  however,	  positioned	  the	  Administration	  on	  the	  side	  of	  repression.	  With	  the	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final	   success	   of	   the	  Revolution,	   the	  Administration	   found	   itself	   paying	   the	  price	  of	   its	  previous	  rebuffing	  of	   the	  opposition,	  and	  of	   the	  general	   lack	  of	  knowledge	  of	  the	  new	  dominant	  forces.	  And	  yet	  the	  Administration	  failed	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  Iranian	  situation.	  A	  ‘back	  in	  business’	  attitude	  was	  coupled	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  positive	  signals	  from	  Washington.	  These	  policies	   –	   with	   ‘timely’	   contributions	   from	   Congress	   -­‐	   discredited	   the	  moderates	  in	  Iran	  and	  presented	  the	  Carter	  Administration	  as	  an	  enemy	  of	  the	   Revolution.	   In	   spite	   of	   Laingen’s	  warnings,	   no	   positive	   signals	   arrived	  from	  Washington.	   The	   final	   admission	   of	   the	   Shah	   dismissed	   the	   risks	   for	  the	  security	  of	   the	  Americans	   in	   Iran,	  and	   for	   long-­‐term	  relations	  with	   the	  Iranian	  government.	  	  	  Finally,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  third	  hypothesis	  and	  in	  a	  pattern	  already	  identified	  in	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  missiles	   in	  Cuba,	  the	  taking	  of	  the	  hostages	  and	  the	  emergence	   of	   crisis	   did	   not	   explode	   overnight.	   It	   developed	   as	   the	   slow	  accumulation	   of	   ‘countervailing	   risks.’	   Presidential	   management	   (and	  mismanagement)	  of	  the	  risks	  involved	  in	  the	  Iranian	  issue	  contributed	  to	  its	  travel	  from	  the	  ‘non-­‐issue’	  pole,	  to	  the	  ‘full	  blown	  crisis’	  one.	  To	  be	  sure,	  this	  chapter	   is	   not	   arguing	   that	   the	   Administration	   could	   have	   prevented	   the	  Iranian	   Revolution.	   Making	   such	   a	   point	   would	   mean	   erasing	   the	   Iranian	  side	  of	   the	  story.	  What	   the	  chapter	  claims	   is	   that	   the	  Administration	  could	  have	  been	  better	  positioned	  when	  the	  Revolution	  finally	  came.	  The	  policies	  of	  the	  Administration	  contributed	  to	  the	  alienation	  of	  the	  Iranian	  population	  and	   of	   the	   Iranian	   opposition.	   Some	   could	   argue	   that	   by	   the	   time	   the	  Administration	   entered	   office,	   the	   US	   Government	   was	   already	   overly	  identified	   with	   the	   Shah	   and	   his	   rule.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   however,	   the	  opposition	  showed	  until	  very	  late	  great	  hopes	  in	  the	  Carter	  Administration.	  As	  the	  historian	  Gaddis	  Smith	  suggests:	  	   If	   Carter	   had	   been	   more	   critical	   of	   the	   Shah,	   conceivably,	   it	  would	   have	   been	   a	   little	   more	   difficult	   for	   the	   Ayatollah	  Khomeini	  to	  identify	  the	  United	  States	  as	  the	  Great	  Satan	  and	  to	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say	  everything	  that	   is	  wrong	  in	  Iran	  is	  basically	  the	  fault	  of	  the	  United	  States.285	  	  	  Questioned	   on	   the	   Carter	   Administration’s	   main	   mistakes,	   Jay	   Hakes	  answered	  that	  becoming	  the	  ‘best	  buddy’	  with	  the	  Shah	  was	  something	  that	  the	  Administration	  and	   the	  President	  should	  have	  avoided.286	  This	  chapter	  agrees.	  	  	  
Chapter	   7	   will	   discuss	   a	   post-­‐Cold	   War	   case	   study:	   the	   Clinton	  Administration’s	   troubles	   in	   the	   Balkans.	   As	   Chapter	   2	   suggested,	   for	  Beckian	  (and	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  Foucauldian)	  approaches	  to	  risk	  in	  IR,	  with	  the	   shift	   to	   a	   post-­‐Cold	   War	   environment	   we	   should	   witness	   a	   radical	  change	   in	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   foreign	   policy	   context	   and	   in	   the	   practice	   of	  foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making.	   In	   particular,	   risk	   should	   become	   a	  predominant	   variable,	   decision-­‐makers	   should	   confront	   unprecedented	  levels	  of	  uncertainty,	   and	   short-­‐term	  practices	  of	   risk-­‐management	   should	  substitute	   long-­‐term	  strategies.	  Chapter	   5	  and	  6	  have	  already	  argued	  that	  these	   features	   defined	   the	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making	   context	   even	  during	   the	   Cold	  War.	  Chapter	   7	   will	   suggest	   that,	   in	   spite	   of	   a	   change	   in	  international	   context,	   continuities	   can	   be	   identified	   in	   the	   pressures	   that	  shape	  Presidential	  decision-­‐making	  and	  in	  its	  conduct.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  285	  George	  Gaddis	  Smith,	  PBS,	  American	  Experience,	  The	  Presidents:	  Jimmy	  
Carter,	  2006,	  [http://video.pbs.org/video/1049390462/]	  (accessed	  18	  August	  2013).	  286	  Dr.	  Jay	  Hakes,	  Carter	  Center,	  ‘The	  Carter	  Presidency	  Revisited,’	  
Conversations	  at	  the	  Carter	  Center,	  28	  October	  2009,	  [http://www.cartercenter.org/news/multimedia/Conversations/CarterPresidencyRevisited.html]	  (accessed	  18	  August	  2013).	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CHAPTER	  7:	  ‘WHY	  IS	  THIS	  HAPPENING	  AND	  WE	  ARE	  NOT	  DOING	  
ANYTHING?’	  THE	  CLINTON	  ADMINISTRATION	  AND	  THE	  RISKY	  ROAD	  TO	  
SREBRENICA,	  1992-­‐1995	  	  
7.1	  INTRODUCTION	  	   If	  one	  had	  to	  identify	  a	  point	  where	  the	  half-­‐hearted	  diplomatic	  initiatives	   and	   hollow	   threats	   and	   straddling	   of	   options	   finally	  coalesced	  into	  a	  purposeful	  American	  policy	  toward	  the	  Balkans,	  it	  would	  be…after	  the	  fall	  of	  Srebrenica.1	  	  The	  consensus	  is	  that	  President	  Clinton’s	  record	  in	  Bosnia,	  before	  1995,	  was	  abysmal. 2 	  Three	   main	   interpretations	   have	   been	   offered	   for	   the	  Administration’s	   ‘flapping	   around’3	  when	   it	   came	   to	   the	  Balkans.	   First,	   the	  President	  was	  uninterested	   in	   foreign	  policy	  and	  Bosnia	  was	  not	   in	  the	  US	  national	   interest.4	  Second,	  bureaucratic	   rivalries	  within	   the	  Administration	  stymied	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process.5	  Third,	  the	  Administration’s	  decisions	  were	  driven	  by	  the	  vagaries	  of	  media	  and	  public	  interest	  in	  the	  war.6	  These	  interpretations	  are	  all,	   to	  a	   certain	  extent	  valid,	  but	  not	   complete.7	  Clinton	  was	   certainly	   more	   concerned	   with	   domestic	   and	   economic	   issues,	   yet	  Bosnia	  was	  impossible	  to	  ignore	  and	  was	  the	  first	  foreign	  policy	  issue	  dealt	  with	   by	   the	   Administration.8	  For	   many	   close	   to	   Clinton,	   the	   ‘uninterested	  President	   interpretation’	   is	   unconvincing.	   ‘When	   I	   talked	   to	   him,’	   Robert	  Gallucci,	   former	  member	  of	  the	  G.	  H.	  W.	  Bush	  and	  Clinton	  Administrations,	  recalled,	   ‘he	  was	  quite	  focused	  on	  Bosnia…he	  was	  always	  the	  smartest	  guy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Mark	  Danner,	  Stripping	  Bare	  the	  Body	  (New	  York:	  Nation	  Books,	  2009):	  128.	  2	  John	  Dumbrell,	  ‘President	  Bill	  Clinton	  and	  US	  Transatlantic	  foreign	  policy,’	  
Journal	  of	  Transatlantic	  Studies,	  Vol.	  8	  (2012),	  pp.	  268-­‐278.	  3	  John	  Dumbrell,	  Clinton’s	  Foreign	  Policy:	  between	  the	  Bushes	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2009),	  86.	  4	  James	  Goldgeiger,	  Interview	  with	  the	  author,	  26	  July	  2012,	  Washington.	  5	  Elizabeth	  Drew,	  On	  the	  Edge	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  1994).	  6	  Piers	  Robinson,	  The	  CNN	  Effect	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2002).	  7	  See	  Steven	  Burg	  and	  Paul	  Shoup,	  Ethnic	  Conflict	  and	  International	  
Intervention	  (New	  York:	  M.	  E.	  Sharpe,	  2000),	  Charles	  Philippe	  David,	  ‘A	  strategy	  of	  circumvention,’	  Journal	  of	  Contingencies	  and	  crisis-­‐management,	  Vol.	  3,	  No.	  4	  (1995),	  pp.	  195-­‐214.	  8	  David,	  ‘A	  strategy’.	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in	   the	   room.’ 9 	  The	   ‘bureaucratic	   rivalry’	   interpretation	   is	   built	   on	   an	  excessively	  mechanical	   division	   between	  hawks	   and	  doves10	  and	   seems	   to	  forget	   that	   until	   late	   in	   the	   game	   voices	   calling	   for	   a	  more	   forceful	   action	  either	   resigned	   or	   were	   not	   heard.11	  As	   to	   the	   ‘CNN	   effect,’12	  on	   Bosnia,	  public	   interest	   and	  media	   coverage,	   especially	   by	   key	   newspapers	   and	   on	  TV,	   followed	   a	   similar	   pattern.	   They	   would	   peak	   during	   particularly	  gruesome	  episodes,	  but	   this	   interest	  would	  soon	  decline	  as	   the	   tension	  on	  the	   ground	   temporarily	   eased.	   These	   bouts	   of	   attention	   were	   sometimes	  enough	   to	   shake	   the	   Administration	   into	   a	   strong	   domestic	   posture,	  especially	  when	  accompanied	  by	  pressure	  coming	  from	  Congress	  and	  other	  political	   circles.	   Until	   late	   in	   the	   game,	   however,	   the	   pressure	   was	   not	  consistent	   enough	   for	   Clinton	   to	   take	   decisive	   action.	   Furthermore,	  throughout	   the	   war,	   US	   public	   opinion,	   although	   often	   pressuring	   to	   ‘do	  more,’	  remained	  sceptical	  of	  any	  direct	  military	  intervention.13	  	  	  Acknowledging	   these	   weaknesses,	   some	   authors	   suggested	   that	   Clinton’s	  main	   aim	   was	   to	   contain	   the	   Bosnia	   issue	   through	   a	   ‘strategy	   of	  circumvention.’14	  This	  ‘containment	  thesis’	  is	  in	  line	  with	  many	  accounts	  of	  the	  Bosnia	  war.	  Memoirs	   of	   participants	   and	   analysis	   of	  US	  policy,	   in	   fact,	  seem	  to	  follow	  an	  established	  pattern.	  They	  deal	  with	  the	  Clinton	  campaign,	  and	  with	  the	  Administration’s	  early	  initiatives	  and	  then	  leave	  the	  following	  years	   relatively	   unexplored,	   simply	   suggesting	   that	   Clinton’s	   performance	  was	  poor,	  until	  the	  ‘Srebrenica	  turning	  point’	  of	  1995.15	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Robert	  Gallucci,	  Skype	  interview	  with	  the	  author,	  16	  May	  2012.	  10	  Leon	  Fuerth,	  Interview	  with	  the	  author,	  23	  July	  2012,	  Washington	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  H.	  Daalder,	  Getting	  to	  Dayton	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In	   line	   with	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   developed	   in	   the	   thesis,	   the	   main	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  look	  at	  the	  intervening	  years.	  Part	   two	  of	  the	  Chapter	  will	  set	   the	  context	   for	   the	  Clinton	  Administration’s	  Bosnia	  policy.	  Clinton	   took	   office	   at	   a	   time	   of	   uncertainty	   for	   the	   future	   of	   the	   US’s	  international	  role.	  Such	  uncertainty	  derived	   from	  the	  disappearance	  of	   the	  Soviet	  threat,	  from	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  threats,	  and	  from	  the	  inability	  of	  the	   George	   H.	  W.	   Bush	   administration	   to	   set	   a	   new,	   clear	   purpose	   for	   US	  power.16	  The	   Clinton	   Administration	   inherited	   the	   issue,	   with	   no	   clear	  solution	  in	  sight.	  However,	  as	  Washington	  debated	  the	  future	  of	  US	  power,	  the	   Balkans	   exploded	   and	   President	   Clinton	  was	   called	   to	   face	   the	   Bosnia	  issue	  even	  before	  taking	  office.	  The	  more	  substantial	  section	  of	  the	  chapter,	  
Part	  three,	  will	  look	  at	  the	  choices	  made	  by	  the	  Clinton	  team.	  As	  in	  previous	  chapters,	   these	  choices	  will	  be	  analysed	   in	  terms	  of	  risk	  vs.	  risk	  trade-­‐offs.	  For	  every	  key	  decision	  on	  Bosnia,	   the	  chapter	  will	   identify	   the	   ‘target	  risk’	  managed,	  and	  the	  ‘countervailing	  risks’	  ignored	  or	  dismissed.	  The	  trade-­‐offs	  will	   follow	   the	   Bosnia	   issue	   from	   the	   1992	   Presidential	   campaign,	   to	   the	  Clinton	  Administration	   inability	   to	   set	   a	   clear	   course,	   concluding	  with	   the	  escalation	  of	  violence	  in	  1995.	  	  	  
7.2	  THE	  NEW	  GAME:	  THE	  END	  OF	  THE	  COLD	  WAR	  AND	  GEORGE	  H.	  W.	  
BUSH’S	  LEGACY	  	  
7.2.1	  A	  New	  World	  Order:	  the	  US	  and	  the	  use	  of	  force	  	  With	  US	  troops	  in	  the	  Gulf	  in	  1991,	  President	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush	  had	  struck	  a	   high	   moral	   tone	   suggesting	   that	   ‘a	   New	  World	   Order,’	   based	   on	   peace,	  security	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  was	  at	  stake.17	  Yet,	  the	  anticlimactic	  end	  of	  the	  war	  had	  left	  the	  Bush	  Administration	  with	  few	  indications	  of	  what	  this	  order	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Washington:	  Brookings	  Institution,	  2000),	  and	  Samantha	  Power,	  ‘A	  
Problem	  from	  Hell’	  (New	  York:	  Harper	  Collins,	  2003).	  16	  Hal	  Brands,	  From	  Berlin	  to	  Baghdad	  (Lexington:	  The	  University	  Press	  of	  Kentucky,	  2008).	  	  17	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush,	  ‘State	  of	  the	  Union	  address,’	  29	  January	  1991,	  [http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19253&st=&st1=#ixzz1wMeMUIT5]	  (accessed	  19	  August	  2013).	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entailed	  and,	  above	  all,	  of	  when	  and	  how	  US	  power	  could	  be	  used.	  A	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  suggests	  that	  three	  main	  positions	  can	  be	  identified	  within	  the	   Administration:	   ‘hegemonists,’	   ‘realists’	   or	   pragmatists, 18 	  	   and	   the	  President.	  For	  the	  first	  group,	  the	  Gulf	  War	  had	  been	  a	  clear	  demonstration	  of	  US	  power.	  The	  US	  could	  mould	  the	  international	  system	  according	  to	  its	  desires	   and,	   in	   order	   to	   do	   so,	   it	   needed	   to	   achieve	   unchallenged	   pre-­‐eminence.	  As	   the	  highly	   contested	  1992	  Defense	  Planning	  Guidance	   stated,	  the	  US	  needed	  to	   ‘prevent	  the	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  a	  new	  rival.’	  The	  document	  suggested	   a	   posture	   of	   total	   predominance	   through	   the	   imposition	   of	  America’s	  will	  on	  allies,	  and	  enemies	  alike,	  and	  through	  the	  maintenance	  of	  ‘mechanisms	   for	   deterring	   potential	   competitors	   from	   even	   aspiring	   to	   a	  larger	   regional	   or	   global	   role.19	  Drafted	   by	   Paul	   Wolfowitz,	   within	   the	  Department	   of	   Defense,	   and	   leaked	   to	   the	  New	  York	  Times,	   the	   document	  created	  an	  immediate	  public	  uproar.20	  	  Within	   the	   Administration,	   such	   a	   posture	   had	   to	   confront	   ‘pragmatists,’	  including	  Secretary	  of	  State	  James	  Baker	  and	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  Colin	  Powell.	  For	   them,	  even	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  a	   ‘new	  world	  order’	  was	  dangerous.	  They	  recognised	  the	  unprecedented	  possibilities	  open	  to	  US	  power,	   but	   were	   wary	   of	   the	   implications.	   Baker	   argued	   that	   in	   the	   new	  world,	  still	  without	  a	  name,	  America’s	  leadership	  remained	  a	  ‘necessity	  and	  not	  a	  luxury.’	  He	  added,	  however,	  that	  the	  situation	  confronting	  the	  US	  was	  complex	   and	   should	   not	   have	   been	   encapsulated	   in	   facile	   slogans.21	  Along	  the	  same	  lines,	  Powell	  understood	  that	  the	  real	  disagreement	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  debate	  was	  an	  old	  one:	  how	  much	  is	  enough?	  Although,	  the	  complete	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Nancy	  Soderberg,	  The	  Superpower	  Myth	  (New	  York:	  Wiley	  and	  Sons,	  2005).	  	  19	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  ‘Excerpts	  From	  Pentagon's	  Plan,’	  8	  March	  1992,	  [http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/08/world/excerpts-­‐from-­‐pentagon-­‐s-­‐plan-­‐prevent-­‐the-­‐re-­‐emergence-­‐of-­‐a-­‐new-­‐rival.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm]	  (accessed	  21	  August	  2013).	  20	  James	  Mann,	  The	  Rise	  of	  the	  Vulcans	  (New	  York:	  Viking,	  2004).	  21	  US	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  ‘The	  future	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  era,’	  Hearings	  before	  the	  Committee	  on	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  102nd	  Congress,	  February	  -­‐	  April,	  1992	  (Washington:	  US	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1992),	  p.	  6.	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uncertainty	   of	   the	   post-­‐Cold	   War	   world	   made	   this	   traditional	   problem	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  solve,22	  Powell	  had	  an	  answer.	  First,	  US	  forces	  were	  in	   the	   process	   of	   being	   restructured	   according	   to	   the	   Base	   Force	   plan,	  focusing	   on	   regional	   contingencies	   instead	   of	   global	  war.	   Second,	   he	   soon	  refined	   his	   understating	   of	   when	   and	   how	   to	   use	   force	   in	   a	   ‘doctrine.’	  Powell’s	   position	   came	   from	   a	   strong	   personal	   and	  moral	   commitment	   to	  avoid	  the	  mistakes	  of	  Vietnam,	  above	  all,	  the	  lack	  of	  clear	  political	  objectives	  and	  the	  piecemeal	  build-­‐up.23	  	  According	   to	   several	   authors,	   beyond	   this	   division,	   the	   President	  demonstrated	   a	  willingness	   to	   strengthen	   the	   role	   of	   the	  United	   States	   on	  the	  international	  scene,	  especially	  through	  the	  United	  Nations.24	  On	  the	  31st	  of	   January	   1992,	   at	   a	   Security	   Council	  meeting	   held	   at	   the	  Heads	   of	   State	  level,	   the	   United	   States	   played	   a	   leading	   role	   in	   requesting	   UN	   Secretary	  General	   Boutros	   Boutros-­‐Ghali	   to	   examine	   ways	   to	   strengthen	   UN	  peacekeeping.	  This	  request	  led	  to	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  Secretary	  General’s	  
Agenda	   for	   Peace. 25 	  The	   President	   also	   launched	   a	   review	   within	   the	  Administration	  of	  the	  US’	  role	  in	  the	  organisation.	  Finally,	  in	  September,	  he	  declared	   to	   the	  UN	  General	  Assembly:	   ‘the	  United	  States	   is	   ready	   to	  do	   its	  part	   to	   strengthen	   world	   peace	   by	   strengthening	   international	  peacekeeping.’	  26	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  ‘The	  future,’	  p.	  368.	  23	  Colin	  Powell,	  My	  American	  Journey	  (New	  York:	  Ballantine	  Books,	  1995),	  p.	  451,	  and	  Colin	  Powell,	  ‘US	  Forces:	  challenges	  ahead,’	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  71,	  No.	  5	  (Winter),	  pp.	  32-­‐45.	  24	  Ivo	  H.	  Daalder,	  ‘Knowing	  when	  to	  say	  no:	  the	  development	  of	  US	  policy	  for	  peacekeeping,’	  in	  William	  Durch	  (Ed.),	  UN	  Peacekeeping,	  American	  politics,	  
and	  the	  uncivil	  wars	  of	  the	  1990s	  (New	  York:	  St.	  Martin’s	  Press,	  1997)	  and	  Sarah	  B.	  Sewall,	  ‘US	  Policy	  and	  Practice	  regarding	  Multilateral	  Peace	  Operations,’	  Carr	  Center	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  Policy	  Working	  Paper	  01-­‐3	  [http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/PKO.pdf]	  (accessed	  26	  October	  2013)	  25	  UN	  Secretary	  General,	  ‘Agenda	  for	  peace,	  preventive	  diplomacy,	  peacemaking	  and	  peacekeeping,’	  Report,	  17	  June	  1992	  [http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf]	  (accessed	  29	  October	  2013).	  26	  Daalder,	  ‘Knowing,’	  in	  Durch	  (Ed.),	  UN	  Peacekeeping,	  p.	  37.	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World	   developments	   in	   the	  meanwhile	   seemed	   to	   support	   the	   President’s	  view	  and	   the	  need	   for	   a	   strong	  UN.	   	   In	   Somalia,	   famine	   and	  warlords	  had	  created	   a	   humanitarian	   tragedy.	   The	   end	   of	   the	   review	   of	   the	   US	   policy	  towards	   the	   UN	   coincided	   precisely	   with	   this	   crisis.	   The	   Administration	  intervened,	   pursuant	   to	   a	   UN	   Security	   Council	   resolution	   approved	   under	  Chapter	  VII,	  for	  either	  purely	  humanitarian,27	  or	  political	  and	  humanitarian	  purposes.28	  Still,	  according	  to	  Ivo	  Daalder,	  Powell	  and	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Dick	   Cheney	   made	   sure	   that	   Operation	   Restore	   Hope,	   which	   included	   US	  troops	  on	  the	  ground,	  would	  not	  act	  as	  a	  blueprint	  for	  future	  adventurism.29	  Both	   the	   National	   Security	   Strategy	   of	   1993	   and	   the	   National	   Security	  Decision	  Directive	  (NSDD)	  74	  (the	  outcome	  of	  the	  policy	  review)	  remained	  vague	  as	  to	  the	  real	  nature	  of	  US	  commitment	  to	  the	  UN.	  The	  directive	  stated	  that	  the	  US	  would	  help	  in	  strengthening	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  also	  urging	  other	  nations	   to	   contribute.	  30	  The	  document,	   however,	   also	   stressed	   that	   the	  US	  contribution	  would	   be	   limited	   US	   participation	   to	   situations	   in	   which	   the	  ‘unique’	  capabilities	  of	  the	  American	  military	  were	  necessary.	  31	  	  The	  Administration’s	  oscillating	  behaviour	  as	  to	  the	  use	  of	  American	  power	  reflected	   the	   broader	   uncertainty	   regarding	   the	   US’	   role	   in	   the	   post-­‐Cold	  War	   world.	   In	   academia,	   scholars	   debated	   the	   shape	   of	   the	   future.	   Some	  argued	   that	   the	  UN	  Security	  Council,	   liberated	  by	   the	  Cold	  War	   stalemate,	  was	  now	  free	  to	  become	  a	  key	  actor	  on	  the	  international	  scene.32	  Madeleine	  Albright,	  at	  the	  time	  still	  at	  Georgetown	  University,	  agreed,	  calling	  for	  a	  new	  international	   community. 33 	  Others	   demonstrated	   only	   contempt	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Robert	  Gallucci,	  Phone	  interview	  with	  the	  author,	  16	  May	  2012.	  28	  Brands,	  From	  Berlin	  and	  David	  Gibbs,	  First	  do	  no	  harm	  (Nashville:	  Vanderbilt	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  p.	  135.	  29	  Daalder,	  ‘Knowing,’	  in	  Durch	  (Ed.),	  UN	  Peacekeeping,	  pp.	  37-­‐39.	  	  30	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush,	  ‘National	  Security	  Directive	  74,’	  24	  November	  1992,	  [http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/nsd/nsd74.pdf]	  (accessed	  19	  August	  2013),	  p.	  2.	  31	  Sewall,	  ‘US	  Policy,’	  p.	  7.	  32	  Bruce	  Russett	  and	  James	  Sutterlin,	  ‘The	  UN	  in	  a	  New	  World	  Order,’	  
Foreign	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  70,	  No.	  2	  (Spring	  1991),	  p.	  82.	  33	  Michael	  Dobbs,	  Madeleine	  Albright:	  a	  Twentieth	  Century	  Odyssey	  (New	  York:	  Henry	  Holt	  and	  Company,	  1999),	  p.	  350.	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multilateralism.	   Charles	   Krauthammer	   famously	   argued	   that	   the	   US	   was	  ‘embarrassed’	  of	   its	  power	  and	  still	   ‘worshipped	  at	   the	  shrine	  of	  collective	  security.’	   The	   US	   was	   the	   only	   uncontested	   superpower	   and	   should	   have	  behaved	   like	   one. 34 	  Jeane	   Kirkpatrick,	   Reagan’s	   hawkish	   former	  Ambassador	   to	   the	   UN,	   argued	   that	   the	   US	   should	   give	   up	   the	  responsibilities	  of	  a	  superpower	  and	  turn	  into	  a	  ‘normal	  power’	  for	  normal	  times.35	  Equally,	   Nathan	   Glazer	   argued	   that	   it	   was	   time	   to	   return	   to	   the	  modest	  role	  the	  Founding	  Fathers	  had	  envisaged.36	  This	  isolationist	  impetus	  had	  even	  more	  vociferous	  supporters	  among	  ‘paleoconservatives,’	  37	  such	  as	  Pat	   Buchanan	   who	   called	   for	   an	   American	   retreat	   with	   no	   more	   foreign	  entanglements. 38 	  Others	   were	   concerned	   by	   American	   retrenchment.	  William	  Hyland	   suggested	   that	  with	   the	   end	   of	   ideologies,	   it	  was	   time	   for	  pragmatism	   and	   compromises.39 	  Similarly,	   historian	   John	   Lewis	   Gaddis	  identified	  the	  need	  to	  find	  a	  balance	  between	  new	  forces	  of	  integration	  and	  fragmentation. 40 	  Strobe	   Talbott,	   future	   member	   of	   the	   Clinton	  Administration,	   warned	   that,	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   victory,	   the	  ‘disreputable’	   grip	   of	   isolationism	   threatened	   future	   developments.41	  The	  same	   mixture	   of	   euphoria	   and	   uncertainty	   characterised	   Francis	  Fukuyama’s	   essay	   ‘Have	   we	   reached	   the	   end	   of	   history?’42	  which	   soon	  turned	  into	  an	  international	  best-­‐seller.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Charles	  Krauthammer,	  ‘The	  Unipolar	  moment,’	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  70,	  No.	  1	  (1990/1991),	  pp.	  23-­‐33.	  	  35	  Jeane	  Kirkpatrick,	  ‘A	  normal	  country	  for	  normal	  times,’	  The	  National	  
Interest,	  Vol.	  21	  (Fall	  1990),	  pp.	  40–45	  36	  Stefan	  Halper	  and	  Jonathan	  Clarke,	  America	  Alone	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  p.	  78.	  37	  Brands,	  From	  Berlin,	  p.	  78.	  	  38	  Patrick	  Buchanan,	  ‘America	  First—and	  Second,	  and	  Third,’	  The	  National	  
Interest,	  No.	  19,	  (Spring	  1990),	  pp.	  77-­‐82.	  39	  William	  Hyland,	  ‘The	  case	  for	  pragmatism,’	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  71,	  No.	  1	  (1992),	  pp.	  44-­‐45.	  40	  John	  Lewis	  Gaddis,	  ‘Toward	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world,’	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  70,	  No.	  2	  (Spring	  1991),	  pp.	  102-­‐122.	  41	  Strobe	  Talbott,	  ‘Post-­‐victory	  Blues,’	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  71,	  No.	  1	  (1992),	  p.	  53.	  42	  Francis	  Fukuyama,	  ‘The	  end	  of	  history?’	  The	  National	  Interest,	  No.	  16	  (Summer	  1989),	  and	  Francis	  Fukuyama,	  The	  End	  of	  History	  and	  the	  Last	  Man	  (New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  1992).	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In	   this	   uncertainty,	   the	   shape	   of	   things	   to	   come	   assumed	   two	   main	  characteristics:	  the	  future	  would	  be	  uncertain,	  and	  frightening.	  The	  National	  Military	  Strategy	  signalled	  the	  defeat	  of	  Communism	  and	  the	  unlikeliness	  of	  global	  war,	   but	  warned	   against	   future	   threats	   inherent	   in	   the	   ‘uncertainty	  and	  instability	  of	  a	  rapidly	  changing	  world.’43	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  NATO	   contributed	   to	   the	   sense	   of	   uncertainty	   surrounding	   the	   post-­‐Cold	  War	  world,	   and	   to	   a	   nostalgic	   outlook	   for	   its	   bipolar	   predecessor.44	  In	   the	  new	   ‘game’	  of	   the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world,	  as	  Madeleine	  Albright	  would	   later	  write,	  ‘there	  were	  far	  more	  than	  two	  teams;	  the	  uniforms	  were	  mixed	  while	  the	  scoreboard	  had	  gone	  haywire.	  And	  all	  the	  spectators	  –	  civil	  society	  –	  had	  come	   pouring	   down	   onto	   the	   field.’45	  On	   a	   similar	   note,	   Robert	   Gates,	  Director	  of	  the	  Central	  Intelligence,	  admitted:	  	   All	   historical	   experience	   suggests	   to	   us	   that,	   while	   the	  revolutionary	   upheavals	   we	   have	   seen…have	   succeeded	   in	  breaking	  us	  loose	  from	  the	  past,	  the	  final	  shape	  of	  the	  future	  is	  far	  from	  established.	  46	  	  In	   a	   memo	   to	   the	   President,	   during	   the	   last	   days	   of	   the	   Administration,	  Acting	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Lawrence	  Eagleburger	  concluded	  that	  complexity	  would	  be	  the	  main	  feature	  of	  the	  future:	  	  	   The	   international	   system	   is	   tilting	   schizophrenically	   toward	  greater	   fragmentation…the	  resulting	  chaos	   is	  enough	  to	  almost	  –	   almost	   –	   make	   one	   nostalgic	   for	   the	   familiar	   discipline	   and	  order	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.47	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  US	  Government,	  National	  Military	  Strategy	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  January	  1992,	  [http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-­‐bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA338837]	  (accessed	  19	  August	  2013),	  p.	  1.	  44	  NATO,	  ‘The	  Alliance	  Strategic	  Concept,	  1991,’	  [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm]	  (accessed	  19	  August	  2013).	  45	  Madeleine	  Albright,	  Madame	  Secretary	  (New	  York:	  MacMillan,	  2003),	  p.	  139.	  46	  US	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  ‘The	  future,’	  p.	  214.	  47	  Derek	  Chollet	  and	  James	  Goldgeiger,	  America	  between	  the	  Wars	  (New	  York:	  Public	  Affairs,	  2008),	  p.	  49.	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No	  conclusion	  could	  have	  been	  more	  distant	  from	  the	  hopes	  of	  a	  New	  World	  Order.	  	  	  
7.2.2	  The	  Bush	  Administration	  and	  Yugoslavia:	  ‘We	  don’t	  have	  a	  dog	  in	  
this	  fight’	  	  While	   the	   world	   and	   the	   US	   were	   focused	   on	   the	   complexity	   and	  unpredictability	  of	  the	  new	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world,	  Yugoslavia	  disintegrated.	  In	  the	  autumn	  of	  1990,	  in	  an	  estimate	  quickly	  leaked	  to	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  the	  CIA	  had	  warned	  that	  Yugoslavia	  would	  have	  ceased	  to	  function	  within	  a	  year,	  and	  that	  civil	  war	  would	  have	  been	  likely,	  although	  not	  before	  1992.48	  With	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Yugoslavia	  had	  lost	  both	  its	  strategic	  value	  (as	  defence	  against	  a	  Soviet	  incursion	  in	  Europe	  through	  the	  so	  called	  Ljubljana	  Gap)	   and	   its	   ideological	   appeal	   as	   challenge	   to	   the	   Soviet	   brand	   of	  communism.49 	  These	   developments	   coincided	   with	   economic	   crisis	   and	  ensuing	   austerity	   measures,	   and	   with	   the	   re-­‐birth	   of	   nationalism,	   which	  often	   turned	   economic	   and	   social	   issues	   into	   ethnic	   and	   national	   ones.50	  More	   problematically,	   developments	   in	   Yugoslavia	   were	   erroneously	  interpreted	   as	   processes	   connected	   with	   the	   disintegration	   of	   the	   Soviet	  Union.	  The	  confirmation	  of	   the	  Communist	  Party’s	   rule	   in	  Serbia	   led	   to	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  war	  as	  a	  last	  effort	  by	  communist	  leaders	  to	  remain	  in	  power.	   The	   possibility	   of	   a	   war	   along	   ethnic	   lines	   initially	   baffled	   the	  international	  community	  and	  the	  United	  States.51	  	  	  In	   the	   spring	   and	   summer	   of	   1991,	   European	   and	   American	   efforts	  remained	   focused	  on	   the	  preservation	  of	   the	  Yugoslav	  Federation,52	  in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Warren	  Zimmermann,	  Origins	  of	  a	  Catastrophe	  (New	  York:	  Times	  Books,	  1999),	  p.	  84.	  49	  James	  Gow,	  Triumph	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  will	  (London:	  Hurst	  and	  Company,	  1997),	  p.	  25.	  50	  See	  Susan	  Woodward,	  Balkan	  tragedy	  (Washington:	  The	  Brookings	  Institution,	  1995).	  51	  See	  James	  A.	  Baker	  III	  with	  Thomas	  DeFrank,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Diplomacy	  (New	  York:	  Putnam’s	  Sons,	  1995).	  	  52	  According	  to	  several	  authors,	  the	  US	  coupled	  a	  ‘unity	  and	  democracy’	  position	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  support	  for	  the	  government	  of	  the	  last	  Yugoslav	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hope	  that	  the	  Federation	  would	  not	  act	  as	  a	  dangerous	  precedent	  of	  violent	  dissolution.	  As	  late	  as	  the	  21st	  of	  June,	  during	  a	  visit	  in	  Belgrade,	  Secretary	  of	  State	   James	   Baker	  made	   clear	   that	   the	   US	  would	   not	   recognise	   unilateral	  secession. 53 	  The	   European	   Community	   (EC)	   tried	   to	   take	   the	   lead	   in	  negotiating	  efforts	  to	  keep	  the	  Federation	  together.	  Four	  days	  after	  Baker’s	  visit,	   though	   Slovenia	   and	   Croatia	   declared	   independence.	   As	   US	  Ambassador	  to	  Yugoslavia	  Warren	  Zimmermann	  suggested,	  Baker’s	   failure	  in	   delaying	   secession	   had	   ‘cooled	   whatever	   ardour	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State	  may	  have	  had	  for	  propelling	  the	  United	  States	  into	  the	  deepening	  crisis.’54	  	  When	  war	  broke	  out	  in	  Slovenia,	  Europe	  maintained	  a	  ‘glowing	  enthusiasm’	  for	  its	  possibilities	  of	  solving	  the	  crisis.	  55	  	  The	  war	  in	  Slovenia	  lasted	  barely	  ten	   days,	   from	   the	   26th	   of	   June	   to	   the	   7th	   of	   July	   1991.	   The	   ‘Brioni	  Agreement,’	  mediated	  by	  the	  EC,	  brought	  the	  war	  to	  a	  close.	  The	  agreement,	  hailed	   as	   a	   ‘triumph’	   of	   diplomacy	   left	   most	   crucial	   issues	   unresolved,56	  including	   the	   future	  of	  Croatia.57	  More	  problematically,	   the	  agreement	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Prime	  Minister	  Ante	  Markovic.	  Markovic	  made	  clear	  (also	  in	  visits	  to	  Washington)	  that	  his	  main	  aim	  was	  debt	  relief.	  The	  US	  however	  did	  not	  help	  Markovic	  government	  for	  three	  main	  reasons:	  Yugoslavia’s	  loss	  of	  importance,	  the	  understanding	  in	  Washington	  of	  Markovic’s	  slim	  chances	  of	  success,	  and	  violations	  of	  human	  rights	  (such	  as	  those	  against	  Albanians	  in	  Kosovo)	  on	  which,	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  US	  had	  turned	  a	  blind	  eye.	  With	  the	  decline	  of	  Markovic’s	  position,	  power	  shifted	  increasingly	  to	  the	  Republics.	  See	  Zimmermann,	  Origins,	  pp.	  44-­‐50,	  David	  Gompert,	  ‘The	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Yugoslav	  War,’	  in	  Ullman	  (Ed.),	  The	  world	  and	  Yugoslavia’s	  
war,	  p.	  123,	  Gibbs,	  First,	  pp.	  71-­‐75.	  53	  Baker,	  The	  Politics,	  p.	  482.	  54	  Zimmermann,	  Origins,	  p.	  164.	  	  55	  Netherlands	  Institute	  for	  War	  Documentation	  (NIOD),	  ‘Srebrenica	  a	  “safe	  area”	  –	  Part	  1,’	  2002,	  p.	  286	  [http://www.srebrenica.nl/Pages/OOR/23/379.bGFuZz1OTA.html]	  (accessed	  19	  August	  2013),	  p.	  20	  56	  Laura	  Silber	  and	  Allan	  Little,	  The	  Death	  of	  Yugoslavia	  (London:	  Penguin	  Books,	  1996),	  p.	  166.	  57	  Misha	  Glenny,	  The	  Fall	  of	  Yugoslavia	  (London:	  Penguin	  Books,	  1996),	  pp.	  99-­‐100.	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perfectly	  in	  line	  with	  Serbian	  President	  Slobodan	  Milosevic’s	  willingness	  to	  let	  Slovenia	  go,	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  Serb	  minorities	  and	  interests	  there.58	  	  	  The	  agreement,	  however,	  maintained	  Europe’s	  hopes	  that	   it	  could	  take	  the	  lead	   in	   solving	   the	   Yugoslav	   crisis.	   The	   war	   in	   Croatia,	   more	   violent	   and	  protracted,	   started	   at	   the	   end	  of	   July	  1991,	   and	   soon	  made	   clear	  Europe’s	  inability	  to	  broker	  a	  cease-­‐fire.	  The	  Hague	  Conference	  organised	  by	  the	  EC	  was	   an	   attempt	   to	   achieve	   a	   general	   settlement	   for	   the	  whole	   Yugoslavia.	  The	   settlement,	   the	   Carrington	   Plan,59	  was	   initially	   supported	   and	   later	  rejected	  by	  Milosevic.60	  The	  violence	  in	  Eastern	  Croatia	  and	  in	  town	  such	  as	  Vukovar	  reached	  almost	  unprecedented	  peaks.	  During	  these	  developments,	  the	   US	   largely	   stood	   by,	   in	   spite	   of	   calls	   for	   action	   from	   many	   quarters	  including	  Croatia’s	  President	  Franjo	  Tudjman61	  and	  part	  of	   the	  media.62	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  Bush	  Administration	  was,	  at	  the	  time,	  involved	  in	  several	  crucial	  developments	   including:	   the	   coup	   against	   Soviet	   Premier	   Mikhail	  Gorbachev,	   the	   dissolution	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   the	   management	   of	   the	  Soviet	  nuclear	  stockpile,	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  peace	  process.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	   Administration	   overlooked	   the	   threat	   posed	   by	   Milosevic.63	  The	   US	  attitude	  was	  summed	  up	  in	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Baker’s	  famous	  sentence:	  ‘We	  don’t	   have	   a	   dog	   in	   this	   fight.’64	  With	   Europe	   unable	   to	   end	   the	   fighting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Jan	  Willem	  Honig	  and	  Norbert	  Both,	  Srebrenica:	  record	  of	  a	  War	  crime	  (London:	  Penguin	  Books,	  1996),	  p.	  71.	  59	  From	  the	  name	  of	  the	  EC	  negotiator	  Lord	  Peter	  Carrington.	  60	  Milosevic	  had	  allegedly	  accepted	  an	  oral	  agreement	  that	  included	  the	  independence	  of	  Croatia	  and	  the	  preservation	  of	  Croatian	  Serbs’	  human	  rights.	  When	  the	  plan	  was	  presented	  in	  written	  form,	  however,	  it	  entailed	  the	  independence	  of	  all	  Republics	  in	  Yugoslavia,	  not	  only	  Croatia.	  Something	  Milosevic	  could	  not	  accept.	  He	  could	  not	  let	  Bosnia	  go.	  See	  BBC,	  ‘The	  Death	  of	  Yugoslavia,’	  BBC	  Documentary,	  1995,	  Part	  3	  ‘Wars	  of	  Independence,’	  Min.	  36-­‐38	  [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jMyQsTLSVeI]	  (accessed	  28	  October	  2013).	  61	  Jane	  M.	  O.	  Sharp,	  ‘Dayton	  report	  card,’	  International	  Security,	  Vol.	  22,	  No.	  3	  (Winter),	  p.	  101.	  62	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  ‘Serbia	  vs.	  the	  New	  World	  Order,’	  14	  August	  1991,	  [http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/14/opinion/serbia-­‐vs-­‐the-­‐new-­‐world-­‐order.html]	  (accessed	  29	  October	  2013).	  63	  Baker,	  The	  Politics,	  p.	  636.	  64	  Silber	  and	  Little,	  Yugoslavia,	  p.	  30.	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alone,	   and	   with	   deep	   division	   within	   the	   EC	   regarding	   the	   recognition	   of	  Slovenia	  and	  Croatia,	  the	  issue	  moved	  to	  the	  UN.65	  The	  war	  in	  Croatia	  would	  officially	   end	   with	   the	   declaration	   of	   a	   UN	   ceasefire,	   brokered	   by	   former	  Secretary	   of	   State	   Cyrus	   Vance,	   on	   the	   2nd	   of	   January	   1992.	   Military	  operations	   would	   continue	   until	   1995.66 	  The	   attention	   soon	   shifted	   to	  Bosnia.	  	  After	  a	  referendum,	  required	  by	  the	  EC	  and	  boycotted	  by	  the	  Bosnia	  Serbs,	  Bosnian	  President	  Alija	  Izetbegovic	  announced	  the	  independence	  of	  Bosnia-­‐Hercegovina	  on	  the	  3rd	  of	  March	  1992.	  Even	  before	  the	  referendum,	  Europe	  had	  started	  to	  work	  on	  a	  plan	  that	  could	  prevent	  conflict.	  Talks	  started	  on	  the	  21st	  of	  February	   in	  Lisbon,	  under	  the	  Portuguese	  Presidency	  of	   the	  EC.	  The	   end	   result,	   the	   Carrington-­‐Cutilheiro	   Plan,	   was	   presented	   in	   March	  1992	  and	  included	  a	  new	  constitutional	  arrangement	  for	  Bosnia.	  According	  to	  the	  plan,	  the	  country	  would	  have	  been	  divided	  into	  ethnically	  based	  units,	  or	  ‘cantons’	  -­‐	  as	  they	  were	  publicly	  know,	  although	  the	  term	  was	  never	  used	  in	   EC	   talks	   –	   with	   ethnically-­‐based	   power-­‐sharing	   at	   all	   levels	   of	  government.	   The	   plan	   was	   certainly	   not	   perfect	   and	   disagreement	   still	  surrounds	  the	  plan’s	  fairness	  and	  chances	  of	  success.67	  All	  parties	  signed	  the	  plan	  on	  the	  18th	  of	  March,	  but	  ten	  days	  later	  President	  Izetbegovic	  withdrew	  his	   signature.	   To	   this	   day	   it	   is	   unclear	   to	  what	   extent	   the	  US	   government,	  through	   Zimmermann,	   influenced	   the	   Bosnian	   Muslims’	   rejection	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Germany	  pushed	  for	  recognition	  whereas	  France	  and	  Britain	  counselled	  restraint.	  William	  J.	  Durch	  and	  James	  A.	  Schaer,	  ‘Faultlines:	  Un	  Operations	  in	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia,’	  in	  Durch	  (Ed.),	  UN	  Peacekeeping,	  p.	  205.	  66	  For	  an	  account	  of	  the	  wars	  in	  Slovenia	  and	  Croatia	  look	  (among	  many	  other	  sources)	  at:	  BBC,	  ‘The	  Death	  of	  Yugoslavia,’	  BBC	  Documentary,	  1995,	  Parts	  1-­‐3	  [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oODjsdLoSYo]	  (accessed	  19	  August	  2013),	  Lenard	  Cohen,	  Broken	  Bonds	  (Oxford:	  Westview	  Press,	  1995),	  David	  Owen,	  Balkan	  Odyssey	  (New	  York:	  Harcourt,	  Brace	  and	  Company,	  1995),	  Gow,	  Triumph,	  and	  Silber	  and	  Little,	  The	  Death	  of	  Yugoslavia.	  For	  the	  Bush	  Administration’s	  role:	  Zimmermann,	  Origins,	  and	  David	  Gompert,	  ‘How	  to	  defeat	  Serbia,’	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  73,	  No.	  4	  (July/August	  1994),	  pp.	  30-­‐47.	  67	  See	  Ed	  Vulliamy,	  Seasons	  in	  Hell	  (New	  York:	  St.	  Martin’s	  Press,	  1994),	  p.	  120	  and	  James	  Gow,	  Triumph,	  p.	  81	  for	  a	  negative	  view.	  NIOD,	  ‘Part	  1’	  for	  a	  positive	  one.	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plan.	  A	  Dutch	  government	  report	  concluded	  that	  it	  is	  not	  ‘unimaginable’	  that	  the	   US	  might	   have	   played	   a	   strong	   role	   in	   Izetbegovic’s	   decision.68	  Others	  have	   suggested	   that	   the	   Bosnian	   Muslims	   themselves	   were	   behind	   the	  decision,	   not	   so	   much	   President	   Izetbegovic,	   but	   the	   radicals	   within	   his	  party	   (the	   SDA);	   a	   ‘grey	   eminence’	   that	   would	   make	   its	   presence	   felt	  throughout	  the	  war.69	  	  	  With	  Izetbegovic’s	  refusal	  of	  the	  plan	  and	  with	  the	  recognition	  of	  Bosnia	  by	  the	   EC	   (on	   the	   6th	   of	   April)	   and	   by	   the	   US	   (on	   the	   7th)	   tension	   quickly	  increased.	  On	   the	   same	  day	  of	  US	   recognition,	   the	  Bosnian	   Serbs	  declared	  the	   independence	   of	   their	   own	   republic,	  with	   capital	   in	   Pale.	  War	   ensued	  with	   the	   level	  of	   violence	   turning	  extremely	  high.	  The	  UN,	  with	   resolution	  713	  on	  the	  25th	  of	  September	  1991,	  had	   imposed	  an	  arms	  embargo	  on	  the	  whole	  Yugoslavia,	  after	  a	  request	  by	   the	  Yugoslav	  government	  at	   the	   time.	  The	  embargo	  now	  left	  the	  newly	  created	  Army	  of	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina	  at	  a	   disadvantage.	   Furthermore,	   in	   May,	   Resolution	   752	   called	   for	   the	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  JNA	  from	  Bosnia.	  Serbia	  responded	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	   Federation	   based	   on	   Serbia	   and	  Montenegro,	   and	   splitting	   the	   army.	  This	  move	  largely	  represented	  a	  scam.	  Most	  of	  the	  JNA	  troops	  and	  materiel	  remained	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  assumed	  the	  colours	  of	  the	  new	  Bosnian	  Serb	  Army.	  The	  UN	  imposed	  economic	  sanctions	  on	  Serbia	  and	  Montenegro	  and	  on	  the	  6th	  of	  June	  expanded	  UNPROFOR’s70	  mandate	  to	  secure	  the	  Sarajevo	  airport.	  The	  Bush	  Administration,	  which	  had	  been	  involved	  in	  the	  Bosnia	  issue	  from	  the	  start,	  went	  along	  with	  the	  UN	  resolutions	  and	  with	  international	  efforts	  at	   mediation.	   As	   the	   tension	   and	   violence	   increased,	   however,	   the	  Administration	   came	   under	   increasing	   pressure	   to	   do	  more.	   Among	   those	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  NIOD,	  ‘Part	  1,’	  p.	  287.	  69	  Burg	  and	  Shoup,	  Ethnic	  Conflict,	  p.	  194,	  and	  Susan	  Woodward,	  Interview	  with	  the	  author,	  16	  July	  2012,	  New	  York.	  70	  The	  establishment	  of	  a	  UN	  mission	  for	  Yugoslavia	  had	  been	  suggested	  in	  Resolution	  721,	  of	  the	  27th	  of	  November	  1991.	  UNPROFOR	  (United	  Nations	  Protection	  Force),	  the	  UN	  mission	  to	  keep	  peace	  in	  Croatia,	  was	  eventually	  established	  with	  Resolution	  743	  on	  the	  21st	  of	  February	  1992.	  	  For	  the	  text	  of	  the	  various	  UN	  Security	  Council	  Resolutions	  regarding	  the	  Balkans	  see	  [http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/home.htm]	  (accessed	  26	  October	  2013).	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pressuring	   was	   Bill	   Clinton,	   Governor	   of	   Arkansas,	   and	   Democratic	  Presidential	  candidate	  for	  the	  1992	  elections.	  
	  
7.3	   CLINTON	   AND	   BOSNIA:	   A	   CANDIDATE’S	   FREEBIE,	   A	   PRESIDENT’S	  
NIGHTMARE	  	  
7.3.1	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk	  trade-­‐off	  1:	  a	  candidate’s	  cheap	  shot	  vs.	  a	  President’s	  
responsibility	  
	  In	   the	   summer	   of	   1992,	   Bush’s	   caution	   seemed	   to	   become	   increasingly	  untenable,	   but	   the	   Administration	   maintained	   its	   focus	   on	   a	   narrow	  understanding	   of	   national	   interest.	   As	   NSA	   Brent	   Scowcroft	   would	   later	  recall:	  	  	   We	   could	   never	   satisfy	   ourselves	   that	   the	   amount	   of	  involvement	  we	  thought	  it	  would	  take	  was	  justified	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  US	  interests	  involved.71	  	  Soon,	   this	   position	   started	   to	   appear	   unjustifiable.	   Amid	   public	   and	  media	  outrage,	  the	  presence	  of	  detention	  camps	  in	  Bosnia	  -­‐	  active	  since	  May	  -­‐	  was	  revealed	   and,	   even	   more	   worrisome,	   the	   Administration	   seemed	   to	   have	  been	  involved	  in	  a	  cover-­‐up	  of	  information.72	  Bush	  immediately	  reacted:	  ‘we	  will	  not	  rest’,	  he	  stated,	  ‘until	  the	  international	  community	  has	  gained	  access	  to	  any	  and	  all	  detentions	  camps.’73	  But	  with	  no	  indications	  of	  how	  that	  could	  be	  done,	  the	  reaction	  sounded	  unconvincing.	  	  	  Democrats	   in	  Congress,	   including	  Senator	   Sam	  Nunn	   (D-­‐GE)	   took	  notice	  of	  the	   Administration’s	   unwillingness	   to	   use	   force	   and	   of	   its	   fear	   of	   getting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Power,	  ‘A	  Problem’,	  p.	  288.	  72	  Mark	  Danner,	  ‘While	  America	  Watched,’	  ABC	  Documentary,	  30	  March	  1994,	  Transcript	  [http://www.markdanner.com/articles/show/while_america_watched_the_bosnia_tragedy]	  (accessed	  21	  September	  2013).	  Unless	  other	  sources	  are	  mentioned,	  this	  and	  other	  Mark	  Danner’s	  articles	  are	  taken	  from	  the	  author’s	  website.	  When	  page	  numbers	  are	  mentioned,	  they	  refer	  to	  the	  PDFs	  available	  on	  the	  website	  [http://www.markdanner.com]	  (accessed	  21	  September	  2013).	  73	  Power,	  ‘A	  Problem’,	  pp.	  274-­‐275	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bogged	  down.74	  Confirming	  the	  point,	  Lt.	  Gen.	  Barry	  McCaffrey,	  Assistant	  to	  Powell,	  warned	  that	  sending	  troops	  to	  Bosnia	  would	  have	  been	  doable,	  but	  the	   costs	   would	   have	   been	   massive. 75 	  This	   reply	   confirmed	   a	   pattern,	  common	   in	   Powell’s	   JCS,	   to	   raise	   the	   costs	   of	   intervention	   to	   politically	  untenable	   levels.76 	  Powell	   also	   replied	   angrily	   to	   the	   ‘so-­‐called	   experts’	  calling	   for	   airstrikes.77	  Powell’s	   attitude	   disturbed	   many	   in	   Washington,	  including	  Les	  Aspin,	  Democratic	  congressman	  from	  Wisconsin	  and,	  crucially,	  future	   Secretary	   of	   Defense.	   He	   contested	   the	   Pentagon’s	   ‘all	   or	   nothing’	  attitude	  and	  accused	   it	  of	   sending	   the	  signal	   that	  ethnic	  cleansing	   could	  go	  unpunished.78	  Several	   State	   Department	   officials	   resigned	   to	   protest	   the	  Administration’s	   ‘guilt	   on	   both	   sides’	   interpretation	   of	   the	   war.	   79	  Washington	   heavyweights	   also	   made	   their	   voices	   heard.	   After	   a	   personal	  visit	   to	   Bosnia,	   Richard	   Holbrooke	   appeared	   on	   several	   TV	   shows	   and	  provocatively	   asked	   in	   the	   pages	   of	   Newsweek	   what	   the	   West’s	   reaction	  would	  have	  been	  if	  Jews	  or	  Christians	  were	  being	  killed	  instead	  of	  Muslims.80	  Holbrooke	   added	   suggestions	   for	   a	   stronger	   American	   policy,	   including	  lifting	  the	  arms	  embargo	  on	  Bosnia.81	  Holbrooke	  was	  not	  alone.	  	  	  From	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  Bosnian	  war,	  Democratic	  Presidential	   candidate	  Bill	  Clinton	  had	  built	  on	  Bush’s	  passivity	  to	  corner	  his	  opponent.	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  Clinton	  campaign	  had	  been	  mainly	   focused	  on	   the	  domestic	  side	  as	   the	  famous	  slogan	  ‘It’s	  the	  economy	  stupid!’	  demonstrated.	  However,	  too	  narrow	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  US	  Senate,	  ‘Situation	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  appropriate	  U.S.	  and	  Western	  responses’,	  Hearing	  before	  the	  Committee	  on	  Armed	  Services,	  United	  States	  Senate,	  102nd	  Congress,	  August	  11,	  1992	  (Washington:	  US	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1992),	  p.	  2,	  75	  US	  Senate,	  ‘Situation	  in	  Bosnia,’	  August	  1992,	  pp.	  7,	  13,	  18,	  27.	  76	  Power,	  ‘A	  Problem’,	  p.	  283.	  77	  Michael	  Gordon,	  ‘Powell	  Delivers	  a	  Resounding	  No	  On	  Using	  Limited	  Force	  in	  Bosnia,’	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  28	  September	  1992	  [http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/28/world/powell-­‐delivers-­‐a-­‐resounding-­‐no-­‐on-­‐using-­‐limited-­‐force-­‐in-­‐bosnia.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm]	  (accessed	  19	  August	  2013).	  78	  Gordon,	  ‘Powell	  delivers.’	  79	  Power,	  ‘A	  Problem’,	  p.	  268.	  80	  Power,	  ‘A	  Problem’,	  p.	  280.	  81	  Holbrooke,	  To	  End,	  p.	  38.	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a	  focus	  on	  domestic	  issues	  posed	  risks.	  After	  Clinton’s	  acceptance	  speech	  for	  the	   Democratic	   nomination,	   Leslie	   Gelb	   had	   criticised	   the	   nominee	   in	   the	  
New	  York	  Times,	  noting	  that	  out	  of	  4250	  words	  in	  Clinton’s	  speech,	  only	  141	  had	   been	   devoted	   to	   foreign	   policy.	   The	   candidate,	   Gelb	   wrote,	   was	  convinced	  that	  the	  topic	  did	  not	  interest	  the	  American	  public	  and	  that	  it	  was	  better	   to	   stay	   away	   from	   it.	   But,	   he	   continued,	   Clinton	  was	  wrong	  on	  both	  counts,	   Americans	   always	   ‘treated	   foreign	   policy	   as	   a	   metaphor	   for	  leadership,’	   and	  wanted	  a	   ‘taste’	   of	   the	  Commander	   in	  Chief	  Clinton	  would	  be.82	  Anthony	  Lake,	   a	   leading	   figure	   in	  Clinton’s	   campaign	   team	  and	   future	  National	   Security	   Advisor,	   had	   reached	   a	   similar	   conclusion.	   Lake	   had	  warned	  Clinton	  that	  to	  be	  President	  he	  needed	  to	  pass	  a	  ‘voting	  booth’	  test.	  ‘In	   the	  mysterious	  process	   that	   took	  place	   in	   the	  voting	  booth,’	  he	  had	  told	  the	   candidate,	   ‘there	  would	  be	  a	  moment	  when	  voters	   considered	  how	   the	  candidate	  might	   behave	   during	   an	   international	   crisis.’83	  To	   pass	   that	   test,	  Clinton	   had	   positioned	   himself	   from	   the	   start	   as	   a	   bolder,	   more	   proactive	  candidate	   than	   Bush.	   First	   among	   his	   criticisms	   was	   the	   accusation	   that	  Bush’s	   foreign	   policy	   in	   Yugoslavia	   ran	   against	   the	   American	   spirit;	   it	  mirrored	  his	  ‘indifference’	  to	  Tiananmen,	  and	  his	  ‘cuddling	  of	  dictators’	  such	  as	  Saddam.84	  	  On	  Bosnia,	  Clinton’s	  team	  debated	  what	  position	  the	  candidate	  should	  take.	  Having	  explicitly	  considered	  the	  risks	  involved	  in	  a	  mild	  position,	  and	  those	  involved	   in	   a	   strong	  one,	  Clinton’s	   advisers	   suggested	   the	   candidate	   to	  use	  the	   strongest	   possible	   language	   against	   the	   Serbs,	   as	   a	   way	   to	   ‘show	  leadership.’85	  When	   Serbs	   encroached	   on	   humanitarian	   convoys,	   Clinton	  went	  on	  the	  record	  with	  a	  bold	  position	  suggesting	  that	  the	  US	  should	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Leslie	  Gelb,	  ‘A	  mere	  141	  words,’	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  19	  July	  1992	  [http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/19/opinion/foreign-­‐affairs-­‐a-­‐mere-­‐141-­‐words.html?src=pm]	  (accessed	  19	  August	  2013).	  83	  David	  Halberstam,	  War	  in	  a	  time	  of	  peace	  (New	  York:	  Scribner,	  2001),	  p.	  22.	  84	  Drew,	  On	  the	  Edge,	  p.	  138.	  85	  L.	  Blumenfeld,	  Memorandum	  to	  Anthony	  Lake,	  12	  June	  (1992),	  Box	  10,	  Clinton	  Administration,	  Folder	  6,	  Clinton	  Campaign	  Files,	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  June	  1992,	  Anthony	  Lake	  Papers	  (ALP),	  Library	  of	  Congress	  (LoC),	  Washington.	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taken	  the	   lead	  in	  seeking	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council’s	  approval	   for	  air	  strikes,	  and	  in	  tightening	  sanctions	  on	  the	  ‘renegade	  regime’	  of	  Slobodan	  Milosevic.86	  Such	  rhetoric	   represented	  a	   radical	  departure	   from	  Bush’s	  portrayal	  of	   the	  conflict	  as	  a	  civil	  war	  with	  atrocities	  on	  both	  sides.	  As	  events,	   including	  the	  discovery	   of	   the	   detention	   camps,	   seemed	   to	   confirm	   his	   interpretation,	  Clinton	  charged	  again	   suggesting	   the	  use	  of	   air	  power	   to	   ‘restore	   the	  basic	  conditions	   of	   humanity.’	   The	  White	  House	   tried	   to	   react.	  Marlin	   Fitzwater,	  White	   House	   spokesperson	   attacked	   Clinton.	   The	   candidate,	   he	   said,	   was	  using	   ‘the	   kind	   of	   reckless	   approach	   that	   indicates	   he	   better	   do	   more	  homework	   on	   foreign	   policy.’	   ‘It's	   clear,’	   he	   added,	   ‘he's	   unaware	   of	   the	  political	   complications	   in	  Yugoslavia.’	   In	   the	   short-­‐term,	  however,	  Clinton’s	  position	  put	  him	  on	  the	  right	  side	  of	  the	  debate.	  As	  Mark	  Danner	  wrote,	  	  	   It	   was	   equally	   clear	   that	   Clinton	   was	   aware	   of	   the	   political	  implications	   in	  America.	  The	  Arkansas	  governor	  had	   found	   the	  perfect	   opening	   to	   attack	   the	   ‘foreign	   policy	   President’	   for	  inaction	   in	   the	   face	   of	   a	  moral	   drama	   that	   voters	   saw	   enacted	  each	  evening	  on	  their	  television	  screens.87	  	  Holbrooke	  supported	  Clinton.	  In	  a	  memo	  to	  the	  candidate,	  he	  wrote	  that	  the	  few	   actions	   taken	   by	   the	   Bush	   Administration,	   such	   as	   supporting	   UN	  resolutions	  requiring	  unobstructed	  delivery	  of	  aid	  and	  access	  to	  the	  camps,	  had	   been	   taken	   largely	   due	   to	   Clinton’s	   pressure.	   Contesting	   Bush’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  war,	  Holbrooke	  added:	  	  	   This	  is	  not	  a	  choice	  between	  Vietnam	  and	  doing	  nothing…There	  are	  many	  actions	   that	  might	  be	  done	  now…Doing	  nothing	  now	  risks	  a	  far	  greater	  and	  more	  costly	  involvement	  later.	  	  In	   praising	   Clinton’s	   activism,	   he	   also	   warned	   of	   future	   risks.	   The	   signals	  given	   in	   the	   campaign	  have	  been	   ‘interpreted	   as	   a	   sign	   that	   if	   elected,	   you	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  Owen,	  Balkan,	  p.	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  Mark	  Danner,	  ‘Clinton,	  the	  UN	  and	  the	  Bosnia	  disaster,’	  The	  New	  York	  
Review	  of	  Books,	  18	  December	  1997	  [http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1997/dec/18/clinton-­‐the-­‐un-­‐and-­‐the-­‐bosnian-­‐disaster/?pagination=false]	  (accessed	  19	  August	  2013).	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will	  follow	  a	  more	  vigorous	  policy.’88	  This	  was	  the	  main	  problem	  for	  Clinton.	  In	  managing	   the	   short-­‐term	  political	   risks	  of	   the	   ‘voting	  booth’	   test,	   and	   in	  his	  effort	  to	  ‘show	  leadership,’	  he	  was	  dangerously	  overlooking	  future	  risks.	  In	   the	   long-­‐term,	   Clinton’s	   highly	   moral	   stand	   and	   his	   call	   for	   action	  presented	   both	   political	   and	   strategic	   risks.	   Some	   on	   the	   campaign	   trail	  disagreed	   with	   the	   candidate’s	   posture.	   As	   an	   official	   working	   on	   the	  campaign	  later	  admitted:	  	  	   I	  said,	   ‘Don't	  make	  this	  commitment	  that	  you're	  never	  going	  to	  keep’.	  But	  Tony	  Lake…was	  completely	  wrapped	  up	  in	  the	  moral	  righteousness	  of	  this	  idea,	  and	  he	  had	  no	  idea	  of	  what	  it	  would	  take	  to	  move	  the	  country	  to	  do	  this.89	  	  Domestically,	  Clinton	  would	  end	  up	  cornered	  by	  his	  own	  campaign	  promises.	  Even	  without	   calls	   for	   action	   from	   the	   public,	   accusations	   of	   inconsistency	  would	   certainly	   pour	   on	   the	  Administration.	   At	   the	   international	   level,	   the	  promises	   made	   on	   the	   campaign	   trail	   affected	   the	   conduct	   of	   the	   war.	   As	  Haris	  Silajdzic,	  Bosnian	  Foreign	  Minister,	  would	  later	  recall,	  Clinton’s	  words	  were	   an	   ‘encouragement	   because	   in	   the	  midst	   of	   this	   tragedy…we	   needed	  someone	   by	   our	   side.’90	  The	   main	   hope	   was	   that	   Clinton	   had	   something	  better	  to	  offer.	  Unfortunately,	  that	  was	  not	  the	  case.	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7.3.2.1	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk	  trade-­‐off	  2a:	  the	  risks	  of	  Office	  vs.	  taking	  time	  	  As	  the	  Administration	  took	  office,	  it	  had	  to	  confront	  three	  main	  issues.	  First,	  in	  spite	  of	  a	  campaign	  largely	  focused	  on	  domestic	  issues,	  the	  Administration	  was	   troubled	   early	   on	   by	   an	   inheritance	   of	   foreign	   policy	   crises.	   These	  included	  Bosnia,	  Haiti	  and	  Somalia.	  As	  George	  Stephanopoulos,	  White	  House	  Press	  Secretary,	  later	  recalled:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  Holbrooke,	  To	  End,	  p.	  42.	  89	  Mark	  Danner,	  ‘Operation	  Storm,’	  The	  New	  York	  Review	  of	  Books,	  22	  October	  1998	  [http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1998/oct/22/operation-­‐storm/?pagination=false]	  (accessed	  25	  September	  2013).	  90	  Danner,	  ‘While	  America.’	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It’s	  funny,	  ours	  was	  a	  campaign	  that	  had	  put	  out	  comparatively	  few	   statements	   on	   foreign	   policy.	   Then	  we	   came	   in	   the	  White	  House	  and	  almost	   immediately	  we	  were	  hit	  with	  foreign	  policy	  problems.	  91	  	  The	  second	  issue	  related	  heavily	  to	  the	  ‘few	  statements’	  the	  Administration	  had	   put	   out.	   ‘Winning	   the	   White	   House,’	   Stephanopoulos	   concluded,	   ‘had	  added	  retroactive	  weight	  to	  everything	  we	  had	  said	  before.’92	  Clinton	  had	  to	  face	   the	   trade-­‐offs	   between	   domestic	   priorities	   and	   foreign	   policy	   claims.	  This	  problem	  hit	  particularly	  hard	  in	  the	  first	  months	  when	  the	  new	  Clinton	  people,	   in	  spite	  of	  not	  being	  novices,	  had	  some	  natural	   troubles	   in	  running	  the	   interagency	   process.93	  The	   overarching	   concern	   in	   the	   first	   months	   in	  Office,	  however,	  was	  the	  same	  problem	  that	  had	  characterised	  the	  final	  years	  of	   the	   Bush	   Administration.	   It	   remained	   unclear	   what	   role	   the	   US	   should	  have	  played	  in	  the	  new	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world.	  ‘Essentially,’	  Nancy	  Soderberg	  admitted,	  ‘we	  had	  as	  a	  central	  question	  to	  define	  the	  role	  of	  the	  use	  of	  force	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  era.’94	  	  	  This,	  to	  be	  sure,	  was	  not,	  at	  least	  initially,	  President	  Clinton’s	  main	  concern.	  In	   spite	   of	   his	   success	   in	   the	   ‘voting	   booth	   test,’	   Clinton	   had	   been	   largely	  elected	  on	  a	  domestic	  platform,	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  selection	  of	  foreign	  policy	   personnel.	   The	   two	   leading	   figures	   were	   Secretary	   of	   State	  Warren	  Christopher	  and	  National	  Security	  Advisor,	  Anthony	  Lake.	  Christopher	  was	  a	  ‘safe-­‐call.’	   Although	   his	   level	   of	   expertise	  was	   undisputed,	   the	   trouble	  was	  that	  he	  seemed	  ‘a	  capable	  and	  highly	  competent	  bureaucrat,	  but	  probably	  a	  limited	  one,	  a	  man	   lacking	  originality	  and	  beliefs	  of	  his	  own.’95;	  a	   ‘tortoise-­‐like’	  figure.96	  But	  this	  was	  exactly	  what	  Clinton	  wanted:	  someone	  who	  would	  not	  be	  tempted	  to	  take	  major	   initiatives.	  Equally	  Lake	  had	  decided	  to	  work	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  David	  Rothkopf,	  Running	  the	  World	  (New	  York:	  Public	  Affairs,	  2005),	  p.	  319.	  92	  Chollet	  and	  Goldgeiger,	  America,	  p.	  59.	  93	  Gallucci,	  Interview	  with	  the	  author.	  94	  Rothkopf,	  Running,	  p.	  325.	  95	  Dumbrell,	  Clinton,	  p.	  174.	  96	  Lexington,	  ‘The	  Tortoise	  at	  Foggy	  Bottom,’	  The	  Economist,	  8	  January	  1994;	  p.	  44.	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behind	  the	  scenes,	  to	  avoid	  the	  rivalries	  of	  the	  Carter	  years.97	  This	  effort	  was	  successful	  only	  on	  the	  surface.	  	  	  Powell,	   whose	   term	  was	   due	   to	   expire	   months	   after	   the	   start	   of	   Clinton’s	  tenure,	   had	   a	   hard	   time	   getting	   along	   with	   the	   informal	   and	   disorganised	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Les	  Aspin.98	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Aspin	  had	  argued	  many	  times	   against	   Powell. 99 	  On	   Bosnia,	   some	   strong,	   moralistic	   and	  interventionist	  voices	  were	  present	  in	  the	  NSC.	  Vice-­‐President	  Al	  Gore,	  who	  had	   a	   long-­‐term	   commitment	   to	   Bosnia,100	  and	   UN	   Ambassador	  Madeleine	  Albright	   argued	   for	   action	   against	   the	   Serbs.	   Albright	   had	   been	   given	   an	  unprecedented	  seat	  in	  the	  Cabinet,	  but	  felt	  that	  her	  position	  was	  weakened	  by	   a	   small	   Washington-­‐based	   staff	   and	   by	   the	   need	   to	   report	   to	   both	   the	  President	  and	   the	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  who	  were	  certainly	  more	  cautious	  on	  Bosnia. 101 	  Furthermore,	   the	   opposition	   of	   the	   military	   was	   difficult	   to	  ignore.102	  The	  rivalry	  would	  famously	  explode	  in	  one	  of	  the	  first	  meetings	  on	  Bosnia	  when	  a	  frustrated	  Albright	  asked	  Powell:	  ‘What’s	  the	  point	  of	  having	  this	   superb	  military	   that	  you’re	  always	   talking	  about	   if	  we	  can’t	  use	   it?’	  As	  Powell	   wrote,	   the	   implication	   that	   US	   troops	   were	   toy-­‐soldiers	   to	   move	  around	  freely,	  almost	  caused	  him	  an	  aneurysm.103	  Eruptions	  like	  this	  were	  a	  rarity.	  Powell	  was	  too	  towering	  a	  figure,	  at	  least	  initially.104	  And	  the	  General,	  although	  trying	  to	  ‘blend	  in	  the	  new	  team,’	  did	  little	  to	  hide	  his	  contempt	  for	  the	   amateurish	   discussions	   of	   the	   new	   Administration.105	  Moreover,	   the	  Administration’s	   initial	   indecisiveness	   reflected	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   ‘team	  captain.’106	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  Ivo	  H.	  Daalder	  and	  Mac	  I.	  Destler,	  In	  the	  Shadow	  of	  the	  Oval	  Office	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  2009),	  p.	  215.	  98	  Powell,	  My	  American,	  p.	  563.	  	  99	  Brands,	  From	  Berlin,	  p.	  110.	  100	  Fuerth,	  Interview	  with	  the	  author.	  101	  Albright,	  Madame:	  165-­‐166.	  102	  Gallucci,	  Interview	  with	  the	  author.	  103	  Powell,	  My	  American,	  p.	  576.	  104	  Albright,	  Madame:	  181.	  	  105	  Powell,	  My	  American,	  p.	  575.	  106	  Daalder	  and	  Destler,	  In	  the	  Shadow,	  p.	  216.	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Clinton,	  the	  ‘captain,’	  was	  not	  absent	  or	  uninterested	  in	  foreign	  policy.107	  He	  was	  simply	  confronting	  the	  risks	  that	  the	  move	  from	  candidate	  to	  President	  implied.	   He	  was	   strongly	   concerned	  with	  what	   could	   go	  wrong	   in	   his	   first	  months	  as	  President.	  First,	  he	  was	  far	  too	  aware	  that	  he	  had	  been	  elected	  on	  a	  domestic	  platform	  and	  that	  the	  public,	   in	  spite	  of	  occasional	  uproars,	  was	  more	   focused	   on	   domestic	   and	   economic	   concerns.	   The	   interest	   in	   an	  intervention	  in	  Bosnia	  had	  plummeted,	  after	  the	  peak	  due	  to	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	   camps.	   Even	   the	   possibility	   of	   helping	   a	  weak	   nation	   in	   need	   failed	   to	  raise	   enthusiasm.108	  And	   Clinton,	   certainly,	   did	   not	   lack	   domestic	   issues	   to	  focus	   on,	   including	   his	   plans	   for	   economic	   recovery,	   health	   care,	   and	   the	  approval	   of	   NAFTA	   in	   the	   Senate.	   He	   understood	   that	   the	   risks	   posed	   by	  foreign	  entanglements,	  threatened	  his	  domestic	  agenda:	  	   An	   entanglement	   that	   turned	   messy	   (as	   Powell	   repeatedly	  asserted	  would	  happen	   in	  Bosnia)	  would	  expose	   the	  President	  to	   early	   criticism	   from	   a	   constituency	   that	   wanted	   primary	  attention	   to	   focus	   on	   internal	   concerns,	   depleting	   his	   political	  capital	  just	  as	  he	  advanced	  a	  number	  of	  domestic	  initiatives.109	  	  Second,	  Clinton	  was	  in	  no	  position	  to	  challenge	  the	  military.	  The	  relationship	  had	  not	   started	  on	  high	  notes.	  Powell	  had	  warned	  Clinton	  not	   to	  make	   the	  ‘gays	   in	   the	  military’	   issue	   -­‐	   a	   key	   pledge	   of	   Clinton’s	   campaign	   -­‐	   his	   ‘first	  horse	  out	  of	  the	  gate	  with	  the	  armed	  forces.’110	  Clinton	  had	  not	  listened	  and	  the	  debate	  was	  now	  raging.	  Part	  of	  the	  military,	  despite	  Powell’s	  silence	  on	  the	  issue,	  also	  criticised	  Clinton	  for	  having	  dodged	  the	  Vietnam	  draft,	  and	  for	  not	  being	  able	  to	  offer	  a	  decent	  Presidential	  military	  salute.111	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  Gallucci,	  Interview	  with	  the	  author.	  108	  Wayne	  Bert,	  The	  Reluctant	  Superpower:	  the	  United	  States’	  Policy	  in	  
Bosnia,	  1991-­‐95	  (London:	  MacMillan,	  1997),	  p.	  82.	  109	  Brands,	  From	  Berlin,	  p.	  117.	  110	  Powell,	  My	  American,	  p.	  564.	  111	  It	  took	  Ronald	  Reagan	  to	  teach	  Clinton	  how	  to	  do	  that.	  Nancy	  Gibbs	  and	  Michael	  Duffy,	  ‘Secrets	  of	  the	  Presidents	  Club:	  How	  Bill	  Clinton	  Learned	  to	  Salute,’	  Time,	  17	  April	  2012,	  [http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2112249,00.html#ixzz1wkHB9IJW]	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With	   the	  President	   focused	  on	  domestic	   politics,	   the	  NSC	   staff	   tasked	  with	  keeping	  quiet	  on	  foreign	  policy,	  and	  with	  key	  rivalries	  ready	  to	  boil	  over,	  the	  Administration	  went	  for	  the	  safest	  course	  on	  Bosnia.	  Anthony	  Lake,	  who	  had	  been	  a	  strong	  voice	   in	   the	  campaign,	  now	  retreated.	  He	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  easy	  promises	  of	  the	  campaign	  were	  tough	  to	  maintain,	  and	  he	  suggested	  an	   early,	   comprehensive	   re-­‐evaluation	   in	   the	   hope	   of	   toning	   down	   the	  debate.112	  The	  President	  called	  for	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  review	  of	  the	  Administration	  posture	   on	   Bosnia	   in	   Presidential	   Review	   Directive	   1.	   However,	   having	  turned	  the	  heat	  up	  on	  Bosnia	  during	  the	  campaign,	  the	  Administration	  now	  risked	   being	   burnt	   by	   it.	   Clinton	   understood	   that	   he	   could	   not	   retreat	  completely	  from	  the	  issue.	   ‘If	  the	  United	  States	  doesn’t	  act	  in	  situations	  like	  this,’	  he	  warned,	   ‘nothing	  will	  happen.’113	  The	  decision,	  in	  spite	  of	  being	  the	  safest	   course	   domestically,	  was	   strategically	   dangerous.	   The	   problem	  with	  the	  President’s	  interpretation	  was	  two-­‐fold.	  First,	  a	  complete	  review	  starting	  from	   scratch	  would	   take	   time,	   at	   a	  moment	  when	   a	   sense	   of	   urgency	  was	  needed.	   Second,	   while	   the	   Administration	   was	   reviewing	   its	   options,	   and	  although	  American	  leadership	  was	  badly	  needed,	  something	  was	  happening:	  a	  peace	  plan	  was	  not	  far	  from	  being	  signed.	  	  
7.3.2.2	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk	  trade-­‐off	  2b:	  domestic	  political	  risks	  vs.	  ditching	  the	  VOPP	  	  UN	   envoy	   Cyrus	   Vance	   and	   EC	   envoy	   David	   Owen,	   co-­‐chairs	   of	   the	  International	  Conference	  on	  Former	  Yugoslavia	  (ICFY)	  drafted	  the	  plan.	  The	  Vance-­‐Owen	  Peace	  Plan	  included:	  a	  set	  of	  constitutional	  principles,	  a	  military	  paper,	  a	  map	  of	  the	  new	  Bosnia,	  and	  several	  annexes	  on	  interim	  agreements.	  Bosnia	  would	  be	  divided	  into	  ten	  provinces,	  with	  substantial	  autonomy,	  but	  no	   international	   legal	   character	   to	   prevent	   international	   unions	   with	  neighbouring	  countries.	  Strong	  human	  rights	  provisions	  would	  be	  enshrined	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  Jason	  DeParter,	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York	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in	   the	   constitution,	  with	   a	   primary	   role	   for	   international	   experts.	   The	  map	  constituted	  an	  admittedly	  complex	  mosaic	  of	  provinces.	  The	  provinces	  were	  allocated	  a	  majority	  rule	  by	  the	  predominant	  ethnic	  group,	  but	  there	  would	  be	   no	   ethnically	   pure	   province.	   As	   Owen	   argued,	   three	   key	   messages	  emerged	   from	   the	   plan.	   First,	   no	   province	   was	   labelled	   ‘Serb,	   Croat	   or	  Muslim,’	  to	  avoid	  the	  accusations	  of	  ‘cantonisation’	  that	  had	  condemned	  the	  Carrington-­‐Cutilheiro	  plan.	  Second,	  since	  the	  allocation	  of	  the	  provinces	  was	  based	   on	   the	   1991	   census,	   that	   is,	   before	   the	   war,	   the	   plan	   aimed	   at	  redressing	  ‘ethnic	  cleansing.’	  Third,	  the	  plan	  allocated	  only	  43%	  of	  Bosnia’s	  land	   to	   the	  Bosnian	  Serbs.	  The	  allocation	   implied	  a	  massive	   retreat	   for	   the	  Serbs	  who	   at	   the	   time	   controlled	   70%,114	  and,	   living	   in	   rural	   communities,	  had	  traditionally	  controlled	  between	  50	  and	  60%.115	  	  Opinions	   on	   the	   merits	   of	   the	   Vance-­‐Owen	   Peace	   Plan	   (VOPP)	   are	   still	  radically	  different.116	  The	  Clinton	   team	  was	   from	  the	  start	  unconvinced.	  On	  the	   first	   day	   of	   the	   Administration,	   the	   State	   Department	   spokesman	  remarked	  that	  the	  Secretary:	  ‘had	  expressed	  doubts’	  about	  whether	  a	  peace	  accord	   could	   ‘realistically	   be	   achieved.’117	  Clinton	   would	   later	   write	   in	   his	  memoirs	  that	  the	  boundaries	  envisaged	  in	  the	  Plan	  seemed	  extremely	  hard	  to	   defend	   and	   could	   invite	   Serb	   aggression.118	  Beyond	   technical	   problems,	  however,	   the	  Administration	  was	  cornered.	  According	  to	  Susan	  Woodward,	  Richard	   Holbrooke	   had	   convinced	   Clinton	   that	   the	   plan	   represented	  appeasement. 119 	  Bosnian	   President	   Izetbegovic	   confirmed	   the	   same	  accusation	   in	   an	   interview	   reproduced	   by	   the	   media.120	  Members	   of	   the	  Administration	   argued	   that	   it	   condoned	   aggression.121	  Madeleine	   Albright	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  (Spring	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  p.	  3.	  116	  Owen,	  Balkan,	  and	  Burg	  and	  Shoup,	  Ethnic.	  Susan	  Woodward	  recently	  argued	  that	  the	  plan	  might	  have	  worked.	  Woodward,	  Interview	  with	  the	  author.	  117	  Daalder,	  Getting,	  p.	  11.	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  (London:	  Arrow	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  Woodward,	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told	   the	   Senate	   Foreign	   Relations	   Committee	   that	   the	   US	   should	   have	  pressed	  the	  allies	  to	  do	  something.122	  As	  Leon	  Fuerth,	  foreign	  policy	  advisor	  to	  Al	  Gore,	  remarked,	  the	  plan:	  	   Was	  presented	   to	  us	   as	   an	   accomplished	   fact,	   “Sign	  here”.	  And	  they	  were	  not	   too	  pleased	  when	  we	   said	   this	   is	   not	   consistent	  with	  our	  views	  of	  how	  things	  should	  develop.123	  	  During	  the	  campaign	  and	  in	  the	  first	  days	  in	  office,	  Clinton	  had	  changed	  the	  rhetoric	   surrounding	   the	   Bosnia	   war.	   Now,	   he	   could	   not	   appear	   weak	  towards	  the	  Serbs.	  If	  the	  plan	  was	  publicly	  understood	  -­‐	  whether	  rightly	  or	  wrongly	   -­‐	   as	   condoning	   aggression,	   the	  Administration	   could	  not	   accept	   it.	  Appearing	  strong	  domestically	  entailed	  strategic	  risks.	  US	  reluctance	  to	  back	  the	  plan	  strained	  relations	  with	  the	  European	  allies	  and	  with	  Russia,	  which	  had	  supported	  the	  ICFY	  from	  the	  start.124	  As	  with	  the	  campaign	  pledges,	  the	  impact	   on	   Bosnia	   was	   dramatic.	   Izetbegovic	   and	   other	   leading	   Bosnian	  figures	   came	   away	   from	   their	   first	  meeting	  with	   the	  Clinton	  people	   ‘under	  the	  impression	  that	  a	  military	  intervention	  was	  imminent.’125	  In	  negotiations	  in	   Geneva	   in	   late	   January,	   Izetbegovic	   and	   Silajdzic,	   confident	   in	   American	  help,	  ‘seemed	  to	  avoid	  opportunities	  to	  come	  to	  agreement.’126	  The	  situation	  did	   not	   change	   after	   a	  meeting	   between	  Christopher	   and	   the	   two	   ICFY	   co-­‐chairmen	   on	   the	   1st	   of	   February.	   Far	   from	   that,	   the	   meeting	   left	   Owen	  ‘dismayed’	   by	   Christopher’s	   limited	   understanding	   of	   the	   plan	   and	   of	   its	  human	  rights	  provisions,	  designed	  precisely	  to	  reverse	  conquest	  and	  ethnic	  cleansing.	   Christopher	   commended	   the	   VOPP	   in	   private	   talks,	   but	   did	   not	  express	  any	  support	  in	  remarks	  with	  the	  press.127	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At	   the	   start	   of	   February,	   the	   President	   confirmed	   the	   Administration’s	  reluctance.	  He	  applauded	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  Co-­‐Chairmen,	  but	  stated	  that	  the	  United	   States	   did	   not	   support	   the	   plan	   as	   it	   implied	   the	   imposition	   of	   the	  plan’s	   provisions	   on	   the	   parties,	   with	   the	   Muslims	   left	   in	   a	   ‘severe	  disadvantage.’128	  On	  the	  10th	  of	  February,	  Christopher	  presented	  the	  results	  of	  the	  policy	  review	  and	  the	  Administration’s	  position.	  The	  crisis,	  tragic	  as	  it	  was,	   he	   remarked,	   was	   not	   the	   fault	   of	   the	   Administration,	   it	   had	   been	  inherited,	  and	  the	  US	  was	  ‘actively’	  engaged	  in	  finding	  a	  solution.129	  As	  if	  on	  the	  campaign	  trail,	   the	  position	  was	  long	  on	  rhetoric	  and	  short	  on	  practical	  measures.	   Bosnia,	   Christopher	   argued,	   represented	   a	   test	   for	   US	   foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world.130	  ‘Bold	  tyrants	  and	  fearful	  minorities’,	  he	  emphasised,	   ‘are	  watching	  to	  see	  whether	  “ethnic	  cleansing”	   is	  a	  policy	   the	  world	  will	   tolerate…[Our]	   answer	  must	  be	   a	   resounding	  no.’131	  Beyond	   the	  rhetoric,	  the	  ‘Six	  Point	  Plan’	  consisted	  of	  a	  series	  of	  measures	  to	  contain	  the	  risks	  coming	  from	  Bosnia,	  and	  to	  shield	  the	  Administration	  from	  accusations	  of	   inaction	   or	   appeasement.	   The	   key	  measures	   taken	  were	   a	   tightening	   of	  sanctions,	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   no-­‐fly	   zone,	   and	   the	   delivery	   of	  humanitarian	  aid.	  No	  definitive	  measure	  was	   taken	   to	  end	   the	  conflict,	  and	  the	  US	  made	  clear	  its	  refusal	  to	  impose	  the	  VOPP	  on	  the	  parties.	  	  	  Internationally,	   however,	   the	   Administration	   was	   unwilling	   to	   be	   seen	   as	  retreating	   completely	   from	   the	   VOPP	   negotiations.	   The	   US	   appointed	  Reginald	   Bartholomew,132	  as	   US	   envoy	   to	   the	   negotiating	   process,	   but	   in	   a	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UN	  Security	  Council	  session	  a	  few	  days	  later	  refused	  to	  ‘endorse’,	  ‘welcome’	  or	  ‘support’	  the	  plan.133	  Furthermore,	  setting	  a	  pattern	  that	  characterised	  the	  Administration’s	   approach	   to	  Bosnia,	  Clinton	  made	  a	   choice	  with	  a	  narrow	  focus	  on	  the	  short-­‐term,	  and	  with	  little	  concern	  for	  long-­‐term	  consequences	  or	   for	   the	   message	   sent	   to	   the	   warring	   parties.	   The	   President	   pledged	   to	  commit	   ground	   troops	   to	   Bosnia	   if	   the	   VOPP	   reached	   the	   implementation	  stage.	  The	  measure	  had	  two	  consequences.	  First,	  it	  sent	  the	  wrong	  message	  to	  the	  Serbs:	  US	  forces	  would	  be	  on	  their	  way	  only	  if	  the	  fighting	  ended,	  not	  if	  it	   continued.	   Second,	   if	   an	   agreement	   were	   reached,	   the	   US	   would	   be	  committed	   to	   send	   troops,	   a	   possibility	   that	   failed	   to	   enthuse	   the	  military.	  Furthermore,	   no	   one	   had	   initially	   requested	   US	   troops	   for	   the	  implementation	  of	  the	  VOPP,	  134	  and	  they	  were	  (probably)	  not	  needed.135	  	  	  
7.3.3	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk	   trade-­‐off	  3:	   ‘Lift	   and	  strive,’	  domestic	  pressures	  vs.	  
European	  constraints	  	  	  Few	   failed	   to	   notice	   that	   Christopher’s	   plan	   amounted	   to	   little	   more	   than	  inaction.	   As	   violence	   in	   Bosnia	   increased	   the	   Administration	   started	   to	  undergo	   heavy	   criticism,	   coming	   mainly	   from	   Congress.	   On	   the	   18th	   of	  February,	  in	  Senate	  hearings,	  Silajdzic	  charged	  that	  if	  the	  Administration	  was	  unwilling	  to	  act,	  Bosnia	  should	  have	  been	  granted	  the	  right	   to	  defend	   itself	  with	  a	   lifting	  of	   the	  arms	  embargo.136	  This	  was	   in	   line	  with	  bipartisan	  calls	  from	  high-­‐ranking	  members	  of	  the	  Senate,	  including	  Robert	  Dole	  (R-­‐Ka)	  and	  Joseph	  Biden	   (D-­‐Del),	  who	  had	  been	   (and	  would	  keep	  on)	   calling	   for	   a	   lift.	  Criticism	  came	  also	  from	  within	  the	  Administration,	  at	  the	  US	  Embassy	  to	  the	  UN,	  David	  Scheffer,	  Albright’s	  Assistant,	  wrote	  to	  the	  Ambassador:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Owen	  Papers	  [http://liv.ac.uk/library/sca/owen/boda/sp2a.pdf]	  (accessed	  20	  August	  2013).	  133	  Burg	  and	  Shoup,	  Ethnic,	  p.	  234.	  134	  Owen,	  Balkan,	  p.	  358.	  135	  Woodward,	  Interview	  with	  the	  author.	  136	  US	  Senate,	  ‘American	  Policy	  in	  Bosnia,’	  Hearing	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  Subcommittee	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  European	  Affairs	  of	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  Committee	  on	  Foreign	  Relations,	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  1993,	  (Washington:	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  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1993),	  p.	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The	  Administration	   is	   losing	   the	   support	   of	   the	  OP-­‐ED	  writers	  and	   the	   public	   affairs	   talk-­‐show	   crowd,	   who	   are	   beginning	   to	  use	   words	   like	   ‘shame’,	   ‘shameful’…and	   ‘credibility	   gap’	   to	  describe	  the	  Clinton	  Administration’s	  policy	  on	  Bosnia.	  	  And	   he	   added:	   ‘We	   face	   the	   serious	   risk	   that	   “multilateralism”	   will	   join	  “Munich”	  as	  a	  codeword	  for	  appeasement.’137	  Supportive	  of	  Scheffer’s	  view,	  Albright	  urged	  Clinton	  to	  adopt	  more	  forceful	  measures,	  including	  air	  strikes.	  Not	   unlike	   the	   Bush	   Administration,	   Clinton	   also	   had	   to	   confront	   criticism	  from	  several	  officials	  resigning	  from	  the	  State	  Department.	  In	  their	  letter	  to	  Christopher,	   leaked	   to	   the	   New	   York	   Times,	   the	   officials	   wrote	   that	   the	  Administration,	  with	  its	  inactivity,	  was	  rewarding	  Serb	  aggression.138	  Public	  pressure	  reached	  its	  climax	  with	  Nobel	  Prize	  winner	  and	  Holocaust	  survivor	  Elie	  Wiesel’s	  emotional	  appeal	  on	  the	  25th	  of	  April,	  at	  the	  inauguration	  of	  the	  Holocaust	  Memorial	  Museum:	  	  	   Mr.	  President,	  I	  cannot	  not	  tell	  you	  something.	  I	  have	  been	  in	  the	  former	   Yugoslavia	   last	   fall.	   I	   cannot	   sleep	   since	   what	   I	   have	  seen…We	   must	   do	   something	   to	   stop	   the	   bloodshed	   in	   that	  country.139	  	  Feeling	  the	  domestic	  pressure,	  the	  principals	  had	  been	  meeting	  since	  the	  end	  of	  March	   to	   discuss	   Bosnia.	   By	  mid-­‐April,	   the	   options	   had	   been	   narrowed	  down	  to	  two:	  a	  cease	  fire,	  and	  ‘lift	  and	  strike;’	   lift	  the	  arms	  embargo	  on	  the	  Bosnian	  Muslims,	  and	  strike	   the	  Serbs	   if	   they	  attack	  before	  weapons	  reach	  the	  Muslims.	   Secretary	   of	   Defense,	   Les	   Aspin,	   and	   the	  military	   favoured	   a	  cease-­‐fire,	  as	  it	  could	  take	  the	  limelight	  away	  from	  Bosnia.	  Gore	  and	  Albright	  supported	   lift	   and	   strike.140	  Eventually,	  with	   only	  Aspin	   opposing	   the	   plan,	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Arthur	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  Michael	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  State	  Dept.	  ask	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  move	  against	  Serbs,’	  The	  
New	  York	  Times,	  23	  April	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  John	  Darnton,	  ‘Does	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  world	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  New	  York	  
Times,	  25	  April	  1993.	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  Daalder,	  Getting,	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the	  President	  decided	  to	  give	  it	  a	  go.	  Politically,	  the	  decision	  was	  a	  winner.	  As	  Mark	  Danner	  wrote:	  	  	   The	  plan	  had	  many	  virtues,	  although	  the	  most	  striking	  of	  these	  were	  designed	  to	  placate	  political	  constituencies	  at	  home	  rather	  than	  alter	  the	  military	  situation	  in	  Bosnia.	  141	  	  Furthermore,	  at	  least	  on	  paper,	  the	  plan	  guaranteed	  that	  no	  US	  troops	  would	  be	  involved.	  The	  strategic	  risks	  of	  the	  choice,	  however,	  were	  massive,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	   relations	  with	   the	  allies	  and	   in	   terms	  of	  effects	  on	   the	  ground.	  On	  the	   ground,	   the	   ICFY	   mediators	   had	   reached	   an	   agreement.	   Serbian	  President	   Milosevic,	   lured	   by	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   lifting	   of	   sanctions	   on	  Serbia,	  had	  convinced	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  to	  sign	  the	  Peace	  Plan.	  After	  tense	  discussions	  in	  Athens,	  the	  Bosnian	  Serb	  leader,	  Radovan	  Karadzic	  had	  signed	  the	  agreement,	  pending	  the	  approval	  from	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  ‘parliament’	  in	  Pale.	   The	   signing	  was	   concluded	   on	   the	   1st	   of	  May,	   as	  Warren	   Christopher	  was	  landing	  in	  London	  to	  sell	  the	  new	  plan.142	  As	  Owen	  wrote,	  this	  was	  the	  moment	   when	   the	   US	   should	   have	   put	   their	   weight	   behind	   the	   plan,	  threatening	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs.	  Two	  factors	  made	  the	  Administration	  wary	  of	  any	  commitment.	  First,	  the	  US	  had	  refused	  to	  impose	  the	  plan	  on	  the	  parties	  and	  could	  not	  renege	  on	  this	  position	  even	  if	  the	  Serbs	  were,	  now,	  the	  ones	  holding	   out.	   Second,	   the	   Administration	   had	   hurriedly	   pledged	   the	  deployment	  of	  troops	  in	  case	  an	  agreement	  was	  reached.	  The	  President	  and	  others	   in	  Washington	   feared	  this	  development.143	  The	  allies,	   in	   turn,	   feared	  ‘lift	  and	  strike.’	  	  At	   least	   since	   the	   last	  months	   of	   the	  Bush	  Administration,	  when	   a	   ‘lift	   and	  strike’	   option	   had	   first	   been	   aired,144	  the	   Europeans,	   especially	   the	   French	  and	   the	   British,	   had	   been	   opposed.	   UK	   and	   France	   were	   among	   the	   main	  contributors	   to	   UNPROFOR	   and	   their	   troops	   had	   already	   been	   involved	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  Danner,	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  p.	  18.	  142	  Daalder,	  Getting,	  p.	  15.	  143	  Owen,	  Balkan,	  p.	  152.	  144	  According	  to	  Susan	  Woodward,	  Zalmay	  Khalilzad,	  in	  the	  Pentagon	  during	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  George	  H.	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  Europeans	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dangerous,	  hostage-­‐like	  situations.	  The	  French	  and	  British	  government	  saw	  a	   lift	   of	   the	   embargo	  as	   incendiary,	   turning	   their	   troops	   into	  hostages,	   and	  certainly	  could	  not	  accept	  airstrikes.145	  US	  officials	  believed	   that	   the	   recent	  increase	  in	  violence	  would	  have	  been	  enough	  to	  mollify	  the	  allies.	  They	  were	  mistaken.	  The	  UK	  and	  France	  were	  enraged	  by	  this	  new	  proposal	  of	  a	  policy	  they	  had	  already	  rejected.	  A	  British	  diplomat	  reportedly	  said:	  ‘We	  told	  them	  [not	   to	  come	  to	  us	  with	  a	   fait	  accompli]	  until	  we	  were	  blue	   in	   the	   face.	  We	  said	   we	   can’t	   do	   “lift	   and	   strike”,	   especially	   lift,	   our	   troops	   are	   on	   the	  ground.’146	  Similarly,	  Raymond	  Seitz,	  US	  Ambassador	   to	  Britain	  at	   the	   time,	  warned	   the	   Administration	   that	   the	   British	   reaction	   would	   have	   probably	  ranged	  ‘somewhere	  between	  shock	  and	  horror.’147	  	  	  Imposing	  the	  decision	  on	  the	  Europeans,	  however,	  would	  have	  made	  Bosnia	  an	   American	   responsibility;	   a	   risk	   Clinton	   was	   unwilling	   to	   take.	   Hence,	  when	  Christopher	  travelled	  to	  Europe	  to	  present	  the	  plan,	  he	  did	  not	  impose	  the	   plan	   on	   his	   European	   counterparts,	   but	   adopted	   a	   ‘conciliatory	  approach’,	   meeting	   the	   Europeans	   in	   a	   ‘listening	   mode.’148 	  The	   lack	   of	  enthusiasm	   for	   the	   plan	   at	   home	   compounded	   Christopher’s	   reticence.149	  The	   military	   had	   made	   clear	   that	   the	   plan	   would	   not	   be	   that	   simple.	   The	  delivery	  of	  weapons	  required	  a	  secure	  corridor,	  and	  troops	  would	  be	  needed	  to	   create	   it.	   The	   number	   was	   set	   to	   more	   than	   100,000.150	  Furthermore,	  Clinton	   famously	   ‘went	   south’	   on	   the	   policy	   after	   reading	   Robert	   Kaplan’s	  
Balkan	  Ghosts.	  The	  book	  allegedly	  convinced	  him	  that	  nothing	  could	  be	  done	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  Raymond	  Seitz,	  Over	  Here	  (London:	  Weidenfeld	  and	  Nicolson,	  1998),	  p.	  328.	  148	  Daalder,	  Getting,	  p.	  16.	  	  149	  William	  Safire,	  ‘Who’s	  got	  clout?’	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  Magazine,	  20	  June	  1993,	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  (accessed	  20	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  2013).	  150	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to	  pacify	  the	  region’s	  ancient	  hatreds.151	  The	  idea	  that	  the	  problem	  could	  not	  be	  solved	   -­‐	  only,	  at	  best,	   contained	   -­‐	  prevailed.	  As	  a	   frustrated	  Christopher	  put	   it:	   ‘it	   is	   hard	   to	   settle	   a	   family	   feud	   if	   the	   family	  doesn’t	  want	   to	   settle	  it.’152	  	  	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  strategic	  disaster	  and	  of	  Christopher’s	  apparent	  retreat	  from	  Europe,	  airing	  ‘lift	  and	  strike’	  proved	  a	  winner	  domestically.	  The	  plan	  	  	   Provided	   President	   Clinton	   with	   an	   effective	   alibi	   for	   his	   own	  inaction.	   If	   the	   President	   had	   not	   moved	   to	   lift	   the	   arms	  embargo…this	   was	   because	   the	   Europeans	   had	   troops	   on	   the	  ground,	  and,	  try	  as	  he	  might,	  he	  could	  not	  bring	  them	  around.153	  	  With	  its	  half-­‐hearted	  measures	  such	  as	  not	  supporting	  the	  VOPP	  and	  airing	  unconvincingly	   ‘lift	   and	   strike,’	   the	   Administration	   had	   managed	   all	   the	  domestic	  political	  risks	  that	  inaction	  in	  Bosnia	  implied.	  Bosnia	  could,	  finally,	  be	   taken	   off	   the	   front	   pages;	   the	   Administration	   could	   not	   be	   accused	   of	  inaction.	  With	  the	  same	  moves,	  however,	   it	  had	  dismissed	  two	   longer-­‐term	  risks.	  First,	   it	  had	  opened	  the	  gates	   to	   transatlantic	  rivalry.	  Soon	  the	  policy	  gap	   would	   become	   so	   deep	   that	   one	   ‘could	   sometimes	   smell	   a	   whiff	   of	  Suez.’154	  Second,	  and	  more	  important,	   the	  Administration	  had	  done	  nothing	  to	  placate	  the	  violence	  in	  Bosnia.	  As	  David	  Rieff,	  liberal	  hawk	  and	  critic	  of	  the	  Administration	  wrote,	  had	  President	  Clinton	  ‘had	  the	  moral	  bottom	  to	  get	  up	  and	  say	  frankly	  that	  no	  decisive	  help	  would	  be	  forthcoming,	  the	  chances	  are	  that	  the	  Bosnians	  would	  have	  accepted	  the	  Vance-­‐Owen	  plan.’155	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  Robert	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  (New	  York:	  Picador,	  1993).	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  NSA.	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  Seitz,	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  Rieff,	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  12,	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  (Spring	  1995),	  p.	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7.3.4	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk	  trade-­‐off	  4:	  ‘safe	  areas’	  vs.	  ‘shooting	  galleries’	  	  Being	   perceived	   as	   doing	   something	   remained	   more	   important	   that	   the	  actions	   taken.	   In	  April	   1993,	   the	   town	  of	   Srebrenica	   had	   come	  under	   Serb	  siege.	   UNPROFOR	   commander	   Gen.	   Philippe	   Morillon	   had	   travelled	   to	   the	  area	  to	  open	  humanitarian	  corridors.	  The	  population	  of	  the	  enclave	  had	  kept	  him	   hostage	   until	   he	   had	   pledged	   UN	   protection.	   The	   United	   Nations	   had	  reacted	   angrily	   to	  what	   it	   considered	  Morillon’s	   cavalier	   attitude,	   and	   had	  felt	  somewhat	  compelled	  to	  declare	  Srebrenica	  a	  ‘safe	  area.’156	  On	  the	  16th	  of	  April,	   the	   Security	  Council	   had	   approved	  Resolution	  819,	   recalling	  Chapter	  VII	  of	  the	  Charter,	  but	  the	  forces	  tasked	  with	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  area	  had	  not	  been	  given	  a	  clear	  mandate;	  and	  Muslim	  forces	  had	  been	  excluded	  from	  the	  demilitarisation	  provisions.157	  After	  the	  ‘lift	  and	  strike	  failure,’	  on	  the	  6th	  of	  May,	  the	  UN	  passed	  a	  second	  resolution	  extending	  the	  ‘safe	  area’	  status	  to	  six	   Muslim	   enclaves.	   The	   ‘safe	   areas’	   idea	   gathered	   momentum,	   but	   this	  could	   not	   hide	  major	   flaws.	   First,	   as	   Vance	   and	  Owen	   suggested,	   declaring	  some	   areas	   safe	   implied	   that	   others	   were	   ‘unsafe,’	   legitimising	   Serb	  conquest.158	  Second,	   the	  UN	  Secretariat	  had	  made	  clear	   that	   it	  did	  not	  have	  enough	  resources	  to	  extend	  the	  ‘safe	  area’	  status	  to	  other	  enclaves.159	  Third,	  the	   Muslims	   forces,	   excluded	   from	   the	   demilitarisation	   of	   the	   ‘safe	   areas,’	  could	  turn	  them	  into	  ‘garrisons’	  to	  launch	  attacks.160	  Fourth,	  the	  ‘safe	  areas’	  plunged	   the	  UN	   force	  on	   the	  ground	   into	  a	   completely	  partisan	   role	   it	  was	  not	  prepared	  to	  take.161	  	  In	   mid-­‐May,	   the	   French	   government	   presented	   a	   ‘non-­‐paper’	   on	   ways	   to	  implement	   the	   ‘safe	   areas’	   provisions,	   as	   a	   step	   towards	   the	   eventual	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  Documentary,	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  157	  Honig	  and	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  and	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  Srebrenica,	  p.	  101.	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  General	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  Report	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  Secretary	  
General,	  15	  November	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  [http://www.un.org/peace/srebrenica.pdf]	  (accessed	  20	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  p.	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  160	  Owen,	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  p.	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  William	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  ‘Keeping	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  peace:	  politics	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  the	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  in	  Durch	  (Ed.),	  UN	  Peacekeeping,	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implementation	   of	   the	   VOPP.	   The	   paper	   stated	   that	   between	   10,000	   and	  12,000	   troops	  would	  have	  been	  enough	   to	   ‘sanctuarize	   the	  areas,’	   and	   that	  the	   credibility	   of	   the	  plan	  would	  have	  been	   increased	   if	  Russia	   and	   the	  US	  were	   to	   contribute	   troops.162	  Both	   Clinton	   and	   Christopher,	   however,	   had	  understood	   the	   strategic	   risks	   involved.	   Clinton	   admitted	   that	   he	   was	  unwilling	   to	  send	  US	   troops	   into	   ‘shooting	  galleries.’163	  Christopher	  defined	  them	  as	  an	  ‘unworkable	  idea.’164	  But	  the	  tone	  of	  the	  Administration	  changed	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  ‘political	  benefits’	  of	  the	  plan	  were	  understood.	  The	  idea	  could	  take	   the	   limelight	   away	   from	   Bosnia	   and	   from	   the	   peace	   process.	   When	  Russian	  foreign	  Minister	  Kozyrev	  seemed	  ready	  to	  bring	  back	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  VOPP	  at	   the	  Security	  Council,	  Christopher	  hijacked	  the	  attempt	   inviting	  him	  and	  European	  foreign	  ministers	  to	  Washington	  to	  discuss	  a	  new	  plan.165	  Kozyrev’s	   urgency	   was	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Bosnian	   Serbs,	   with	   a	  referendum,	  had	  rejected	  the	  VOPP	  and	  tough	  action	  was	  needed.	  	  	  This,	   however,	   was	   not	   the	   Administration’s	   target	   risk.	   After	   the	   ‘lift	   and	  strike’	  debacle,	  the	  Administration	  had	  reassessed	  the	  Bosnia	  situation,	  and	  had	  identified	  the	  improvement	  of	  relations	  with	  the	  allies	  as	  its	  target	  risk,	  and	  it	  also	  wanted	  to	  bring	  Russia	  closer	  to	  the	  US	  position.	  In	  managing	  this	  risk,	  not	  much	  was	  left	  in	  terms	  of	  measures	  to	  ease	  the	  Bosnian	  conflict.	  On	  the	   25th	   of	   May,	   the	   US,	   Russia,	   Spain,	   France	   and	   Britain,	   in	   a	   grandiose	  ceremony,	  signed	  a	  Joint	  Action	  Plan	  (JAP).166	  The	  powers	  agreed	  to	  protect	  the	  six	  ‘safe	  areas’	  -­‐	  with	  the	  US	  providing	  only	  air	  support	  -­‐	  to	  support	  the	  establishment	   of	   an	   international	   war	   crime	   tribunal,	   as	   decided	   by	   UN	  resolution	  808	  of	  February	  1993,167	  to	  place	  monitors	  on	  the	  Serbian	  border,	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  and	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  p.	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  Drew,	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  166	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  France,	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  UK	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  the	  US	  (25	  May	  1993),’	  [http://liv.ac.uk/library/sca/owen/boda/mi12.pdf]	  (accessed	  20	  August	  2013),	  Lord	  Owen	  Papers.	  167	  Resolution	  808	  asked	  the	  Secretary	  General	  to	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  a	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  on	  the	  issue.	  Resolution	  827	  of	  25th	  May	  1993	  received	  the	  Secretary’s	  report	  and	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  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  tribunal.	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and	   to	   increase	   the	   international	   presence	   in	   Kosovo	   and	  Macedonia.168	  In	  line	   with	   a	   risk	   management	   approach,	   the	   ‘safe	   areas’	   and	   the	   JAP	   were	  accepted	  as	  victories.	  The	  measures,	  thogh,	  were	  minimalist	  and	  short-­‐term.	  As	   Marshall	   Harris	   recently	   put	   it,	   even	   in	   a	   best-­‐case	   scenario,	   that	   is,	  provided	   the	   enclaves	   survived,	   no	   one	   had	   thought	   where	   the	   refugees	  flooding	  the	  areas	  might	  end	  up	  living.169	  Everybody	  knew	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  safe	  areas	  depended	  largely	  on	  the	  good	  will	  of	  the	  Serbs	  (not	  the	  most	  reliable	   factor),	   but	   the	   safe	   areas	   ‘had	   begun	   to	   serve	   a	   ‘greater’	   political	  interest	   than	   the	   actual	   needs	   of	   the	   beleaguered	   people	   of…Bosnian	  towns.’ 170 	  They	   managed	   several	   short-­‐term	   risks.	   They	   could	   help	   in	  stymieing	   refugees’	  migration	   to	  Europe,	   and	   in	   giving	   the	   impression	  of	   a	  concerned	   international	   community.171	  In	   the	   euphoria	   following	   the	   JAP,	  few	  noticed	  that	  Izetbegovic	  had	  been	  the	  first	  in	  criticising	  the	  areas,	  calling	  them	  ‘reserves.’172	  Furthermore,	  the	  JAP	  ‘papered	  over’	  disagreement	  among	  the	   allies.	   The	   ‘safe	   areas’	   represented	   the	   common	   denominator	   that	   had	  permitted	  the	  agreement.173	  	  	  With	  the	  agreement	  the	  US	  and	  Russia	  had	  de	  facto	  agreed	  to	  accept	  Serbian	  gains.174	  This	  was,	  at	  best,	  an	  ironic	  conclusion,	  since	  the	  Administration	  had	  dismissed	  the	  VOPP’s	  calls	  for	  a	  Serb	  rollback	  as	  appeasement.	  When,	  on	  the	  4th	   of	   June,	   the	   UN	   Security	   Council	   adopted	   resolution	   836,	   extending	  UNPROFOR’s	  mandate	   in	   the	   safe	   areas,	  Western	   countries	   confirmed	   the	  bankruptcy	  of	   their	  position.	   In	  spite	  of	  having	  both	  signed	   the	  agreement	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  21	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and	  sponsored	  the	  resolution,	  none	  of	  the	  signatories	  was	  willing	  to	  supply	  troops	   to	   secure	   the	   safe	  areas.	  Kofi	  Annan,	  UN	  Director	  of	  Peace	  Keeping	  Operations,	  made	  clear	  that	  34,000	  troops	  were	  needed.	  The	  UK	  and	  France	  were	  unwilling	  to	  take	  additional	  responsibilities.	  The	  US	  and	  Russia	  bluntly	  refused	  any	  commitment.175	  	  
	  
7.3.5	   Risk	   vs.	   Risk	   trade-­‐off	   5:	   ‘great	   power	   politics’	   and	   domestic	  
constraints	  vs.	  Bosnian	  escalation	  	  The	   fine	  balancing	  act	   that	  had	   led	   to	   the	  establishment	  of	   the	   ‘safe	  areas’	  would	   be	   repeated	   throughout	   the	   end	   of	   1993	   and	   1994.	   The	   Clinton	  Administration	   would	   often	   be	   spurred	   into	   action,	   sometimes	   by	   TV	  images,	   but	   the	   images	   were	   not	   enough	   to	   change	   policy.176	  Clinton’s	  predicament	  was	  complex.	  Unwilling	  to	  face	  the	  risks	  of	  intervention,	  or	  of	  strained	   relations	  with	   other	   great	   powers	   on	   one	   side,	   and	   the	   domestic	  risks	  of	  inaction	  on	  the	  other,	  he	  would	  often	  settle	  for	  token	  measures.	  The	  decisions	   made	   had	   more	   to	   do	   with	   managing	   the	   risks	   inherent	   in	  maintaining	   transatlantic,	   or	   great	  power,	   harmony,	   and	   those	   inherent	   in	  domestic	  criticism,	  than	  with	  ending	  the	  war	  in	  Bosnia.	  	  
7.3.5.1	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk	  trade-­‐off	  5a:	  European	  pressures	  vs.	  domestic	  pressures	  	  In	   July	   1993,	   while	   the	   G-­‐7	   gathered	   in	   Tokyo,	   the	   situation	   in	   Sarajevo	  turned	   dramatic.	   As	   Daalder	   recalled,	   the	   media	   were	   all	   over	   the	   crisis.	  Gruesome	  TV	  images	  shocked	  Clinton177	  and	  spurred	  him	  to	  ask	  his	  advisors	  to	   review	  all	   the	  options	  available	   in	  Bosnia,	   including	  ground	   troops.	  The	  Vice	   Chairman	   of	   the	   Joint	   Chiefs	   of	   Staff,	   Admiral	   David	   Jeremiah	   set	   the	  troop	  requirement	  to	  ease	  the	  pressure	  on	  Sarajevo	  at	  70000.	  Powell	   later	  reduced	   it	   to	   25000,	   but	   the	   number	   was	   still	   too	   high	   to	   be	   politically	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  1,’	  p.	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  ‘TV	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  The	  
Christian	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  14	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  1994.	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viable.178	  Furthermore,	  uncertainty	  remained	  as	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  Serbia’s	  intervention	   in	   the	   conflict	   if	   the	   US	   sent	   ground	   troops.	   A	   Serbian	  intervention,	   in	   turn,	   could	   make	   an	   escalation	   with	   Russia	   possible.	   The	  military	   won	   the	   day,	   the	   principals	   opted	   for	   air	   strikes.	   Lake	   and	  Bartholomew	  travelled	  to	  Europe	  to	  sell	  the	  plan.	  As	  Lake	  wrote,	  ‘this	  would	  not	  be	  a	  “trial	  balloon”’	  like	  ‘lift	  and	  strike.’179	  The	  envoys	  affirmed	  that	  ‘the	  President	  had	  decided’	  and	  were	  the	  Europeans	  to	  reject	  US	  plans,	  Sarajevo	  might	   collapse	   making	   a	   ‘mockery’	   of	   the	   upcoming	   NATO	   summit,	  scheduled	   for	   January	   1994.	   Furthermore,	   the	   fall	   of	   the	   city	   would	   also	  imperil	   the	   future	   of	   the	   Atlantic	   Alliance	  with	   bitter	   recriminations	   from	  both	  sides.180	  	  	  After	  a	  marathon	  session,	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  Council	  seemed	  to	  take	  a	  strong	  position.	  ‘The	  alliance’,	  a	  press	  release	  on	  the	  4th	  of	  August	  read,	  	  	   Has	   now	   decided	   to	   make	   immediate	   preparations	   for	  undertaking,	  in	  the	  event	  that	  the	  strangulation	  of	  Sarajevo	  and	  other	  areas	  continues…stronger	  measures	  including	  air	  strikes.	  	  The	  actions	  would	  be	  taken	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  and	  the	  NATO	  Military	  Authority	  was	  tasked	  to	  draw	  up	  plans	  for	  air	  strike	  options.181	  Once	  again,	   the	  US	  presented	   the	  agreement	  as	  a	  great	   success.	  Yet,	  many	   elements	   seemed	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	   declaration	   confirmed	   the	  Administration’s	  minimalist	  approach	  and	  its	  priorities	  in	  risk	  management.	  First,	  some	  flaws	  were	  clear	  in	  the	  statement.	  As	  Elizabeth	  Drew	  noted:	  	   The	   resolution	  didn’t	   state	   that	   strangulation…should	  be	   acted	  against,	  or	  that	  force	  could	  be	  used	  to	  get	  the	  warring	  parties	  to	  the	  negotiating	  table.182	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Second,	   to	   get	   a	   deal	   the	   US	   had	   surrendered	   to	   European	   requests.	   The	  command	  of	   the	  airstrikes	  would	  be	  shared	  with	  the	  UN.183	  This	   ‘dual	  key’	  arrangement	  would	  prevent	   any	   effective	  use	   of	   force,	   since	   the	   countries	  with	  troops	  on	  the	  ground	  were	  naturally	  opposed	  to	  air	  strikes.	  The	  need	  to	  maintain	  NATO’s	  harmony,	  and	  to	  manage	  risks	  inherent	  in	  transatlantic	  rifts	  overshadowed	   the	   risks	   in	   the	   longer	   term.	  As	  Owen	  and	  Stoltenberg	  (Vance’s	   successor	   as	   UN	   envoy)	   kept	   on	   repeating,	   the	   ‘mirage’	   of	   air	  strikes	  convinced	  the	  Bosnian	  Muslims	  that	  if	  they	  resisted	  a	  bit	  longer	  the	  US	  would	  eventually	  enter	  the	  fray.	  This	  conviction	  hardened	  their	  position	  in	  the	  negotiations	  for	  the	  new	  Owen-­‐Stoltenberg	  plan.184	  	  	  
7.3.5.2	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk	  trade-­‐off	  5b:	  Russian	  concerns	  vs.	  Bosnian	  nightmares	  	  A	   similar	  minimalism	  was	  evident	  after	   the	   following	  escalation.	   Since	   the	  NAC	  declaration,	  the	  US	  had	  continued	  its	  talk	  of	  air	  strikes,	  disturbing	  the	  allies.	  During	  the	  1994	  NATO	  Council,	  French	  Foreign	  Minister	  Alain	  Juppé	  urged	  the	  Administration	  to	   ‘put	  or	  shut	  up’.	  At	  the	  moment,	  he	  suggested,	  the	  US	  was	  both	  refusing	  to	  intervene	  military,	  and	  supporting	  the	  Bosnian	  Muslims	  in	  their	  refusal	  to	  accept	  any	  peace	  agreement.185	  The	  US	  envoy	  to	  the	  ICFY,	  Bartholomew,	  had	  often	  been	  more	  prone	  to	  act	   ‘as	  a	  conduit	  for	  Izetbegovic	   to	   put	   requests	   to	   the	   Co-­‐Chairmen,’	   than	   as	   an	   honest	  broker.186	  The	  external	  pressure	  reinvigorated	  critics	  of	  inaction	  within	  the	  Administration.	   Albright	   had	   raised	   her	   concerns	   in	   a	   memo	   to	   the	  President,	   arguing	   that	   the	   lack	  of	   leadership	  was	  damaging	   the	  US	   image	  abroad.187	  Lake	  was	  starting	  to	  share	  this	  view.188	  But	  more	  hawkish	  voices	  faced	   stern	   opposition	   from	   the	  military.	   Beyond	   personal	   or	   institutional	  rivalries,	  the	  real	  problem	  facing	  the	  Administration	  was	  the	  same	  that	  had	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characterised	  the	  last	  years	  of	  the	  Bush	  Presidency:	  the	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  the	  possibilities	   open	   to	   American	  military	   power.	   The	  military’s	   caution	   had	  recently	  received	  a	  tremendous	  boost	  with	  the	  debacle	  in	  Somalia.	  This	  had	  led	   to	   a	   major	   re-­‐thinking	   of	   the	   initial	   Administration	   pro-­‐UN	   position	   -­‐	  enshrined	  in	  Presidential	  Review	  13	  -­‐	  and	  had	  raised	  the	  profile	  of	  Powell-­‐style	   approaches	   to	   military	   intervention.189	  Somalia	   confirmed	   the	   well-­‐established	   reluctance	   to	   involve	   ground	   troops,	   and	   this	   was	   the	   main	  object	  of	  Juppé’s	  criticism.	  	  	  When	   a	   shell	   exploded	   in	   the	   Sarajevo	   marketplace,	   the	   Administration	  proved	   unable	   or	   unwilling	   to	   take	   a	   stand.	   Clinton	   declared	   himself	  ‘outraged’	   by	   the	   bombing,	   and	   made	   clear	   that	   Bosnia	   was	   in	   the	   US	  interest	   since	   the	  US	  needed	   to	  prevent	   the	   spread	  of	   the	  war,	   reduce	   the	  flow	   of	   refugees,	   and	   ease	   the	   humanitarian	   catastrophe.	   Confirming	  minimalism,	   no	   mention	   was	   made	   of	   a	   specific	   interest	   in	   (or	   practical	  measures	   for)	  ending	  the	  war.190	  The	  US	  went	  along	  with	  a	  French	  plan	  to	  establish	   an	   exclusion	   zone	   for	   artillery	   around	   the	   Bosnian	   capital.	   The	  initial	  French	  proposal	  called	  for	  an	  increased	  number	  of	  ground	  troops	  to	  secure	  the	  zone.	  	  The	  Administration	  lobbied	  to	  reduce	  the	  zone	  from	  30	  to	  20km	  and	   to	   exclude	   ground	   troops	   from	   the	   plan.191	  NATO	   approved	   the	  plan	   on	   the	   9th	   of	   February.	   A	   failure	   to	   comply	  with	   demilitarisation	   and	  with	  a	  ceasefire	  in	  Sarajevo	  would	  have	  been	  followed	  by	  air	  strikes.	  	  	  What	  this	  plan	  overlooked	  was	  Russia’s	  fury	  at	  having	  been	  excluded	  from	  the	  discussion.	  Since	  the	  start	  of	  the	  war,	  Russia	  had	  been	  in	  a	  dire	  position.	  The	  main	  aim	  of	  President	  Borsi	  Yeltsin’s	  foreign	  policy	  had	  been	  to	  present	  Russia	   as	   a	   great	   power,	   thus	   diverting	   criticism	   from	   nationalist	   groups	  within	  Russia	   and	   the	  Russian	  Parliament.	   Clinton	   had	   established	   a	   good	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  U.N.	  Peace	  Keeping,’	  The	  Washington	  Post,	  18	  June	  1993.	  	  190	  Bill	  Clinton,	  ‘Responding	  to	  the	  Sarajevo	  marketplace	  bombing,’	  State	  
Department	  Dispatch,	  Vol.	  5,	  No.	  8,	  21	  February	  1994	  [http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1994/html/Dispatchv5no08.html]	  (accessed	  20	  August	  2013).	  191	  Daalder,	  Getting,	  p.	  25.	  
	   268	  
working	   relationship	   with	   the	   Russian	   President,	   managing	   his	   bouts	   of	  nationalism	   and	   his	   sometimes-­‐unpredictable	   behaviour. 192 	  Bosnia,	  however,	  was	  a	   sensitive	   issue,	  with	  many	   in	  Russia	  believing	   that	  Yeltsin	  should	   have	   done	  more	   for	   the	   Serbs.	   Yeltsin	   was	   also	   under	   fire	   for	   his	  passive	   attitude	   towards	   NATO	   expansion.	  193	  Among	   the	  main	   critics	  was	  Vladimir	  Zhirinovsky,	  Russia’s	  opposition	  leader	  and	  Yeltsin’s	  nemesis,	  who	  had	   travelled	   to	   Belgrade	   in	   January	   1994	   to	   pledge	   Russian	   military	  intervention	   in	   case	   of	   Western	   air	   strikes.194 	  A	   situation	   such	   as	   the	  Sarajevo	  ultimatum	  and	   a	   humiliation	   for	  Russia	  was	   exactly	  what	  Yeltsin	  and	   Deputy	   Foreign	   Minister,	   Vitaly	   Churkin,	   feared. 195 	  All	   Russia’s	  frustration	   exploded	   in	   a	  phone	   call	   from	  Yeltsin	   to	  Clinton	  on	   the	  11th	   of	  February	  in	  which	  the	  Russian	  President	  warned	  that	  they	  ‘had	  better	  stay	  in	  touch	  on	  urgent	  matters	  that	  might	  even	  involve	  nuclear	  weapons.’196	  	  Eventually,	   the	   Serbs	   and	   the	   Bosnian	   Muslims	   accepted	   the	  demilitarisation,	   the	   latter	   after	   UNPROFOR	   Commander	   Gen.	   Michael	  Rose’s	   strong	   convincing.197	  No	   one	   was	   more	   relieved	   than	   Clinton.	   The	  President	   confided	   to	   Taylor	   Branch	   that	   the	   ultimatum	   had	   been	   given	  more	  as	  a	  bluff	   ‘stitched	  over	  strong	  objections	  from	  countries	  with	  troops	  deployed	  as	  peacekeepers	  in	  Bosnia.’	  Carrying	  out	  the	  bombing	  would	  have	  caused	  unacceptable	  risks	  for	  the	  US	  and	  for	  relations	  with	  the	  allies.198	  Still,	  the	  Administration	  and	  the	  Bosnians	  paid	  a	  high	  price.	  Russia,	  excluded	  by	  the	  ultimatum	  agreement,	  had	  gone	  directly	  to	  the	  Serbs	  convincing	  them	  to	  withdraw	   in	   exchange	   for	   the	   deployment	   of	   Russian	   peacekeepers.	  Although	  a	  face-­‐saving	  device	  for	  Russia,	  the	  deployment	  was	  certainly	  not	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optimal	   for	   the	   US,	   or	   the	   Bosnians,	   who	   saw	   Russian	   troops	   entering	  Sarajevo	  with	  a	  big	  smile	  and	  the	  Serbian	  three-­‐fingered	  salute.199	  	  	  
7.3.5.3	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk	  trade-­‐off	  5c:	  Contact	  Group	  cohesion	  vs.	  Bosnia’s	  future	  	  The	  ‘Sarajevo	  ultimatum’	  success	  seemed	  to	  convince	  the	  US	  of	  the	  need	  for	  a	  more	  active	   role.	  The	  US	   started	  negotiations,	   led	  by	  Under-­‐Secretary	  of	  State	  Peter	  Tarnoff	  and	  the	  new	  US	  ICFY	  envoy	  Charles	  Redman,	  to	  reach	  an	  agreement	  between	  Bosnian	  Muslims	  and	  Bosnian	  Croats	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	   Federation.	   As	   with	   previous	   measures,	   the	   Washington	   Agreement,	  although	  a	  success	  on	  the	  surface,	  entailed	  long-­‐term	  risks.	  First,	  it	  officially	  established	   the	   partition	   of	   Bosnia	   into	   two	   separate	   entities	   -­‐	   something	  that	   plans	   such	   as	   the	   VOPP	   had	   tried	   to	   avoid	   -­‐	   with	   no	   space	   left	   for	  moderate	  Serbs.200	  Second,	  the	  agreement	  lacked	  any	  provision	  for	  (and	  the	  Administration	  seemed	  to	  lack	  any	  understanding	  of)	  what	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Serb	  ‘entity’	  in	  Bosnia	  would	  be.	  Third,	  in	  the	  long-­‐term,	  as	  many	  suggested,	  the	  US	  had	  conceded	   far	   too	  much	   to	  Tudjman	  and	   the	  Croats	   to	  get	   their	  signature	  on	  the	  plan.	  	  	  The	  agreement	  opened	  the	  gates	  for	  the	  transit	  of	  weapons	  from	  the	  Croats	  to	   the	  Muslims,	   increasing	   the	   ‘weapon	   tax’	   levered	   by	   the	   Croats	   on	   any	  shipment.201 	  More	   generally,	   the	   understanding	   was	   that	   Tudjman	   had	  signed	   the	   agreement	   after	   a	   pledge	   from	   Clinton	   to	   solve	   Croatia’s	  problems.	   Tudjman	   also	   understood	   that	   the	   US	   would	   look	   more	  favourably	   at	   his	   project	   to	   retake	   the	   Krajina	   region,	   under	   Serb	  occupation,	   if	   he	   signed	   the	   deal. 202 	  Croatia	   would	   receive	   military	  equipment	  and	  training	  from	  private	  US	  contractors,	  with	  the	  acquiescence	  of	   the	   State	   Department.203	  This	   renewed	   US	   activism	   was	   coupled	   with	  Russian	  frustration	  with	  the	  Serbs,	  especially	  after	  the	  attack	  on	  Gorazde,	  a	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‘safe	  area’,	  had	  exposed	  Russia	   to	   international	   criticism	   for	   its	   support	  of	  the	  Serbs.	  These	  developments	   led	   to	   the	  creation	  of	   the	  Contact	  Group	   in	  April	  1994,	  which	  also	   included	  France,	  Britain	   and	  Germany.	  Throughout	  the	  spring	  and	  summer	  of	  1994,	   the	  Group	  worked	   to	  develop	  a	  new	  plan	  and	   a	   new	   map	   to	   bring	   peace	   to	   Bosnia.	   The	   situation	   in	   Washington,	  however,	  often	  weakened	  the	  US	  position	  in	  the	  Group.	  	  	  Albright,	  faced	  with	  the	  impossibility	  of	  changing	  the	  situation	  from	  within,	  showed	  commitment	  to	  the	  Bosnian	  Muslims’	  cause	  with	  public	  diplomacy,	  including	   the	   dramatic	   inauguration	   of	   the	   American	   Embassy	   in	  Sarajevo. 204 	  Furthermore,	   the	   Administration	   was	   increasingly	   coming	  under	  domestic	  pressure	  to	  lift	  the	  arms	  embargo	  and	  to	  conduct	  air	  strikes.	  In	  the	  spring	  of	  1994,	  the	  Senate	  held	  yet	  another	  session	  of	  Hearings	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  a	  possible	  lifting	  of	  the	  arms	  embargo.	  The	  discussion	  epitomised	  the	   risks	   confronted	   by	   the	   Administration.	   Representatives	   of	   European	  countries,	   including	   France	   and	   the	  UK,	  warned	   the	  Administration	   of	   the	  strategic	  risks	  of	  a	  lift:	  an	  increase	  in	  violence,	  the	  end	  of	  the	  peace	  process,	  and	   the	   possibility	   of	   UNPROFOR’s	   withdrawal.	   But	   these	   voices	   were	  submerged	  by	  criticism.	  Ejup	  Ganic,	   from	   the	  Bosnian	  Presidency	  went	  on	  the	  attack,	  pushing	  for	  a	  lift.	  He	  accused	  the	  Administration	  of	  having	  lived	  in	   a	   ‘Hamlet-­‐like	   dilemma’	   that	   had	   allowed	   the	   accumulation	   of	   ‘dead	  bodies.’	   Richard	   Perle,	   former	   Assistant	   Secretary	   of	   Defense,	   working	   as	  lobbyist	   for	   the	  Bosnian	  Muslims,205	  accused	  Christopher	  of	   having	  bowed	  to	  European	  pressures.	  Members	  of	   the	  Administration	  tried	  to	  defend	  the	  refusal	  to	  lift	  arguing	  that	  it	  posed	  risks	  of	  escalation.206	  	  	  Criticism	  would	  not	   stop.	   Feeling	   the	  pressure,	   Clinton	   famously	   exploded	  against	   CNN	   journalist	   Christine	   Amanpour,	   denying	   the	   journalist’s	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accusations	  of	  ‘flip-­‐flopping,’	  and	  shifting	  responsibility	  to	  the	  Europeans	  for	  their	  rejection	  of	   ‘lift	  and	  strike.’207	  Within	  the	  Contact	  Group,	   these	  noises	  created	  several	  problems.	  But,	  as	  many	  authors	  have	  suggested,	   the	  Group	  acted	  precisely	  as	  a	  forum	  to	  ease	  rivalries	  among	  great	  powers.	  Decisions	  taken	   within	   the	   group	   would	   represent	   a	   ‘lowest-­‐common	   denominator	  approach,’	   pursuing	   minimalist	   strategies	   and	   goals.	   Furthermore,	   the	  existence	   of	   the	   Group	   and	   its	   decisions	   helped	   the	   Administration	   in	  managing	   domestic	   risks.	   The	   Administration	   could	   justify	   its	   own	  resistance	  to	  the	  policy	  options	  suggested	  by	  domestic	  critics,	  by	  citing	  the	  difficulties	   of	   an	   international	  mediation	   effort;	   but	   in	   the	   Group	   it	  would	  not	  accept	  solution	  that	  were	  unwise	  domestically.208	  	  	  The	   key	   trade-­‐off	   pitted	   risks	   inherent	   in	   straining	   the	   relations	  with	   the	  other	  members	  of	   the	  group	  against	   taking	   stronger	  measures	   to	   ease	   the	  situation	   in	  Bosnia.	   Events	   in	   the	   second	  part	   of	   1994,	   demonstrated	   that	  the	  Administration	  was	  not	   ready	   to	  put	  Bosnia	   first.	   First,	   as	   the	  Contact	  Group	  was	  discussing	  a	  possible	  new	  map,	  many	  realised	  that	  the	  enclaves	  in	  Eastern	  Bosnia,	  including	  Srebrenica,	  complicated	  the	  drawing	  of	  a	  map.	  Even	  the	  Bosnian	  Muslims	  had	  accepted	  the	  need	  to	  ‘simplify’	  the	  map	  and	  they	   had	   showed	   a	   willingness	   to	   swap	   Srebrenica	   for	   areas	   around	  Sarajevo.	   Haris	   Silajdzic,	   Bosnian	   Prime	   Minister,	   had	   stated,	   with	  Izetbegovic’s	   approval,	   that	   he	  was	   ready	   to	   go	   to	   Srebrenica,	   to	   convince	  the	   people	   that	   they	   had	   to	   leave.	   For	   the	   Contact	   Group,	   however,	   and	  particularly	   for	   the	   US,	   such	   a	   position	   was	   a	   non-­‐starter.	   As	   US	   envoy	  Redman	  confirmed,	  no	  one	  could	  be	  seen	  making	  a	  deal	  that	  involved	  a	  land	  swap	   with	   the	   Serbs,	   especially	   Clinton,	   who,	   from	   the	   start,	   had	  made	   a	  clear	   distinction	   between	   the	   Serb	   aggressor	   and	   the	   Bosnian	   victim.	  Members	   of	   the	   Administration,	   such	   as	   Gore	   and	   Albright,	   were	   heavily	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opposed	   and	   such	   a	   move	   would	   have	   created	   a	   barrage	   of	   public	  criticism.209	  	  Second,	   in	   July,	   the	   Group	   presented	   its	   peace	   plan	   and	   a	   new	  map	   on	   a	  ‘take-­‐it-­‐or-­‐leave-­‐it’	   basis,	   but	   the	   Bosnian	   Serbs	   were	   unimpressed.	   The	  cards	   that	   the	  Administration	   could	  play	   to	   convince	   the	   Serbs	  were	   soon	  deprived	  of	  any	  meaning.	  As	  always,	   lifting	   the	  arms	  embargo	  appealed	   to	  many	   at	   home.	   Yet,	   the	   allies	   made	   clear	   that	   in	   case	   of	   unilateral	   lift,	  UNPROFOR	   would	   leave,	   increasing	   the	   tempo	   of	   the	   fighting.	   The	   US	  government	   would	   be	   confronted	   by	   Muslim	   pleas	   for	   help	   and	   it	   would	  have	  a	  hard	  time	  ignoring	  them.210	  Russia	  opposed	  the	  second	  card;	  that	  is,	  using	  Milosevic	  to	  convince	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs,	  by	  threatening	  an	  increase	  in	  sanctions	  on	  Serbia.	  Furthermore,	  Milosevic	  seemed	  to	  have	  outsmarted	  the	  Contact	   Group.	   As	   the	   prospect	   of	   sanctions	   on	   Serbia	   approached,	   he	  declared	  that	  Serbia	  had	  severed	  ties	  with	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs.211	  No	  measure	  was	   taken.	   The	   harmony	   of	   the	   Contact	   Group	   overshadowed	   risks	   of	  increased	   violence	   in	   Bosnia.	   As	   Owen	   suggested,	   with	   the	   failure	   of	   the	  ‘take-­‐it-­‐or-­‐leave-­‐it’	  gamble:	  	   The	  Contact	  Group	  nations…had	  lost	  authority	  in	  the	  region,	  and	  the	   Bosnian	   Serbs	   and	   the	   Croatian	   government	   had	   felt	  emboldened	  to	  take	  aggressive	  action.212	  	  The	  safe	  area	  of	  Bihac	  was	  now	  on	  the	  Serbs’	  radar.	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7.3.5.4	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk	  trade-­‐off	  5d:	  domestic	  upheaval	  vs.	  European	  concerns	  	  	  In	  Washington,	  the	  situation	  had	  turned	  even	  worse	  for	  Clinton.	  In	  the	  1994	  mid-­‐term	  elections,	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  suffered	  a	  staggering	  defeat,	  with	  Republicans	  regaining	  control	  of	  both	  the	  House	  and	  the	  Senate.	  Clinton	  was	  reportedly	  shocked,	  he	  felt	   like	  a	   ‘hostage	  in	  the	  White	  House.’213	  Although	  their	  party	  was	  riding	  on	  the	  largely	  domestic	  ‘Contract	  with	  America’,	  many	  Republicans	   felt	   emboldened	   to	   criticise	   the	  President’s	   record	   on	  Bosnia.	  The	   critics	   also	   included	   leading	   Democrats,	   such	   as	   Biden.214	  Biden,	   Dole	  and	  other	  Senators	  had	  travelled	  to	  Sarajevo,	  to	  meet	  Izetbegovic,	  and	  had	  not	   been	   supportive	   of	   US	   policy.215	  In	   no	   position	   to	   contest	   the	   now	  predominantly	   Republican	   Congress,	   Clinton	   yielded.	   The	   US	   government	  would	   not	   unilaterally	   lift	   the	   arms	   embargo,	   but	   it	   would	   stop	   enforcing	  it.216	  The	  decision	  had	   few	  consequences	  on	   the	   ground,	   since	  most	  of	   the	  weapons	  were	  already	  delivered	  by	  air,	  and	  since	  the	  Europeans	  played	  the	  key	   role	   in	   enforcing	   it.217	  The	   decision,	   however,	   put	   the	   US	   in	   direct	  contrast	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Contact	  Group.	  	  	  The	   tension	   within	   the	   Group	   reached	   its	   peak	   as	   the	   Serbs	   attacked	   the	  ‘safe	  area’	  of	  Bihac,	  on	  the	  27th	  of	  November.	  Bosnian	  Muslims	  had	  launched	  an	  offensive	  from	  the	  safe	  area,	  confirming	  the	  point	  that	  the	  enclaves	  could	  be	   turned	   into	   garrisons.	   The	   boldness,	   power	   and	   disregard	   for	   the	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international	   community	   of	   the	   Serb	   counter-­‐attack	   was,	   however,	  unprecedented.	   Croatian	   Serb	   forces	   joined	   the	   Bosnian	   Serbs,	   risking	   a	  massive	   escalation,	   involving	   Croatia.218	  Planes	   had	   taken	   off	   from	   the	   air	  base	  of	  Ubdina,	  in	  the	  territory	  of	  Serb	  occupied	  Krajina,	  allegedly	  under	  UN	  protection,	   and	   fuel	   for	   the	   aircraft	   had	   been	   provided	   by	   Belgrade,	   in	  violation	  of	  a	  previous	  agreement	  between	  Milosevic	  and	  the	  Group.219	  The	  US	  initially	  had	  its	  way.	  To	  punish	  the	  Serbs	  for	  Bihac,	  NATO	  carried	  out	  air	  strikes.	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  were	  not	  deterred.	  They	  blockaded	  and	  detained	  UN	  peacekeepers	   and	   stopped	   any	   movement	   of	   UN	   personnel.	   UNPROFOR	  Commander	  Michael	  Rose	  admitted	  that	  the	  peacekeepers	  were	  effectively	  ‘hostages,’	  and	  Bosnian	  Serb	  leader	  Radovan	  Karadzic	  warned	  that	  in	  case	  of	  any	  further	  attack	  all	  UN	  and	  NATO	  personnel	  would	  be	  considered	  enemy	  forces.220	  These	  developments,	  coupled	  with	  the	  previous	  US	  decision	  on	  the	  embargo,	   represented	   the	   last	   straw	   for	   the	   Europeans.	   They	   let	   the	   US	  know	  that	  they	  had	  reached	  the	  ‘end	  of	  the	  road’:	  either	  the	  US	  was	  willing	  to	  send	  troops	  to	  Bosnia	  or	  they	  would	  reject	  any	  escalation.	  	  	  The	   Administration	  was	   faced	  with	   risks	   on	   all	   sides.	   The	   Serbs	   could	   go	  unpunished,	   NATO	   could	   be	   severely	   damaged,	   and,	   in	   case	   of	   UN	  withdrawal,	   the	   US	  might	   have	   to	   help	   the	   Bosnian	  Muslims	   alone.	   Faced	  with	   the	   possibility	   of	   undermining	   NATO,	   the	   Administration	   abandoned	  any	  project	  of	  tough	  action	  against	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs.	  In	  managing	  the	  risks	  of	  divisions	  within	  NATO,	  the	  Administration	  overlooked	  other	  risks.	  First,	  on	  the	  domestic	  side,	  its	  critics	  felt	  emboldened.	  In	  a	  remark	  similar	  to	  one	  Clinton	  had	  made	  in	  his	  campaign,	  Newt	  Gingrich	  (R-­‐GE	  and	  new	  Speaker	  of	  the	  House)	  went	   on	   the	   record	   suggesting	   that	   the	  Administration	   should	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threaten	  an	  all-­‐out	  offensive	  against	  the	  Serbs	  with	  a	  Desert	  Storm-­‐style	  air	  campaign.	  221	  	  These	   voices	   were	   now	   starting	   to	   represent	   a	   broader	   concern	  with	   the	  situation	  in	  Bosnia	  shared	  by	  several	  journalists	  in	  key	  newspapers	  such	  as	  
The	  New	  York	  Times,	  by	  the	  media,	  by	  political	  circles,	  and	  by	  citizen	  groups	  in	   Washington.	   George	   Soros	   financed	   the	   American	   Committee	   to	   save	  Bosnia	   and	   the	   Balkan	   Action	   Council,	   including	   former	   members	   of	   the	  Bush	  and	  Clinton	  Administrations.	  They	  had	  access	  to	  the	  decision-­‐making	  circles	   and	   to	   members	   of	   Congress. 222 	  On	   the	   strategic	   side,	   the	  Administration	   had	   conceded	   a	   victory	   to	   the	   Bosnian	   Serbs.	   Preserving	  NATO	  meant	   abandoning	   plans	   for	  military	   action.	   The	   only	  way	   forward	  was	  negotiation,	  an	  extremely	  painful	  conclusion	  since	  the	  US	  had	  criticised	  the	  VOPP	  for	  rewarding	  aggression.223	  In	  a	  replay	  of	  his	  earlier	  decision	  on	  the	   VOPP,	   Clinton	  went	   an	   extra	  mile	   to	   demonstrate	   his	   commitment	   to	  NATO.	  He	  pledged	  the	  use	  of	  up	  to	  25000	  US	  ground	  troops	  within	  a	  NATO	  framework	   to	   extract	   the	   UN	   personnel	   in	   case	   of	   withdrawal.224	  As	   will	  soon	  be	  clear	  he	  would	  come	  to	  regret	  such	  a	  decision.	  	  	  
7.3.6	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk	  trade-­‐off	  6:	  domestic	  risk	  vs.	  strategic	  nightmares	  
7.3.6.1	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk	  trade-­‐off	  6a:	  political	  risks	  vs.	  chances	  for	  peace	  	  The	   first	   months	   of	   1995	   proved	   that	   the	   US	   government	   was	   unwilling	  either	   to	  accept	   the	  domestic	  political	   risks	  of	   compromise,	  or	   the	  risks	  of	  intervention.	   In	   December	   1994,	   former	   US	   President	   Jimmy	   Carter	   had	  brokered	  a	   four	  months	  cease-­‐fire	  among	  the	  parties.225	  As	  the	  deadline	  of	  the	  ceasefire	  approached,	  the	  military	  situation	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  Muslims	  had	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improved	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Federation,	  and	  through	  the	  provision	  of	  weapons	  from	  Muslim	  countries,	  including	  Iran,	  with	  the	  acquiescence	  of	  the	   US	   government.226	  Some	   authors	   also	   argued	   that	   the	   ranks	   of	   the	  Bosnian	   Muslims	   were	   increasingly	   composed	   of	   militias	   from	   terrorist	  groups.227	  The	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  were,	  thus,	  cornered.	  The	  new	  commander	  of	  UNRPOFOR	   forces	   in	   Bosnia,	   Lt.	   Gen.	   Rupert	   Smith,	   told	   its	   men	   that	   the	  Serbs	  would	  soon	  be	  ready	  to	  fight	  and	  to	  improve	  their	  defensive	  positions.	  This	   almost	   certainly	   entailed	   ‘doing	   something’	   about	   the	   Muslim	  enclaves.228	  The	  Clinton	  Administration	  did	  not	  share	  the	  sense	  of	  urgency.	  In	  early	  1995,	  Lake,	  increasingly	  frustrated	  by	  US	  policy	  in	  Bosnia,	  called	  for	  a	  major	  review	  of	  all	  the	  options.	  The	  State	  Department	  favoured	  the	  status	  quo,	  whereas	  the	  Pentagon	  preferred	  a	  policy	  of	  active	  containment;	  that	  is	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  neutral	  stand.	  More	  generally,	  many	  argued	  that	  since	  the	  cease-­‐fire	  was	  still	  holding,	  it	  made	  no	  sense	  to	  change	  policy.229	  No	  change	  occurred.	   Later,	   as	   the	   fighting	   restarted,	   the	   US	   played	   a	   leading	   role	   in	  rejecting	  two	  developments	  that	  might	  have	  improved	  the	  situation	  on	  the	  ground.	  	  	  At	   the	  UN,	  Albright	   took	   the	   lead	   in	   rejecting	  a	  plan	   to	   restructure	   the	  UN	  Forces.	  Building	  on	  recommendations	  from	  the	  UN	  Secretary	  General,	  Gen.	  Bernard	  Janvier	  and	  Lt.	  Gen.	  Rupert	  Smith,	  UNPROFOR	  commanders,	  argued	  that,	   since	   no	   country	   had	   offered	   the	   additional	   troops	   required,	   the	  ‘effectiveness	  and	  security’	  of	  UNPROFOR’s	  forces	  should	  be	  improved,	  and	  this	  meant	  redeployment.	  Forces	  should	  be	  concentrated	  in	  central	  Bosnia,	  to	  make	   them	   less	  vulnerable	   to	  hostage	   taking,	  and	  should	  be	  withdrawn	  from	   the	  Muslim	  enclaves	   (leaving	  only	  a	   few	  observers),	   since	  UN	   troops	  could	   not	   defend	   the	   areas	   anyway.230	  After	   the	   Generals’	   briefing	   at	   the	  Security	   Council,	   Albright	   accused	   them	   of	   ‘dumping	   the	   safe	   areas’	   and	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  227	  Gibbs,	  First,	  p.	  157,	  and	  Holbrooke,	  To	  end,	  p.	  50.	  For	  an	  extreme	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  2007).	  228	  Honig	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argued	   that	   the	  United	  States	   could	  not	  accept	   the	  plan.	  As	  Danner	  wrote,	  Albright	   had	   come	   to	   believe	   the	   ‘political	   fiction’	   of	   the	   ‘safe	   areas.’	   The	  Administration	   had	   sold	   the	   ‘safe	   areas’	   policy	   to	   the	   public	   as	   a	   strong	  commitment.	  With	  the	  US	  still	  posturing	  as	  tough	  on	  Bosnia,	  abandoning	  it	  would	  have	  been	  hard	  to	  explain.231	  Such	  a	  position	  overlooked	  that	  the	  risk	  of	  UN	   forces	   being	   taken	  hostage	   prevented	   any	   strong	   action	   against	   the	  Serbs,	   including	   the	   air	   strikes	   that	   Albright	   often	   invoked.	   But	   it	   also	  overlooked	  that	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  safe	  areas	  was	  desperate	  and	  that	  they	  were	  already	  ‘lost.’232	  	  The	   failure	   of	   talks	   between	   the	   US	   and	   Serbia’s	   President	   Milosevic	  demonstrated	   the	   same	   dismissal	   of	   strategic	   risks.	   The	   talks	   built	   on	   the	  possibility	  of	  Serbia’s	   recognition	  of	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina	   in	  exchange	   for	  a	  lifting	   of	   sanctions	   on	   Serbia.	   Bosnian	  Muslim	   authorities	   had	   even	  made	  public	   that	   they	  would	   not	   restart	   the	   war,	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   ceasefire,	   if	  Serbia	  recognised	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina.	  An	  agreement	  seemed	  within	  reach.	  Milosevic	   would	   have	   recognised	   Bosnia	   and	   sealed	   the	   border	   with	   the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	   in	  exchange	   for	  a	   ‘suspension,’	  not	  a	  complete	   lifting,	  of	   the	  sanctions.	   Many	   in	   the	   US	   Administration	   balked	   at	   the	   possibility.	  Christopher,	   Albright	   and	   Gore	   still	   argued	   that	   the	   Serbs	   had	   to	   be	  punished	  and	  no	  deal	  could	  be	  cut	  with	   them.	  Albright	  even	   threatened	  to	  resign	   if	   this	   ‘softly-­‐softly	   pact’	   was	   finalised. 233 	  Robert	   Frasure,	   the	  American	   negotiator,	  was	   instructed	   to	   go	   back	  with	   a	   stronger	   proposal:	  sanctions	  could	  now	  be	  re-­‐imposed	  not	  by	  a	  vote	  of	  the	  Security	  Council,	  but	  by	   the	   request	   of	   any	   permanent	   member	   of	   the	   Council.	   The	   deal	   was	  lost.234	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Beyond	  the	  opposition	  within	  the	  Administration,	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  deal	  was	  in	  line	  with	  Clinton’s	  policy	  on	  Bosnia.	  President	  Clinton,	  who	  had	  identified	  the	  Serbs	  as	  the	  main	  aggressor	  in	  the	  war	  since	  his	  Presidential	  campaign,	  needed	   a	   strong	   punitive	   element	   if	   any	   deal	   with	   the	   Serbs	   was	   to	   be	  accepted	  by	  Congress	  and	  the	  public.	  In	  the	  effort	  to	  adopt	  a	  tough	  posture,	  the	   US	   lost	   another	   chance	   of	   improving	   (even	   if	   only	   marginally)	   the	  situation.	  Furthermore,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  Administration	  had	  failed	  in	   managing	   even	   the	   domestic	   risks.	   Criticism	   of	   the	   Administration’s	  inaction	  continued.	  As	  late	  as	  March,	  Strobe	  Talbott	  was	  calling	  for	  the	  US	  to	  be	   more	   ‘eagle’	   than	   ‘ostrich,’235 	  but	   to	   no	   avail.	   In	   Serbia,	   where	   his	  willingness	  to	  compromise	  had	  been	  heavily	  questioned,	  Milosevic	  was	  now	  cornered.	   The	   only	   way	   forward	   was	   an	   all-­‐out	   support	   for	   the	   Bosnian	  Serbs	   and	   their	   efforts	   to	   end	   the	  war	   on	   their	   own	   terms.236	  The	   fighting	  that	  had	   remained	  at	   a	   low	   level	   at	   the	   start	  of	  1995,	   re-­‐exploded	   in	  May,	  with	  the	  improved	  weather	  and,	  crucially,	  after	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Milosevic-­‐Frasure	  talks.	  	  	  
7.3.6.2	   Risk	   vs.	   Risk	   trade-­‐off	   6b:	   strategic	   risks	   vs.	   Presidential	   nightmares,	  
towards	  Srebrenica	  	  On	   the	  25th	  May	   the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  savagely	  attacked	  Tuzla.	  NATO	  reacted	  with	   an	   unprecedented	   bombing	   of	   weapons	   depots	   in	   Pale,	   the	   Bosnian	  Serbs’	   capital.	   The	   Serbs,	   this	   time,	   took	   hundreds	   of	   UN	   hostages	   as	  reprisal.	  Lt.	  Gen.	  Smith	  was	  unimpressed,	  he	  wanted	  to	  ‘break	  the	  machine’	  of	   hostage	   taking.	   He	   knew	   that	   for	   the	   Serbs,	   killing	   the	   hostages	  would	  have	  been	  too	  risky	  and	  wanted	  to	  call	  the	  bluff.	  No	  one	  else	  agreed.	  In	  the	  Security	   Council	   no	   one	   called	   for	   additional	   airstrikes	   and	   with	   the	  hostages	   used	   as	   human	   shields,	   even	  Washington	   abandoned	   the	   idea.237	  The	  UN,	  fearful	  of	  escalation,	  brokered	  a	  deal	  with	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  for	  the	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release	  of	  the	  hostages.	  After	  a	  meeting	  between	  Janvier	  and	  Mladic,	  the	  UN	  Secretary	  General’s	  representative	  Yasushi	  Akashi,	  Smith	  and	  Janvier,	  met	  to	  discuss	  the	   future	  of	   the	  mission	  and	  stated	  that	  UNPROFOR	  would	  return	  to	   ‘traditional	  peacekeeping	  principles,’	   that	   is,	   it	  would	  no	   longer	  conduct	  attacks	   on	   the	   Serbs.238	  To	   confirm	   the	   change,	   air	   strikes	   now	   had	   to	   be	  approved	   directly	   by	   the	   UN	   Secretary	   General	   in	   New	   York,	   increasing	  dramatically	   the	   length	   of	   the	   process	   and	   depriving	   them	   of	   any	  effectiveness. 239 	  Furthermore,	   UNPROFOR	   troops	   were	   given	   new	  instructions.	   Directive	   1/95	   in	   March	   1995	   had	   already	   stated	   that	   the	  Bosnian	   population	   should	   have	   been	   protected,	   but	   that	   any	   risk	   for	   UN	  personnel	   in	   doing	   so	   should	   have	   been	   avoided.240	  Directive	   2/95	   stated	  that	   the	   ‘execution	   of	   the	  mandate	   [was]	   secondary	   to	   the	   security	   of	   UN	  personnel,’	  and	  that	  force	  was	  to	  be	  used	  strictly	  for	  self-­‐defence	  and	  only	  as	  a	   last	   resort.241 	  With	   the	   taking	   of	   the	   hostages,	   and	   the	   situation	   of	  UNPROFOR	   worsening,	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   UN	   withdrawal	   now	   loomed	  large.	  In	  his	  memoirs,	  Clinton	  expressed	  the	  several	  pressures	  he	  faced:	  	  	   I	   was	   reluctant	   to	   go	   along	   with	   Senator	   Dole	   in	   unilaterally	  lifting	   the	   arms	   embargo,	   for	   fear	   of	   weakening	   the	   United	  Nations…I	   also	   didn’t	   want	   to	   divide	   the	   NATO	   alliance	   by	  unilaterally	   bombing	   Serb	   military	   positions,	   especially	   since	  there	   were	   European,	   but	   no	   American,	   soldiers	   on	   the	  ground…And	  I	  didn’t	  want	  to	  send	  American	  troops	  there.242	  	  To	   be	   sure,	   the	   hurried	   pledge	   to	   deploy	  US	   ground	   troops	   in	   case	   of	   UN	  withdrawal	   worsened	   Clinton’s	   position.	   NATO	   had	   already	   developed	   a	  plan	  to	  extricate	  the	  UN	  forces.	  OPLAN	  40104	  envisaged	  the	  deployment	  of	  82,000	  NATO	  troops	  including	  25,000	  Americans.	  The	  cost	  for	  the	  US	  would	  have	   been	   staggering:	   $700	   million.	   According	   to	   General	   Wesley	   Clark	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OPLAN	  40104	  was	  a	  major	  war	  plan,	  with	  high	  risk	  of	  conflict	  both	  before	  and	   during	   the	   withdrawal.243	  The	   specifics	   of	   the	   plan	   assigned	   to	   US	  troops	   the	   hazardous	   duty	   of	   extricating	   UN	   troops	   from	   the	   Muslim	  enclaves.244	  	  	  For	   Clinton,	   who	   allegedly	   had	   not	   realised	   the	   level	   of	   automaticity	  inherent	  in	  the	  NATO	  plan,245	  this	  represented	  the	  worst	  nightmare.	  He	  was	  relieved	  when	  the	  attention	  momentarily	  shifted	  to	  France’s	  proposal	  for	  a	  Rapid	   Reaction	   Force.	   The	   RRF	   served	   the	   short-­‐term	   purpose	   of	  maintaining	   UNPROFOR	   in	   place,	   delaying	   the	   possibility	   of	   US	   ground	  involvement.	  Politically,	  however,	  French	  President	  Jacques	  Chirac’s	  bid	  for	  leadership	   required	   an	   American	   response.	   New	   Secretary	   of	   Defense	  William	   Perry	   and	   the	   new	   Chairman	   of	   the	   JCS,	   Gen.	   John	   Shalikashvili,	  suggested	   that,	   if	   asked	   to	   do	   so,	   US	   troops	   should	   help	   the	   UN	   force	   to	  redeploy.	  Not	  everyone	  agreed,	  but	  Clinton,	   spurred	  by	  Lake,	  accepted	   the	  suggestion.	   On	   the	   31st	   of	   May,	   in	   an	   address	   at	   the	   Air	   Force	   Academy,	  Clinton	  stated	  that	  beyond	  the	  longstanding	  commitment	  to	  help	  in	  case	  of	  withdrawal,	   ‘if	   necessary,	   and	   after	   consultation	   with	   Congress,’	   the	   US	  should	  be	  prepared	  to	  ‘assist	  NATO	  if	  it	  decides	  to	  meet	  a	  request	  from	  the	  United	  Nations	   troops	   for	  help	   in	  a	  withdrawal	  or	  a	   reconfiguration	  and	  a	  strengthening	  of	  its	  forces.’246	  In	  other	  words,	  Clinton	  seemed	  to	  go	  beyond	  withdrawal	  with	   help	   in	   ‘reconfiguration’	   and	   ‘strengthening.’	   The	   change	  created	  a	  domestic	  uproar.	  	  	  Dole	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  speech	  to	  reinforce	  his	  role	  as	   leading	  voice	  on	  Bosnia,	   his	   challenge	   to	   Presidential	   leadership,	   and	   his	   potential	   role	   as	  1996	  Republican	  Presidential	  candidate.	   In	   January,	  Dole	  had	   introduced	  a	  bill	   requiring	   the	   President	   to	   unilaterally	   lift	   the	   arms	   embargo.	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  243	  Chollet,	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  p.	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  244	  Rohde,	  Endgame,	  p.	  29.	  	  245	  Holbrooke,	  To	  End,	  p.	  68.	  246	  Bill	  Clinton,	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  President	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  Air	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  Academy	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  Ceremony,’	  31	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  (accessed	  20	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Administration	   had	   opposed	   it.	   Now,	   Dole	   argued,	   the	   new	   policy	   was	  simply	   ‘reinforcing	   failure.’	   The	   Bosnians	   should	   have	   been	   given	   the	  opportunity	  to	  defend	  themselves,	  by	  lifting	  the	  embargo.247	  Other	  quarters	  within	  the	  Administration	  were	  critical	  for	  the	  opposite	  reason.	  Dick	  Morris,	  long-­‐time	  policy	  advisor	  to	  the	  President	  was	  shocked.	  The	  country,	  Morris	  argued,	   was	   largely	   against	   intervention	   and	   the	   President’s	   ratings	   had	  dropped	  after	  his	  speech.	  He	  added:	  	  	   You	  don’t	  want	  to	  be	  Lyndon	  Johnson…sacrificing	  your	  potential	  for	   doing	   good	   on	   the	   domestic	   front,	   by	   a	   destructive,	   never-­‐ending	  foreign	  involvement.248	  	  The	   ever-­‐cautious	   Christopher	   similarly	   opposed	   the	   shift,	   as	   he	   had	  opposed	   Lake’s	   earlier	   proposals	   for	   a	   change	   of	   policy.	   249 	  With	   his	  statement	   backfiring,	   Clinton	   retreated.	   The	  US	  would	   intervene	   only	   in	   a	  ‘remote	   and	   unlikely’	   emergency	   extraction.250 	  Clinton	   had,	   once	   again,	  appeared	   weak.	   His	   policy	   had	   changed	   at	   the	   first	   sign	   of	   opposition.	  Congress	  continued	  its	  assault	  on	  the	  Administration,	  trying	  to	  pass	  bills	  to	  lift	   the	   arms	   embargo.	   ‘We	  were	   getting	  more	   and	  more	   votes’	   to	   lift	   the	  embargo,	  ‘every	  time	  there	  would	  be	  a	  vote	  we	  were	  a	  bit	  stronger,’	  Senator	  Dole	  recalled.251	  Congress’	  requests	  for	  a	  lift	  were	  largely	  political	  posturing.	  Once	  the	  debate	  moved	  on	  to	  what	  to	  do	  after	  the	  lifting	  of	  the	  embargo,	  no	  one	   had	   clear	   answers.252	  Congress’	   inconsistent	   position	   had	   also	   been	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  refusal	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  RRF,	  re-­‐named	  by	  Biden	   ‘Rapid	  Ripoff’	   force. 253 	  Still	   what	   mattered	   was	   the	   appearance	   of	   Congress’	  activism	  and	  of	  Clinton’s	  weakness.	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  (New	  York:	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  (accessed	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On	  the	  8th	  of	   June,	   the	  House	   inserted	   the	   lifting	  of	   the	  arms	  embargo	   in	  a	  foreign	   aid	   bill	   that	   the	   President	   had	   already	   promised	   to	   veto	   for	   other	  reasons,	   and	   approved	   it	   by	   a	   veto-­‐proof	   majority	   of	   318-­‐99.	   The	  Administration	   had	   largely	   ignored	   other	   non-­‐binding	   votes	   on	   lifting	   the	  embargo,	   but	   this	   time,	   the	   bill’s	   sponsors	   contended	   that	   the	   vote	  would	  have	  been	  binding	  if	  also	  approved	  by	  the	  Senate.254	  Clinton	  risked	  a	  major	  embarrassment. 255 	  Bosnia	   was	   ‘becoming	   a	   cancer	   on	   Clinton’s	   entire	  foreign	  policy	  –	  spreading	  and	  eating	  away	  at	  its	  credibility’.256	  	  	  The	  efforts	  to	  develop	  a	  new	  policy	  in	  the	  spring	  had	  failed.	  Now,	  Lake	  and	  others	  realised	  that	  the	  muddling	  through	  and	  the	  short-­‐term	  measures	  that	  had	   been	   characterising	   the	   Administration’s	   behaviour	  were	   affecting	   its	  position,	   both	   at	   home	   and	   abroad.	   In	   particular,	   the	   need	   to	   maintain	  harmony	  within	  NATO	  was	  damaging	  the	  Administration.	   ‘The	  need	   for	  us	  to	   protect	   and	   preserve	   the	   alliance	   is	   driving	   our	   policy,’	   Vice-­‐President	  Gore	  exploded,	  ‘It	  is	  driving	  us	  into	  a	  brick	  wall	  with	  Congress.’257	  It	  could	  be	  added	  that	  the	  policy	  had	  also	  been	  disastrous	  on	  the	  ground.	  And	  yet,	  the	  Administration	  could	  not	  abandon	   its	   inaction.	  As	  Lake	  acknowledged,	   the	  Administration	   needed	   leverage	   over	   the	   parties.258	  Developments	   on	   the	  ground	  provided	  the	  leverage	  needed.	  Between	  the	  11th	  and	  the	  13th	  of	  July,	  the	  Bosnia	  Serbs	  overran	   the	   ‘safe	  area’	  of	   Srebrenica.	  The	   reaction	  of	   the	  international	  community	  and	  of	  the	  UN	  forces	  in	  Srebrenica	  was	  disastrous.	  The	  crimes	  committed	  in	  the	  area	  reached	  shocking	  peaks	  of	  brutality:	  rape,	  abuse	  of	  civilians,	  and	  the	  massacre	  of	  approximately	  7000	  Muslim	  boys	  and	  men.259	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7.4	  CONCLUSION	  	  With	   the	   Srebrenica	   massacre	   and	   with	   the	   delicate	   political	   situation	   at	  home,	  all	   the	  risks	   that	  Clinton	  had	  tried	   to	  manage	   in	   two	  years	  of	  short-­‐term,	   minimalist	   and	   half-­‐hearted	   measures	   proverbially	   came	   back	   to	  haunt	   him.	   Srebrenica	   represented	   the	   crisis	   for	   the	   US	   in	   the	   Bosnia	  conflict,	   the	   real	   moment	   for	   decision.	   Domestically,	   as	   evidence	   of	   the	  massacre	  accumulated,	   criticism	  of	   the	  Administration	   skyrocketed,	   as	  did	  Congress’	   requests	   for	   a	   lift	   of	   the	   embargo.	   Gingrich	  went	   on	   the	   record	  suggesting	   that	   Srebrenica	   had	   been	   ‘the	   worst	   humiliation	   for	   Western	  democracies	  since	  the	  1930s.’260	  Dole	  saw	  in	  this	   further	  humiliation	  a	  key	  chance	   to	   attack	   Clinton’s	   record	   in	   foreign	   policy	   and	   on	   the	   Bosnia	  failure.261	  The	  Washington	  Post	  defined	  the	  Administration	  as	  a	   ‘big	  mouth,	  no	  stick’	  Administration.	  The	  critics	  of	  the	  Administration	  now	  included	  all	  the	  most	  prominent	  US	   journalists,	   and	  Washington	  heavyweights	   such	  as	  Zbigniew	  Brzezinski	  and	  Brent	  Scowcroft.262	  Public	  uproar	  at	  the	  massacre	  now	  seeped	  through	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  In	  a	  meeting	  on	  the	  18th	  of	  July,	  Vice	  President	  Gore	  built	  on	  the	  ‘public	  opinion	  argument’.	  Debating	  a	  gruesome	  picture	  on	  the	  front-­‐page	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Times,	  he	  stated:	  	   My	   21-­‐year-­‐old	   daughter	   asked	   about	   that	   picture…What	   am	   I	  supposed	  to	  tell	  her?	  Why	  is	  this	  happening	  and	  we’re	  not	  doing	  anything?263	  	  In	   terms	  of	   public	   attitudes,	   the	  Bosnia	   issue	   represented	  not	   so	  much	   an	  explicit	  threat	  to	  Clinton’s	  re-­‐election,	  but	  a	  more	  subtle,	  long-­‐term	  risk:	  	   Bosnia	  was	   not	   an	   issue	   in	   and	   of	   itself.	   Not	  many	   Americans	  were	  likely	  to	  go	  to	  the	  polls	   in	  the	  1996	  Presidential	  elections	  and	   vote	   one	  way	  or	   another	  because	   of	   events	   in	   Sarajevo	  or	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Srebrenica.	   Rather	   its	   importance	   was	  more	   complicated	   than	  that,	   for	   it	   appeared	   to	   suggest	   something	   larger	   and	   far	  more	  devastating,	   an	   impotence	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   Clinton	  Administration	  not	  just	  in	  this	  but	  in	  all	  matters.264	  	  	  Ironically,	   Clinton	   would	   be	   failing	   the	   ‘voting	   booth’	   test	   of	   Presidential	  leadership	   that	   had	   convinced	   him	   to	   be	   tough	   on	   Bosnia	   when	   he	   was	  running	   for	   President.	   Furthermore,	   the	   allies	   shared	   the	   impression	   that	  the	  Administration	  was	  weak.	  Many	  of	   the	  measures	   taken	  by	  Clinton	  had	  been	  aimed	  at	  preserving	  NATO	  and,	  more	  generally,	  harmony	  among	  great	  powers.	   The	   humiliation	   from	   the	   massacre	   at	   Srebrenica	   now	   fatally	  threatened	   the	   credibility	   of	   NATO,	   and	   US	   leadership.	   The	   allies	   kept	  threatening	   that	  without	  a	  new,	   full	  US	  commitment	   they	  would	  withdraw	  their	   troops	   from	   UNPROFOR.	   The	   possibility	   of	   a	   withdrawal	   and	   the	  ensuing	  implementation	  of	  OPLAN	  40104,	  now	  represented	  a	  ticking	  time-­‐bomb	  for	  Clinton.	  The	  President	  realised	  that	  he	  had	  to	  do	  something,	  and	  fast,	   otherwise	   UNPROFOR	   withdrawal	   and	   the	   deployment	   of	   US	   troops	  would	  be	  ‘dropped	  in	  during	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  campaign.’265	  	  The	  Administration	  developed	  a	  new	  policy,	  building	  on	  a	  French	  proposal,	  threatening	   massive	   air	   strikes	   -­‐	   no	   longer	   contained	   by	   the	   ‘dual-­‐key’	  arrangement	  -­‐	  if	  Serbs	  attacked,	  and	  confirmed	  their	  new	  commitment	  in	  an	  emergency	   Conference	   in	   London.	   Furthermore,	   the	   Administration,	   with	  Anthony	   Lake	   at	   the	   forefront,	   was	   now	   fully	   engaged	   in	   drafting	   a	   new	  ‘endgame	  strategy’	  for	  the	  war	  in	  Bosnia.	  Plans	  to	  end	  the	  war	  were	  already	  on	   the	   table	  when	   the	  Serbs	  decided	   to	   test	  NATO’s	  newfound	  willingness	  by	   bombing	   the	   Sarajevo	   marketplace.	   NATO	   airstrikes	   followed.	   As	   the	  political	  risks	  of	  inaction	  had	  increased,	  the	  strategic	  risks	  of	  action	  seemed	  to	  decrease.	  The	  Croats	  launched	  a	  massive	  campaign	  to	  retake	  the	  Krajina	  region,	   creating	   the	   worst	   episode	   of	   ethnic	   cleansing	   of	   the	   whole	   war.	  What	  was	  important	  for	  the	  Administration	  was	  that	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  had	  been	   dramatically	   defeated	   and	   that	   Milosevic	   had	   not	   helped	   them.	   As	  Christopher	  suggested,	  this	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  new	  ‘strategic	  situation’	  beneficial	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  Halberstam,	  War,	  p.	  298.	  265	  Power,	  ‘A	  Problem’,	  p.	  424.	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to	   the	   US.266	  No	  major	   obstacle	   remained	   to	   full	   US	   involvement.	   Richard	  Holbrooke	  would	  soon	  take	  the	  lead	  in	  the	  negotiations.267	  	  In	   line	   with	   the	   first	   hypothesis	   of	   the	   thesis,	   the	   chapter	   started	   with	   a	  discussion	   of	   the	   general	   uncertainty	   surrounding	   the	   use	   of	   American	  power	   and	   the	   US	   role	   in	   the	   international	   context	   of	   the	   early	   1990s.	  Uncertainty	   also	   played	   an	   ‘active’	   part	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   as	  Clinton	  confronted	   the	   impossibility	  of	  knowing	   the	  extent	  of	  Serbian	  and,	  above	   all,	   Russian	   reactions	   to	   US	   measures	   in	   Bosnia.	   Furthermore,	   the	  analysis	   also	   identified	   how	   President	   Clinton	   and	   many	   of	   his	   advisers	  discussed	   US	   actions	   in	   Bosnia	   in	   terms	   of	   what	   could	   go	   wrong	   both	  strategically	   (on	   the	   ground	   and	   in	   the	   relation	  with	   European	   allies	   and	  Russia)	  and	  at	  home.	  	  	  Strengthening	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   second	   hypothesis,	   the	   chapter	   has	  elaborated	  on	  the	  ‘containment’	  thesis.	  Focusing	  on	  the	  ‘containment’	  years,	  the	  chapter	  has	  shown	  the	  trade-­‐offs	  involved	  in	  Clinton’s	  policies,	  and,	  with	  them,	   the	   minimalism	   and	   short-­‐termism	   that	   characterized	   American	  actions.	   Strong	   campaign	   pledges	   were	   made,	   mainly,	   to	   pass	   the	   ‘voting	  booth’	   test,	  with	  a	  total	  disregard	  for	  the	  consequences	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  for	   the	   future	   of	   the	   Administration.	   Campaign	   pledges	   of	   a	   strong	   stand	  affected	  the	  Administration’s	  approach	  to	  the	  VOPP.	  The	  President	  could	  not	  appear	   to	  be	  making	  concessions	  to	   the	  Serbs	  (although	  this	  was	  certainly	  not	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  VOPP).	  The	  decision	  to	  rule	  out	  the	  use	  of	  ground	  troops	  and	   the	   ‘lift	   and	   strike’	   proposal	   worked	   for	   Clinton	   domestically	   as	   they	  placated	   the	   ‘do	   something’	   impulse,	  but	   strained	   relations	  with	  allies	  and	  had	  no	  visible	  effect	  on	  the	  ground.	  From	  there,	  the	  Administration	  moved	  to	   a	   series	   of	   measures	   that	   had	   more	   to	   do	   with	   harmony	   among	   great	  powers,	   than	   with	   the	   conflict,	   including	   the	   dreadful	   ‘safe	   areas’	  compromise.	  The	  establishment	  of	  the	  Contact	  Group	  confirmed	  this	  trend.	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  Derek	  Chollet	  and	  Samantha	  Power,	  The	  Unquiet	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  (New	  York:	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Until	   the	   Srebrenica	  massacre,	   the	  Administration	   coupled	   strong	   rhetoric	  and	  strong	  stands	  at	  home,	  such	  as	  the	  decision	  to	  end	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	   embargo,	   with	   measures	   to	   placate	   allies’	   concerns	   regarding	   US	  activism.	  Bosnia	  was	   left	  on	   its	  own	  until	  violence	  reached	  unprecedented	  peaks	   in	   the	   summer	  of	  1995.	   In	   line	  with	  Lamborn’s	  prediction	  and	  with	  the	   sub-­‐hypothesis	   identified	   in	  Chapter	   3,	   several	   choices	   of	   the	   Clinton	  Administration	   demonstrated	   a	   propensity	   to	   give	   priority	   to	   short-­‐term	  political	  risk	  over	  longer-­‐term	  strategic	  risks.	  	  Finally,	   the	   account	   is	   also	   consistent	   with	   the	   understanding	   of	   foreign	  policy	  crises	  and	  with	  the	  third	  hypothesis	  brought	  forward	  by	  this	  project.	  The	  chapter	  has	  interpreted	  Srebrenica	  as	  ‘the’	  crisis	  within	  the	  Bosnia	  war	  and	   first-­‐hand	   accounts	   confirm	   this	   interpretation.268	  In	   explaining	   the	  origins	   of	   this	   crisis,	   however,	   the	   chapter	   has	   not	   been	   limited	   to	   a	  circumscribed	   and	   well-­‐defined	   ‘pre-­‐crisis’	   period.	   It	   has	   expanded	   the	  horizon	   on	   the	  whole	   Bosnia	   issue	   and	   has	   tried	   to	   demonstrate	   how	   the	  accumulation	   of	   short-­‐term	   measures,	   and,	   above	   all,	   of	   ‘countervailing	  risks’	   contributed	   to	   the	   peak	   of	   violence	   in	   1995.	   As	   David	   Gompert	  suggested,	  the	  break-­‐up	  of	  Yugoslavia	  and	  the	  war	  in	  Bosnia	  were	  probably	  inevitable;	   but	   ‘it	   took	   bad	   policy	   –	   on	   top	   of	   bad	   policy’	   to	   bring	   the	  situation	  to	  ‘such	  a	  tragic	  juncture.’269	  	  In	   this	   sense,	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   Clinton	   Administration’s	   Bosnia	   policy	  conforms	  to	   the	  several	  accounts	  offered	   in	   the	  sociological	  risk	   literature.	  Uncertainty,	  risks	  and	  short-­‐term	  measures	  prevailed	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  environment.	  More	   importantly,	  however,	  within	   this	  project,	   this	  analysis	  constitutes	  only	  the	  final	  building	  block	  of	  a	  broader	  argument.	  Uncertainty,	  risks	   and	   short-­‐term	   measures	   prevailed	   in	   the	   post-­‐Cold	   War	   world,	   as	  they	   did	   in	   the	   Cold	   War	   one.	   Chapter	   8	   will	   conclude	   the	   thesis	  summarising	  the	  main	  argument,	  identifying	  the	  contributions	  made	  by	  the	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  the	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  in	  Ullman	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  world	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thesis	  and	  the	  possible	  objections	  to	  it,	  and	  pointing	  towards	  future	  avenues	  of	  research.	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And	  yet,	  a	  more	  rigorous	  examination	  of	  the	  past	  
might	  reveal	  that	  what	  we	  sense	  as	  new	  really	  is	  not,	  
and	  that	  some	  of	  the	  “traditional”	  features	  
	  are	  more	  complex	  than	  we	  think1.	  Stanley	  Hoffman.	  	  On	   the	   23rd	   of	   May	   2013,	   President	   Barack	   Obama	   gave	   a	   speech	   on	   the	  United	  States’	  drone	  policy.	  The	  speech	  extended	  beyond	  targeted	  killings	  to	  give	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  future	  of	   the	   ‘War	  on	  Terror,’	  and	  of	  United	  States	  policy	   against	   terrorism.	   Quoting	   James	  Madison,	   Obama	  warned	   that	   the	  United	  States	  should	  not	  allow	  war	  to	  define	  its	  national	  character.	  This	  war,	  the	   President	   made	   clear,	   ‘like	   all	   wars	   must	   end.’	   Answering	   a	   question	  from	  the	  audience,	  the	  President	  stated:	  	   We	  have	   faced	  down	  dangers	   far	  greater	   than	  al	  Qaeda…we	  have	  overcome	   slavery	   and	  Civil	  War;	   fascism	  and	   communism...	   these	  events	  could	  not	  come	  close	  to	  breaking	  us.2	  	  As	  James	  Fallows	  suggested,	  this	  position	  seemed	  like	  a	  breath	  of	  fresh	  air.	  For	   the	   first	   time	   in	  years,	   the	  terrorist	   threat	  had	  been	  put	   into	  historical	  perspective,	  and	  the	  President	  seemed	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  US	  could	  live	  with	  the	  risk	  of	  terrorism.3	  Lack	  of	  perspective	  was	  one	  of	  the	  main	  springboards	  for	  this	  research	  project.	  	  	  My	   project	   aimed	   at	   gauging	   whether	   the	   nature	   of	   US	   foreign	   policy	  decision-­‐making	   had	   changed	   -­‐	   after	   the	   Cold	   War	   and	   after	   9/11	   –	   as	  radically	   as	   a	   large	   body	   of	   literature	   seemed	   to	   suggest.	   It	   aimed	   at	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Stanley	  Hoffman,	  ‘An	  American	  Social	  Science:	  International	  Relations,’	  
Daedalus,	  Vol.	  106,	  No.	  3	  (Summer,	  1977),	  p.	  57.	  2	  James	  Fallows,	  ‘What	  Mattered	  in	  Obama's	  Speech	  Today:	  Ending	  the	  Open-­‐Ended	  “War	  on	  Terror,”’	  The	  Atlantic,	  23	  May	  2013,	  [http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/05/what-­‐mattered-­‐in-­‐obamas-­‐speech-­‐today-­‐ending-­‐the-­‐open-­‐ended-­‐war-­‐on-­‐terror/276208/]	  (accessed	  22	  August	  2013).	  3	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evaluating	   the	   assessment	   that	   the	  Cold	  War	  world	   represented	   a	   certain,	  clear	   and	   secure	   world	   that	   had	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	   the	   uncertain,	  unpredictable	   and	   risky	   post-­‐Cold	  War	   one.	   It	   soon	   became	   clear	   that,	   to	  achieve	  these	  aims,	  the	  research	  had	  to	  take	  a	  long	  detour.	  The	  questions,	  in	  fact,	  did	  not	  develop	  in	  a	  vacuum,	  but	  represented	  a	  reaction	  to	  a	  particular	  type	   of	   literature.	   Several	   studies	   published	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   2003	  Iraq	  War,	   identified	   the	  predominance	  of	   risk	  and	  uncertainty	  as	   radically	  new	   features	   of	   international	   politics.	   Hence,	   to	   answer	   the	   original	  questions,	   it	   became	   necessary	   to	   tackle	   risk,	   uncertainty	   and	   the	   ‘risk	  literature.’	  The	  research	  found	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  treatment	  of	  risk	  provided	  by	  several	  schools	  inspired	  by	  sociology	  and	  decision	  theory,	  and	  proceeded	  to	  suggest	  a	  reconceptualisation.	  With	  risk	  and	  uncertainty	  clearly	  defined,	  the	   thesis	  argued	   that	   foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making	  could	  be	   interpreted	  as	   a	   particular	   form	   of	   risk	   management.	   The	   research	   developed	   three	  main	   hypotheses	   that,	   if	   verified	  would	   suggest	   continuities	   in	   the	   nature	  and	   practice	   of	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making.	   The	   development	   of	  hypotheses	  and	  the	  study	  of	  risk,	  in	  other	  words,	  helped	  the	  thesis	  reach	  its	  original	  destination.	  	  	  This	  concluding	  chapter	  reflects	  on	  the	  research	   journey.	   It	  can	  be	  divided	  into	   four	   main	   parts.	   Part	   two	   will	   discuss	   the	   risk	   literature,	   and	   the	  emergence	  of	  the	  research	  hypotheses.	  Part	   three	  will	  provide	  a	  summary	  of	   how	   the	   research	   hypotheses	   performed	   in	   the	   case	   studies.	  Part	   four	  will	   identify	   the	   contributions	   this	   research	   makes,	   and	   the	   potential	  objections	   to	   the	   thesis.	  Part	   five	  will	   briefly	   suggest	   avenues	   for	   further	  research.	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8.2	  RISK	  AND	  RISK	  MANAGEMENT	  IN	  FOREIGN	  POLICY	  
	  
8.2.1	  Risk	  in	  IR:	  sociology	  and	  decision	  theory	  	  In	   the	   book	   Managing	   Strategic	   Surprise,	   Paul	   Bracken	   et	   al.	   wrote	   that	  ‘thinking	  systematically	  about	  risk’	  has	  ‘barely	  touched	  the	  world	  of	  national	  security	   and	   international	   affairs.’ 4 	  When	   this	   research	   started,	   the	  assessment	   seemed	   paradoxical.	   Risk	   seemed	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   a	   rich	   IR	  scholarship.	   Although	   other	   divisions	   have	   been	   suggested,5	  Chapter	   2	  divided	  this	  recent	   ‘risk	  literature’	   into	  two	  main	  sections:	  the	   ‘risk	  society	  at	  war	  scholarship’	  inspired	  by	  Ulrich	  Beck’s	  theory	  of	  ‘risk	  society,’	  and	  the	  ‘governmentality	  at	  war’	  scholarship,	  inspired	  by	  Michel	  Foucault’s	  work	  on	  security	  and	  by	  governmentality	  studies.6	  The	  analysis	  discussed	  the	  origins	  and	  the	  main	  tenets	  of	  these	  scholarships	  separately,	  but	  it	  also	  pointed	  out	  weaknesses	   and	   common	   elements.	   In	   particular,	   the	   analysis	   suggested	  that	  these	  two	  scholarships	  share	  three	  main	  propositions.	  	  
	  First,	   they	   both	   identify	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   historical	   divide.	   This	   divide	   is	  signposted	   by	   the	   rise	   to	   prominence	   of	   risk	   and	   uncertainty.	   For	  ‘governmentality	   scholars,’	   9/11	   and	   the	   radical	   uncertainty	   of	   terrorism	  brought	   a	   radicalisation	   of	   neo-­‐liberal	   practices	   of	   government	   aimed	   at	  extending	   governmental	   control	   over	   society,	   both	   within	   and	   without	   a	  state’s	   borders.7	  For	   the	   Beckian	   scholarship,	   9/11	   represented	   only	   the	  latest	   manifestation	   of	   a	   longer	   process.	   The	   real	   change,	   these	   scholars	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Paul	  Bracken,	  Ian	  Bremmer,	  and	  David	  Gordon	  (Eds.),	  Managing	  Strategic	  
Surprise	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  press,	  2008),	  p.	  1.	  5	  William	  Clapton,	  ‘Risk	  in	  International	  Relations,’	  International	  Relations,	  Vol.	  25	  (2011),	  pp.	  280-­‐295;	  and	  Karen	  Lund	  Petersen,	  ‘Risk	  analysis	  –	  a	  field	  within	  security	  studies?,’	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Relations,	  vol.	  18,	  no.	  4	  (December	  2012),	  pp.	  693-­‐717	  6	  For	  a	  similar	  division	  see	  the	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies,	  Volume	  37,	  No.	  5	  (December	  2011).	  Tanja	  Aalberts	  and	  Wouter	  Wener,	  ‘Mobilising	  Uncertainty,’	  pp.	  2183-­‐2200,	  and	  Filip	  Gelev,	  ‘Checks	  and	  balances	  of	  risk	  management:	  precautionary	  logic	  and	  the	  judiciary,’	  pp.	  2237-­‐2252.	  7	  Louise	  Amoore	  and	  Mareike	  De	  Goede,	  Risk	  and	  the	  War	  on	  Terror	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2008),	  p.	  6;	  and	  Claudia	  Aradau	  and	  Rens	  Van	  Munster,	  ‘Taming	  the	  future:	  the	  dispositif	  of	  risk	  in	  the	  War	  on	  Terror,’	  in	  Amoore	  and	  De	  Goede,	  Risk	  and	  the	  War	  on	  Terror,	  p.	  24.	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argued,	   occurred	  with	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	  War.8	  Beckian	   scholars	   such	   as	  Christopher	  Coker,	  Mikkel	  Rasmussen,	  and	  Yee-­‐Kuang	  Heng	  argued	  that	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  brought	  with	  it	  the	  demise	  of	  clear	  threats,	  substituted	  by	  unpredictable	  risks.9	  	  
	  Second,	   these	   schools	   suggest	   that	   with	   the	   new	   predominance	   of	   risk,	  governments	  have	  adopted	  new	  practices	  to	  deal	  with	  them.	  The	  rise	  of	  risk	  was	   accompanied	   by	   the	   rise	   of	   risk	   management.	   To	   be	   sure,	   the	   two	  schools	   differ	   in	   their	   interpretation	   of	   risk	   management.	   For	   scholars	   of	  Foucauldian	   inspiration,	   practices	   of	   risk	   management	   are	   the	   best	  strategies	  decision-­‐makers	   can	  adopt	   to	  extend	  governments’	   control	  over	  society	  and	  to	  reproduce	  neoliberal	  rationalities	  of	  government.	  For	  Beckian	  scholars,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   risk	   management	   becomes	   the	   only	   strategy	  decision-­‐makers	  can	  adopt.	  They	  need	  to	  abandon	  long-­‐term	  strategies	  and	  dreams	  of	  establishing	  ‘new	  world	  orders,’	  and	  should	  aim	  at	  preventing	  the	  spread	  of	  risks.10	  	  
	  From	   this	   account,	   the	   third	   element	   should	   be	   clear.	   In	   line	  with	   similar	  studies	   on	   the	   ‘risk	   citizen,’ 11 	  the	   analysis	   extrapolated	   from	   these	  literatures	   the	  key	   features	  of	   the	   ‘risk	   foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐maker.’	  The	  analysis	   suggested	   that	   these	   schools	   share	   an	   extreme	   (albeit	   radically	  opposed)	  view	  of	  decision-­‐makers	  and	  of	  their	  possibilities	  of	  control	  over	  the	   environment,	   and	   over	   the	   consequences	   of	   their	   own	   actions.	   The	  decision-­‐maker	   of	   the	   ‘risk	   society	   at	   war’	   seems	   almost	   powerless.	   The	  reasons	  behind	   this	   lack	  of	  control	  are:	   the	  sheer	  unpredictability	  of	   risks,	  the	  thick	  layer	  of	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  decision-­‐making	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Christopher	  Coker,	  War	  in	  an	  Age	  of	  Risk	  (Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press,	  2009),	  p.	  69.	  9	  See	  in	  particular	  Coker,	  War,	  Mikkel	  V.	  Rasmussen,	  The	  Risk	  society	  at	  War	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  and	  Yee-­‐Kuang	  Heng,	  War	  
as	  risk	  management	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2006).	  10	  Rasmussen,	  The	  Risk,	  p.	  35;	  and	  Heng,	  War,	  p.	  24.	  11	  Sandra	  Walklate	  and	  Gabriel	  Mythen,	  ‘Agency,	  reflexivity	  and	  risk:	  cosmopolitan,	  neurotic	  of	  prudential	  citizen?’	  The	  British	  Journal	  of	  
Sociology,	  Vol.	  61,	  No.	  1,	  2010,	  pp.	  46-­‐62.	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War	   world,	   and	   the	   presence	   of	   what	   Beck	   called	   ‘boomerang	   effects’	   –	  efforts	  to	  control	  risks	  that	  come	  back	  to	  haunt	  the	  centres	  of	  decision.12	  In	  the	   Foucauldian	   scholarship	   (admittedly	   more	   orientated	   to	   domestic	  policies),13	  the	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐maker	  seems	  in	  almost	  total	  control.	  He	  adopts,	  in	  foreign	  policy,	  the	  same	  strategies	  of	  pre-­‐emption,	  control,	  and	  violence	  that	  he	  adopts	  in	  the	  domestic	  context.14	  	  	  The	  analysis	   found	   these	   three	  propositions	  unsatisfactory.	  The	  search	   for	  clarity	   as	   to	   the	   role	   of	   risk	   in	   decision-­‐making	   started	   from	   other	  treatments	   of	   the	   same	   concepts	   available	   in	   the	   literature.	   The	   analysis	  suggested	   that,	   although	   the	   ‘sociological’	   interpretation	   of	   risk	   was	  relatively	   new,	   risk	   had	   been	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   several	   studies	   drawing	   on	  economic	   or	   psychological	   perspectives.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   these	   authors	  relied	  on	  insights	  as	  varied	  as	  Bernoulli’s	  expected	  utility	  theory,15	  prospect	  theory,16	  a	  combination	  of	  prospect	  theory	  and	  other	  IR	  literatures,17	  and	  a	  combination	   of	   works	   on	   risk	   and	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making	  literature.18	  Two	  new	  problems	  emerged.	  First,	  the	  literature	  discussed	  risk	  only	   in	   term	   of	   risk-­‐taking:	   risk-­‐aversion	   or	   risk-­‐propensity.	   Second,	   the	  effort	  to	  translate	  the	  laboratory	  findings	  of	  the	  psychological	  literature	  into	  a	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making	   context	   led	   to	   an	   excessively	   aseptic	  account.	  We	  have	  observed	  how	  this	  type	  of	  analysis	  completely	  dismissed	  the	  role	  of	  domestic	  politics	  and	  other	  constraints	  that	  could	  limit	  a	  foreign	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Coker,	  War,	  p.	  132.	  	  13	  Amoore	  and	  De	  Goede,	  Risk,	  p.	  6.	  14	  See	  among	  many	  Larner,	  ‘Spatial,’	  Brian	  Massumi,	  ‘Potential	  Politics	  and	  the	  Primacy	  of	  Preemption,’	  Theory	  and	  Event,	  2007,	  Vol.	  10,	  No.	  2	  [http://muse.jhu.edu.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2massumi.html]	  (accessed	  21	  August	  2013).	  15	  Hannes	  Adomeit,	  Soviet	  Risk-­‐taking	  and	  Crisis	  Behavior	  (London:	  George	  Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  1982).	  16	  Rose	  McDermott,	  Risk-­‐Taking	  in	  International	  Politics:	  Prospect	  Theory	  in	  
American	  Foreign	  Policy	  (Ann	  Arbor:	  Michigan	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  and	  William	  A.	  Boettcher	  III,	  Presidential	  Risk	  Behavior	  in	  Foreign	  Policy:	  
Prudence	  or	  Peril	  (New	  York:	  Palgrave	  MacMillan,	  2005);	  and	  	  17	  Boettcher,	  Presidential;	  and	  Jeffrey	  W.	  Taliaferro,	  Balancing	  Risks:	  Great	  
Power	  Intervention	  in	  the	  Periphery	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2004).	  18	  Yacoov	  Vertzberger,	  Risk	  Taking	  and	  Decisionmaking:	  Foreign	  Military	  
Intervention	  decisions	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1998).	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policy-­‐decision-­‐maker’s	   risk-­‐taking	   freedom.	   Most	   of	   these	   studies	   dealt	  with	   US	   foreign	   policy	   and	   correctly	   focused	   on	   the	   President	   as	   the	  ultimate	   decision-­‐maker,	   but	   portrayed	   him	   as	   completely	   free	   to	   make	  decisions,	   with	   no	   constraints	   imposed	   by	   strategic	   pressure,	   domestic	  politics,	   public	   opinion,	   or	   domestic	   criticism.19	  In	   other	   words,	   the	   ‘risk-­‐taking’	  decision-­‐maker	  did	  not	   appear	  more	   realistic	   than	   the	   ‘Beckian’	   or	  ‘Foucauldian’	  one.	  	  	  At	   the	   end	   of	   this	   review,	   the	   analysis	   concluded	   that	   the	   three	   bodies	   of	  literature	   discussed	   provided	   neither	   satisfactory	   definitions,	   nor	   realistic	  accounts	  of	  risk,	  uncertainty,	  risk	  management,	  and	  of	  their	  role	   in	  foreign	  policy.	   In	   particular,	   four	   issues	   seemed	   to	   need	   specific	   attention:	   a	  definition	   of	   the	   concepts	   and	   role	   of	   risk	   and	   uncertainty,	   a	   definition	   of	  risk	  management,	  suggestions	  on	  how	  it	  could	  be	  relevant	  for	  foreign	  policy,	  and	  a	  more	  realistic	   image	  of	   the	  decision-­‐maker.	  Chapter	  3	  proceeded	  to	  tackle	   these	   issues	   blending	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making	   texts,	   and	  insights	  from	  outside	  the	  international	  politics	  literature.	  	  	  
8.2.2	  Two	  worlds	  collide:	  risk	  management	  and	  foreign	  policy	  	  Having	   discussed	   the	   contrasting	   and	   contradictory	   definitions	   of	   risk	  present	   in	   the	   sociological	   and	   in	   the	   decision	   theory	   literatures,	   the	   first	  aim	  of	  Chapter	  3	  was	  to	  provide	  definitions	  of	  these	  concepts.	  The	  process	  was	   divided	   into	   two	  main	   parts.	   The	   first	   part	   discussed	   several	   authors	  within	   the	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making	   literature,	   developing	   ‘hints’	   on	  how	  risk,	  uncertainty,	  risk	  management	  and	  control	  work	  in	  foreign	  policy.	  The	   first	   step	   was	   identifying	   the	   roles	   of	   risk	   and	   uncertainty.	   Here,	  Thomas	   Schelling’s	  work	  on	   the	   strategy	   of	   conflict	  made	   clear	   how,	   even	  though	   decision-­‐makers	   can	   take	   risks;	   they	   are	   far	   from	   having	   total	  control.	   Risk	   and	   uncertainty	   coexist.	   In	   any	   situation,	   the	   ‘fact	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Boettcher,	  Presidential,	  and	  McDermott,	  Risk-­‐Taking.	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uncertainty’	  remains.20	  Second,	  the	  analysis	  moved	  closer	  to	  the	  study	  of	  US	  Presidential	   decision-­‐making.	   This	   step,	   as	  Chapters	   3	   and	   4	  made	   clear,	  was	  taken	  since	  the	  analysis	  had	  to	  confront	  the	  sociological	  risk	  literature,	  and	  the	  risk-­‐taking	  literature,	  on	  their	  own	  turfs.	  These	  scholarships,	  in	  fact,	  drew	   conclusions	   for	   US	   foreign	   policy	   (sociological	   studies),	   and	   mostly	  discussed	  risk-­‐taking	  as	  ‘Presidential	  risk-­‐taking’	  (‘decision	  theory’	  studies).	  Richard	   Neustadt’s	   work	   on	   Presidential	   power	   highlighted	   the	   short-­‐termism,	  minimalism,	  and	  lack	  of	  control	  inherent	  in	  Presidential	  decision-­‐making.21	  To	   understand	   this	   process,	   the	   analysis	   looked	  more	   closely	   at	  the	  nature	  of	  decision-­‐making.	  Alan	  Lamborn	  provided	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	   objects	   of	   the	   foreign	   policy	   trade-­‐off.	   In	   particular,	   he	   suggested	   that	  decision-­‐making	  could	  be	   interpreted	  as	  a	   ‘balance’	  between	  political	  risks	  (the	  need	   to	  maintain	  domestic	   consensus),	   and	  policy	   (or	   strategic)	   risks	  (the	   risks	   inherent	   in	   the	  policy	   chosen).	   Lamborn	   suggested	   that	   the	   two	  dimensions	   are	   contingent.	   Foreign	   policy	   cannot	   be	   understood	   without	  taking	   both	   into	   account. 22 	  More	   specifically,	   he	   argued	   that,	   in	   this	  balancing	   act,	   decision-­‐makers	   put	   a	   premium	   on	   managing	   short-­‐term	  political	   risks,	   since	   political	   consequences	   appear	   clearer	   than	   strategic	  ones.	   Although	   Lamborn’s	   analysis	   concerned	   European	   decision-­‐makers,	  the	  chapter	   confirmed	   its	  applicability	   to	  US	  Presidents.	  Alexander	  George	  similarly	   argued	   that	   Presidents	   are	   constrained	   by	   the	   need	   to	   achieve	  contrasting	   goals:	   optimising	   resources,	   gaining	   consensus,	   and	   improving	  decisions’	  quality.	  This	  compels	  Presidents	  to	  accept	  trade-­‐offs.23	  	  	  From	   the	   study	   of	   these	   authors,	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   risk,	   uncertainty,	  short-­‐termism	   and	   control	   are	   traditional	   concerns	   of	   the	   foreign	   policy	  literature;	   and,	  more	   importantly,	   of	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making	   itself.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Thomas	  Schelling,	  Arms	  and	  Influence	  (London:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  p.	  94.	  21	  Richard	  E.	  Neustadt,	  Presidential	  power	  and	  the	  Modern	  Presidents	  (New	  York:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  1990),	  p.	  212.	  22	  Robert	  G.	  Kaufman,	  ‘Book	  reviews:	  Statecraft,	  Domestic	  Politics,	  and	  Foreign	  Policy	  Making,’	  The	  Journal	  of	  Politics,	  Vol.	  51	  (1989),	  pp.	  790-­‐794.	  23	  Alexander	  George,	  Presidential	  Decision-­‐making	  in	  Foreign	  Policy	  (Boulder:	  Westview	  Press,	  1980).	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Before	  proceeding	  to	  forge	  an	  explicit	  link,	  the	  second	  section	  tried	  to	  bring	  clarity	  as	  to	  the	  concepts	   involved	  in	  the	  discussion.	  The	  analysis	  accepted	  the	  ‘contested	  nature’	  of	  the	  concepts	  of	  risk	  and	  uncertainty,24	  but	  tried	  to	  provide	   operational	   definitions.	   Starting	   from	   Frank	   Knight25 	  and	   John	  Maynard	   Keynes26	  the	   analysis	   identified	   uncertainty	   as	   the	   overarching	  principle	  of	  international	  politics.	  It	  suggested	  that	  uncertainty	  comes	  from	  lack	  of	  knowledge,	  from	  impossibility	  of	  knowing,	  and	  from	  impossibility	  of	  controlling	   the	   consequences	   of	   one’s	   own	   action.	   It	   also	   suggested,	  however,	  that,	  when	  approaching	  uncertainty,	  decision-­‐makers	  treat	  it	  as	  if	  their	   actions	   were	   supported	   by	   a	   set	   of	   probabilities.	   As	   Knight	   put	   it,	  decision-­‐makers	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  judgments	  that	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  ‘an	  opinion	   of	   probability.’27	  In	   doing	   this,	   Keynes	   concurred,	   they	   ignore	   the	  ‘awkward	   fact’28	  that	   they	   don’t	   know.	   These	   efforts	   to	   control	   and	   to	  manage	  risks	  needed	  to	  confront	  the	  possibility	  of	  failure	  due	  to	  irreducible	  uncertainty.	  29	  This	  point	  led	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  risk.	  	  	  The	  analysis,	  once	  again,	  agreed	  with	  Frank	  Knight’s	  insight	  that	  risks	  are	  a	  matter	  of	  probability,	  but	  it	  also	  updated	  the	  definition	  of	  risk	  to	  bring	  it	  in	  line	  with	  risk	  management	  studies	  and,	  more	  generally,	  with	  common	  sense.	  The	   analysis	   suggested	   that	   risk	   implies	   a	   specific	   probability:	   the	  probability	  of	  negative	  outcome	  coupled	  with	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  damage.	  As	  Douglas	   Hubbard	   put	   it,	   risk	  means	   that	   ‘something	   bad	   could	   happen.’	  30	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  See	  Heng,	  War,	  and	  Brian	  C.	  Rathbun,	  ‘Uncertain	  about	  Uncertainty:	  Understanding	  the	  multiple	  meanings	  of	  a	  crucial	  concept	  in	  International	  Relations	  Theory,’	  International	  Studies	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  51	  (2007),	  pp.	  533-­‐557.	  25	  Frank	  H.	  Knight,	  Risk,	  Uncertainty	  and	  Profit	  (Cambridge:	  Mifflin	  and	  Company,	  1921).	  26	  John	  Maynard	  Keynes,	  ‘The	  General	  Theory	  of	  Employment,’	  The	  
Quarterly	  Journal	  of	  Economics,	  Vol.	  51,	  No.	  2	  (Feb.	  1937),	  pp.	  209-­‐223.	  	  27	  Knight,	  Risk,	  p.	  237.	  28	  Keynes,	  ‘The	  General,’	  p.	  214.	  29	  Sanjay	  G.	  Reddy,	  ‘Claims	  to	  expert	  knowledge	  and	  the	  subversion	  of	  democracy:	  the	  triumph	  of	  risk	  over	  uncertainty,’	  Economy	  and	  Society,	  Vol.	  25,	  No.	  2	  (May	  1996),	  p.	  227.	  30	  Douglas	  Hubbard,	  The	  Failure	  of	  Risk	  Management:	  why	  it’s	  broken	  and	  
how	  to	  fix	  it	  (Hoboken:	  John	  Wiley	  and	  Sons,	  2009),	  p.	  8.	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The	  analysis	  also	  stressed	  the	  point	  -­‐	  common	  in	  the	   literature	  -­‐	   that	  risks	  depend	  on	  decisions	  in	  two	  main	  ways.	  First,	   there	  would	  be	  no	  risk	   if	   the	  future	  were	  predetermined.31	  Second,	  risks	  are	  a	  matter	  of	  decision;	  hence,	  they	   are	   both	   real	   and	   constructed.	   They	   represent	   ‘something	   out	   there’	  (the	  probability	  and	  magnitude	  of	   a	  negative	  event),	  but	   they	  also	  depend	  on	   a	   decision-­‐maker’s	   ‘definition	   of	   the	   situation’	   (the	   ‘opinion	   of	  probability’).	  Finally,	  building	  on	  Hubbard,	  Heng,	  and	  others,32	  the	  analysis	  provided	   a	   definition	   of	   risk	   management	   as	   a	   process	   of	   identification,	  assessment	  and	  prioritisation,	  in	  which	  resources	  are	  managed	  to	  minimise	  and	  control	   the	  occurrence	  and	   impact	  of	  adverse	  events.	  33	  This	  definition	  recognises	   that	   it	   is	   not	   an	   instrument	   to	   solve	   problems,	   but	   to	   contain	  them,	   to	   minimise	   risks	   given	   resource	   constraints.	   In	   a	   nutshell,	   it	   is	   an	  effort	  to	  ‘be	  smart	  when	  taking	  chances.’34	  	  	  Adapting	   risk	  management	   to	   foreign	  policy	   decision-­‐making,	   then,	  meant	  discussing	  which	  chances	  Presidents	   take	  and	  which	  constraints	   they	   face.	  For	  this	  reason,	  building	  on	  Lamborn	  and	  George’s	  insights,	  the	  analysis	  has	  suggested	   that	   Presidential	   decision-­‐making	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   risk	  management,	  but	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  trade-­‐offs.	  Presidents,	  like	  decision-­‐makers	  in	   many	   other	   contexts,	   rarely	   confront	   ‘risk	   free’	   alternatives.	   For	   each	  decision,	  Presidents	  confront	  risk-­‐risk	  situations,	  or	  ‘risk	  vs.	  risk	  trade-­‐offs.’	  Since	   foreign	   policy	   occurs	   at	   ‘the	   point	   where	   all	   the	   lines	   of	  communication	   and	   pressure,	   foreign	   and	   domestic,	   intersect,’ 35 	  this	  analysis	   has	   divided	   foreign	   policy	   risk	   into	   political	   risks	   (probability	   of	  adverse	  domestic	  political	  consequences)	  and	  strategic	  risks	  (probability	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  David	  Garland,	  ‘The	  Rise	  of	  Risk,’	  in	  Richard	  V.	  Ericson	  and	  Aaron	  Doyle	  (Eds.),	  Risk	  and	  Morality	  (Toronto:	  University	  of	  Toronto	  Press,	  2003).	  32	  Christopher	  Hood	  and	  David	  K.	  C.	  Jones	  (Eds.),	  Accidents	  and	  design:	  
contemporary	  debates	  in	  risk	  management	  (London:	  Routledge	  2003).	  33	  Hubbard,	  The	  Failure,	  p.	  11.	  34	  Hubbard,	  The	  Failure,	  p.	  12.	  	  35	  David	  Vital,	  ‘The	  Problem,’	  in	  James	  Barber	  and	  Michael	  Smith	  (Eds.),	  The	  
Nature	  of	  Foreign	  policy:	  a	  reader	  (Edinburgh:	  Holmes	  McDoughall,	  1974),	  p.	  21.	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adverse	   international	  consequences).	  36	  In	   line	  with	   the	   ‘risk	  vs.	   risk	   trade-­‐offs’	   framework,	   developed	   by	   John	   Graham	   and	   Jonathan	   Wiener,	   the	  analysis	  has	  argued	  that	  Presidents	  often	  face	  situations	  in	  which	  measures	  to	   manage	   a	   ‘target	   risk,’	   dismiss	   or	   ignore	   ‘countervailing	   risks.’	   More	  specifically,	   following	   the	  hypothesis	   brought	   forward	  by	  Alan	  Lamborn,37	  the	   analysis	   also	   argued	   that	   Presidents	   often	   select	   strategically	   riskier	  alternatives	  if	  they	  assume	  they	  are	  able	  to	  manage	  domestic	  political	  risks.	  	  	  Only	  one	  issue	  remained:	  finding	  the	  ideal	  context	  to	  explore	  these	  In	  other	  words,	   the	   research	   still	   needed	   to	   answer	   two	   related	   questions:	   which	  case	   studies,	   and	   case	   studies	   of	   what?	   The	   first	   question	   was	   easily	  answered,	  and	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  selection	  were	  explained	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  In	  particular,	   the	   selection	   of	   the	   case	   studies	   responded	   to	   a	   historical	  necessity.	  Since	   the	  main	  aim	  of	   the	   thesis	   is	   to	   show	  continuity	  along	   the	  Cold	   War/Post-­‐Cold	   War	   divide,	   the	   thesis	   needed	   three	   different	   case	  studies,	   from	   three	   different	   historical	   contexts.	   For	   this	   reason	   the	   case	  studies	  are	  placed	  at	  the	  peak	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  (Kennedy	  and	  Cuba);	  during	  a	  more	   complex	   international	   phase	   (Carter	   and	   Iran);	   and	   in	   the	   post-­‐Cold	  War	   world	   (Clinton	   and	   Bosnia).	   For	   the	   second	   question,	   the	   analysis	  interpreted	   foreign	   policy	   crises	   as	   instances	   of	   ‘lack	   of	   control.’	   On	   this	  point,	  the	  research	  has	  aligned	  itself	  with	  more	  recent	  works.	  These	  studies	  have	   gone	   beyond	   the	   traditional	   interpretation	   of	   crises	   as	   clearly	  circumscribed	   events,	   suggesting	   that	   crises	   do	   not	   explode	   in	   an	  identifiable	  pre-­‐crisis	  period.	  Crises	  are	  like	  diseases,	  whose	  pathogens	  are	  spreading	   in	   the	   body	   long	   before	   the	   first	   symptoms	   emerge. 38 	  This	  research	   added	   that	   these	   ‘pathogens’	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	   the	  accumulation	  of	  ‘countervailing	  risks.’	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  John	  D.	  Graham	  and	  Jonathan	  B.	  Wiener	  (Eds.)	  (1995),	  Risk	  versus	  Risk,	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  London.	  37	  Alan	  C.	  Lamborn,	  The	  Price	  of	  Power	  (London:	  Unwin	  Hyman,	  1991).	  38	  Arjen	  Boin,	  Paul	  ‘t	  Hart,	  Eric	  Stern	  and	  Bengt	  Sundelius,	  The	  Politics	  of	  
Crisis	  Management	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  p.	  19.	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With	   these	   final	   points,	   the	   research	   had	   come	   full	   circle.	   It	   identified	   the	  reasons	   for	   the	   divide	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   risk,	   uncertainty,	   and	   risk	  management.	   It	   suggested	   that	   these	   factors	   led	   to	   a	   particular	  understanding	  of	  decision-­‐makers’	   extent	  of	   control.	   It	   tried,	   and	   failed,	   to	  find	   answers	   in	   the	   risk-­‐taking	   literature,	   emerging	   with	   an	   unrealistic	  interpretation	  of	  decision-­‐making.	  For	   this	   reason,	   it	  proceeded	   to	  analyse	  how	  these	  factors	  had	  been	  discussed	  in	  traditional	  foreign	  policy	  literature.	  It	   gave	   clear	  definitions	   for	   the	   concepts	  at	   the	   centre	  of	   the	  analysis,	   and	  identified	   Presidential	   decision-­‐making	   as	   a	   specific	   type	   of	   risk	  management.	  Finally,	   it	   identified	  a	  context	   in	  which	   the	  relevance	  of	   risk,	  uncertainty	   and	   risk	  management,	   and	   decision-­‐makers’	   extent	   of	   control,	  could	  be	  tested.	  	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  this	  long	  detour,	  these	  conclusions	  were	  summarised	  in	  three	  research	  hypotheses,	  or	  ‘thematic	  schema’39	  that	  drove	  the	  discussion	  in	  the	  case	  studies:	  	  1)	   Risk	   and	   uncertainty	   have	   always	   co-­‐existed.	   They	   do	   not	   identify	  different	   types	   of	   objects,	   or	   different	   historical	   eras.	   Whereas	  uncertainty	  represents	  the	  dominant	  condition	  of	   international	  politics,	  decision-­‐makers	  approach	  foreign	  policy	  issues	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  risks:	  in	  terms	  of	  probability,	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  could	  go	  wrong.	  	  2)	   Foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making	   can	   be	   interpreted	   a	   form	   of	   risk	  management,	   more	   specifically,	   of	   ‘risk	   vs.	   risk’	   trade-­‐off	   in	   which	  political	  risks	  and	  strategic	  risks	  are	  managed.	  	  a)	  In	  the	  management	  process	  three	  features	  prevail:	  minimalism,	  short-­‐termism,	  and	  recognition	  that	  threats	  cannot	  be	  ‘eliminated,’	  but	  only	  managed.	  	  b)	   Presidents	   are	   willing	   to	   select	   strategically	   riskier	   options	   in	  the	  hope	  to	  manage	  domestic	  political	  risks.	  	  3)	  Lack	  of	  control	  represents	  a	  natural	  feature	  of	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making.	   Short-­‐termism	   and	  minimalism	   play	   a	   key	   role	   in	   Presidents’	  lack	  of	  control,	  leading	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  failure.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Heng,	  War,	  p.	  59.	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The	   main	   assumption	   was	   that,	   if	   these	   hypotheses	   were	   verified,	   the	  reasons	   for	   understanding	   risk,	   uncertainty	   and	   risk	   management	   as	  radically	  new	  would	  be	  questioned.	  More	  broadly,	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  radical	  Cold	  War/Post-­‐Cold	  War	  or	  post-­‐9/11	  divide	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making	  would	  be	  questioned.	  The	  next	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  deal	  with	  how	  the	  hypotheses	  performed	  in	  the	  case	  studies.	  	  
8.3	  THE	  HYPOTHESES	  AND	  THE	  CASE	  STUDIES	  
	  
8.3.1	  Uncertainty	  and	  risk:	  a	  President’s	  predicament	  	  For	   the	   first	   hypothesis,	   each	   case	   study	   discussed	   the	   President’s	  predicament	   as	   he	   took	   office,	   and	   the	   interplay	   between	   the	   prevailing	  uncertainty	  and	  issue-­‐specific	  risks.	  The	  Kennedy	  Administration	  provided,	  in	  this	  sense,	  the	  hardest	  test.	  Authors	  arguing	  for	  a	  Cold	  War	  of	  knowledge	  and	  certainty	  could,	  in	  fact,	  point	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  almost	  any	  uncertainty	  in	  terms	  of	  Soviet	  nuclear	  forces.	  The	  ‘missile	  gap’	  was	  more	  an	  ‘electoral	  card’	  than	  a	  real	  concern.	  As	  the	  research	  has	  shown,	  however,	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  much	  more	   than	   counting	   Soviet	  missiles.	   Soviet	   capabilities	  were	  not	   the	  only	  concern.	  Soviet	  intentions	  in	  strategic	  hotspots	  such	  as	  Laos,	  Cuba	  and	  Berlin	  remained	  unknown	  to	  US	  policy-­‐makers.	  In	  particular,	  a	  thick	  layer	  of	  uncertainty	  remained	  regarding	  Soviet	  support	  for	  Third	  World	  movements	  and	   wars	   of	   national	   liberation	   that	   could	   imperil	   US	   interests. 40 	  In	  Kennedy’s	   policy	   towards	   Cuba,	   the	   deep	   uncertainty	   regarding	   Soviet	  moves	  and	  the	  possibility	  and	  locus	  of	  a	  Soviet	  reaction	  remained	  one	  of	  the	  main	  concerns,	  limiting	  freedom	  of	  choice.	  Furthermore,	  the	  trick	  regarding	  the	   deployment	   of	   the	  missiles	   played	   by	  KGB	   agent	  Georgi	   Bolshakov	   on	  Robert	   Kennedy	   stands	   as	   a	   reminder	   that	   US	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐makers	  did	  not	  know	  Soviet	  intentions,	  even	  when	  they	  thought	  they	  did.41	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Alex	  Von	  Tunzelmann,	  Red	  Heat:	  conspiracy,	  murder	  and	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  
the	  Caribbean	  (London:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  2011).	  41	  Christopher	  Andrew,	  For	  the	  President’s	  eyes	  only	  (London:	  Harper	  and	  Collins,	  1995),	  p.	  278.	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For	  the	  Carter	  Administration,	  uncertainty	  prevailed	   in	  two	  main	  contexts.	  First,	  and	  only	  touched	  upon	  in	  the	  analysis,	  the	  Carter	  Administration	  was	  unsure	  about	  Soviet	  intentions	  in	  the	  Third	  World,	  and	  faced	  an	  increasingly	  complex	   domestic	   agenda.	   Second,	   and	   key	   in	   the	   analysis,	   the	   Carter	  Administration	  was	   not	   only	   incapable	   of	   gathering	   the	   right	   information	  and	  the	  right	  answers	  in	  Iran;	  but	  also	  unable	  to	  ask	  the	  correct	  questions.	  The	   reduction	   of	   intelligence	   personnel,	   the	   predominance	   of	   Cold	   War	  concerns	  and	  the	  need	  to	  maintain	  the	  Shah	  as	  a	  ‘happy	  ally,’	  made	  of	  Iran	  a	  black	  hole.	  Complete	  uncertainty	  remained	  as	  to	  internal	  developments,	  up	  until	   the	  start	  of	   the	  Revolution.	  When	  the	  Revolution	  succeeded	  complete	  uncertainty	   remained	   as	   to	   the	   intentions	   of	   the	   new	   government.	   As	   the	  analysis	   made	   clear,	   US	   intelligence,	   and	   hence	   decision-­‐makers,	   had	   no	  understanding	  of	  Khomeini;	  even	  if	  they	  did,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  impossible	  for	  the	  US	  to	  predict	  the	  Ayatollah’s	  intentions.42	  	  	  In	  line	  with	  ‘risk	  society	  at	  war’	  accounts,	  the	  uncertainty	  confronted	  by	  the	  Clinton	   Administration	   related	   to	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   specific	   enemy	   in	   the	  post-­‐Cold	   War	   world.	   In	   the	   first	   post-­‐Cold	   War	   Presidency,	   scholars,	  politicians	   and	   institutions	   debated	   the	   role	   of	   the	   United	   States	   and	   of	  American	  power.	  However,	  uncertainty	  also	  related	  to	  the	  confrontation	  in	  the	  Balkans	  and	  to	  the	  impossibility	  of	  knowing	  future	  Serbian	  moves,	  and	  possible	   Russian	   reactions	   to	   US	   policies.	   To	   be	   sure,	   the	   analysis	   is	   not	  suggesting	   that	   the	   three	   types	  of	  uncertainty	  are	   identical,	  but	   that	   in	   the	  three	  contexts,	  ‘known	  unknowns,’	  and	  ‘unknown	  unknowns’	  co-­‐existed.	  	  	  Moving	   from	   the	   general	   uncertainty	   to	   specific	   foreign	   policy	   issues,	   the	  analysis	   has	   demonstrated	   how	   risk	   becomes	   the	   key	   variable.	   The	   case	  studies	   have	   shown	   that	   in	   dealing	   with	   foreign	   policy	   issues,	   Presidents	  look	   at	   the	   future	   impact	   of	   their	   choices,	   both	   in	   domestic/political	   and	  strategic	   terms.	   They	   ‘want	   to	   know	  what’s	   the	   best	   and	  worst	   that	   could	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  Andrew,	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happen,’	   and	   ‘what	   are	   the	   consequences	   of	   different	   actions.’	   This	  means	  reasoning	  in	  terms	  of	  risk	  and	  risk	  management.43	  	  	  In	   the	   cases	   analysed,	   the	   acknowledgment	   of	   risk	   -­‐	   of	   the	   probability	   of	  something	   going	   wrong	   depending	   on	   the	   decision	   taken	   -­‐	   was	   often	  explicit.	   Arthur	   Schlesinger	   Jr.	   warned	   President	   Kennedy	   that	   the	   Bay	   of	  Pigs	  posed	  both	  political	  risks	  for	  the	  Administration,	  alongside	  the	  military	  risks.	   Robert	   Kennedy	   and	   Richard	   Goodwin	   argued	   for	   Operation	  Mongoose	   and	   for	   the	   harassment	   of	   Cuba	   as	   a	   ‘risk-­‐free’	   operation.	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Robert	  McNamara	  tried	  to	  convince	  the	  President	  that	  any	  statement	  on	  the	  Soviet	  build-­‐up	  in	  Cuba,	  posed	  serious	  long-­‐term	  risks.	  	  	  For	  the	  Carter	  Administration,	  a	  reduction	  in	  weapons	  sales	  to	  the	  Shah,	  and	  the	  commitment	  to	  human	  rights	  were	  understood	  as	  posing	  risk	  to	  the	  US-­‐Iran	  alliance.	  Officials	   in	  Tehran	  were	   instructed	   to	   limit	  contacts	  with	   the	  opposition	  as	  these	  might	  pose	  risks	  to	  the	  friendship	  with	  the	  Shah,	  and	  to	  US	   Cold	   War	   interests;	   that	   is,	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	   spying	   on	   the	   Soviet	  Union	   from	   bases	   in	   Iranian	   territory.	   As	   the	   Revolution	   got	   under	   way,	  various	   options	   were	   considered	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   risk	   they	   posed	   to	   the	  future	  of	  the	  Shah	  and	  to	  the	  US	  position	  in	  the	  region,	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  risks	   of	   a	   possible	   Soviet	   reaction.	   Finally,	   the	   admission	   of	   the	   Shah	  was	  clearly	   understood	   as	   posing	   two	   separate	   sets	   of	   risks.	   Risks	   for	   the	  Administration’s	   relation	   with	   the	   Revolutionary	   government	   and	   for	   the	  Americans	  in	  Iran	  were	  counter-­‐balanced	  by	  domestic	  political	  risks	  for	  the	  Administration	  and	  possibly	  by	  risks	  to	  Carter’s	  political	  agenda.	  	  	  In	  Bosnia,	  the	  Clinton	  Administration	  constantly	  confronted	  three	  main	  sets	  of	  risks.	  Domestic	  political	  risks	  often	  came	  from	  President	  Clinton’s	  strong	  postures	   at	   home	   and	   equally	   glaring	   retreats.	   Strategic	   risks	   came	   from	  both	   the	   conflagration	   in	   the	   Balkans,	   and	   from	   great	   power	   politics	  between	   the	   US,	   Europe,	   and	   the	   Russian	   Federation.	   Several	   measures	  taken	  in	  Bosnia,	  including	  the	  cancellation	  of	  ‘lift	  and	  strike,’	  the	  ‘safe	  areas,’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Bracken	  et	  al.,	  Managing,	  p.	  303.	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and	  the	  Joint	  Action	  Plan	  (JAP),	  were	  interpreted	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  risks	  they	  posed	   to	  Clinton’s	  domestic	  position,	   to	   relations	  with	   the	  European	  allies	  and	  Russia,	  to	  NATO,	  and	  (more	  rarely)	  to	  the	  position	  of	  the	  Bosnia	  Serbs	  and	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  Muslims.	  	  	  
8.3.2	  Risk	  management	  and	  lack	  of	  control	  	  The	   second	   and	   third	   hypotheses	   are	   considered	   together	   as	   they	   can	   be	  understood	   as	   inter-­‐linked.	   In	   a	   world	   of	   uncertainty,	   decision-­‐makers	  confront	  risks.	  The	  way	  in	  which	  they	  manage	  risks	  affects	  their	  possibilities	  of	   control.	   The	   three	   Presidents	   analysed	   in	   the	   case	   studies	   showed	   a	  remarkable	   short-­‐termism	   in	   their	   approach	   to	   foreign	   policy	   issues.	  Equally,	  they	  shared	  the	  recognition	  that	  the	  possibilities	  open	  to	  the	  United	  States	  were	   limited.	   The	  US	   could	   not	   solve	   once	   and	   for	   all	   the	   issues	   at	  hand	  without	  incurring	  unacceptable	  political	  or	  strategic	  risks.	  In	  line	  with	  a	   risk	   management	   framework,	   the	   problems	   faced	   were	   often	   contained	  and	   cyclically	   re-­‐addressed.	   The	   end	   result	   was	   a	   series	   of	   short-­‐term	  measures	  that	  had	  more	  to	  do	  with	  managing	  the	  risks	  of	  the	  moment	  than	  with	  shaping	  foreign	  policy	  development.	  As	  Richard	  Neustadt	  predicted,	  all	  the	   Presidents	   did	   was	   try	   to	   stop	   fires,	   but	   these	   fires	   often	   got	   out	   of	  control.44	  	  Kennedy	  skilfully	  played	  the	  ‘Cuba	  card’	  during	  the	  campaign	  to	  manage	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  outflanked	  from	  the	  right	  and	  accused	  of	  appeasement.	  As	  he	  took	  office,	  however,	  the	  strength	  of	  his	  posture	  translated	  into	  his	  inability	  or	   lack	   of	   will	   to	   stop	   the	   momentum	   behind	   the	   Bay	   of	   Pigs	   invasion.	  Political	   and	   strategic	   risks	   convinced	   the	   President	   to	   impose	   strict	  limitations	  on	  the	  invasion,	  but	  the	  President’s	  minimalism	  did	  not	  pay	  off.	  After	   the	   catastrophic	   failure	   of	   the	   invasion,	   Kennedy	   certainly	   became	  obsessed	  with	   Castro,	   and	  with	   the	   need	   to	   get	   his	   revenge	   on	   the	   Cuban	  dictator.	  However,	   he	   also	   recognised	   the	   impossibility	   of	   an	   all-­‐out	   effort	  against	   Cuba.	   A	   well-­‐funded,	   but	   low	   level	   campaign	   of	   harassment	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Neustadt,	  Presidential,	  p.	  131.	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assassination	  attempts	  was	  conducted,	  in	  which	  hiding	  the	  US	  hand	  was	  as	  important	   as	   harming	   the	   Cuban	   dictator.	   In	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   Vienna	  Summit,	   the	   need	   to	   show	   strength	   led	   Kennedy	   to	   dismiss	   both	   Soviet	  sensibilities,	   and	   long-­‐term	  risks	   inherent	   in	  his	   choices.	  Public	   rhetoric,	   a	  stepped	  up	  campaign	  against	  Cuba,	  unprecedented	  military	  exercises	  in	  the	  Caribbean,	   and	   the	   missiles	   in	   Turkey	   convinced	   Khrushchev	   that	   a	  confrontation	  was	  coming,	  whether	  in	  Cuba,	  or	  in	  other	  trouble	  spots.	  As	  the	  Soviet	   build-­‐up	   in	   Cuba	   mounted,	   political	   risks	   and	   mounting	   domestic	  pressure	   convinced	  Kennedy	   to	   take	   a	   strong	   stand.	   The	   unwillingness	   to	  show	   the	   American	   hand	   and	   the	   need	   to	   avoid	   international	  embarrassment	  provided	  for	  contradictory	  choices.	  The	  President	  went	  on	  the	   record	   with	   strong	   statements	   against	   the	   build-­‐up,	   the	   Pentagon	  carried	  out	  unprecedented	  military	  exercises	  aimed	  at	  Cuba,	  and	   the	  State	  Department,	  supported	  by	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  Bundy,	  decided	  to	  stop	  the	  over	  flights	  of	  Cuba,	  delaying	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  missiles.	  	  	  The	  Shah	  of	  Iran	  represented	  everything	  the	  Carter	  Administration	  wanted	  to	   change	   in	   US	   foreign	   policy:	   a	   dictator	   with	   an	   abysmal	   human	   rights	  record	   and	   an	   infinite	   appetite	   for	   US	  weapons.	   Dealing	  with	   Iran,	   Carter	  made	  only	  cosmetic	  changes	  to	  weapons	  sales	  and	  never	  really	  insisted	  on	  an	   improvement	   in	   the	   domestic	   political	   situation	   of	   Iran.	   These	   choices	  managed	   the	   risks	   to	   American	   Cold	   War	   interests	   inherent	   in	  ‘disappointing’	   the	   monarch,	   but	   exacerbated	   the	   frustration	   of	   the	  awakening	   Iranian	   opposition.	   With	   the	   start	   of	   the	   Revolution,	   the	  Administration	   adopted	   a	   series	   of	   short-­‐term	   measures	   aimed	   at	  reassuring	   the	   Shah	   of	   American	   support.	   Furthermore,	   President	   Carter	  repeatedly	  went	  on	  the	  record	  stating	  that	  the	  US	  was	  unwilling	  and	  unable	  to	   interfere	   with	   developments	   in	   Iran.	   US	   attempts	   at	   solving	   other	  countries’	   problems,	   Carter	   repeatedly	   stated,	   had	   been	   discredited	   in	  Vietnam.	   The	   only	   choice	   available	   was	   managing	   the	   risks	   coming	   from	  Iran	   and	   avoiding	   any	   escalation	   involving	   the	   Soviet	   Union.	   The	  Administration	  stubbornly	  refused	  to	  effect	  any	  change	   in	   its	  approach.	  As	  the	  Revolution	  peaked,	  US	  officials	  in	  Washington	  and	  in	  Tehran	  understood	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that	   the	   Administration	   policies	   confronted	   two	   clear	   types	   of	   risks:	  ‘sticking	   with	   the	   Shah’	   meant	   failing	   to	   position	   the	   US	   in	   line	   with	   a	  possible	  new	  government;	  opening	   to	   the	  opposition	  meant	  weakening	  an	  already	  disheartened	  Shah.	  The	   trade-­‐off	  was	  epitomised	  by	  Washington’s	  refusal	   to	  build	  on	   the	  contacts	  with	  members	  of	   the	  secular	  and	  religious	  opposition.	   Carter	   decided	   to	   stick	   with	   the	   Shah	   and	   the	   only	   US	  interventions	   –	   such	   as	   the	  delivery	   of	   anti-­‐riot	   equipment	   and	   gasoline	   –	  sided	  with	   repression.	  Even	  after	   the	  Shah’s	  departure	   the	  Administration	  maintained	   its	   minimal	   and	   short-­‐term	   outlook	   supporting	   the	   hopeless	  Prime	  Minister	   Shahpour	   Bakhtiar	   and	   refusing	   to	   take	   any	   strong	   stand.	  When	   the	   Revolutionary	   government	   took	   power,	   domestic	   political	   risks	  and	  a	  heated	  Washington	  context	  prevented	  Carter	  from	  openly	  extending	  a	  clear	   (and	   arguably	   desperate)	   olive	   branch	   to	   the	   new	   government.	   The	  admission	   of	   the	   Shah	   to	   New	   York	   represented	   only	   the	   last	   episode	   in	  which	  domestic	   political	   risks	   coming	   from	  pressure	   groups	   and	   from	   the	  possible	   damage	   to	   Carter’s	   domestic	   agenda,	   led	   to	   the	   dismissal	   of	   the	  strategic	  risks	  for	  the	  Americans	  in	  Iran	  and	  of	  those	  inherent	  in	  a	  damaged	  relationship	  with	  the	  new	  government.	  	  In	   the	   uncertainty	   of	   the	   post-­‐Cold	   War	   world,	   the	   disintegration	   of	   the	  Balkans	  provided	   candidate	  Clinton	  with	   the	  perfect	   gap	   in	   the	   armour	  of	  the	  ‘foreign	  policy	  President.’	  Clinton	  criticised	  the	  passive	  approach	  to	  the	  Balkans	   of	   the	   George	   H.	   W.	   Bush	   Administration.	   As	   officials	   on	   the	  candidate’s	  campaign	   trail	  had	  made	  clear,	  a	  strong	  stand	  on	  Bosnia	  could	  show	   leadership	   and	   manage	   the	   risks	   posed	   by	   Clinton’s	   foreign	   policy	  inexperience.	  To	  be	  sure,	  Bosnia	  played	  a	  minimal	  role	  in	  Clinton’s	  victory,	  but,	  once	  in	  office,	  he	  was	  held	  accountable	  for	  his	  statements.	  Once	  again,	  however,	  a	  combination	  of	  strategic	  risks	  and	  domestic	  political	  risks	  meant	  that	  Bosnia	  was	  approached	  in	  haphazard	  fashion.	  Domestic	  accusations	  of	  appeasement	  prevented	  the	  Administration	  from	  accepting	  the	  plan	  devised	  by	   the	  UN	  and	   the	  EC.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  military’s	   reluctance	   and	   the	  allies’	  warnings	  prevented	  any	  direct	  action	  against	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs.	  ‘Lift	  and	  strike’	  was	  dead	  even	  before	  reaching	  Europe.	  As	  the	  Bosnia	  war	  turned	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brutal,	   the	   Administration	   changed	   its	   rhetoric,	   recognising	   US	   impotence	  and	  inability	  to	  solve	  the	  conflict.	  Bosnia	  became	  an	  intractable	  ‘family	  feud,’	  a	   ‘problem	   from	   hell.’	   The	   only	   thing	   Clinton	   could	   do	   was	   contain	   the	  conflict.	  The	  Administration	  accepted	  a	  series	  of	  short-­‐term	  measures	  that,	  although	  maintaining	   relative	   harmony	   among	   the	   allies	   and	  with	   Russia,	  did	   little	   to	   ease	   the	   situation.	   The	   ‘safe	   areas,’	   the	   JAP,	   and	   the	  establishment	   of	   the	   Contact	   Group	   left	   the	   situation	   on	   the	   field	   largely	  untouched	   and	   violence	   flared.	   In	   the	   summer	   of	   1995,	   domestic	   political	  risks	  coming	  from	  the	  challenge	  posed	  by	  Bob	  Dole	  and	  by	  the	  Republican	  Party	  prevented	   the	  Administration	   from	  aligning	   its	   policies	  with	   the	  UN	  and	   from	  reaching	  an	  agreement	  with	  Serbian	  President	  Milosevic.	   It	   took	  the	  massacre	  at	  Srebrenica	  and	  a	  domestic	  assault	  on	  the	  Administration	  to	  finally	  change	  policy	  and	  show	  a	  longer-­‐term	  commitment.	  	  	  In	  line	  with	  the	  initial	  hypotheses,	  three	  elements	  emerge	  from	  a	  review	  of	  the	   case	   studies’	   findings.	   First,	   risk	   and	   uncertainty	   are	   key	   variables	   of	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making.	  Second,	  risk	  management	  and	  ‘risk	  vs.	  risk’	  trade-­‐offs	  provide	  a	  lens	  to	  interpret	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making.	  Third,	  lack	   of	   control	   is	   inherent	   in	   this	   management	   process.	   Short-­‐termism,	  minimalism,	  and	  the	  accumulation	  of	  countervailing	  risks	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	   emergence	   of	   crises.	   To	   be	   sure,	   uncertainty	   and	   unpredictable	  consequences	   play	   a	   role,	   but,	   in	   line	   with	   the	   risk	   vs.	   risk	   trade-­‐off	  framework,	  risks	  and	  multiple	  trade-­‐offs	  are	  ‘the	  crucial	  issue.’45	  	  	  
8.4	  CONTRIBUTIONS	  AND	  POSSIBLE	  OBJECTIONS	  	  
8.4.1	  The	  targets:	  literatures	  and	  contributions	  	  Beyond	   the	   main	   purpose	   of	   questioning	   the	   existence	   of	   an	   historical	  divide,	  the	  contributions	  of	  this	  thesis	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  three	   main	   bodies	   of	   literature	   identified	   in	   Chapters	   2	   and	   3:	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Jonathan	  B.	  Wiener,	  ‘Precaution	  in	  a	  multirisk	  world,’	  in	  Dennis	  Paustenbach	  (Ed.),	  Human	  and	  Ecological	  Risk	  assessment:	  theory	  and	  
practice	  (New	  York:	  John	  Wiley	  and	  Sons,	  2002),	  p.	  1519.	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‘sociological’	   approaches	   to	   risk,	   the	   ‘risk-­‐taking’	   literature,	   and	   the	   crisis	  literature.	  Furthermore,	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  also	  contributes	  to	  the	  literatures	  on	  the	  three	  US	  Administrations	  involved.	  	  
8.4.1.1	  The	  sociological	  literature:	  risk,	  uncertainty,	  and	  decision-­‐making	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  although	  discussing	  risk	  and	  uncertainty	  at	  length,	  Beckian	  and	  Foucauldian	  scholars	  failed	  to	  give	  precise	  definitions.	  Beck	  defines	  risk	  carelessly	   as	   the	   probability	   of	   a	   negative	   event,	   as	   the	   negative	   event	   in	  itself,	  or	  as	  a	  strategy	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  negative	  event.	  Beckian	  scholars	  use	  definitions	  such	  as	   ‘flows,’	  or	   ‘scenarios;’46	  interpreting	  risks	  sometimes	  as	  realities,	  sometimes	  as	  ‘beliefs.’	  47	  Foucauldian	  scholars	  seem	  equally	  unsure	  whether	   risks	   are	   a	   mediated	   product	   of	   something	   out	   there,	   or	   more	  generally	   ‘dispositifs,’	   ‘assemblages’	   to	   deal	   with	   danger.48	  The	   concept	   of	  uncertainty	   is	   equally	   blurred.	   The	   governmentality	   scholarship	   does	   not	  elaborate	  much	  on	  the	  concept.	  It	  limits	  the	  analysis	  to	  the	  assumption	  that	  uncertainty	  depends	  on	  the	  ‘infinity’	  –	  too	  small	  to	  be	  prevented,	  too	  big	  to	  be	   contained/insured	   against	   -­‐	   of	   contemporary	   risks. 49 	  More	   often,	  uncertainty	  is	  interpreted	  simply	  as	  a	  pretext	  to	  extend	  practices	  of	  control.	  Coker	  and	  Rasmussen	  understand	  uncertainty	  as	  the	  overarching	  principle	  of	   international	   politics.	   Even	   here,	   however,	   a	   certain	   dose	   of	   confusion	  seems	   to	   reign.	   Christopher	   Coker’s	  Age	  of	  Risk,	   looks	   remarkably	   like	   an	  ‘age	   of	   uncertainty.’	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   these	   scholars	   argue	   that	   the	  predominance	  of	  uncertainty	  represent	  a	  recent	  development.	  	  	  Finally,	  risk	  management	  is	  equally	  ill	  defined.	  Most	  scholars	  identify	  some	  characteristics	  of	  risk	  management	  without	  going	  into	  much	  detail	  on	  what	  risk	  management	  means,	  or	  on	  what	  risks	  decision-­‐makers	  are	  called	  upon	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Rasmussen,	  The	  Risk,	  pp.	  2	  and	  4.	  47	  Coker,	  War,	  pp.	  66	  and	  142.	  48	  Ammore	  and	  De	  Goede,	  Risk.	  49	  Francois	  Ewald,	  ‘Two	  Infinities	  of	  Risk,’	  in	  Brian	  Massumi	  (Ed.),	  The	  
Politics	  of	  Everyday	  Fear	  (London:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1993).	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to	  manage.50	  Some,	  such	  as	  Rasmussen	  alternate	  between	  the	  suggestion	  to	  adopt	   risk	   management	   strategies,	   and	   more	   vague	   suggestions	   that	  strategists	   should	  behave	   like	  meteorologists.51	  The	  present	   analysis	   gives	  precise	   meanings	   to	   these	   concepts,	   establishing	   boundaries,	   and	  distinctions.	  	  	  This	  work	  on	  reconceptualisation,	  however,	  is	  not	  an	  end	  in	  itself.	  Achieving	  clarity	  as	   to	   the	  meaning	  of	   risk,	  uncertainty	  and	  risk	  management	  helped	  the	   thesis	   achieve	   two	   main	   goals.	   The	   analysis	   made	   clear	   how	   these	  concepts	   have	   always	   played	   a	   leading	   role	   in	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making.	  Decision-­‐makers	  -­‐	  in	  this	  case	  Presidents	  –	  have	  always	  confronted	  uncertainty;	  have	  always	  managed	  the	  risks	  posed	  by	  foreign	  policy	  issues;	  and	  have	  often	  been	  undermined	  by	  the	  short-­‐termism	  of	  their	  choices	  and	  by	  unpredictable	  or	  unexpected	  consequences	  of	  their	  own	  action.	  Equally,	  the	  work	  of	   redefinition	  and	   the	  discussion	  of	   the	  case	  studies	   in	   terms	  of	  risk	  management	  have	  helped	  in	  casting	  doubt	  on	  the	  two	  radical	  views	  of	  the	  decision-­‐maker	  provided	  by	  the	  Foucauldian	  and	  Beckian	  scholarship.	  	  	  Contrary	   to	  Foucauldian	   interpretations,	   the	   case	   studies	  have	   shown	   that	  Presidents	   and	   decision-­‐makers	   often	   lack	   control	   of	   the	   consequences	   of	  their	   own	   action,	   and	   that	   their	   efforts	   to	   control	   sometimes	   backfire.	  Contrary	   to	   Beckian	   scholars,	   the	   case	   studies	   have	   cautioned	   against	  assigning	   these	   ‘blowbacks’	   to	   unpredictable	   boomerang	   effects.	  Uncertainty	  and	  unpredictable	  consequences	  have	  certainly	  contributed	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  crises,	  but	  a	  key	  role	  was	  played	  by	  the	  short-­‐sightedness	  and	  minimalism	   of	   Presidential	   risk	  management.	   The	   analysis	   portrayed	  the	  risks	  Presidents	  managed,	  and	  those	  they	  ignored	  and	  dismissed.	  It	  also	  suggested	   why	   these	   ‘countervailing’	   risks	   were	   dismissed,	   giving	   the	  opportunity	  to	  assess	  the	  President’s	  performance.	  Making	  clear	  what	  risk,	  uncertainty	   and	   risk	  management	   are,	   and	   the	   role	   they	   play,	   as	  much	   as	  giving	  a	  ‘real	  life’	  portrayal	  of	  decision-­‐makers,	  helps	  in	  showing	  continuity	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Heng’s	  War	  represents	  an	  exception.	  51	  Rasmussen,	  The	  Risk	  Society,	  p.	  98.	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in	  the	  nature	  and	  practice	  of	  foreign	  policy.	  Once	  risk,	  uncertainty	  and	  risk	  management	   are	   deprived	   of	   their	   aura	   of	   radical	   newness;	   and	   once	   the	  decision-­‐maker	  is	  portrayed	  as	  struggling	  in	  his	  own	  predicament,	  many	  of	  the	  arguments	  for	  positing	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  stark	  Cold	  War/Post-­‐Cold	  War	  divide	  become	  unclear.	  	  
8.4.1.2	  Risk	  and	  risk-­‐taking,	  politics	  and	  foreign	  policy	  	  Questioning	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   Cold	  War/Post-­‐Cold	  War	   divide	   represents	  the	  crucial	  node	  of	  the	  thesis.	  The	  research	  project,	  however,	  has	  brought	  to	  the	   surface	   other	   contributions.	   It	   found	   the	   ‘decision	   theory’	   literature	  wanting.	  To	  be	  sure,	  within	  the	  risk-­‐taking	  literature,	  Prospect	  Theory	  plays	  a	   key	   role.	   In	   this	   context,	   the	   main	   contribution	   of	   the	   thesis	   was	   the	  introduction	   of	   domestic	   politics	   and	   domestic	   constraints.	   It	   was	   argued	  that	   they	   do	   not	   represent	   only	   part	   of	   a	   President’s	   perceptions	   of	   his	  ‘domain,’	   but	   forces	   of	   their	   own.	   The	   analysis	   has	   agreed	   with	   many	  insights	   provided	   by	   Prospect	   Theory.	   The	   case	   studies	   have	   provided	  confirmation	   for	  Prospect	  Theory	   scholars’	  understanding	  of	   commitment,	  and	   of	   Presidents’	   unwillingness	   to	   cut	   their	   losses	   and	   change	   policy.	  Whereas	  Prospect	  Theory	  understood	  these	  choices	  in	  terms	  of	  Presidents’	  psychology	   and	   perceptions	   -­‐	   Presidents	   perceive	   to	   be	   in	   a	   domain	   of	  losses,	  hence	  they	  take	  increased	  risks	  -­‐	  the	  risk	  vs.	  risk	  trade-­‐off	  framework	  has	  discussed	  how	  the	  strategic	  and	  the	  political	  risks	  inherent	  in	  a	  change	  of	  policy	  make	  Presidents	  unwilling	  to	  change.	  The	  increased	  complexity	  of	  risk	   vs.	   risk	   trade-­‐offs	   seems	   to	   provide	   a	   better	   interpretation	   for	  developments	  that	  would	  otherwise	  appear	  baffling	  using	  Prospect	  Theory.	  The	  Bay	  of	  Pigs	  invasion	  provides	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  It	  seems	  difficult	  to	  argue	  that	   in	   the	   immediate	   aftermath	   of	   the	   election,	   President	   Kennedy	  perceived	   himself	   to	   be	   in	   a	   domain	   of	   losses, 52 	  and	   yet	   he	   took	  extraordinary	   risks	   in	   carrying	   out	   the	   invasion	   plan.	   The	   risk	   vs.	   risk	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Arthur	  Schlesinger	  Jr.,	  One	  Thousand	  Days	  (London:	  Andre	  Deutsch,	  1965),	  and	  Richard	  Goodwin,	  Remembering	  America	  (New	  York:	  Little	  Brown,	  1988).	  
	   309	  
framework	   has	   shown	   how	   the	   cancellation	   of	   the	   invasion	   posed	  unacceptable	  political	  risks	  to	  Kennedy.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  strategic	  risks	  of	  an	  open	  confrontation	  with	  Cuba	  made	  the	  President	  unwilling	   to	  show	  America’s	  hand.	  	  	  The	   analysis	   of	   the	   case	   studies	   has	   also	   provided	   a	   richer	   account	   of	   the	  President’s	   predicament.	   In	   the	   risk	   vs.	   risk	   trade-­‐off	   framework,	   the	  President	   maintains	   the	   role	   of	   final	   decision-­‐maker,	   but	   the	   amount	   of	  freedom	  he	  enjoys	  proves	  to	  be	  much	  more	  limited	  than	  the	  one	  granted	  by	  Prospect	   Theory	   scholars.	   The	   case	   studies	   have	   often	   showed	   Presidents	  battling	   against	   several	   forces	   and	   contradictory	   pressure.	   Organisational	  powerhouses	  (the	  CIA	  before	  the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs),	  domestic	  media	  (with	  Clinton	  during	   the	   Bosnia	   war),	   Congressional	   challenges	   (the	   Javits	   resolution	  against	   Iran,	   or	   the	   various	   attempts	   to	   lift	   the	   arms	   embargo	   on	   Bosnia)	  have	  often	  constrained	  a	  President’s	  choices.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  Chapter	  3	  and	  4,	  this	  account	  is	  partially	  in	  line	  with	  ‘bureaucratic	  politics’	  approaches	  and	   with	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	   President	   as	   pushed	   and	   pulled	   by	  several	   forces	   and	   pressures,	   but	   still	   at	   the	   helm	   of	   foreign	   policy.	   The	  account	   provided	   here	   suggests	   that	   Presidents	   are	   not	   ‘uncommitted	  thinkers,’53	  	  but	  the	  ultimate	  risk	  managers.	  	  	  
8.4.1.3	  Crisis,	  risk,	  and	  foreign	  policy	  	  Finally,	   acknowledging	   the	   complexity	   of	   international	   politics	   and	   the	  inter-­‐play	   between	   strategic	   and	   domestic	   variables	   also	   contributes	   in	  three	  main	  ways	  to	  the	  scholarship	  on	  foreign	  policy	  crises.	  First,	  it	  helps	  in	  re-­‐balancing	  (if	  only	  marginally)	  the	  huge	  literature	  on	  crises.	  As	  Chapter	  3	  made	  clear,	  within	   this	   literature,	  most	  of	   the	  attention	   is	  reserved	   for	   the	  process	  of	  crisis	  management,	  and	  crises	  are	  generally	  understood	  as	  clearly	  circumscribed	   events.	   The	   risk	   vs.	   risk	   trade-­‐off	   framework	   rejects	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Morton	  Halperin	  (with	  Priscilla	  A.	  Clapp	  and	  Arnold	  Kanter),	  Bureaucratic	  
Politics	  and	  Foreign	  Policy	  (Washington:	  Brookings	  Institution	  Press,	  2006),	  pp.	  4	  and	  16.	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approach.	  First,	   it	  shifts	  the	  focus	  from	  crisis	  management	  to	  the	   long	  pre-­‐crisis	  period.	   Second,	   looking	   at	   the	   accumulation	  of	   ignored	  or	  dismissed	  risks,	  it	  provides	  a	  richer	  and	  more	  complex	  interpretation	  of	  the	  origins	  of	  crises.	  	  	  From	   this	   longer-­‐term	   perspective,	   the	   second	   contribution	   to	   the	   crisis	  literature	   emerges.	   The	   idea	   that	   crises	   are	   clearly	   defined	   events	   has	   led	  most	  of	  the	  literature	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  identification	  of	  clear	  ‘mistakes’	  either	  in	  terms	  of	  decisions,	  or	  in	  terms	  of	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  This	  led	  to	  the	  conclusion	   that,	   once	   those	   changes	   are	   implemented	   in	   decision-­‐making	  groups	  and	  processes,	  crises	  will	  become	  manageable,	  sometimes	  risky,	  but	  always	   controlled	   events.	   Shifting	   the	   focus	   away	   from	   the	   management	  stage	  and	  stressing	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  clear	   ‘pre-­‐crisis’	  period,	  the	  thesis	  has	  made	  clear	  how	  risk	  and	  uncertainty	  play	  a	  key	  role,	  and	  has	  identified	  the	  potential	   of	   foreign	   policy	   issues	   to	   get	   out	   of	   control	   and	   slowly	   become	  crises.	  To	  be	  sure,	  some	  crisis	  scholars54	  discuss	  this	  point,	  but	  this	  project	  has	  put	  it	  under	  the	  spotlight.	  	  The	   third	   contribution	   addresses	   a	   key	   dispute	   among	   crisis	   scholars.	  Beyond	   the	  manageability	   and	   the	   timing	   of	   crisis,	   the	   object	   of	   crisis	   has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  most	  contentious	  issues.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  scholars	  such	  as	  Michael	   Brecher55 	  argue	   that	   crises	   occur	   only	   when	   core	   values	   are	  threatened.	  On	  the	  opposite	  side,	  scholars	  such	  as	  Jutta	  Weldes	  and	  Thomas	  Halper	  suggest	  that	  decision-­‐makers	  can	  turn	  even	  a	  threat	  to	  ‘appearances’	  into	  an	  occasion	  for	  crisis.56	  The	  ‘risks	  vs.	  risks	  trade-­‐off’	  framework	  helps	  in	  taking	   a	   middle	   way.	   Interplay	   between	   strategic	   factors	   and	   political	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Richard	  Ned	  Lebow,	  Between	  peace	  and	  war	  (Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1981),	  and	  Glenn	  H.	  Snyder	  and	  Paul	  Diesing,	  Conflict	  
among	  Nations	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1977).	  55	  Michael	  Brecher,	  Crises	  in	  World	  Politics	  (Oxford:	  Pergamon	  Press,	  1993).	  56	  Jutta	  Weldes,	  Constructing	  national	  interests:	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  
Cuban	  
Missile	  Crisis	  (London:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1999),	  and	  Thomas	  Halper,	  Foreign	  Policy	  Crises:	  appearance	  and	  reality	  in	  decision-­‐making	  (Columbus:	  Merrill	  Publishing	  Company,	  1971).	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factors	   drives	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making.	   Politics	   and	   appearances	  contribute	  to	  crises,	  but	  there	  also	  needs	  to	  ‘be	  something’	  out	  there.	  Weldes	  is	   correct	   in	   mentioning	   Kennedy’s	   point	   that	   the	   missiles	   in	   Cuba	  threatened	  US	  appearances	  of	  strength.57	  This,	  however,	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  strategic	   factors	   need	   to	   be	   excluded,	   or	   that	   appearances	   are	   enough	   to	  make	   a	   crisis.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Cuba,	   appearances	   were	   particularly	   under	  threat	   as	   a	   consequence	  of	   the	   choices	  made	  prior	   to	   the	  discovery	  of	   the	  missiles.	  It	  took	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  weapon	  in	  Cuba,	  a	  particular	  deception	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  tremendous	  domestic	  pressure	  in	  Washington,	  and	  a	  precise	  series	  of	  short-­‐sighted	  choices	  to	  make	  a	  crisis.	  The	  mismanagement	  of	   the	   risks	   posed	   by	   Cuba	   had	   turned	   the	   missiles	   into	   a	   political	  catastrophe	  and	  a	   strategic	  blow	   for	   the	  Administration.	   It	  might	   seem	  an	  obvious	   remark,	   but	   there	   would	   have	   been	   no	   Missile	   Crisis	   without	  missiles,	  regardless	  of	  the	  appearances.	  	  
8.4.1.4	  Kennedy,	  Carter	  and	  Clinton:	  enriching	  the	  historical	  account.	  	  The	  crises	  discussed	  in	  the	  thesis	  represent,	  for	  reasons	  that	  should	  now	  be	  clear,	  typical	  case	  studies	  in	  US	  foreign	  policy.	  Their	  typical	  nature,	  however,	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  the	  account	  provided	  does	  not	  contribute	  to	  both	  the	  US	  foreign	   policy	   literature	   and	   the	   specific	   literatures	   on	   the	   three	  administrations	  involved.	  In	  terms	  of	  contributions	  to	  US	  foreign	  policy	  and	  Presidential	   decision-­‐making	   literatures,	   three	   main	   contributions	   can	   be	  identified.	  The	  first	  contribution	  comes	  from	  the	  particular	  approach	  taken	  by	   the	   thesis.	   As	   the	   introductory	   paragraphs	   in	   the	   three	   case	   studies	  chapters	  have	  made	  clear,	  most	  of	  the	  scholarship	  on	  these	  crises	  focuses	  on	  the	   crisis	   management	   period.	   The	   account	   provided	   here	   shifts	   the	  attention	   to	   the	   ‘normality	   period.’	   Second,	   the	   discussion	   of	   Presidential	  decision-­‐making	   has	   identified	   continuities	   not	   only	   across	   different	  international	   and	   domestic	   contexts, 58 	  but	   also	   across	   different	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Weldes,	  Constructing,	  p.	  99.	  58	  A	  much	  broader	  argument	  suggesting	  continuities	  and	  the	  relevance	  of	  ‘political	  time’	  across	  Presidencies	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Stephen	  Skowronek,	  The	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organisational	  structures.	  The	  thesis,	  in	  other	  words,	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  national	  security	  apparatus	  and	  the	  organisation	  of	  the	  Administration	  are	   less	   important	  than	  the	  decisions	  taken	  by	  those	  at	  the	  helm,	  that	   is,	   the	  Presidents.	  Third,	   the	  thesis	  seems	  to	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  the	   role	   of	   foreign	  policy	   in	   Presidential	   campaigns.	   It	   is	   generally	   argued	  that	   domestic	   issues	   typically	   decide	   Presidential	   elections.	   Yet,	   the	  Presidents	  considered	  in	  this	  study	  have	  often	  made	  foreign	  policy	  promises	  that	  they	  have	  been	  unwilling	  or	  unable	  to	  maintain.59	  	  Beyond	  these	  general	  points,	  each	  chapter	  provides	  different	  contributions	  to	  the	  scholarship	  on	  the	  Administrations.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  Cuba,	   it	  would	  be	  hard	   to	  claim	  that	  something	  radically	  new	  can	  be	  added	   to	   the	   literature.	  Still,	   the	   account	   takes	   advantage	   of	   recently	   released	   documents	   and	  recently	   published	   books	   to	   enrich	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	   ‘eighteen	  months’	   prior	   to	   the	   fateful	   ‘thirteen	   days.’	   The	   chapter	   on	   the	   Carter	  Administration	   provides	   several	   contributions	   to	   the	   relevant	   literature.	  First,	   it	   suggests	   that	   the	   prominent	   role	   given	   to	   the	   Vance-­‐Brzezinski	  rivalry	   in	   the	   account	   of	   the	   Administration’s	   decision-­‐making	   should	   be	  rethought.	  As	  the	  study	  has	  shown,	  on	  Iran,	  the	  rivalry	  emerged	  only	  when	  it	  was	   arguably	   too	   late	   to	   save	   the	   Shah.	   Similarly,	   the	   analysis	   seems	   to	  undermine	   accounts	   of	   the	   Carter	   Administration’s	   policies	   in	   terms	   of	   a	  ‘Carter	   conversion.’	   In	   Brian	   Auten’s	   account,	   an	   initially	   liberal	   Carter	  hardened	   to	   the	   reality	   of	   Soviet	   power	   and	   moved	   towards	   a	   more	  traditional	   Cold	  War	   stand.60	  The	   analysis	   provided	   here	   suggests	   that	   on	  the	  Iranian	  issue,	  Carter	  adopted	  a	  ‘hard’	  stand	  from	  the	  start,	  with	  only	  lip-­‐service	   to	   human	   rights	   commitments	   and	   to	   the	   reduction	   of	   arms	   sales.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Politics	  Presidents	  make	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1993).	  See	  also	  Stephen	  Skowronek,	  ‘Presidential	  Leadership	  in	  Political	  time,’	  in	  Michael	  Nelson	  (Ed.),	  The	  Presidency	  and	  the	  political	  system	  (Washington:	  Congressional	  Qaurterly,	  1990).	  59	  I.	  M.	  Destler,	  Leslie	  Gelb,	  and	  Anthony	  Lake	  have	  made	  a	  similar	  point.	  It	  might	  be	  worth	  updating	  their	  work	  with	  additional	  research.	  See	  Our	  own	  
worst	  enemy	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  1984)	  60	  Brian	  J.	  Auten,	  Carter’s	  Conversion	  (Columbia:	  University	  of	  Missouri	  Press,	  2008).	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Furthermore,	   the	   chapter	   relies	   on	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   primary	   sources,	  including	  documents	  released	  by	  the	  Carter	  Presidential	  Library	  after	  2009,	  and	   interviews.	   Finally,	   the	   Clinton	   chapter	   sheds	   a	   new	   light	   on	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘containment	   phase’	   of	   the	  war	   in	   Bosnia.	   In	   particular,	   it	   relies	   on	  interviews	  and	  on	  recently	  released	  primary	  sources	  such	  as	  the	  documents	  obtained	   by	   the	   NSA	   through	   FOIAs	   requests,	   and	   documents	   from	   the	  personal	  collection	  of	  Anthony	  Lake	  held	  at	  the	  Library	  of	  Congress.	  	  	  
8.4.2	  Additional	  contributions	  
	  Beyond	   the	   specific	   contributions	   to	   the	   literatures	   discussed	   above,	   the	  research	   provides	   additional	   benefits.	   The	   first	   benefit	   comes	   from	   the	  project’s	  discussion	  of	   risk	  management	   in	  a	   foreign	  policy	   context.	  As	  we	  have	   seen,	   few	   works	   establish	   a	   link	   between	   foreign	   policy	   and	   risk	  management	  and,	  among	  these,	  even	  fewer	  provide	  a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  risk	   management.	   The	   research	   helps	   in	   increasing	   the	   ‘conversation’	  between	   risk-­‐managers	   and	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐makers.	   This	   work	  acknowledges	   the	   need	   to	   break	   ‘specialized	   silos,’	   growing	   around	  problems	  affecting	   international	   affairs.	   The	  project	   recognises	   that	   acting	  as	   risk-­‐managers	   ‘comes	   natural’	   to	   foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐makers,61	  and	  that	  making	  this	  connection	  explicit	  might	  bring	  benefits.	  	  	  Although	  this	  project	  has	  avoided	  offering	  any	  direct	  advice	  to	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐makers,	   it	   seems	   clear	   that	   some	   lessons	   could	   be	   drawn.	   The	  analysis	  points	  towards	  a	  dangerous	  tendency	  to	  focus	  on	  short-­‐term	  risks	  at	   the	   expenses	   of	   longer	   term	   ones.62	  It	   also	   stresses	   the	   complexity	   of	  foreign	  policy	  situations	  and	  of	  the	  risks	  each	  choice	  entails.	  Too	  often,	  the	  debate	  on	  risks	  is	  limited	  to	  empty	  positions	  such	  as	   ‘the	  risks	  of	  inaction,’	  as	  if	  action	  implied	  no	  risks.	  This	  premium	  on	  action	  hides,	  more	  often	  than	  not,	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  situation.	  The	  ideal	  choice	  here,	  would	  be	  a	   ‘risk	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  For	  similar	  points	  see	  Bracken	  et	  al.,	  Managing,	  p.	  304.	  62	  Similarly,	  psychodynamic	  approaches	  to	  risk	  demonstrate	  that	  people	  fear	  short-­‐term	  risk	  more	  than	  longer	  terms	  ones.	  See	  Paul	  Slovic,	  Perception	  of	  Risk	  (London:	  Routledge/Earthscan,	  2000)	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superior	   move’	   using	   additional	   time	   and	   information.	   This	   would	   not	  guarantee	   success,	   but	   would	   at	   least	   increase	   its	   chances.63	  As	   we	   have	  seen,	   however,	   political	   and	   strategic	   constraints	  often	  prevent	  Presidents	  from	  doing	  so,	  and	  Presidents	  often	  ignore	  or	  dismiss	  the	  risks	  inherent	  in	  their	  choices.	  Similarly,	  the	  understanding	  of	  decisions	  in	  terms	  of	  trade-­‐offs	  might	  help	  to	  ease	  policymakers’	  tendency	  to	  ‘having-­‐it-­‐all-­‐ism:’	  the	  illusion	  that	   choices	   and	   improvements	   can	   be	   made	   without	   sacrifices.64	  Even	   if	  prescriptions	  are	  completely	  avoided,	  the	  project’s	  use	  of	  risk	  management	  provides	   a	   coherent	   interpretation	   of	   decisions,	   tries	   to	   reach	   several	  specialised	  audiences,	  and	  hopes	  to	  kick-­‐start	  inter-­‐disciplinary	  discussions.	  	  	  In	  particular,	   this	   research	  discusses	  a	   specific	   form	  of	   risk	  management	   -­‐	  ‘risk	   vs.	   risk	   trade-­‐offs’	   –	   and,	   hence,	   contributes	   to	   that	   ‘community.’	   As	  discussed	   in	   Chapter	   3,	   Graham	   and	   Wiener	   initially	   developed	   this	  framework	  to	  deal	  with	  environmental	  and	  health	  problems.	  In	  more	  recent	  years,	   the	  discussion	  of	   risk	  vs.	   risk	  has	  expanded	   to	  other	  sectors.	   Jessica	  Stern	  and	  Jonathan	  Wiener	  have	  used	  the	  framework	  to	  assess	  the	  policies	  of	   the	   George	   W.	   Bush	   Administration	   in	   the	   fight	   against	   terrorism.65	  Adrian	  Vermeule	  has	  used	  the	  same	  framework	  to	  look	  at	  developments	  in	  constitutional	  law.	  Using	  Albert	  Hirschman’s	  ‘effects’,	  he	  has	  discussed	  how	  regulatory	  efforts	  can	  lead	  to	  futility,	  perversity,	  or	  jeopardy.66	  This	  project	  has	   avoided	   this	   type	   of	   judgment	   but	   Hirschman’s	   categories	   offer	  interesting	  insights	  for	  further	  research.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Graham	  and	  Wiener,	  Risk	  vs.	  Risk,	  p.	  37.	  64	  David	  Rothkopf,	  ‘Why	  America	  can’t	  have	  it	  all,’	  Foreign	  Policy,	  25	  June	  2012	  [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/25/why_america_cant_have_it_all?page=0,0]	  (accessed	  22	  August	  2013).	  65	  Jonathan	  Wiener	  and	  Jessica	  Stern,	  ‘Precaution	  against	  Terrorism,’	  in	  Bracken	  et	  al.,	  Managing.	  66	  Adrian	  Vermeule,	  ‘Precautionary	  Principles	  in	  constitutional	  law,’	  Journal	  
of	  Legal	  analysis,	  Vol.	  4,	  No.	  1	  (Spring	  2012),	  pp.	  181-­‐222.	  The	  three	  categories	  (perversion,	  jeopardy,	  and	  futility)	  are	  taken	  from	  Albert	  Hirschman’s	  work	  on	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  reaction.	  Albert	  Hirschman,	  Rhetoric	  of	  
reaction	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1991).	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8.4.3	  Countervailing	  risks:	  possible	  objections	  to	  the	  project	  
	  Before	   looking	   at	   avenues	   of	   further	   research,	   it	   seems	   necessary	   to	  acknowledge	  and	  discuss	  some	  of	  the	  possible	  objections	  to	  the	  project.	  This	  section	  identifies	  two	  main	  sets	  of	  possible	  objections.	  The	  first	  set	  includes	  three	  objections	   that	  concern	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  project	  and	  particularly	   its	  extent,	  its	  interpretive	  outlook	  and	  its	  problematic	  classification.	  The	  second	  set	  identifies	  possible	  objections	  relating	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  project	  and,	  in	  particular,	  to	  the	  selection	  of	  case	  studies	  and	  to	  the	  stress	  of	  continuity	  that	  characterises	  the	  thesis.	  	  
8.4.3.1	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  project	  	  The	   project	   starts	   with	   a	   willingness	   to	   gauge	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   Cold	  War/post-­‐Cold	  War	  divide.	  The	   thesis,	   however,	   is	  mainly	   concerned	  with	  uncertainty,	  risk	  and	  risk	  management,	  and	  it	  suggests	  the	  development	  of	  a	  new	  understanding	  of	  these	  concepts.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  first	  objection	  might	  be	   that	   the	   thesis	   seems	   to	  end	   in	  a	  different	  place	   from	  where	   it	   started;	  that	  it	  is	  trying	  to	  do	  too	  much.	  This,	  however,	  can	  be	  explained.	  A	  particular	  type	  of	   literature	   sparked	   the	   initial	   curiosity:	   the	   sociological	   accounts	  of	  risk	   that	  had	  made	   it	   into	   IR.	  To	  assess	   the	  claims	  made	  by	   this	   literature,	  the	  project	  had	  to	  analyse	  them	  and	  to	  assess	  their	  key	  features.	  Throughout	  the	  analysis,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  claim	  of	  a	  radical	  Cold	  War/post-­‐Cold	  War	   divide	   relied	   on	   the	   understanding	   that	   risk,	   uncertainty	   and	   risk	  management	   represented	   radically	   new	   features	   of	   the	   post-­‐Cold	   War	  world.	   It	   also	   became	   clear	   that	   these	   assumptions	   relied	   on	   particular	  definitions	  of	  risk,	  uncertainty,	  and	  risk	  management.	  To	  question	  the	  myth	  of	  the	  divide,	  the	  thesis	  had	  to	  tackle	  the	  problems	  within	  this	  literature.	  The	  thesis	   suggested	   that	   if	   risk	   and	   uncertainty	   are	   stripped	   of	   their	  Foucauldian	   and	   Beckian	   trappings,	   their	   role	   in	   foreign	   policy	   becomes	  clearer	  and	  their	  newness	  is	  questioned.	  As	  a	  final	  step,	  if	  risk,	  uncertainty,	  and	   risk	  management	   are	   relevant	   in	   contexts	   and	   case	   studies	   along	   the	  Cold	  War/post-­‐Cold	  War	  divide,	  the	  argument	  for	  continuity	  is	  made.	  In	  this	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sense,	   the	   research	   project	   is	   not	   made	   up	   of	   two	   different	   projects:	  demonstrating	   the	   relevance	   of	   risk,	   risk	   management	   and	   uncertainty,	  means	  identifying	  continuities,	  questioning	  the	  divide,	  and	  vice-­‐versa.	  	  	  Two	  further	  possible	  objections	  present	  themselves.	  First,	  the	  research	  is	  an	  interpretive	  study.	  This	  issue	  was	  already	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  but	  a	  few	  words	  are	   in	  order	   in	   this	  conclusion.	  The	  case	  studies	  have	  discussed	  the	  emergence	  of	   foreign	  policy	  crises	  and	   they	  have	   identified	  several	   factors	  contributing	   to	   the	   shift	   from	   foreign	   policy	   issue	   to	   full-­‐blown	   crisis.	   It	  could	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   project	   did	   not	   ‘explain’	   the	   emergence	   of	   those	  crises.	  It	  did	  not	  identify	  a	  variable	  or	  key	  variables	  that	  caused	  the	  crisis.	  As	  
Chapter	   4	   made	   clear,	   however,	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   research	   was	   not	   to	  identify	  clear	  relations	  of	  causation,	  but	  rather	  to	  interpret	  the	  emergence	  of	  crisis.	  The	  case	  studies	  have	  not	  been	  tested	  against	  an	  objective	  truth,	  but	  against	   other	   interpretations.67	  The	   thesis	   suggested	   that	   the	  management	  of	  risks	  -­‐	  adjusted	  for	  the	  presence	  of	  uncertainty	  -­‐	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  emergence	   of	   crises;	   not	   that	   it	   was	   the	   only	   cause.	   In	   this	   context,	   the	  account	   provided	   could	   also	   be	   seen	   as	   too	   deterministic.	   This	   objection	  must	   be	   acknowledged,	   whilst	   keeping	   in	   mind	   two	   elements;	   first,	   the	  effort	   made	   by	   the	   research	   to	   provide	   a	   balanced	   account	   in	   which	  uncertainty	   plays	   an	   important	   role;	   and	   second,	   the	   premium	   on	  complexity	  and	  richness	   inherent	   in	   the	   interpretive	  approach	  and	   in	  case	  studies.	  	  	  Second,	  this	  research	  lies	  at	  the	  crossroads	  between	  the	  risk	  literature	  and	  the	  decision-­‐making	   literature.	   In	   an	   email	   exchange,	   one	   author	   from	   the	  Beckian	  scholarship	  criticised	  the	  argument	  made	  in	  this	  project	  suggesting	  that	  it	  took	  a	  ‘micro’	  perspective	  (that	  of	  decision-­‐making)	  to	  criticise	  works	  addressing	   the	  macro	   level	   (of	   sociological	   developments).68	  The	   criticism	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Mark	  Neufeld,	  ‘Interpretation	  and	  the	  “science”	  of	  International	  Relations,’	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies,	  Vol.	  19,	  No.	  1	  (January	  1993),	  p.	  48.	  68	  Mikkel	  Vedby	  Rasmussen,	  Email	  exchange	  with	  the	  author,	  20	  August	  2012.	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seems	   fair.	   To	   be	   sure,	   the	   sociological	   literature	   has	   several	   merits,	  including:	   questioning	   the	   expansion	   of	   governments’	   technologies	   of	  control,	   exposing	   the	   difficulties	   encountered	   by	   nation	   states	   in	   the	  confrontation	  against	  terrorism,	  and	  identifying	  a	  shift	   in	  war	  and	  strategy	  from	   complete	   victory	   to	   prudent	   risk	  management.	   However,	   the	   project	  has	   targeted	   those	  areas	   in	  which	   these	   ‘macro’	   studies	  moved	   from	  more	  general	   sociological	   developments	   to	   the	  description	  of	   how	  decisions	   are	  made	  in	  the	  various	  ‘risk	  societies’	  or	  ‘governmentality’	  worlds.	  The	  project	  does	  not	  question	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  Beckian	  and	  Foucauldian	  scholarships	  themselves.	   It	   criticises	   these	   schools’	   interpretation	   of	   decision-­‐making,	  and	   warns	   against	   the	   generalisations	   and	   simplifications	   these	   schools	  indulge	  in	  when	  moving	  from	  ‘macro’	  to	  the	  ‘micro’	  level.	  	  
8.4.3.2	  The	  cases	  selected	  and	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  project	  	  	  The	  main	  aim	  of	   the	   thesis	  has	  been	  to	  show	  continuities	   in	   foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making	  between	   the	  Cold	  War	  and	   the	  Post-­‐Cold	  War	  world.	  One	  gap,	  however,	   could	  perhaps	  be	   identified	   in	   the	   thesis:	   the	   lack	  of	  a	  post-­‐9/11	  case	  study.	  The	  decision	  not	  to	  include	  such	  case	  study	  has	  been	  taken	  for	  both	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  reasons.	  On	  the	  theoretical	  side,	  the	  thesis	  has	  targeted	  mainly	  the	  sociological	  literature	  and	  in	  most	  of	  this	  literature	  9/11	  is	  interpreted	  as	  the	  latest	  radicalisation	  of	  processes	  that	  had	  started	  with	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  On	  the	  practical	  side,	  the	  project	  is	  focused	  on	  Presidential	   decision-­‐making	   and	   relies	   heavily	   on	   primary	   sources.	   The	  slow	  pace	  of	  declassification	  would	  have	  likely	  hindered	  analysis	  of	  a	  post-­‐9/11	   case	   study.	   These	   points	   notwithstanding,	   the	   thesis	   points	   to	   the	  initial	  validity	  of	  an	  approach	  –	  the	  ‘risk	  vs.	  risk	  trade-­‐offs’	  framework	  -­‐	  that	  can	   be	   applied	   to	   diverse	   issues	   in	   foreign	   policy-­‐making	   in	   contrast	   to	  much	  current	  literature	  that	  focuses	  on	  counter-­‐terrorism.	  In	  particular,	  the	  framework	  could	  help	  interpret	  the	  decision	  surrounding	  the	  US	  invasion	  of	  Iraq	   in	   2003,	   suggesting	   that	   the	   permissive	   post-­‐9/11	   domestic	   context	  entailed	   an	   almost	   complete	   absence	   of	   domestic	   political	   risks.	  Furthermore,	   both	   the	   fine	   balancing	   act	   of	   the	   Obama	   Administration	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regarding	   the	   conflict	   in	   Syria	   	   (including	   the	   ‘red-­‐line’	   on	   the	   use	   of	  chemical	   weapons),	   and	   the	   debate	   surrounding	   political	   risks	   and	   long-­‐term	   strategic	   risks	   inherent	   in	   the	   use	   of	   drones69	  seem	   to	   conform	   to	  several	  of	  the	  points	  made	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  In	   terms	  of	  purposes,	   the	   research	  might	  be	   characterised	  as	  presenting	  a	  ‘nothing	   has	   changed/nothing	   will	   ever	   change’	   type	   of	   argument.	   In	   this	  context,	  it	  seems	  necessary	  to	  fend	  off	  possible	  objections	  from	  Beckian	  and	  Foucauldian	   scholars.	   From	  a	  Beckian	   perspective,	   it	   is	   certainly	   true	   that	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘risk’	  has	  taken	  the	  centre	  stage	  only	  in	  the	  1990s	  as	  several	  sectors,	  disciplines	  and	  governments	  started	  to	  interpret	  the	  problems	  they	  faced	  explicitly	   in	   terms	  of	   risk.	   It	   is	   also	   true	   that	   international	   terrorism	  has	   become	   prominent	   in	   the	   post-­‐9/11	   world,	   and	   that	   terrorism	   poses	  particular	   types	   of	   challenges	   for	   which	   decision-­‐makers	   may	   be	   ill-­‐prepared.	  This	  project	  does	  not	  suggest	  that	  the	  international	  context	  or	  the	  type	  of	  crisis	  faced	  remained	  unchanged	  throughout	  the	  three	  case	  studies,	  nor	   that	  nothing	  has	   changed	   in	   terms	  of	   challenges	   confronting	  decision-­‐makers.	   It	   states:	   first,	   that	   within	   these	   international	   contexts	   decision-­‐makers	   faced	   situations	   of	   uncertainty,	   and	   had	   to	   manage	   risks;	   second,	  that	  these	  management	  efforts	  have	  always	  been	  defined	  by	  short-­‐termism	  and	  minimalism;	   and	   third,	   that	   the	  way	   in	  which	   policymakers	  managed	  risks	  contributed	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  crises.	  This	  project	  has	  tried	  to	  argue	  that	   uncertainties	   and	   risks	   did	   not	   appear	   overnight,	   after	   the	   fall	   of	   the	  Berlin	  Wall,	   or	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	  World	  Trade	  Center,	   and	   that	   decision-­‐makers	  have	  dealt	  with	  them	  in	  comparable	  fashion.	  Similarly,	  it	  has	  argued	  that	  practices	  of	  risk	  management	  in	  foreign	  policy	  are	  not	  new,	  even	  if	  the	  name	  ‘risk	  management’	  is.70	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Audrey	  Kurth	  Cronin,	  'Why	  Drones	  fail:	  when	  tactics	  drive	  strategy,'	  
Foreign	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  92,	  No.	  4	  (July/August	  2013),	  pp.	  44-­‐54	  and	  Daniel	  Byman,	  ‘Why	  drones	  work:	  The	  Case	  for	  Washington’s	  Weapon	  of	  Choice,’	  
Foreign	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  92,	  No.	  4	  (July/August	  2013),	  pp.	  32-­‐43.	  70	  For	  an	  account	  of	  how	  the	  DoD	  confronted	  uncertainty	  and	  managed	  resources	  and	  risks	  under	  Robert	  McNamara,	  see	  Alain	  Enthoven	  and	  Wayne	  K.	  Smith,	  How	  much	  is	  enough:	  shaping	  the	  defense	  program,	  1961–
1969	  (New	  York:	  Harper	  and	  Row,	  1971).	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The	   stress	   on	   continuity	   may	   also	   provoke	   challenges	   from	   Foucauldian	  quarters.	   As	  Chapter	   2	  made	   clear,	   events	   such	   as	   Snowden’s	   revelations	  concerning	   the	   PRISM	   program	   make	   ‘Foucauldian	   arguments’	   look	  extremely	   appropriate	   for	   the	   post-­‐9/11	   world.	   The	   revelation	   that	  government	   agencies	   and	   private	   companies	   cooperated	   to	   collect	  information	   and	  meta-­‐data	   from	  various	   types	   of	   communication	   reminds	  us	   of	   Butler’s	   ‘petty	   sovereigns’	   and	   should	   invite	   reflection	   on	  government’s	  practices.71	  The	  breadth	  and	  depth	  of	  governments’	  means	  of	  control	   is	   certainly	   unprecedented,	   as	   are	   the	   opportunities	   to	   collect	  information.	   There	   is,	   however,	   a	   problem	  with	  defining	  PRISM	  and	  other	  systems	   as	   unprecedented	   in	   themselves.	   In	   a	   nutshell:	   these	   efforts	   of	  control	  are	  not	  unprecedented,	  the	  technology	  at	  their	  disposal	  is.72	  Within	  the	   Foucauldian	   scholarship,	   Wendy	   Larner	   argued	   that	   there	   was	   a	   key	  difference	  between	  previous	  systems	  of	  control	  and	  information	  collection,	  such	  as	  those	  supervised	  by	  FBI	  Director	  J.	  Edgar	  Hoover,	  and	  the	  post-­‐9/11	  ones.	  The	  post-­‐9/11	  ones	  can	  rely	  on	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  technologies	  than	  can	  be	   shaped	   into	   a	   single	   assemblage.	   Although	   this	   is	   true,	   arguing	   for	  complete	  difference	  means	  arguing	  that	  had	  Hoover	  been	  able	  to	  deploy	  the	  same	  technologies	  he	  would	  have	  politely	  refused.	  This	  seems	  unlikely.73	  	  Only	  Gabe	  Mythen	  has	  acknowledged	  that	  claiming	  radical	  newness	  is	  very	  difficult.	   He	   stresses	   that	   it	   is	   foolish	   to	   claim	   the	   existence	   of	   ‘new’	   or	  ‘postmodern’	  terrorism	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  techniques	  used.	  We	  should	  not	  expect,	   he	   correctly	   points	   out,	   terrorists	   to	   choose	  out-­‐dated	  weapons	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Ewen	  MacAskill,	  ‘Edward	  Snowden:	  how	  the	  spy	  story	  of	  the	  age	  leaked	  out,’	  The	  Guardian,	  12	  June	  2013	  (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/11/edward-­‐snowden-­‐nsa-­‐whistleblower-­‐profile)	  [accessed	  22	  August	  2013).	  72	  For	  some	  perspective	  see	  David	  Gomez,	  ‘Hoovered,’	  Foreign	  Policy,	  11	  June	  2013	  (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/11/fbi_hoover_nsa_prism_verizon_metadata?page=full),	  and	  Hayes	  Brown,	  ‘America:	  Choosing	  Security	  Over	  Liberty	  Since	  1798,’	  Foreign	  Policy,	  11	  June	  2013	  (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/11/america_choosing_security_over_liberty_since_1798)	  (both	  accessed	  22	  August	  2013).	  	  73	  Larner,	  ‘Spatial	  imaginaries,’	  p.	  65.	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techniques.	  Equally,	  he	  argues,	  we	  should	  not	  expect	  governments	   fighting	  them	  to	  rely	  on	  out-­‐dated	  technologies.	  The	  techniques	  used	  by	  the	  British	  government	  against	  the	  IRA	  and	  the	  controls	  of	  (and	  effects	  on)	  society	  that	  emerged	  from	  that	  struggle	  are,	  according	  to	  Mythen,	  not	  different	  in	  nature	  from	   the	   ones	   adopted	   against	   the	   risk	   of	   terrorism.	   Only	   the	   level	   of	  technology	  changed.74	  	  	  
8.5	  FUTURE	  AVENUES	  OF	  RESEARCH	  
	  Mythen’s	   remark	   that	   the	   policies	   adopted	   to	   fight	   the	   IRA	   are	   not	   too	  dissimilar	   from	   the	   ones	   adopted	   in	   the	   fight	   against	   international	  terrorism,	  points	  directly	  to	  new	  avenues	  of	  research.	  Future	  projects	  could	  make	   terrorism	  one	   of	   the	   key	   objects	   of	   study.	   In	   particular,	   it	  would	   be	  interesting	  to	  analyse	  the	  policies	  adopted	  by	  the	  United	  States	  government	  to	   confront	   international	   terrorism	   and	   to	   compare	   them	   with	   those	  adopted	   against	   international	   communism	   during	   the	   Cold	   War.	   Such	   a	  project	   will	   discuss	   foreign	   and	   domestic	   policies	   adopted	   by	   the	   US	  government	   in	   the	   post-­‐9/11	   environment.	   These	   policies	   include:	   regime	  change;	  targeted	  killings;	  covert	  actions;	  and	  domestic	  strategies	  of	  control,	  such	  as	  screening	  and	  information	  collection.	  Like	  the	  current	  research,	  this	  new	  project	  would	  suggest	  a	  more	  nuanced	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  The	  superpower	  confrontation	  would	  emerge	  not	  so	  much	  as	  a	  predictable	  stalemate,	  but	  as	  a	  worldwide	  fight	  at	  several	  military	  and	  political	  levels.	  	  	  Some	   authors	   have	   already	   pointed	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	   drawing	  comparisons.	  Marc	  Trachtenberg	  has	  suggested	  how	  ‘preventive	  war’	  is	  not	  a	  new	  post-­‐9/11	   instrument,	  but	  had	  always	  been	  a	  possibility	  during	   the	  Cold	  War.75	  Stephen	  Kinzer	   has	   shown	   the	   frequent	   recurrence	   of	   ‘regime	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Gabe	  Mythen,	  ‘The	  postmodern	  Terrorist	  risk:	  plus	  ça	  change,	  plus	  c’est	  la	  même	  chose,’	  in	  Jason	  L.	  Powell	  and	  Tim	  Owen	  (Eds.),	  Reconstructing	  
Postmodernism:	  critical	  debates	  (Hauppauge:	  Nova	  Science,	  2007).	  75	  Marc	  Trachtenberg,	  ‘Preventive	  War	  and	  US	  foreign	  policy,’	  in	  Marc	  Trachtenberg,	  The	  Cold	  War	  and	  after	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2012).	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change’	   in	  US	  history.76	  Other	   authors,	   like	  Greg	  Grandin,	   have	   focused	  on	  regional	  areas	  suggesting	  how	  the	  policies	  adopted	  by	  the	  United	  States	   in	  Latin	  American	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  represented	  a	  blueprint	  for	  the	  twenty-­‐first	   century. 77 	  Finally,	   some	   have	   focused	   on	   military	   tactics,	  counterinsurgency	   and	   the	   fight	   in	  Central	  America,	   drawing	   comparisons	  with	   the	  War	  on	  Terror	   and	   Iraq.	  Mark	  Danner	  has	   argued	   that	   strategies	  and	  military	   tactics	   adopted	   against	   communist	   (or	   allegedly	   communist)	  forces	  in	  Guatemala	  resembled	  the	  counterinsurgency	  tactics	  of	  the	  War	  on	  Terror.78	  Peter	  Maas	  has	  polemically	  written	  about	   the	   ‘Salvadorization’	  of	  Iraq,	   pointing	   out	   continuities	   in	   US	   personnel	   dealing	   with	   the	   two	  countries	  and	  in	  the	  tactics	  used.79	  	  	  The	   putative	   new	  project	  would	   expand	   on	   these	   suggestions,	   including	   a	  broader	   range	   of	   issues	   and	   of	   policies.	   The	   project	   could	   provide	   an	  historical	  comparison,	  but	  it	  could	  also	  build	  on	  the	  research	  conducted	  for	  this	  project.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  ‘risk	  vs.	  risk	  trade-­‐offs’	  framework	  could	  be	  adapted	  to	  compare	  and	  assess	  these	  strategies.	  Their	  effectiveness	  could	  be	  evaluated	   using	   the	   Hirschman/Vermeule	   criteria	   identified	   above,	  identifying	   the	   strategies’	   effects	   on	   the	   US	   government’s	   position,	   on	   US	  interests,	   and,	   perhaps,	   on	   the	   country	   targeted.	   More	   specifically,	   the	  criteria	   would	   provide	   a	   framework	   to	   assess	   how	   the	   ‘target	   risk’	   was	  managed,	   with	   what	   benefits,	   and	   at	   what	   costs,	   both	   in	   terms	   of	  opportunity	  costs	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘countervailing	  risks.’	  Hirschman’s	  criteria	  could	  help	   in	  assessing	  whether	   counter-­‐terrorism	  policies,	   and	   their	  Cold	  War	  counterparts,	  represented	  cases	  of	  futility,	  perversion	  or	  jeopardy.	  	  	  To	   be	   sure,	   it	   is	   too	   early	   to	   decide	   which	   particular	   avenue	   of	   research	  future	   projects	  will	   follow,	   and	   to	   decide	   if	   the	   projects	  will	   be	   limited	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Stepehn	  Kinzer,	  Overthrow	  (London:	  MacMillan,	  2007).	  77	  Greg	  Grandin,	  Empire’s	  workshop	  (New	  York:	  MacMillan,	  2006).	  78	  Mark	  Danner,	  The	  massacre	  at	  El	  Mozote	  (New	  York:	  Knopf,	  1994)	  79	  Peter	  Maas,	  ‘The	  Salvadorization	  of	  Iraq?’	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  Magazine,	  1	  May	  2005,	  [http://www.petermaass.com/articles/the_salvadorization_of_iraq]	  (accessed	  22	  August	  2013).	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historical	  analysis	  or	  will	  delve	  further	  into	  risk	  management.	  However,	  one	  point	  is	  clear:	  both	  the	  study	  of	  continuity	  between	  the	  Cold	  War	  world	  and	  the	   contemporary	   one	   and	   the	   discussion	   of	   risk	   management	   in	   foreign	  policy	  can	  and	  should	  be	  expanded.	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